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The glory of a lawyer is his strength of character. His knowledge and
acumen must be forever respected. It is his lasting capital. Fires
never burn it, slanders cannot destroy it, for what he owns in knowl-
edge is his, is valuable and is lasting.'
- George Q. Richmond, 1924
Seventy-five years ago, this journal printed extracts from speeches
given at "Old Timer's Day." George Richmond, a private in the Union
Army in 1865 who then traveled west to practice in Pueblo, Colorado,
addressed a gathering of attorneys who had practiced in the 1870s.
Richmond's high-minded oratory notwithstanding, he reminded the
younger attorneys that the "Western Bar" was a term "used to designate
that class of lawyers who were supposed to know more about the prac-
tices of Colonel Bowie than those of Chancellor Chitty, and better versed
in 'Colt, On Revolvers,' than Coke, on Common Law."2
While volumes one through five included many articles evocative of
the "Western Bar," with volume six the journal left its roots as a "modest
pamphlet" and began a career as a "magazine of substance."3 In 1924,
this "little paper of news" proclaimed that a dictaphone, typewriter in
good repair, and a flat-top desk properly equipped the "modem office."'
The editors insisted that the law need not be melancholy, stating that
smiling in court is "not unseemly."' By 1928, the journal addressed such
"substantive" subjects as "Automobile Collisions at Intersections,"
"Some Business Problems in Planning Wills from the Standpoint of the
Fiduciary,"' and "Legal Institutions of the Pilgrims,"' as well as the cus-
tomary comments on court decisions. Finally, the courage to publish
interdisciplinary works is traced to 1929, when a medical doctor contrib-
uted the article "Medical Aspects of the Crime Situation."'"
1. Extracts from Address Delivered by George Q. Richmond at Old Timers Day, 1 DENY. B.
ASS'N REC., Aug. 1924, at 7, 8 [hereinafter Extracts]. The Denver Bar Association Record (1923-
1928) preceded publication of Dicta (1928-1962), a journal co-published by'the University of
Denver College of Law and the Denver Bar Association. See Robert B. Yegge, The Final Word:
Some Historical Notes, in Reflections on the College of Law and the Denver University Law
Review, 75 DENY. U. L. REv. 693, 706 (1998) (describing the Denver University Law Review's
parade of name changes).
2. Extracts, supra note 1. at 7.
3. So the People May Know, DICTA, Nov. 1928, at 3.
4. Editorial, DENY. B. ASS'N REc., Dec. 1923, at 2 (stating the first words of the first issue
of the first volume).
5. System in a Law Office, DENY. B. ASS'N REC., Jan. 1924, at 2.
6. Must the Law be Melancholy?, DENY. B. Ass'N REC., Apr. 1924, at 5.
7. Kenneth V. Riley, Automobile Collisions at Intersections, DICTA, July 1929, at 3.
8. Leroy McWhinney, Some Business Problems in Planning Wills from the Standpoint of the
Fiduciary, DICTA, Sept. 1929, at 3.
9. Julian P. Nordlund, Legal Institutions of the Pilgrims, DICTA, Feb. 1929, at 3.
10. Franklin G. Ebaugh, Medical Aspects of the Crime Situation, DICTA, Mar. 1929, at 3.
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This "little paper of news" grew into a law review dedicated to legal
scholarship that spans local, national, and international interests. The
annual survey of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals provides a useful
reference to practitioners in the Rocky Mountain West. The Law Re-
view's general issues and annual symposia reflect a dedication to schol-
arship that "is not afraid of exploring reality; scholarship that straddles
disciplines, and draws inspiration from the social sciences.""
To honor the Law Review's 75th anniversary, the editors asked ac-
complished graduates, faculty, and associates to contribute to this issue.
Professor Lawrence Friedman of Stanford University and a member of
the University of Denver College of Law's Hughes Research and Devel-
opment Committee, provides the keynote address in his article exploring
the relation of law reviews to law and society. Richard Lamm, governor
of Colorado from 1975 to 1987 and a professor of law here in the 1970s,
discusses his personal odyssey and the development of his political phi-
losophies. Judge Kane of the United States District Court, District of
Colorado, and former Law Review editor-in-chief, graciously allows us
to print his remarks given at the College of Law's graduation ceremony
in December 1997. Another former editor-in-chief and partner at the law
firm of Holland and Hart in Denver, Richard Koon, proposes equal op-
portunity for transactional and litigation skills in contemporary legal
education.
Five short reflections on legal education, the College of Law, and
the Law Review conclude the special anniversary section of this issue.
The following alumni provide the diverse reminiscences: Justice Patricio
Serna of the New Mexico Supreme Court and former Law Review editor;
Judge John Porfilio of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals; Kenneth Kay,
chief executive officer of Infotech Strategies, an innovative company
focused on information technology applications, who proves that success
can be found outside the bench and bar; John Love, governor of Colo-
rado from 1963 to 1973; and Robert Yegge, dean and professor of law at
the University of Denver, and former Law Review editor.
It is my hope that this issue contributes to the strong legacy of 75




11. Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reviews and Legal Scholarship: Some Comments, 75 DEV.
U. L. REv. 661,668 (1998).
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Michigan State University, 1975; J.D., Case Western Reserve Law School, 1990. 1 wish to thank
Charlotte Melius, Head of Public Services of LSU Law Center Library and her staff; Law Library of
Louisiana staff; Loyola University of New Orleans Law Library staff, Southern Illinois University
Law Library staff; and Tulane University Law Library staff for their tireless assistance in locating
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PORTIA GOES TO PARLIAMENT
This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood;
The words expressly are "a pound offlesh:"
Then take thy bond, take thou thy pound offlesh;
But, in the cutting it, if thou dost shed
One drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods
Are, by the laws of Venice, confiscate
Unto the state of Venice.'
I. INTRODUCTION
By pleading for the literal application of the law in The Merchant of
Venice, Portia hopes to avoid the bloody result of a bad bargain. In
pointing out that Shylock is entitled to "a pound of flesh," but nothing
more, she identifies the justice that an advocate requests and a judge
grants in applying the law, if the parties are willing to accept the foresee-
able result of that application. Perhaps believing that with admission
would come acceptance,' the would-be Portias of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries pled for the literal application of the laws that
would have allowed them to appear as attorneys in the English courts?
While their own lawyers desired the literal outcome of the applicable
statutes, the judges and the official representatives of the organized bar
did not.' Their reluctance to accept the legitimate outcome of properly
drawn and enacted legislation allowed them to formulate a legal theory
that successfully prevented the admission of women to the English legal
profession for nearly fifty years after Parliament decreed that the status
quo should be changed
The character of Portia in Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice is
one of the most familiar figures to be classed as a "woman lawyer" in
literature or in life, even though she is not a member of the bar.' The ref-
erence is so common that Horace Rumpole's dubbing of Phyllida Trant
Erskine-Browne as "the Portia of our Chambers" is immediately under-
standable to English-speaking readers.' Yet, any recognition of the right
1. WILLAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1, lines 307-13 (William
Lyon Phelps ed., Yale University Press 1923).
2. The literature makes it clear that this was not the case. See infra notes 17, 443-64 and
accompanying text.
3. See ALBIE SACHS & JOAN HOFF WILSON, SExISM AND THE LAW: A STUDY OF MALE
BELIEFS AND LEGAL BIAS tN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 27-33 (1978) (discussing cases
where women applied for positions of law agent, barrister and solicitor in the English courts).
4. See id.
5. See id. at 40-53 (discussing the "myth of judicial neutrality" and how the fact that the
judiciary was exclusively male made judicial neutrality towards women's involvement virtually a
myth).
6. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, act 4, sc. 1, line 170. Portia's famous scene begins here.
See generally Isabel Giles, The Twentieth Century Portia, 21 CASE & COM. 353 (1914) (discussing
the future of women attorneys in the twentieth century).
7. JOHN MORTIMER, Rumpole and the Right to Silence, in RuMPOLE A LA CARTE 103, 121
(1990); see Giles, supra note 6, at 352 (providing a reproduction of an oil painting by Sir John
Millais titled "Portia"); David Cuthbert, Last Call For Rumpole: Tonight's 'Mystery!' Marks the
Beginning of the End for Leo McKern's Turn as the Wiley Old Barrister of the Old Bailey, NEW
1998]
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of women to be admitted to the English legal profession was a rarity until
the late nineteenth century, after various states of the United States," and
then the provinces of Canada,9 admitted women. Perhaps this delay is
understandable in a country whose national symbol is a litigant.'° Re-
cently, contemporary women lawyers have become a subject of much
study, in both serious historical and legal literature," and in discussions
of popular culture.'2 Their problems with the male-dominated legal cul-
ture continue to occupy our attention.
ORLEANS TIMEs-PICAYUNE, Apr. 13, 1995, at El (discussing a television show based on John
Mortimer's Rumpole). Patricia Hedge, an actress who plays Phyllida in the show, bears an uncanny
resemblance to the model in Millais's painting.
8. See infra notes 255, 371 and accompanying text. The battle was won state by state,
however, and admission to the practice of law did not imply that states were willing to admit women
to ancillary professions such as notary public. See Bickett v. Knight, 85 S.E. 418 (N.C. 1915)
(holding that women are ineligible for the public office of notary public since women are not voters
in the state); see also Recent Cases: Public Office-Can a Woman Be a Notary Public?, 64 U. PA. L.
REV. 95, 105 (1915) (examining cases prohibiting women from public office positions and
discussing the theory behind the restriction of women from the position of notary public).
9. See infra Part uIl.A.1.
10. "John Bull" is the main character in the political allegory and satirical pamphlets written
by John Arbuthnot and published in 1712 by John Morphew. See JOHN ARBUTHNOT, THE HISTORY
OF JOHN BuLL (Alan W. Bower & Robert A. Erickson eds., 1976). In the pamphlets, Bull sues Lewis
Baboon, where the lawsuit represented the war with France.
11. See CYNTHIA FucHs EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW (1981) (analyzing the ways in which
women attorneys are treated by their colleagues and their families, the pressures they face, and the
manner in which they deal with problems); Christine Haight Farley, Confronting Expectations:
Women in the Legal Academy, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 333 (1996) (providing an extensive
bibliography for U.S. materials); see also ROBERT GRANFIEw, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS
OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND (1992) (detailing legal education at Harvard Law School and its
effect on ideals); LAso GuINIER ET AL., BECOMING GFNxmIMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTrTJT=IONAL CHANGE 103-69 (1997) (providing important bibliographic information); Robert
Granfield, Contextualizing the Different Voice: Women, Occupational Goals, and Legal Education,
16 LAw & POL'Y 1 (1994) (examining gender differences among students attending Harvard Law
School).
12. See, e.g., Christine A. Corcos, Women Lawyers, in PRIME TIME LAW (Robert Jarvis and
Paul Joseph eds., 1998); Diane M. Glass, Portia in Primetime: Women Lawyers, Television, and LA.
Law, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 371 (1990) (examining the image of women lawyers in the television
drama, LA. Law, viewed in the historical context of women's depiction on television); Louise
Everett Graham & Geraldine Maschio, A False Public Sentiment: Narrative and Visual Images of
Women Lawyers in Film, 84 KY. LJ. 1027 (1966) (exploring cinematic images of women lawyers);
Judith Mayne, LA. Law and Prime-Time Feminism, 10 DIScOURSE 30 (1988) (discussing the
depiction of female attorneys on television); Carolyn Lisa Miller, "What a Waste. Beautifd, Sexy
Gal. Hell of a Lawyer.": Film and the Female Attorney, 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 203 (1994)
(analyzing films which feature female attorneys); Carole Shapiro, Women Lawyers in Celluloid:
Why Hollywood Skirts the Truth, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 955 (1995) (examining women lawyers in film
because they illustrate the way visual images help maintain gender roles); Ric Sheffield, Taking
Exception to Six Decades on Film: A Social History of Women Lawyers in Popular Culture 1930 to
1990, 14 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 73 (1993) (suggesting that stereotypical depictions of women lawyers
in film may influence or reinforce the stereotypes about female attorneys in practice to the detriment
of society and the legal profession); Elaine Weiss, Who's Missing in This Picture?, BARRISTER
MAG., Winter 1989-90, at 4 (reviewing the treatment of women lawyers in film and television).
The "double standard" which continues to confront women professionals generally has also
been explored humorously in films and television broadcasts. See, e.g., BABY BOOM (United Artists
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The question of admission of women to the English Bar is not sim-
ply an interesting side issue in legal history. It illustrates the familiar
battle of an excluded group for inclusion in a larger society that has tra-
ditionally maintained control by becoming self-defining." In the case of
barristers, this self-definition was exacerbated by the fact that only the
Inns of Court were authorized to bestow the designation of "barrister"
and the Inns of Court, because they were self-regulating, insured their
control of the profession. In addition, judges were chosen from the bar-
rister class, and judgeships were for life barring gross misconduct."' An
early twentieth century American woman attorney made the point elo-
quently:
It is a well known fact that no man really understands a woman, and
yet until recently we have had only men to decide what is right and
wrong as far as we are concerned. Is it not only natural that men,
looking at things from their standpoint, will often make mistakes? If
there is one place where women ought to be it is in law. Our laws for
women are made by man. How can man do justice to a creature
which he frankly admits no man ever understands? '-
Much of the discussion on the fitness of women to practice law in
England parallels contemporaneous discussion of the actual performance
of female attorneys in countries that had already admitted women, nota-
bly France and the United States. The English Bar thus demonstrated that
while. it followed certain peculiarities of thought on the subject, most
dictated by the structure and history of the English common law, the
quality of its debate reflected the spirit and the style of its brethren in
other lands.
Because the battle is for inclusion into the legal profession, that is,
the profession that decides what issues are properly the focus of the law
and what issues are not, participation in it represents an essential goal for
any marginalized group. "Medicine, Science, Arts, had all been thor-
1987); Baby Boom (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 1986-Jan. 1989); TOOTSIE (Columbia 1982);
VIcTOR/VICrORIA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1982). For a discussion of the double standard in
English legal history, see Ann Sumner Holmes, The Double Standard in the English Divorce Laws,
1857-1923, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 601 (1995). The 1987 film ADAM's RIB (MGM/UA Home
Video 1987) is primarily about the legal double standard.
13. See generally Daniel Duman, Pathway to Professionalism: The English Bar in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 13 J. Soc. HIST. 615 (1980) (discussing the mechanics of self-
definition).
14. See 15 SIR WI.LIAM HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 244 (A.L. (oodhart &
H.G. Hanbury eds., 1965).
15. Women in the Law, 58 OHIo L. BuLL. 133, 134 (1913). Some male lawyers are still not
vying very hard to understand women's frustrations. See generally Elizabeth A. Delfs, Foul Play in
Courtroom: Persistence, Cause and Remedies, 17 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 309 (1996) (analyzing the
parameters of foul play). However, one popular commentator asserts that laws and society in general
benefit women more than men. WARREN FARRmL, WHY MEN ARE THE WAY THEY ARE 161-68
(1986). While Farrell's reasoning fails to take into account the historical and cultural reasons for
what he sees as favoritism, his position illustrates the anger and confusion that many men, not just
professionals, feel toward the "mixed messages" that they believe women send.
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oughly explored before Law was thought of. This was probably due in
part to the fact that the Law itself prevented women from entering its
precincts, and numerous initial difficulties had to be removed... ,,6 As
women admitted to the bar in England and other countries discovered,
however, the right of admission was not a guarantee of social or profes-
sional acceptance.'7
Thus, the nature of the anti-feminist argument over the admission of
women bears scrutiny. It expresses the understandable fears and resent-
ments of men who had labored for centuries, taken economic, social and
political chances, and sometimes risked their lives to acquire certain
rights and positions in the political and legal system. A group which de-
manded inclusion in that system but which had not, as men saw it, "paid
its dues," was making excessive and unacceptable demands. Many male
"gatekeepers" of the system saw attacks on all fronts, including the pro-
fession of law, and were offended and dismayed. They shared and ex-
pressed, along with their male colleagues in other countries, a concern
that women were not, indeed could not be, adequately socialized or edu-
cated to be members of a profession that formulated and interpreted soci-
ety's rules.
The battle over women's admission to the bar in England also illus-
trated the willingness of the English judiciary to make law while it de-
nied that it was doing so. By placing the interpretation of what it deemed
to be custom and the common law above the plain meaning of certain
relevant statutes, the English judges involved forced Parliament to con-
sider an issue that it thought it had already settled. By redefining the
question as one that the appellant really did not present and asserting that
they were asked to decide it, the judiciary both trivialized the issue and
temporarily redirected the attention of the profession. The attempt to
repel women from the profession was only temporarily successful, how-
ever, because it failed to take into account both the political and philo-
sophical strength of the women's movement and support for that move-
ment from men for whom the equity arguments outweighed fears about
either the inadequacy or potential competition from women. Further, by
16. G. Flos. Greig, The Law as a Profession for Women, 6 COMMONWEALTH L. REv. 145, 147
(1909).
17. The literature on the marginalization of women attorneys continues to grow. Apart from
the extensive "glass ceiling" studies that are available, some writers have begun to study the
situation of women law school academics. See Farley, supra note 11. The phenomenon has even
begun to engender its own jurisprudence. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open
Doors: Women's Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1995) (exploring
women's integration into large corporate law practices and their mobility within firms); Mark S.
Kende, Shattering the Glass Ceiling: A Legal Theory for Attacking Discrimination Against Women
Partners, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 17 (1994) (examining, in part, the glass ceiling that women law partners
face). On English women attorneys, more specifically, see David Podmore & Anne Spencer, Women
Lawyers in England: The Experience of Inequality, 9 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 337, 339-42 (1982)
(discussing the entry of women into the profession and the reactions of opponents).
[Vol. 75:2
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refusing to accept the plain meaning of the statute at bar, the judges in-
volved in the litigation over the admission of women to the bar denied
these Portias the outcome obtained by their namesake, a literal interpre-
tation of the law.
Although several writers have produced exhaustive (and exhausting)
histories of the English legal profession, the question of women's admis-
sion is disposed of in a few pages or worse yet, paragraphs."8 Contempo-
rary writers are more concerned with the current status of women law-
yers;' 9 yet, much of the discrimination today's female attorneys experi-
ence is rooted in the reluctance of many male barristers and solicitors to
welcome them to begin with, or work with them to make those accom-
modations necessary to encourage their full participation in the profes-
sion. Continued acceptance of traditional gender roles is a major barrier
to many women attorneys. Yet, an understanding of its origins is neces-
sary to its effective neutralization. Otherwise women attorneys will con-
tinue to be shunted into those legal specializations deemed "appropriate"
for females.
A 1985 survey of the members of the Association of Women Solici-
tors found that the proportion temporarily retired from practice in or-
der to raise children ranged from 8.6 per cent of those 36-40 years old
to 17.4 per cent of those 31-35. Furthermore, those in private practice
took short maternity leaves (an average of 5.2 months, but only 2.4
months for partners), and though 87.2 per cent returned to the same
job, only 53.7 per cent kept the same hours; 22.7 per cent of those in
private practice were working part time, and 34 per cent of those with
children thought their career prospects were changed by
motherhood.20
18. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES 172-76
(1988); MIcHAEL BIRKS, GENTLEMEN OF THE LAW 276-78 (1960); cf Norman St. John-Stevas,
Women in Public Law, in A CENTURY OF FAMILY LAW: 1857-1957, at 256, 276-78 (R.H. Graveson
& F.R. Crane eds., 1957) (providing a more in-depth discussion of women in the legal profession).
Some may question the importance of studying or writing legal history. For those for whom the
answer is not intuitive, we should remember that much of present day law is based on assumptions,
sometimes mistaken ones, about the past. Challenging those assumptions in an intellectually honest
way will make the present more comprehensible and the future, possibly, more just. John Orth offers
a practical reason that will be persuasive to those for whom the Whig interpretation of history is
most comfortable. See John V. Orth, Thinking About Law Historically: Why Bother?, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 287 (1991). Orth writes: "The obvious reason for thinking about law historically is that it helps
us to solve problems in the present." Id. at 287. The rest of his essay points out more subtle but
powerful reasons for studying history, not the least of which is to learn in what cases we make
decisions or write policy based on biased or incorrect information. Id.
19. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 18, at 173-76; David Podmore & Anne Spencer, The Law as a
Sex-Typed Profession, 9 J.L. & Soc'Y 21 (1982) (offering a careful analysis of the consequences to
the legal profession of overidentification with one sex).
20. ABEL, supra note 18, at 174 (citing Pauline Molyneux, Association of Women Solicitors -
Membership Survey, 83 LAw Soc'Y GAZErrE 3082 (1986)). Molyneux's survey does not reveal
whether married male solicitors made any changes in their work schedules to accommodate child
rearing. See Molyneux, supra. Molyneux's advice to ambitious female lawyers is to "delay starting a
family until they are partners." Id. at 3084.
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Women solicitors tend to concentrate their practices in the areas of
probate and trust, family law, and domestic conveyancing, although liti-
gation is by far the most popular area,"1 possibly because of its high visi-
bility.- A 1982 study suggests that this "bunching" in specializations is at
least partly due to "conceptions of the appropriate roles and qualities of
women in the labour force .... The 'servant' image inhibits the promo-
tion of women to 'master' positions whilst the image of women as sex
objects militates against their being taken seriously as persons in their
own right."' Neither the authors of this study nor a 1986 survey ' explain
why litigation, one of the more aggressive specializations, is so popular,
although the litigator's easily recognizable image as a dominant figure in
law may be part of the attraction.
21. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 18, at 175 (citing Molyneux, supra note 20). Other
commentators have stated:
Just as women police officers (until relatively equal work was recently introduced in
return for equal pay) found that little work came their way besides "women's" offences
(prostitution, shop-lifting) and "juveniles," so women lawyers are disproportionately
involved in family and divorce work, or "back room" routinized work .... The over-
representation of women lawyers in "back room" work has also been justified by the
claim that "clients would object" to dealing with a woman.
Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 27. Note that in some cases, a woman lawyer may provide a
stronger symbol than a man. In the film, Jagged Edge, lawyer Teddi Barnes points out that the jury
will be influenced by seeing her client, an accused wife-murderer, carrying her briefcase and taking
her advice. JAGGED EDGE (RCA/Columbia Pictures Home Video 1985).
22. See Molyneux, supra note 20, at 3083.
23. See Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 24. The perception that women are much more
likely than men to leave the workplace for the demands of childrearing also figure into the
disinclination to promote them into positions of authority. The statutory period for maternity leave is
generous: "[An employee's maternity leave period continues for the period of fourteen weeks from
its commencement or until the birth of the child, if later." Employment Rights Act of 1996, ch. 18,
pt. VIII, § 73 (Eng.). Employees with two years or longer also have "the right to return to work at
any time during the period beginning at the end of her maternity leave period and ending twenty-
nine weeks after the beginning of the week in which childbirth occurs." Id. § 79.
It might in fact create serious business problems for an employer who makes the effort to hire
women as fifty percent of its staff if, for example, a substantial part of half of the workforce were to
take maternity leave on a rotating basis every few years.
Many senior partners will express reluctance to employ a woman solicitor because of
the likelihood that she will have children and consequently the firm will suffer either by
losing the solicitor altogether or by her taking time off to have the baby. It may be of
some consolation to such senior partners that the average length of leave from the date of
leaving until the date of return was only 5.24 months. For those respondents who were
partners at the date of maternity leave, the period was much shorter being only 2.43
months. It should be borne in mind however that the employment protection legislation
does not cover partners and in such cases the length of time off and arrangements for
doing work during that period were matters for negotiation between the individual partner
and her firm.
Molyneux, supra note 20, at 3083-84. From the employer's point of view the female employee
covered by relevant legislation is taking nearly as much time as she is entitled to, without regard for
the convenience of the employer. From the employee's point of view, she is attempting to fulfill the
expectation of both her employer (faithfully returning to work when required) and of society (staying
home with her infant and proving herself a "good mother"). Thus, the situation seems to become
much more adversarial than perhaps it needs to be. This issue clearly needs more objective
investigation.
24. See Molyneux, supra note 20.
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II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE LATE
NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES
A. In General
The English Bar in the late seventeenth century was, as it is today, a
bifurcated bar.' Divided into the twin professions of solicitor and barris-
ter, the bar established and maintained a careful and rigorous distinction
between the non-litigious role of the lawyer, eventually taken by the so-
licitor, and the litigious aspects, eventually taken by the barrister.'
We have seen that the distinction between the attorney who repre-
sents a person for the purposes of litigation, and the pleader who
speaks for a litigant in court, is fundamental in early law. The idea
that one man can represent another is foreign to early law. When first
it is introduced it is regarded as an exceptional privilege, and the rep-
resentative must be solemnly appointed. On the other hand, the idea
that a litigant may get assistance from his friends or others to conduct
his case in court is known to and recognized by early law. Thus the
appointment by a litigant of an attorney, and the obtaining by the liti-
gant of the assistance of a pleader, are two very different things; and
so the class of attorneys and the class of pleaders naturally tended,
25. See generally BnxS, supra note 18 (discussing history of the legal system); 6 W.S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 431-81 (1924) (discussing the general history of the
English Bar in the latter half of the seventeenth century); THEODoRE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW pt. 11 (1929) (discussing the history of the law courts and the legal
profession). For a discussion of the English Bar in the Jacobean and early modem period, see C.W.
BROOKS, PEmTYFoGGERS AND VIPERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH: THE 'LOWER BRANCH' OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1986); J.S. COCKBURN, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH AsSIzES: 1558-1714 (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1986); DAVID LEMMINGS, GENTLEMEN
AND BARRIsrERS: THE INNS OF COURT AND THE ENGLISH BAR: 1680-1730 (1990); BRIAN P.
LEVACK, THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND: 1603-1641, A POLITcAL STUDY (1973). For a
discussion of the Victorian period, see RAYMOND COCKS, FOuNDATIONs OF THE MODERN BAR
(1983). See also, e.g., Daniel Duman, Pathway to Professionalism: The English Bar in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 13 J. Soc. HIST. 615 (1980) (suggesting that the bar developed
its own model of professionalism before other occupations); W. Wesley Pue, In Pursuit of Better
Myth: Lawyers' Histories and Histories of Lawyers, 33 ALTA. L. REv. 730 (1995) (advancing the
view that lawyers, Canadian lawyers in particular, are enamoured with history because it allows
them to create and recreate more flattering images of themselves).
Currently, some movement is underway to change the structure of the English Bar. This
discussion is not new. Some of the commentators who favored the admission of women into the
profession also favored a dismantling of the distinction between solicitor and barrister, as had
already been done in some other countries in the Commonwealth, as well as in the United States. On
the structure of the legal profession in the Commonwealth during the period discussed in this essay,
see C.E.A. Bedwell, Conditions of Admission to the Legal Profession Throughout the British
Empire, 12 J. SoC'Y COMI'. LEG. 209 (1912) (discussing the conditions of admission to the legal
profession within the Commonwealth); Holford Knight, The Organisation of the Bar in the British
Empire, 15 J. SOC'Y COMP. LEG. 161 (1915) (examining the structure of the Bar in the British
Empire).
26. See 6 HOLDSwORTH, supra note 25, at 432, 504-05.
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from a very early period, to become quite distinct. English law has
retained this distinction throughout its history.
27
For the most part, the profession in the British Empire was closed to
women; although a few Commonwealth jurisdictions such as New
Brunswick' and Newfoundland ' in Canada, and Queensland" (which
eliminated the bifurcated bar in 1881),1 Tasmania,32 and Victoria33 in
Australia admitted women during the period.
B. Other Countries of the Union
1. Scotland
In 1900, eighteen-year-old Margaret Hall requested permission to sit
for the first of two required examinations given by the Examiners of
Law-Agents."' The organization refused, and Hall brought suit against the
Incorporated Society of Law-Agents in Scotland.35 The Society, surpris-
ingly, volunteered that although "[aiccording to inveterate usage and
custom in Scotland, that practice has in all departments of the law been
hitherto confined exclusively to men .... [It did not] conceive it to be
their interest or duty to maintain that women ought not to be enrolled as
law-agents."3'
The Hall case, like the Chauvin case across the Channel,37 turned on
the court's narrow interpretation of its power to act in what might be
considered a purely administrative matter. In the Chauvin case, the
French court refused to order the petitioner's admission on the grounds
that the law did not permit it to usurp the power of the relevant profes-
sional association." In the Hall case, the court worried about its ability to
take such a drastic step absent a very clear indication from the legislature
that the admission of women as law-agents was contemplated when the
statute was drawn, even though the professional organization in question
did not oppose the admission of women.39 The organization did, however,
27. Id. at 432.
28. See Bedwell, supra note 25, at 218 (citing Act Enabling Women to Practice Law, 1906, 6
Edw. 7, ch. 5, §1 (Eng.)).
29. See id. at 221 (citing 10 Edw. 7, ch. 16 (Eng.)).
30. See id. at 223 (citing 5 Edw. 7, no. 10 (Eng.)).
31. See 45 Vict., no. 5 (1881).
32. See Bedwell, supra note 25, at 224 (citing 4 Edw. 7, no. 14 (Eng.)).
33. See id. at 225 (citing 3 Edw. 7, no. 1837, § 2 (Eng.)).
34. Hall v. Incorporated Soc'y of Law-Agents in Scotland, 3 Fr. 1059 (1901).
35. See id. at 1059-60.
36. See id. at 1060.
37. See Christine Alice Corcos, Lawyers for Marianne: The Nature of Discourse of the Entry
of French Women into the Legal Profession, 1894-1926, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 435, 443-56 (1996).
38. See id.
39. See Hall, 3 Fr. at 1062-64.
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"pass the buck" to the court by indicating some hesitation on the question
of the admissibility of women to practice law in Scotland:
The respondents do not feel called upon to oppose the prayer of the
petition. At the same time there may be a question whether women
have a legal right to be admitted to practise the profession of the law.
According to inveterate usage and custom in Scotland, that practice
has in all departments of the law been hitherto confined exclusively to
40men.
Custom apart, however, "[tihe respondents ... do not conceive it to be
their interest or duty to maintain that women ought not to be enrolled as
law-agents."'
Hall herself maintained that the law presently permitted the admis-
sion of women, but even if the justices disagreed with her interpretation,
the court still had the power to admit women as part of its traditional role
as regulator of the Scottish Bar.'2 She based much of her case on the
wording of the Law-Agents Act of 1873' 3 which held that "[firom and
after the passing of this Act no person shall be admitted as a law-agent in
Scotland except in accordance with the provisions of this Act." As Hall
pointed out, "no person" applied equally to men and women (unless the
court deemed for some reason not to recognize women as "persons" for
the purposes of the statute):
The Act neither expressly nor by implication excluded women. It
contained express notice of disability of minority, but none of dis-
ability of sex. Its terms, strictly construed, included women. The sub-
stantive used throughout was the general one, "person," which was
followed in accordance with English usage, even where the term ap-
plied to both genders, by the masculine pronoun "he," "his" or "him."
Moreover, previous to the passing of the Act of 1873, Lord
Brougham's Act of 1850 had been passed, which provided that after
1850 "in all Acts words importing the masculine gender shall be
deemed and taken to include females, unless the contrary as to gender
is expressly provided." The Act of 1873, construed in the light of
Lord Brougham's Act, included women. Lord Brougham's Act was
repealed and substantially re-enacted by the Interpretation Act, 1889,
section 1.4
Further, even if the statute was not capable of the reading Hall gave it,
she asserted that the court had, by custom and statute, the responsibility
of admitting all law-agents who met the appropriate standards:
40. Id. at 1060.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 63 (Eng.).
44. Id. § 2.
45. Hall v. Incorporated Soc'y of Law-Agents in Scotland, 3 Fr. 1059, 1061 (1901) (citations
omitted).
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It was competent for the Court, and within its discretion, to admit
them. The Act of 1873 created no new duty in the Court, and gave it
no new power with regard to this question. The duty of regulating the
admission of persons desiring to practise as law-agents had been ex-
ercised by the Lord of Council and Session of their own motion ever
since they first admitted agents to practise before the Courts, and
simply as a matter of the administration of the Courts.... The Court
had, ever since they had first admitted agents to practise either in the
superior or inferior Courts, regulated their admission merely as one of
the incidents of the administration of the Courts of the country with-
out any further power conferred upon them by the Legislature than
that of conducting the business of the Courts.... Seeing, then, that
the admission of persons as law-agents had always been treated by
the Lords of Session as one solely of administration in conducting the
business of the Courts, it could not be said to be incompetent for the
Court to admit women to practise law.46
By presenting the question of admission as one of simple administration,
requiring little judgment on the part of the court except a willingness to
"go along," Hall clearly hoped to diffuse the question on which the Soci-
ety attached its refusal, that of technical inability to support admission,
even though the Society had never really been requested to do so. Hall's
initial petition to the Law-Agents had simply been for the right to sit "for
the first of the two examinations which intending law-agents" were re-
quired to pass.'
Turning to the question of custom, Hall pointed to historical in-
stances of female advocates, including that of Lady Crawford, who ob-
tained an acquittal for her client.'
That the Court might not have been entirely averse to admitting
women to the practice of the law, even in early times, might be gath-
ered from the fact that the Justiciary records contained a report of a
trial on 12th June 1563 in which the Lady Crawford appeared as ad-
vocate in the High Court of Justiciary for the defence of a prisoner
who was ultimately acquitted.49
Note the addition of the phrase "even in early times," implying that in
fact women could point to a long tradition of admission, even though the
last documented instance was 350 years previous. The words suggested
to the court that even the culturally benighted legal profession of Renais-
sance Scotland recognized the rights of able women in this regard.
Hall also answered other objections. Women were now able to earn
the appropriate education at the University; therefore they could not be
46. Id. at 1061-62.
47. Id. at 1059.
48. Id. at 1062 (citing ScorTISHL. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1901, at 126).
49. Id.
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said to be lacking in training.' Other countries, including the United
States, admitted women to the bar, and even in Scotland women were
admitted to the practice of medicine and allowed to hold other positions
of authority.'
The Incorporated Society of Law-Agents responded by asserting
that women never had been law-agents, or held any other office bearing
on the practice of law. 2 Further, even after the Act of 1873, legislation
regulating the practice of law always used the masculine form. "The
masculine gender was used throughout the whole of the Acts of Parlia-
ment and Acts of Sederunt both prior and subsequent to the Law-Agents
Act of 1873, and there was nothing to suggest that Parliament or the
Court contemplated women acting as agents.""
In addressing the questions of interpretation posed by the Interpre-
tation Act of 1889," the Society cited two cases which clearly contra-
vened the intent of the Act, Beresford Hope v. Sandhurst' and Chorlton
v. Lings,' both of which assumed that Parliament could not have meant
what it said. In Beresford Hope, the presiding justice held that in order to
determine whether use of the masculine gender also included the femi-
nine, as required by the Interpretation Act, "'the history of the matter'
must be looked at."" In the suffrage case, Choriton, "it was held that
'man' did not include 'woman,' notwithstanding the provision of Lord
Brougham's Act.""8 As the Bebb court would later suggest,59 the Law
Society suggested Parliament simply could not have meant what it said.
Thus, the court, which prided itself on its adherence to the letter of the
law, must necessarily find that Parliament's actual language meant the
opposite if to give effect to the literal meaning meant a change in the
status quo.
As far as custom was concerned, "[i]t did not appear that women at
any time prior to the present application sought to be admitted as
agents." Further, citing to the case of Sophia Jex-Blake, who had re-
quested admission to medical school,6' the Society quoted Lord Neaves,
who
50. See id. at 1062-63.
51. See id. at 1063.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 1064.
54. 52 & 53 Vict., ch. 63 (Eng.).
55. 23 Q.B.D. 79 (1889).
56. 4 L.R.-C.P. 374 (1868).
57. Hall v. Incorporated Soc'y of Law-Agents in Scotland, 3 Fr. 1059, 1064 (1901).
58. Id
59. Bebb v. Law Society, 24 T.L.R. 634 (1913), affd, 30 T.L.R. 179 (C.A. 1913). See infra
Parts IV.C.2, IV.C.3.
60. Hall, 3 Fr. at 1064.
61. Jex-Blake v. University of Edinburgh, 10 M. 549 (1873).
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referred to the Roman law disabling women from acting as procura-
tors, and further said that he never heard it suggested that a woman
could be a member of the College of Justice. Reference to the Roman
law, and to the reason for women being disabled, was made in an ad-
dress of Sir Robert Spottiswood, Lord President of the College of
Justice, to the members of the Faculty of Advocates, summer session,
1633.62
Regardless of the outcome of Jex-Blake's petition, women were ulti-
mately admitted to medical school and to the practice of medicine. The
dicta in that case, citing to the practice of the seventeenth century, was
comparable to the arguments advanced in the Bebb case concerning Sir
Edward Coke's pronouncements on the legal disabilities of women.
Further, the Society pointed out that "the respondents had commu-
nicated with the societies corresponding to their own in England and
Ireland, and had been informed that no woman had been admitted to
practise as a law-agent in these countries. No woman, it appeared, had
hitherto sought to be admitted." 3 Yet, the Society concluded lamely,
"[t]he respondents ... did not.., conceive it to be their interest or duty
to maintain that women ought not to be admitted to practise the profes-
sion of law."' The Society did not make it clear whether it considered
such a position legally questionable, or simply politically unwise.
While the judges of the Second Division agreed that, within the
confines of the Interpretation Act, "persons" included both males and
females,65 it disagreed that Parliament meant what it said.
[uIn the case of an ambiguous term, that meaning must be assigned to
it which is in accordance with inveterate usage. Accordingly we in-
terpret the word as meaning "male persons," as no other has ever
been admitted as a law-agent. If females are now to be admitted as
law-agents, that must, in our view, be authorised by the Legislature.66
What was "ambiguous" about the use of the word "person" is unclear,
given the very clear explanation in the Interpretation Act of 1889,67 un-
less the court was requiring that Parliament anticipate which of its uses
of the word might seem radical should it be interpreted to include
women, and thus use the phrase "male and female" instead of "person."
The other judges delivering the Hall opinion held that "before the Act of
1873 women were not eligible to be appointed law-agents, and that they
are not made eligible by that Act." With such language a judicial inter-
62. Hall, 3 Fr. at 1064.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1065.
66. Id.
67. 52 & 53 Vict., ch. 63 (Eng.).
68. Hall v. Incorporated Soc'y of Law-Agents in Scotland, 3 Fr. 1059, 1065 (1901).
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pretation of custom and usage overrode a statute intended to address the
shortcomings of that custom and usage.
Like the Bebb judges after them, these judges felt it necessary to
protect Parliament from what they considered to be the unintended ef-
fects of its legislation, due to the incautious use of the word "persons."
Nevertheless, by 1907 women were admitted to study law at one Scottish
university, although they were not admitted to the profession until the
passage of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act.' However, the num-
ber of women admitted as solicitors did not reach thirty percent until
1979.70
2. Ireland
Although it was still part of the Union in the early 1900s, Ireland
offered women somewhat more latitude in participating in the legal pro-
fession than did England. "Women were entitled to appear in court and
plead for themselves in cases in which they were concerned and some
Irish women became well known for this in the latter half of the nine-
teenth century.. . ."'' One woman even argued her own divorce appeal
before the House of Lords. Meanwhile, the Irish legal profession
watched and waited.
Irish women had clearly been waiting for the opportunity to qualify
for the bar. In January 1920, the King's Inns admitted the first two
women in Ireland to the study of law. One, Frances Kyle, distinguished
herself by winning the leading scholarly prize for Irish law students then
available.' Both she and her colleague were admitted to the bar in No-
vember of 1921, ' six months before the first Englishwoman was admit-
ted in England.'6 Kyle was also the first woman admitted to the bar of
Northern Ireland." By 1920 a woman was a magistrate in Northern Ire-
land and by 1923 the Irish legal profession had welcomed its first female
solicitor." In 1921 an Irish woman sat on a Dublin jury. 9 Generally
69. Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919,9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71, § 1 (Eng.); see also Alan
A. Paterson, The Legal Profession in Scotland: An Endangered Species or a Problem Case For Market
Theory, in I LAWYERS IN SOCIErY 76, 93 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988).
70. Paterson, supra note 69, at 113 tbl.3.12.
71. DAIRE HOGAN, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN IRELAND, 1789-1922, at 147 (1986).
72. Id.
73. Hogan speculates that they participated actively but without recognition for some decades
before admission. Id. This may well be true since Irish women quickly qualified for legal study and
were admitted before English women, thus suggesting that they, like their English sisters, were not only
"in the pipeline" but psychologically ready for admission.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See infra note 431 and accompanying text.
77. HOGAN, supranote 71,at 147.
78. Studies in the history of the Irish legal profession are still somewhat sparse. The major
bibliography on Irish law is PAUL O'HiGGiNs, A BiBUOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LrrERATURE
RELATING TO IRISH LAW (1966), with subsequent supplementation; HOGAN, supra note 71, is a general
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speaking, the situation of women barristers and solicitors in Ireland
seems to parallel that of women lawyers in other countries. Women tend
to make less money than men in the same position and with the same
number of years of experience,' tend to cluster in particular areas of
work,' and suffer the same kinds of discrimination, although it seems to
occur less frequently in Ireland than in other countries.
As to experience and perception of bias and sexist attitudes, whether
from solicitors, clients, judges or colleagues, there was some, but lit-
tle, evidence of bias from all sources. Colleague bias was the most
frequently mentioned, and it was particularly remarked that some
older male barristers appear to have problems dealing with a female
barrister. Also, a woman's attire might be commented on in a way
which that of a man would not. There seems, however, to be little
scope for individuality of dress. With the statutory exception of cer-
tain family law proceedings ... the wearing of a wig and gown is
obligatory in court. Indeed, this dress regime seems emblematic of an
atmosphere in which there is great pressure to conform and censure of
those who do not.82
El. SIMILARITIES WITH THE PROFESSION IN OTHER COUNTRIES
In general, women's admission to the bars of most European and
Commonwealth countries took place between the 1870s and the 1920s.
Thus, the English movement to admit women was part of a multinational
wave of discontent with the exclusion of women from political equality
with men that also included demands for suffrage rights, child custody
rights, property rights, and employment rights.' The "persons" cases,U in
which British women repeatedly attempted to expand their political and
civil rights, form a unified attack on male privilege and power.
account. Generally, the collection BREHONS, SERIEANTS AND ArroRNEYs (Daire Hogan & W.N.
Osborough eds., 1991), contains nothing for the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, but W.N.
Osborough, The Regulation of the Admission of Attorneys and Solicitors in Ireland, 1600-1866, in
BREHONS, SERJEANis AND ATrORNEYS, supra, at 101, is of some interest. A good collection for
general Irish legal history is THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: ESSAYS IN IRISH LEGAL HISTORY (J.F.
McEldowney & Paul O'Higgins eds., 1990), which has a useful bibliography beginning at page 231.
79. HOGAN, supra note 71, at 147.
80. On women in the Irish legal profession, see Alpha Connelly & Betty Hilliard, The Legal
Profession, in GENDER AND THE LAw IN IRELAND 212, 216-17 (Alpha Connelly ed., 1993).
81. Seeid.at217.
82. Id. at219.
83. The literature on each of these movements grows yearly. On the women's movement and the
development of the recognition of women's rights in the U.S., see, for example, SARA M. EvANs, BORN
FOR LiBERTY: A HISTORY OF WOMEN N AMERICA (1989). On custody rights, see PHYLLIS CHESIER,
MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN & CUSTODY (1986). On equal employment, see
ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL
EMP.OYMENT OPPORTUNITY (1993).
84. See SACHS & WILSON, supra note 3, at 22-35.
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A. Other Countries of the Commonwealth
1. Canada
The efforts to admit women to the Ontario Bar paralleled, to some
extent, the battle in England. Clara Brett Martin requested admission to
the Benchers," a group of senior attorneys appointed by Ontario's "gate-
keeper" law society to enforce its regulations.' In its decision of June 30,
1891, the Convocation of Benchers decided that it could not admit Miss
Martin, based on its reading of applicable regulations.' The govern-
ment's response was swift. The Prime Minister, Sir Oliver Mowat, asked
the Ontario legislature to permit the Law Society of Upper Canada to
admit women' as solicitors by affirmative language in an appropriate
statute." Martin duly applied and was eventually called to the bar, but not
without further obstacles.' Her admission finally required two separate
acts of the legislature,9 which finally admitted her as both a solicitor and
barrister on February 2, 1897, after the Ontario legislature passed further
legislation enabling women to be barristers.'
An observer of the contemporary scene wrote:
If I were to sum up in a sentence the results of the admissions of
women to the practice of law from my experience and inquiry, I
would say that it has done some good, and no harm, while all prophe-
cies of ill results have been falsified; that its effects on the profession
and practice of law have been negligible, and that it is now regarded
with indifference and as the normal and natural thing by Bench, Bar,
and the community at large.93
85. William Renwick Riddell, Women as Practitioners of Law, 18 J. CoMP. LEG. & INT'L LAW
200, 201 (1918). On Martin's battle for admission, see Constance B. Backhouse, "To Open the Way
For Others of My Sex"; Clara Brett Martin's Career as Canada's First Woman Lawyer, I CAN. J.
WOMEN & L. 1 (1985), and on Canadian women lawyers of the early and mid-twentieth century, see
Mary Kinnear, "That There Woman Lawyer": Women Lawyers in Manitoba 1915-1970, 5 CAN. J.
WOMEN & L 411 (1992).
86. On the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Benchers, see WILLIAM RENwicK RiDDELL,
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN UPPER CANADA IN ITS EARLY PERIODS 133-42 (1916). Riddell, who
documented Martin's fight for admission elsewhere does not mention it in this overview.
87. Riddell, supra note 85, at 201.
88. The Law Society may in its discretion make rules providing for the admission of women to
practice as solicitors. 55 Vic., ch. 32 (1892) (Eng.). See also Riddell, supra note 85, at 201-02.
89. Riddell, supra note 85, at 202.
90. Id. at 202 n.3.
91. See JOHN HAGAN & FIONA KAY, GENDER IN PRACTICE: A STUDY OF LAwYERs' LivEs 7
(1995).
92. Riddell, supra note 85, at 202.
93. Id. at209.
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Certainly English lawyers would have examined the Ontario statute. If
women could be admitted in a part of the Commonwealth, why not in the
Mother Country herself?"
2. Australia
Various territories of Australia admitted women to the legal profes-
sion long before their mother country did.95 G.F. Greig, identified by the
Commonwealth Law Review as "the first woman lawyer to practise in the
Commonwealth," delivered cogent views on the difficulties of law
practice for women. In her opinion, women's fuller participation in all
occupations, not just in law, contributed to public morality.' "No sign yet
appears of any approaching catastrophe, such as the wise men have pre-
dicted, and still predict."' A woman's ability to succeed in law simply
repeats her ability to succeed in other professions, once given the chance.
"The women who first determined to enter commercial life were those
who were forced to immediately do something remunerative.., and then
each year found a new inroad made into higher and still higher posi-
tions." Once they had proven themselves in business, they attacked the
centers of learning and made their names in science and medicine."m
Yet law remained closed to Australian women far longer than it
should have. "[T]o many, the main question is, are women capable of
performing legal work? Well, why not? Personally I have never heard
one rational reason against it, although I have listened to heaps of twad-
dle."'"' As Greig points out, "[flor many years now we have been accus-
tomed to see women figuring as exhibitioners and in the first class hon-
our lists of our University, and the Law school is not more difficult than
any other."'"m Greig pointed out the deficiencies of the male habit of ar-
94. I have not been able to ascertain whether any female solicitor or barrister, having been
admitted in a constituent country of the Commonwealth, made a request to be admitted to the Bar in
England. The result would certainly have been interesting, though probably negative.
95. David Weisbrot, The Australian Legal Profession: From Provincial Family Firms to
Multinationals, in I LAWYERS IN SocEry, supra note 69, at 244, 270-71 (giving a short history of the
admission of women and their subsequent success in the profession).
Victoria removed the legal barrier in 1903, followed by Tasmania (1904), Queensland
(1905), South Australia (1911), New South Wales (1918), and Western Australia (1923).
In New South Wales, the first woman was admitted to practice in 1921 (she had been the
first woman law graduate (1902); in Victoria, the first woman was admitted in 1923 (she
was appointed Victoria's first and only woman Queen's Counsel in 1965) ....
Id. at 270.
96. See Greig, supra note 16, at 146.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 146-47.
100. Id. at 147.
101. id. at 149.
102. Id.
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guing that women never had been lawyers, therefore were incapable of
performing adequately in that profession.
I notice that most men, when it comes to an argument as to what
women could or could not do, generally argue "You have not, ergo
you cannot."..... They will rarely make allowance for the fact that
men for generations have been trained to do what women are doing
now for the first time .... Opportunity is everything with we medi-
ocrities.... [A]ny man or woman of average ability, given the op-
portunity to thoroughly master any business, profession, or trade that
he or she has some natural taste for, and he or she will become a ca-
pable mediocrity worthy of all respect.'
Given the same abilities and the same training, women could, in
Greig's opinion, be the equals of men in any branch of the law, not just
those with which some felt women had a natural affinity. Barristers had
the more consistently interesting practices,'" but the profession of so-
licitors offered steady work, and though some of it was tedious, some
was rewarding and challenging, including the preparation of briefs for a
barrister.'" Ultimately, education could not take the place of experience
and temperament.
The most successful solicitor, then, is not always the most erudite, he
is the one who has a good working knowledge of the law that is daily
applicable and knows exactly where to find anything else that is
likely to crop up. In a word, he requires exactly the same qualities
which go to make the successful business man in any other path of
commercial life. And as women have succeeded in other businesses,
why not in this?' 6
However, by the 1980s, women were still underrepresented in the profes-
sion. "' As in other countries they were "bunched" in certain areas of
practice, primarily those concerned with family law, except for estate
planning."
103. Id. at 150-51.
104. Id. at 151-52.
105. Id. at 152-53.
106. Id. at 154.
107. Weisbrot, supra note 95, at 271. Weisbrot states:
In New South Wales in 1984, women constituted only 3.9 percent of partners in
solicitors' firms and 8 percent of sole practitioners but 26.5 percent of employed
solicitors. Stated another way, while 48.9 percent of male solicitors in private practice
were partners and only 27.4 percent were employed, only 14.2 percent of women were
partners and fully 70.8 percent were employed. According to figures supplied by the
Women Lawyers Association of New South Wales, only about 78 of the 1,100 active
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3. New Zealand
Unlike other member states of the Commonwealth, New Zealand
never prohibited women from practicing law, '09 and the first woman to set
up practice as an attorney in New Zealand was Ellen Melville in 1909."10
However, women felt discouraged from entering the profession, primar-
ily because of the attitude of male lawyers. A 1981 study by the Auck-
land District Law Society found that women faced discrimination based
on assumptions about their family responsibilities and interest in fur-
thering their careers."'
4. South Africa
While the first attempt to admit a woman failed in 1912,"2 the Cape
Supreme Court determined that the word "person" did in fact include
women, to the satisfaction of the plaintiff, Madeline Wookey."3 A disap-
pointed Cape Law Society obtained a reversal of that court's decision in
Incorporated Law Society v. Wookey, which contains language reminis-
cent of that in the Bebb decision.
The second (of three) judge(s)... said that ordinarily the term "per-
son" included women as well as men, but was often used to refer to
one sex only. Looking at the statute in the context in which it was
passed, it seemed inconceivable to him that if the Legislature had in-
tended to introduce so great a change and to throw open the doors of
the profession to women, it would not have done so in clear and un-
ambiguous language, instead of leaving it as an inference to be drawn
from the use of the word "person", which might or might not include
women as well as men."
B. France
Generally speaking, the more virulent argument over the admission
of women to the French legal profession took place after, not before ad-
mission."5 While some debate took place between 1888 (the date of pub-
lication of an influential book on the subject)"6 and the denial of admis-
sion to Jeanne Chauvin in 1897, that event shocked the incoming gov-
ernment to the point that it made the passage of enabling legislation in
109. Georgina Murray, New Zealand Lawyers: From Colonial GPs to the Servants of Capital, in 1
LAWYERS IN SOcIETY, supra note 69, at 318, 329.
110. Id.
111. Id. at329-30.
112. See SACHS & WILSON, supra note 3, at 36.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 37.
115, See Corcos, supra note 37, at 437 (regarding the admission of women to the French Bar).
116. LOLTs FRANK, LA FEMME-AvOCAT Au PoIr DE VUE DE LA SOCIOLOGIE (1898). This book
went into at least two editions, the second appearing in 1898. See also infra notes 141-42 and
accompanying text.
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1900 a priority."' After the admission of women, the profession engaged
in spirited debate, but the possibility of expelling women, once they were
admitted, was very slight.
In England, the debate began at about the same period, but because
of unified opposition in the profession as well as failure in the courts and
in Parliament, women waited an additional twenty years for the right to
practice law. Without the intervention of wartime necessities, it is likely
that opposition to the notion of female solicitors and barristers would
have continued for another ten or twenty years.
Like their French sisters, English female solicitors made very little
initial impact.
The subsequent history of women as solicitors is rather an anti-
climax; the fear of competition proved quite unfounded. The first
woman solicitor was admitted in 1922 and the event went unnoticed.
Since then the numbers admitted each year have risen steadily but
very slowly. Even now fewer than forty women are admitted each
year. In 1957 there were 560 women on the roll, of whom 337 held
practising certificates. The solicitors' profession does not appear to
attract women very much. Among practising solicitors the ratio of
women to men is roughly one in fifty. A large number of these have
family links with the profession, which no doubt exercised some in-
fluence upon their choice of career. At the Bar the ratio of women to
men is nearer one in twenty-five, but this may be deceptive. It is
likely that many of them have only been recently called to the Bar,
and the proportion who become established is practice is probably
much smaller."'
Similarly, when describing the French Bar in a short article, one
commentator of the late twenties failed to note the presence of any
women in the profession, demonstrating that women lawyers simply had
not made much of an impression at the time.
The Bar council still nails to the cross any man who makes the slight-
est attempt at advertising.... No lawyer may bring an action for the
payment of a fee unless he obtains the specific authorization of the
Bar Council .... Lawyers, when they appear in Court, wear a black
gown somewhat similar to, but more formal than that adopted by the
American bench .... They represent a professional lite of educated
gentlemen who have high ideals and who live up to them. To be an
avocat A la Cour d'Appel de Paris or of the most remote provincial
center is to stand forth among one's fellows .... The French lawyer
117. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 443-44.
118. BnIRs, supra note 18, at 277-78 (reporting that the number of women lawyers, per hundred,
in the U.S. as 2.48 in 1951 and in England as 2.1 in 1957; then comparing these ratios with the number
of women in the English medical profession (1 in 6)).
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may be said to have taken Holy Orders. His sacerdotal office is as in-
divisible as that of any priest of the Gospel." 9
Even though they obtained the same education and fulfilled the same
requirements as men, French women lawyers were still constrained to
some extent by tradition or by other existing legal handicaps. An Ameri-
can observer of the time noted that
[t]he woman lawyer who is married, cannot practice law without the
consent of her husband; and no woman is permitted to practice in the
Court of Cassation (Court of Appeals). Should a woman lawyer have
a case that would necessitate an appeal to the higher court, she is
obliged to have a man bring the appeal for her. Queer, isn't it, the
handicaps men place on women, while so often admitting their effi-
ciency? In France, the country which writes in great letters of stone,
"Equality, Fraternity, Liberty," over the gates of its capitol, we have
men, when it comes to admitting the equality of the woman, only
half-practising that which is their boast, and, like little Jack Homers,
thinking they are great boys at that.'20
English legal journals, however, followed the progress of French women
lawyers with satisfaction and interest. As early as 1915 the Solicitors'
Journal and Weekly Reporter noted the admission of the twenty-ninth
female member of the profession.' They chronicled the success of
Jeanne Rospars, the first woman to be accepted to the Confirence des
Avocats," and observed that she might well become the btonnier (head)
of the Paris Bar. 3 The Law Times ridiculed the arguments of the oppo-
nents of female participation in the French legal profession. "They had
discovered this formula, in the form of juridic axioms, which to-day
makes one smile; for instance, Robe sur robe ne vaut. The profession of
avocat was considered virile.""'2 It also reported on the question of dress
for avocates.
It was curious to see how she (Mme Petit, the first woman to be ad-
mitted to the French bar) bore her robe in the manner of one who had
not expected to become an avocate to possess a robe. She justified
women wearing the gown: "Since the avocats dress themselves as
women, the women should be allowed to dress themselves as avo-
cats." 1
25
119. Pierre Crabites, The French Bar From Within, 14 A.B.A. J. 369, 371 (1928).
120. Mary M. Lilly, The French Women Lawyers, 21 CASE &COM. 431, 431 (1914).
121. Current Topics: The Admission of Women to the French Bar, 60 SoLIC. J. & WKLY. REP. 35,
35-36(1915).
122. Occasional Notes, 154 LAw TMES 123, 124(1922).
123. See also id. (stating that Jeanne Rospars might as well be made bdtonnier); The Legal
Profession in France, 14 LAW NOTES 149, 149 (1910) (stating that the presiding officer is known as the
Bdtonnier, which in Paris is a position of great dignity, held by one of the conceded leaders of the bar).
124. Occasional Notes, supra note 122, at 124.
125. Id.
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The American legal journal the Green Bag noted with enthusiasm
the professional dibut of H16ne Miropolosky, which, it felt, added some
clat to the female half of the profession.
[I]t is said that she made a most pleasing appearance. She was attired
in a simple black gown relieved by the conventional white barrister's
bib. Her costume was further accentuated by the black toque which
crowned her jet black hair. She appeared to every one an irresistible
legal belle.... If the ladies of the United States would more generally
emulate the example of the charming Mlle. Miropolosky, the beauty
of woman would vie with the dignity of man in raising the general
tone of the profession.1
6
However, neither English nor U.S. legal journals were unanimous in
their support of the avocates, and some watched their progress with
amused contempt. The Green Bag's acclaim of Miropolosky's admission
to the Paris Bar occasioned this snippy response from A.H. Robbins in-
the Central Law Journal:
While every lover of the fair sex, and they are legion, wish for them
the highest possible places in our civilization, we do not think the
editor of the Green Bag has in any degree helped them in that direc-
tion when he encourages them to "emulate the example of the
charming Mle. Miropolosky." Whether women should forsake, under
no circumstances, the ideals of home life, might be a debatable ques-
tion. Surely many exigencies of her existence in these modem days
often compel a woman to seek her living in gainful occupations, but
neither the woman herself nor the world generally regards the situa-
tion as in any way elevating her. It is always a situation that calls for
some apology. And of all the occupations usually performed by men
which tend in some degree to embarrass a woman and detract greatly
from her delightfully retiring and maidenly qualities, that of the legal
profession probably heads the list.'7
For Robbins, both woman's innate lack of ability to "think like a lawyer"
and her (sex-linked) weaknesses combined to demonstrate her incapacity
to perform adequately as an advocate:
Woman's failure in this profession has been notorious and is due to
several reasons. First, a woman's emotional temperament utterly un-
fits her for unprejudicial analytical investigation; second, her sensi-
tive disposition recoils and is shocked by the necessary rudeness and
bitterness of contesting litigants; thirdly, her natural feminine in-
stincts often embarrass her in her relations with other members of the
profession and with witnesses; fourthly, the peculiar and frequent
physical incapacity of women jeopardize their success in the trial of
126. The Call to Arms, 21 GREN BAG 597, 597 (1909).
127. A.H.R[obbins], Jetsam and Flotsam: Women and the Law, 69 CENT. LJ. 397, 397-98 (1909).
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cases by making them unfit to meet the demands of the situation con-
fronting them."
The appeal to scientific bases to support his objection reveals itself in the
writer's dispassionate references to female emotionalism and sensitivity
and to her "peculiar and frequent physical incapacity." Objectionable
traits are listed and classified as if they are the result of an objective
study of the issue. The reference to menstruation lifts the argument above
the accusation that Robbins is simply prejudiced against women lawyers:
undeniably, human females undergo monthly biological changes for
thirty to forty years of their lives.'
Robbins also rejects the "moral uplift" argument by asserting that
women are superior to men by virtue of their gentler natures. If they at-
tempt to compete with men at a professional level, they lose that superi-
ority. They distract their male opponents through feminine wiles or they
force men to abandon their chivalrous instincts in order to do their duty.
In either case, women cause a dislocation of the system.
[T]o lawyers generally it is an occasion for much embarrassment to
have to meet a lady as opposing counsel, and often, either of two
things must result, to-wit, either the interests of their clients must suf-
fer by reason of their unwillingness to take advantage of their fair op-
ponent's mistakes, or they must crush their natural feelings and atti-
tude toward the weaker sex and treat her as any other opponent to a
point which they must consider rude toward a woman, although not
so as between man and man.... The argument that woman's entrance
would elevate the moral tone of the profession may, for the sake of
the argument, be admitted, but such result could not possibly be
reached without detracting to a large extent from the high standing
women already enjoy. To a gentleman, a lady is an object, if not of
worship, at least of the highest possible esteem.... For her to be-
come, not merely a competitor as in some lines of business, but his
active antagonist as she must do when she assumes the role of a bar-
rister, is either to take advantage of her antagonist or to abdicate her
throne. Either altemative degrades a woman in the estimation of the
man she thus unfairly opposes.' 3
128. Id. at 398.
129. One Canadian law school dean blatantly stated his belief that women students were at a
biological disadvantage. According to one law student
mhe old Dean really had a lot of reservations about women going into Law. He called
me in for a little chat and explained that although he knew that I was quite clever enough
to do all these things it really wasn't suitable. I was baffled. He said, very embarrassed,
"[Well, some times of the month you just might not be up to it."
Kinnear, supra note 85, at 425. Male students also made clear their firm conviction that women pursued
law degrees to get a husband. "One woman, married and a little older, perplexed the men. 'A couple of
fellows couldn't figure out what I was doing there. One of them said to me (he was not a very smart
fellow), "You've already got a husband. What are you doing here?"." Id.
130. R[obbins], supra note 127, at 398.
[Vol. 75:2
19981 PORTIA GOES TO PARLIAMENT
By trivializing women's desire to obtain civic and legal equality,
Robbins fails to address their very real concerns. He evokes the most
enduring of images of conflict between male and female, and one of the
most frightening for men."' He suggests that the woman in competition
with the man threatens not only his ability to remain true to his profes-
sion (she is a distraction) but to his natural code of honor (she tries his
patience and his virtue).' A real lady could not possibly wish to "abdi-
cate her throne," even through most women have sat on thrones through
the ages only because of a particular relationship with men (marriage to a
male sovereign) and not because of inheritance, and a real lady, he
clucks, would not want to put a male adversary at the huge disadvantage
of competing with her unchivalrously in order to win a case. Further,
notice that Robbins sounds the familiar theme that women do not under-
stand the rules of competition. They would necessarily play the game
unfairly, as "active antagonists," while men are precluded by tradition
and socialization from fighting back as they would with a male opponent.
Too many accommodations would have to be made to allow a woman to
compete at all in the legal area, much less to compete "fairly."
[Hier success must necessarily be relatively small as she is not in
mind or body predisposed to the kind of work, mental and physical,
131. See FARL.L, supra note 15 (casting the entire male-female relationship in terms of a
continuing battle based on misunderstandings and conflicting assumptions about male and female
roles). For Farrell, the culture tends to encourage and value women. For Joan Shapiro, another popular
commentator, the opposite is true.
In our culture, boys ... learn a sense of entitlement. After all, men are the important
people in the world .... Because of this status, they learn that they are important. All we
have to do is look around us, and especially on TV and in newspapers and magazines, to
know that the most "important" people are men. Boys may say that they want to be a
fireman or a policeman when they grow up. They also say that they want to be President
of the United States. They very often learn that they should get the things that they want,
and very often from women. We as women need to recognize our participation in this as
we try to understand why men react to us in the ways that they do. We are, like it or not, a
part of the culture that elevates men and devalues women. We absorb our cultural roles as
well as do men. After all, we are the ones who lead men to believe that shirts appear, as if
by magic, cleaned, pressed, and in their drawers! By living up to our role as helpers,
nurturers, as the ones who meet men's ordinary daily needs, we cripple them in a sense.
We handle them so quickly they don't even know they have these needs.
JOAN SHtAmo, MEN: A TRANSLATION FOR WOMEN 54 (1992). If women relinquish this supportive
role in order to "compete" with men in the arena in which they are the traditional leaders, men will
naturally feel confused and betrayed.
132. This attitude is painfully obvious throughout all of the arts. In particular, the familiar plot of
the woman attempting to compete with a man is depicted in movies (from Susan Hayward as an oil
prospector in TULSA (Eagle-Lion 1949) to Jane Fonda in COMES A HORSEMAN (MGM/UA Home
Video 1997)), in fiction (Scarlett O'Hara as a mill owner in MARGARET MrrCHELL, GONE wrm THE
WIND (1936)), and in ballet (the cowgirl who ropes as well as a man in Agnes DeMille's ballet RODEO
(1950) can't get a date for Saturday night (see Maggie Hall, "Rodeo" Hobbled by Sticking to Safe, Old
Trail, TAMPA TR., Mar. 30, 1997, at 4)). That women compete unfairly, usually by using sex as a
weapon, is also a common message. The Demi Moore character in DIsCLosuRE (Warner Bros. 1994)
harrasses poor innocent employee Michael Douglas, and Carolyn Pohlhemus sleeps her way to the top
in PRESUMED INNOCENT (Mirage Productions 1990), but she gets murdered for it. Michael Douglas
catches bell again from a woman for sexual misconduct in FATAL ATTRACnON (Paramount 1987)
wherein the rabbit dies once more.
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which a successful lawyer is often called upon to endure. ... We
have no intention by our position in this article to indicate any oppo-
sition to the right of women to earn a livelihood whenever it becomes
necessary in any business to which she may be physically and men-
tally equal and where she does not become a direct personal antago-
nist to one of the opposite sex. Our only purpose is to hold out to her
a fair warning that we see no possibility of her permanent success as
an active practitioner of the law.'
These arguments are remarkably similar to those advanced by French
opponents of women's admission.'-"
One contemporary commentator concluded that French women
lawyers of the period took the initiative to defend women and children
charged with crimes directly traceable to the effects of poverty and pow-
erlessness.'35
The woman lawyer is everywhere in the criminal courts of Paris. She
is a charming figure as she floats smilingly through the halls and cor-
ridors of the Assises of the Palais de Justice; and truly is she an angel
of mercy to the women and children brought to these courts charged
with crime. She pleads for them without hope of remuneration, and
rarely, if ever, receives a fee for her services. The men lawyers voted
this field of the law entirely to her, and most enthusiastically does she
fill it. With my American commercialism, I could not help speculat-
ing as to whether or not the men would have so gallantly accorded
this distinctive place in the law courts to the women had there been
any money in this particular field.... This thought of helping women
and children seemed to have been in the minds of all these French
women lawyers, unorganized as they were; for with one accord, al-
most in one voice, they flung at me the question, "What are you
women lawyers of the United States, with all your liberty, doing for
the women and children of the United States, for," said they, "You
lead, we follow.' ' 6
133. R[obbins], supra note 127, at 398. Miropolosky herself seems to have been quite aware of
her image. An American woman lawyer of the period noted, "When I told her I had seen notices of her
in the American papers, she replied, with an alluring smile and the most delightful accent, 'Have I, then,
so bad a reputation?' Lilly, supra note 120, at 432.
134. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 472; FERNAND CoRcos, LEs AvocATEs 163 (1926).
135. Jeanne Chauvin, the woman whose attempt to be admitted to the Paris Bar in 1897 ultimately
forced the issue of female participation in the legal profession, made her debut as an attorney in a
criminal action. See Occasional Notes, supra note 122.
136. Lilly, supra note 120, at 431. However, some Canadian women attorneys of the period
objected to their automatic inclusion in the ranks of family lawyers. "I did have to make a demand that I
not do all the Family Work. I liked it no more than the men did and had to make that clear. Usually the
women lawyers were landed with all the Family Work and not much else." Kinnear, supra note 85, at
429 (quoting an unnamed Canadian female attorney).
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C. Belgium
In 1882, Marie Popelin requested admission to the Brussels Bar.'"
As could be expected, the Council of Discipline refused to allow her to
take the required oath, and the Cour d'Appel and then the Cour de Cas-
sation upheld this decision. The court of appeals expressed itself in
words that would be echoed in the debate over the admission of women
to the English and French Bars and in the U. S. Supreme Court decision
Muller v. Oregon.38
Seeing that the special nature of woman, the feebleness of her con-
stitution, the modesty inherent to her sex, the protection which is nec-
essary to her, her peculiar mission to humanity, the demands and the
obligations of maternity, the training that she owes to her children,
the control of the household and the domestic hearth entrusted to her
efforts, place her in conditions little reconcilable with the duties of
the profession of an advocate, and give her neither the necessary lei-
sure, strength, nor fitness for the strifes and labours of the Bar.'39
The Cour de Cassation reiterated this view. "Considering that under the
old system conformably with the Roman law the profession of an advo-
cate was considered as a masculine office, that the restraint imposed by
good manners on the woman does not permit her to fulfil."'"
While Popelin failed in her attempt, she inspired other women, par-
ticularly in France, and one Belgian attorney was moved to write an im-
passioned defense of the woman's right to practice law. Louis Frank's La
Femme-Avocat au Point de Vue de la Sociologie"'' went into several edi-
tions and was studied by both sides in the debate over female admission,
most particularly in the Chauvin case.' 2 Belgium finally admitted women
to the bar in 1922.' 3
IV. THE CONTROVERSY OVER PROPOSED LEGISLATION
With regard to the admission of women to the English Bar during
the period, male solicitors and baristers exhibited a range of attitudes.'"
Some believed that the profession in general should by right be opened to
women, either because they had already proven themselves the intellec-
tual equals of men or because such proof was irrelevant to the question.
137. Edward S. Cox-Sinclair, The Bar in Belgium, 24 LAw MAG. & REv. 17(1909).
138. 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (holding that the state had an interest in regulating women's
working conditions because of their physical inferiority).
139. Cox-Sinclair, supra note 137, at 263 (citing a Dec. 12, 1888, decision of the Cour d'Appel).
140. Id. at 264. (citing a Nov. 11, 1889, decision of the Cour de Cassation).
141. FRANK, supra note 116.
142. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 443 n.51 and accompanying text
143. See Luc Huyse, Legal Experts in Belgium, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOcIETY, supra note 69, at 225,
231. By contrast, Italy admitted its first woman lawyer, Lidia Poet, on August 9, 1883, after passage of
the General University Act of October 8, 1876. See Vittorio Olgiati & Valerio Pocar, The Italian Legal
Profession: An Institutional Dilemma, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIEry, supra note 69, at 336,338.
144. See Bumxs, supra note 18, at 276-77.
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Some held that women should be admitted, but directed to certain roles
or encouraged to take up only certain types of law. And some were ada-
mantly opposed to the entrance of women into the profession at all be-
cause they thought that women were intellectually, physically, socially
and emotionally ill-suited to the practice of law.
In addition, because the profession was then, as it is now, somewhat
overcrowded, some male solicitors feared that the admission of females
to their ranks would make earning a living an even more precarious
proposition." The admission of women to the legal profession was a
contentious issue primarily because it meant that women were requesting
admission to the very profession that created, interpreted and adminis-
tered society's official rules.
For many Englishmen the attitude toward the entrance of women
into the profession was as recounted in a story of the period.
Mayor Baker (a contemporary Mayor of Cleveland, OH), lecturing at
the law school, told a little story of an Englishman who was asked by
an American, why the brass railings in the galleries of the House of
Lords were not removed, as they obstruct the view of the Speaker.
Horrified, the Englishman gazed at the American for a moment and
then answered: "Why, they have always been there."' 6
"Because it has always been so" is an attitude quite understandable
of the English lawyer, whose experience is primarily with the common
law and with written law as expressed by the legislative branch. Lacking
a written constitution for guidance, the English lawyer relies on the strict
interpretation of Parliament's word as expressed by particular statutes, on
the rules of interpretation set forth in the Interpretation Act, and on the
presumed reluctance of judges to make law by inferring Parliamentary
intent. At least, such is the common explanation of the workings of Eng-
lish law.
In the case of the admission of women to the twin English legal
professions of solicitor and barrister, we have a prime example of the
ability of English judges to make law without seeming to do so, and a
reflection of the controversies that surround any legal issue consigned to
statutory rather than constitutional regulation. The courts' insistence on
both positive and unambiguous expression by Parliament of the intent to
enable women to join the profession led to much more acrimonious de-
bate and many more pieces of legislation than would have been the result
had the courts been willing to find, for example, that legislation of
145. "One correspondent wrote to the Solicitors' Journal complaining that 'a crowd of women are
to be let loose further to cut up the profession'; another thought that such a proposal was 'sacrificing the
profession on the present-day altar of 'sentimentality gone mad'." Id. at 276.
146. Women in the Law, supra note 15, at 133.
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1877"' and 1888"' addressed the question of women's participation in the
legal profession. Certainly they could have done so; just as certainly,
English courts previously had interpreted statutes or common law to find
other rights when they chose. In addition, in interpreting the act in ques-
tion to exclude women, the courts arguably may have failed to give
proper effect to the Interpretation Act of 1889,'" as well.
The desire to control female behavior through proscription (women
shall not be lawyers) and through prescription (women shall be unpaid
caregivers and helpmeets to male attorneys) was part of the larger wave
during that period of legislation intended to force women into particular
avenues of activity, although it did not carry forward unquestioned. As
early as 1844, Lord Brougham demanded to know on the floor of the
House of Lords why such protectionist and paternal legislation was nec-
essary. "Cannot a woman make a bargain? Cannot a woman look after
her own interests? Is not a woman capable of understanding those inter-
ests, of saying whether or not she has stamina and strength to work?"'"
The writer Barbara Leigh Smith commented ten years later that while
men's social and economic progress could be measured by the lessening
of laws restricting their activities, the same could not be said for women,
who
more than other members of the community, suffer from over legisla-
tion. A woman of twenty-one becomes an independent human crea-
ture, capable of holding and administering property to any amount;
or, if she can earn money, she may appropriate her earnings freely to
any purpose she thinks good. Her father has no power over her or her
property. But if she unites herself to a man, the law immediately steps
in, and she finds herself legislated for, and her condition of life sud-
denly and entirely changed .... In short," says Judge Hurlbut, "a
woman is courted and wedded as an angel, and yet denied the dignity
of rational and moral being ever after."' '
147. The Solicitors Act of 1877 gave complete control to the Law Society of the preliminary
examination for Solicitors of the Supreme Court of Judicature. The Solicitors Act of 1877, 40 & 41
Vict., ch. 25 (Eng.). It represented the culmination of several attempts to exert some uniformity and
control over the profession of solicitor, beginning with the granting of a charter to the Law Society in
1831 and continuing through the Solicitors Act of 1843, which allowed the judges to regulate the
administration of examinations. See Lord Hailsham of St. Marylbone, Solicitor's Profession and
Qualifications, 44 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 7, 8 (4th ed. reissue 1995).
148. The Solicitors Act of 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., ch. 65 (Eng.) (giving custody of the Role of
Solicitors to the Law Society).
149. 52 & 53 Vict, ch. 63 (Eng.).
150. 84PARL. DEB.(3dser.) 1315(1844).
151. BARBARA LEIGH SMIrH, A BRIEF SUMMARY IN PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE MosT IMPORTANT
LAWS CONCERNING WoMEN TOGETHER WITH A FEW OBSERVATnONS THEREON 13 (1854).
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A. Early Attempts by Women to Gain Admission to the English Bar
1. Private Attempts
In 1876 the Law Society, the organization charged with regulation
of the profession,' 2 denied membership to a woman candidate.' 3 During
the same period Lincoln's Inn denied ninety-two women permission to
attend its lectures.'" As early as 1879, a Society was founded "to promote
knowledge of the law and to consider the abilities and disabilities of
women as to the practice of the law in any of its branches."'5" The argu-
ments for inclusion seem to have been based on the premise that the
practice of law, at least as far as solicitors were concerned, was a private
office since admission was regulated by private entities, albeit entities
chartered by Parliament.
Eventually rejected by the courts,'" this argument nevertheless fore-
shadowed the intercession of Parliament to recognize and regulate the
law as a profession that had emerged as a particularly public function.
That Parliament took this role eventually is ironic, since earlier it had
rejected attempts by women to obtain civil equality, thus forcing their
battle into the courts. 7
Other women who attempted unsuccessfully to obtain admission to
the profession included the "suffragette" Christabel Pankhurst.'55 Some-
time in the 1890s, two women opened a legal practice in London,
through which they provided some service to the bar, although they ap-
parently did not practice law.' In 1902, Gray's Inn accidentally admitted
Bertha Cave; when it realized its error it deliberately expelled her. "6 She
appealed, and lost,'' for the learned judges led by the Lord Chancellor
152. Solicitors Act of 1877, 40 & 41 Vict., ch. 25 (Eng.).
153. BmKS, supra note 18, at 276.
154. In regard to a petition of 92 ladies praying to be admitted to attend law lectures, it was
resolved "that in the opinion of this Bench it is not expedient that Women should be admitted to the
Lectures of the Professors appointed by the Council of Legal Education." V THE BLACK BOOKS OF
LINCOLN's INN 178 (Ronald Roxburgh ed., 1968).
155. St. John-Stevas, supra note 18, at 271-72.
156. See Bebb v. Law Society, 29 T.L.R. 634 (1913). See also infra notes 292-97 and
accompanying text.
157. St. John-Stevas, supra note 18, at 261-63.
158. Helena Kennedy, Women at the Bar, in THE BAR ON TRIAL 148 (Robert Hazell ed., 1978).
See also St. John-Stevas, supra note 18, at 276-82. On Pankhurst's attempts to be admitted, see SACHS
& WILSON, supra note 3, at 172-73.
159. See BmjS, supra note 18, at 276 (identifying these women as Miss Orme and Miss
Richardson and the location of their office as in Chancery Lane).
160. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 148.
161. Id. (citing PENSION BOOK OF GRAY'S INN (RJ. Fletcher ed., 1903)). However, the PENSION
BOOK index gives several citations to "women in chambers," but all refer either to wives of members or
to women of "questionable virtue" and uniformly indicate that the governing body of the Inn directed
that these women be removed, no matter what their claims to residency. But see FRANCIS COwPER, A
PROSPECr OF GRAY'S INN (1951) ("In 1903 a committee of judges had dismissed an appeal by Miss
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applied the same reasoning as did the trial court and Court of Appeals in
the Bebb case ten years later. No woman had ever been an attorney in
England, and Bertha Cave was not going to be the first.
But Cave's attempt did not go unnoticed. In 1910 the Solicitors'
Journal and Weekly Reporter published part of a letter advocating the
admission of women which summarized the other jurisdictions which
had already admitted them and urged his colleagues in the Law Society
"not to follow the example of the society's revered patres conscripti,
who in 1903, without assigning any reason, refused to entertain or listen
to the application that was then made by Miss Cave to be allowed to en-
ter her name on the roll of students .... .""6 Unpersuaded by the corre-
spondent's arguments from equity and example, the Journal advanced
the objection that admission was neither socially nor economically rec-
ommendable. "We venture to doubt whether, in the present overcrowded
condition of the profession, it will be considered desirable, either in the
interests of women or present male solicitors, that the profession should
be opened to the female sex.""6 3
2. Early Attempts in Parliament
a. Support for Women Attorneys in the Profession
Two years later, after the tentative letter to the Journal, that periodi-
cal reported on Edward A. Bell's" paper on the admission of women to
the profession, written in support of a like-minded bill introduced into
Parliament. That bill, introduced by Lord Wolmer and also favored by
Lord Robert Cecil'65 (who later took on the case of Gwyneth Bebb),
would have permitted women to become both solicitors and barristers,
but it failed to obtain the support of either the Law Society or a signifi-
cant portion of the practicing bar.'" Bell's paper foreshadowed the argu-
ments that would be raised in support of Gwyneth Bebb's application
and addressed most of the issues that concerned opponents and those
neutral on the subject.
Bertha Cave, a young lady whose application for admission to Gray's Inn had been refused by the
Benchers.").
162. Our Learned Sister, 55 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 25,25 (1910).
163. Id.
164. See Edward A. Bell, Admission of Women, 56 SoLic. J. & WKLY. REP. 814, 814 (1912)
(indicating that Bell also agreed to take Gwyneth Bebb as a clerk).
165. Neither party nor personal affiliations were an indication of a politician's stand on the issue
of women's admission. Both Robert Cecil and David Lloyd George favored admission. On Lloyd
George's role, see infra note 400 and accompanying text. On the politics of Robert Cecil (later Viscount
Cecil of Chelwood), see LORD ROBERT CECIL, ALL THE WAY (1949); LORD ROBERT CECIL, A GREAT
EXPERimENT (1941); Jere Langdon Jackson, Lord Robert Cecil: Apostle of the League, in
PERSONALITEs AND POLIcIEs: ESSAYS ON ENGuSH AND EUROPEAN HISTORY 94 (E. Deanne Malpass
ed., 1977).
166. BIRKS, supra note 18, at 276.
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First, Bell reported that other common law countries already admit-
ted women. "I have been informed that there are no less than 20,000
women carrying on the profession of attorneys at law in the United
States. A great number of women... also follow the vocation of notaries
and, I believe, patent agents.'"" He also pointed out that women already
served as advocates in some courts, "with marked ability.""' He noted
their abilities in the political arena and pointed out that some members of
Parliament certainly favored the activities of women in the legal profes-
sion by stating that "quite recently the daughter of a present member of
Parliament for a Welsh constituency acted as her father's ex officio Par-
liamentary agent, and gained the election for him."'"
Bell directly addressed the question of statutory interpretation as
well, criticizing in advance the ultimate decision of the court of appeals
in the Bebb case.
I find on reference to the Solicitors Act, 1843, ... which Act controls
all subsequent Solicitors Acts, that the Interpretation Clause of this
Act of Parliament distinctly provides "that every word importing the
masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to a female as well
as a male." Now I venture to assert that in law the interpretation of
this Act gives women sound legal grounds upon which to support
their claim to be admitted upon the Roll of Solicitors. It is on record
that a lady has applied to the Law Society to be allowed to qualify for
such admission; her application, however, was refused. I do not think
any appeal to the law courts was made in this particular case. If such
an appeal were ever made in any other case it would be a matter
which would require an exceedingly refined judicial power of inter-
pretation to read out of an Act of Parliament what I submit is a clear
enactment enabling duly qualified women to be enrolled assolicitors.'7°
Bell clearly recognized the fear of competition as well as a genuine if
somewhat hysterical anticipation of possible dilution of the quality of
practitioners manifested by some of his colleagues.
I would urge upon members of this Society that the Bill which this
resolution purports to support does not enable any woman to get on
the Rolls; they have to render themselves eligible by good character
and education and competent by qualifying examinations .... Fur-
ther, they have to present themselves for examination at the Law So-
ciety in London where... their demeanour and deportment can be
taken into consideration. If women who have qualified themselves for
the unromantic, serious and responsible profession of a solicitor,
calmly and decorously request the responsible authority of this hon-
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ourable Society to be allowed to become solicitors, why should that
request be refused?. . . Why should woman be prevented from devel-
oping her life along the lines for which her particular capabilities may
fit her, and in which she is most interested... ? I can hardly bring
myself to believe that there is an underlying and unexpressed opin-
ion-a selfish and timid attitude to mind-that the profession is over-
crowded already. This could not be so when every man who is quali-
fied is allowed to become a member as "of course.''
Bell also pointed out that the dulce domum argument (that women were
by nature fitted only for home and family)" which had been used to pre-
vent women from pursuing other professions had been unsuccessful, and
women had "taken up positions which, it is now admitted, they adorn and
intensify by their ability.'7 3 Concluding with a flourish, he stated,
[T]he enfranchisement of the sex, the force of modern circumstances,
the progress of public opinion, the example of other civilised com-
munities and the acknowledged average mental equality of women
and men if they be trained for any particular calling, render the ad-
mission of women into the ranks of the legal profession a matter of
time only. Granted these facts, I venture to assert on the ground not
only of expediency, but of justice, that the Law Society, which has
long been one of the pioneers of legal reform, should through its Rep-
resentative Council support the Bill when it again comes before Par-
liament for the removal of the existing archaic and unjust restraint
upon the admission of qualified and competent women into the ranks
of the legal profession.""
That his arguments were persuasive seems evident from the inability of
another solicitor present, identified as R. Ellett, to dispute them, but sim-
ply to repeat the arguments which Bell had addressed. Further, he in-
sisted that the admission of women was a parliamentary question, a point
on which he and Bell agreed.
If females were to be admitted to the profession, the step must be
authorised by the Legislature, for the word "persons" in the Solicitors
Act was interpreted to mean male persons. If ladies were to be ad-
mitted, it would be necessary for the council to support a Bill with
that object. He asked if the proposition was in the interest of the pro-
fession. He had never heard that there was any lack of solicitors. The
public could not be said to have demanded the change. And it was not
in the interest of women themselves that they should enter so labori-
ous a profession. The president had already referred to the smallness
of the incomes of solicitors, and pointed out that in many cases they
171. Id. On the fear of competition among French male attorneys towards women, see Corcos,
supra note 37, at 466-67.
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were absolutely insufficient. If women were admitted it would obvi-
ously tend to reduce the remuneration.7
Appealing to the popular conception of women as natural chatter-
boxes, he also asserted, "[t]heir great faculty of continuous speech would
fit them better for the bar, and when the benchers had admitted them to
that branch of the profession, it would be time to admit them as solici-
tors." Let the rival branch have these interfering females! Deliberately
misunderstanding Bell's reference to a pending bill, he said, "Mr. Bell
spoke of a bill that was to be introduced into Parliament, and when that
was done it would be time enough to consider whether it should be sup-
ported.'" Other speakers announced themselves for or against Bell's
position. C.E. Longmore made a practical argument in favor of admis-
sion: "Thousands of pounds were spent in educating women, and when
the time came for them to put their exertions to some advantage they
were shut out. He hoped they were not going to be afraid of the competi-
tion of women."'"
The temporary setbacks in obtaining support from the Law Society
and Parliament turned women's attention to a less formal means to ob-
tain admission to the profession. Four women who had successfully
completed the formal education required for solicitors agreed to request
admission to the Law Society.'" The Society's eventual refusal, based on
the claims of custom, resulted in the judgment in Bebb v. Law Society."
But twenty years later, the same claim was rejected in a colonial court. In
the British Mandate of Palestine, a woman requested admission to the
bar. The Supreme Court of that jurisdiction held that since no regulation
or statute prohibited the admission of women, she might be admitted.
Custom was not a sufficient reason to exclude her.'
8'
b. Objections Based on Custom and Existing Legislation
Generally speaking, objections to the entry of women into the legal
profession were based on arguments of custom, and as a fallback, on the
intellectual and physicial inability or unsuitability of women to perform
the duties of advocates. For many male opponents, a woman's intellec-
tual inferiority consisted largely of assumptions about her inability to
understand legal ways of thinking, which essentially institutionalized the
male world view, and male notions of dispute resolution. Because
women had never been trained in these ways of thinking, and would not,
175. id. at 814-15 (citing remarks of R. Ellett).
176. 1l at 815.
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing remarks of C.E. Longmore).
179. See Bnaus, supra note 18, at 276 (identifying the four as Miss Bebb, Miss Costello, Miss
Ingram and Miss Nettlefold, "all of whom had brilliant careers at either Oxford or Cambridge").
180. 29 T.L.R. 634 (1913).
181. F.M.G., Notes: Women at the Bar in Palestine, 13 J. COMP. LEG. 128 (3d ser. 1931).
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indeed, could not, develop them on their own, they could never demon-
strate an aptitude for the practice of law. Since they had never demon-
strated such an aptitude, it followed that they should not be admitted.
Historically, women never had been admitted to the English Bar, there-
fore they should continue to be excluded. That these objections consti-
tuted a chicken-and-egg argument was not lost on supporters of the
women's movement. 2
These arguments were not unique to the English opponents of
women's admission. Indeed they were shared by opponents in other
common-law jurisdictions. The American attorney Mary Bartelme an-
grily pointed out their hypocrisy and self-serving nature in a 1911 ad-
dress to the Illinois State Bar Association. What is interesting in her talk
is that she speaks briefly but eloquently to each of the misapprehensions,
objections, and mistaken assumptions that govern male resistance to
women in the professions.
I am well aware of the many prejudices that exist against women en-
tering different professions and fields of occupations, and also am
aware that they exist largely among persons who have not given the
matter serious consideration and whose sentimental opinions are
based upon conditions that existed in the good old time of their fore-
fathers, to which they would not return if they could. They are still
bound by the tyranny of tradition.'83
Further, she noted that one of the reasons that women were de-
manding the right to enter into traditionally male occupations was the
result of male intrusion into occupations that had previously been pri-
marily female, and that had provided most if not all of the paltry income
that women were allowed to earn for themselves. This tit-for-tat argu-
ment is quite aggressive given the prevailing submissiveness of women
even in the early twentieth century.
Not many years ago addresses were made and articles written advo-
cating the prohibition of women in industrial and professional fields
because they were trespassing upon the domain of men. They com-
plained that women were out of their sphere, and yet many of the men
182. This attitude still permeates some legal thinking. See, for example, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. CL
2312 (1997) (holding that members of Congress had no standing to challenge the line item veto), in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that "several episodes in our history show that in analogous
confrontations between one or both Houses of Congress and the Executive Branch, no suit was brought
on the basis of claimed injury to official authority or power." Id. at 2321. If appellees' claim was
sustained, presumably several presidents would have had standing to challenge the Tenure of Office
Act, which prevented the removal of a presidential appointee without Congress' consent. Id at 2321-22.
But see the often repeated comment by Justice Holmes that
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457,469 (1897).
183. Mary M. Bartelme, A Woman's Place at the Bar, Address Before the Illinois State Bar
Association, 43 C-u. LEGAL NEws 370, 370 (1911).
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who were advocating such measures and defining women's sphere,
were opening mills and factories, dairies, bakeries and canneries
which were taking out of the home the many activities that had been
woman's contribution to the family household, and as a matter of
economy and good business management will never be returned to
the home. The spinning, weaving, knitting, making of butter, and to a
large extent, the sewing, baking and canning are no longer done in the
home... and women necessarily have followed their work in order
that they may contribute their part to the maintenance of the family,
and it is not because of their whims or wishes, their desire for feathers
and frills and their loss or lack of love for home ties and family life,
but because economic conditions have changed and they are forced to
do their part. .. '"
The argument from equity is particularly powerful. Bartelme further ac-
cuses her audience of hypocrisy in suggesting that they listen closely to
arguments of any sort only when they believe they are being espoused by
men. Men in any occupation, she asserts, fear competition.
The question of competition is another factor that places barriers in
the entrance of women to the professions or vocations heretofore
wholly occupied by men. As an illustration ... let me cite the experi-
ence of a woman teacher who wished the opinion of some experts on
her theory pertaining to the treatment of certain scientific subjects.
Her first requests were signed with her full name, and the replies to
them were courteous but empty. She then wrote a letter signed with
her initials, which brought forth this reply: "Dear Mr. A: I am tre-
mendously interested in the question and consider it the most vital
and important with reference to-education now before the teachers of
the country. You will have a hard fight for your position .... So
many women teachers who ought to be tatting or doing other fancy
work, are wedded to their pretty little courses in-, and they will fight
for them like cats. I hope you will get your paper printed. Could I not
help you?"'"
Helena Normanton, a law graduate and supporter of women's ad-
mission, would make substantially the same arguments eight years
later." For Bartelme, female participation in professional and technical
occupations promises more happiness for everyone in society, even
though traditional social constructs may become less numerous.
The question, "Will women lose interest in wifehood and motherhood
through entering these broader fields," may be answered. Yes. From
the standpoint of marriage for shelter and support, or to escape the
opprobrium of being an old maid, she may, but from the basis of mar-
riage for wholesome companionship and love, I believe that in the ul-
184. ld
185. Id. (dashes in original).
186. Admission of Women to the Profession, 146 LAW TIMES 428 (1919) [hereinafter Admission of
Women].
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timate adjustment of economic conditions, because of her greater un-
derstanding and broader knowledge and views of life, she will come
nearer to the highest ideals of home and family life and relationship,
and, as a natural consequence there will be fewer divorces, fewer de-
linquent and deficient children, and fewer helpless, ignorant and de-
serted families.'
Bartelme's glowing vision of the salutary effect of economic independ-
ence on women indirectly attacks one of the grounds on which male at-
tractiveness to women is built: that of economic stability. She further
suggests that men, not women, are to blame for the poor upbringing or
destitution of their children, since it is a direct result of male mistreat-
ment or desertion. Women naturally attempt to care for the young and
the unfortunate, whether or not they have children; men care primarily
for themselves, even if the reproductive urge is satisfied."'
Bartelme also discusses the "shared environment" aspect of the pro-
fession, which some male barristers asserted was an insurmountable bar-
rier to women's comprehension of the legal profession.
Men from childhood hear business matters discussed, and if a father
intends that his son shall enter the legal profession, early in the son's
life he takes him to his clubs, and aims to place him in contact with
lawyers and men who are handling large business interests, while the
daughter, who may have a desire to enter the profession, almost never
is given these opportunities, and today, in order to secure a large and
lucrative practice one must be a business man or woman, as well as
learned in the profession.'"
The discrimination against young women is more overt once they select
a legal career. Members of the profession subject them to more scrutiny
and more criticism than they do young men.
The young man who can show a good university and law school rec-
ord can readily find an opening with one of the best law firms of his
city or county. This is not true of the young woman graduate of high
standing. A man is admitted to the profession and beings to practice.
He does not have to undergo a measuring up of his clothes, character,
disposition, appearance, attitude toward the other sex, etc., on the part
of his fellow-attorneys. He is taken to be a man earnest and sincere in
his profession, while she must give proof of her sincerity of purpose
and motive in entering the profession.'9
Bartelme points out that, at least in the United States, the women who
entered the legal profession early had less education and fewer advan-
tages than their male counterparts, yet they managed to graduate from
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law schools and pass the bar.'9 ' At the least, this success demonstrates the
equality of the female intellect; at the most, its superiority.
Bartelme does accept the notion that women will prefer a civil prac-
tice to a criminal one, and within the civil law, areas such as real estate,
probate and family law.'" She assures her listeners that those male law-
yers and legislators who take an interest in the working and living condi-
tions of the less fortunate, including an alarming number of children,
would find nothing but assistance and admiration from their female col-
leagues."3 But for this American attorney, as for her sisters in England,
who were attempting to enter the profession, traditional views of the fe-
male intellect and female ability must necessarily give way to the natural
urges of women to better themselves as well as to interest themselves in
the world around them and to make some positive change in the social
and economic conditions to which they objected.
In 1982, two English sociologists noted that the inequities of which
Bartelme spoke still existed:
When women enter a male-dominated profession they operate in an
opportunity structure and in an internal labour market which is differ-
ent to that of men. Coser has noted how women at work experience a
"deficit in rewards" compared with men, and how the presence of
women in an occupation or profession is inversely related to the re-
wards available. Women tend to be paid less and their opportunities
for promotion are more restricted than those of men. They are un-
likely to be permitted to do similar work to men of the same (or even
inferior) education and status. The lower financial rewards of women
in male-dominated professions are partly the result of their concen-
tration in low-reward segments and partly the result of women's un-
der-representation in the higher rank of such professions. The average
income of barristers illustrates this. A survey carried out for the Royal
Commission on Legal Services showed that the average income of
women juniors in 1976/77 was £3,908 compared with £6,700 for
men. For all barristers the figures were £4,137 and £8,039 respec-
tively. Even when men and women barristers doing similar work
were compared in the same survey, the average earnings of women
were only 50-60% of those of men.' 9'
The assumed lack of intellectual ability justified the continued ex-
clusion of women from the profession, and the continued exclusion as-
sured that the argument over lack of intellectual ability could never be
addressed, much less put to rest. How, then, was the problem to be re-
solved?
191. Id. She also notes that at that time a woman had achieved the highest grade point average yet
at the University of Chicago Law School. Id.
192. Bartelme, supra note 183, at 370.
193. Id.
194. Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 27-28 (footnotes omitted).
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For some male attorneys, the fact that women never had been for-
mally accepted into the bar was enough reason to continue to exclude
them, even though they might make inroads into other professions, such
as medicine. Proponents of the admission of women retorted that "[t]here
were women lawyers in ancient Rome, and there was quite a chain of
women lecturers and teachers of law in this country throughout the Mid-
dle Ages." '  One American lawyer made reference to "one Spanish
woman receiving the degree of doctor of laws at the age of twenty-
one." " Nevertheless, as we shall see, when Gwyneth Bebb made this
"historical" argument before the English courts, they found it unpersua-
sive.
The argument that women should not be allowed to practice law
because they did not participate fully in military service was also a com-
mon one, and at first glance it looks fairly persuasive." However, one of
the major functions of the military is to settle disputes which have gone
beyond words, that is, beyond the capacity of a specific dispute resolu-
tion system. To suggest that because women have not, cannot, or should
not impose a solution through physical force they ought not to participate
in finding solutions through argumentation or persuasion is extremely
tortured logic. Yet because so many analogies and thought processes in
the common law are drawn from the language of war or sports'98 (mock
195. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 428. The reference seems to be to three women in
particular. Paul Fuller, The French Bar 11, 23 YALE U. 248 (1914).
I find in an old volume, which I presume reliable, that long before the Theodosian Code
(in the fourteenth century) women were accepted as lawyers in Rome, and that two of
these, Amasia and Hortensia, acquitted themselves with great credit, while a third,
Afrasia, was usually herself the litigant and so scandalized the judges by her loquacity,
her effrontery and her outbursts of passion, that she was forbidden to speak in pubic [sic],
a prohibition later extended to all women, and only modified by Theodosius to the extent
of permitting them to speak in their own defense. Whether Afrasia is an argument against
the new proposition or whether Amasia and Hortensia are a preponderating argument in
its favor, I leave to your own judgment.
Id. at 262.
See also Nicolaus Benke, Women in the Courts: An Old Thorn in Men's Sides, 3 MicH. J.
GENDER & L. 195, 203 (1995) (identifying the offending female as Carfania). Benke uses Carfania's
case as a method of investigating traditional male and patriarchal objections to women's exercise of
legal power, particularly as advocates. Id. at 203-40.
196. Women in the Law, supranote 15, at 133.
197. We can, however, speculate on the effect of "male attitudes" on women in predominantly
male professions. Pilots are notorious for their sexual escapades, for example. One expert on military
law suggests that some female military pilots may deliberately engage in sexually aggressive behavior
in order to seem more like "one of the guys." Conversation with Kenneth Murchison, in Baton Rouge,
La. (July 3, 1997). On one female pilot's legal problems and subsequent discharge, see Ron Martz,
Military Justice: An Elite Career in Ashes; 1st Lt. Kelly Flinn Has Escaped a Possible Prison Term
With a Plea Bargain, But Others Say They'll Keep Fighting on Her Behalf, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
May 23,1997, at 18A.
198. On the use of sports metaphors in law school and legal communication, see Catherine Weiss
& Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1299 (1988) (the issue
was devoted to gender and law). "Men. presume that everyone understands a sports analogy. I would
never presume to use a. knitting analogy." Id. at 1337. Consider also the use of sports analogies in
discussing substantive law, such as the "level playing field" in anti-discrimination cases.
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war) such a comparison made sense to those opposed to the participation
of women in the legal profession.
Technically, "adversary system" merely means that "neutral and pas-
sive factfinders ... resolve lawsuits on the basis of evidence pre-
sented by contending litigants during formal adjudicatory proceed-
ings." The phrase connotes more than its technical definition, how-
ever. A complex web of metaphor pervades the idea of the adversary
system in a way that captures the hearts and minds of the lawyers
who function within that system. In case law, academic literature,
professional literature, and in popular culture, a trial is a battle and
the lawyer the client's champion; a trial is a sports contest and the
lawyer the client-team's winning coach or star player. Metaphors
transform the trial lawyer from a mere person who presents informa-
tion favorable to his client to a triumphant hero and change the other
party to the dispute into the enemy.)
Some commentators are unwilling to accept as settled the premise that
women are naturally less combative than men, but acknowledge that
inability to engage in ritualistic verbal combat puts female attorneys at a
disadvantage.
The premise behind this contentious system is that ardent, strident
representation of both sides to a dispute is the best mechanism for un-
earthing all the relevant facts and defining all the relevant law while
still respecting the rights of the individuals involved. And the further
premise is that with the best case for both sides out on the table,
whether in a congressional hearing room, or in a court before a judge,
or in direct negotiations between opposing lawyers, the side with the
greatest merit prevails. Therefore, in the interest of ultimate fairness,
lawyers compete with all the skill, energy, and creativity at their
command. Like football players or armed warriors, they are licensed
to compete with the serious aim of defeating the opposing side.r0
The similarities between this description of the ideal functioning of
the adversary system and the ideal functioning of the traditional "trial by
battle" in which one or both sides hired a "champion" to fight for him is
obvious."' While the operating assumption was that God was on the side
of right and justice, still each side hoped to increase the possibility of
199. Elizabeth G. Thomburg, Metaphors Matter. How Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex Shape the
Adversary System, 10 Wis. WOMEN's LJ. 225, 225 (1995) (footnotes omitted) (quoting STEPHAN
LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 1
(1988)). Consider as well the use of sports analogies to describe the behavior of OJ. Simpson's criminal
defense lawyers. Robert Shapiro and F. Lee Bailey, among others, were the defendant's "dream team."
Lawrence Schiller notes that during their conferences with him, the attorneys frequently communicated
with the former football player in sports terms, which enabled him to take active charge of his defense.
Journalists also translated analyses of defense strategy into sports talk. See LAWRENCE SCHajER &
JAMES W..LWERTH, AMERICAN TRAGEDY 381-82 (1997).
200. MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REWRrrING THE RULES 129(1994).
201. On trial by battle, see GEORGE NEILSON, TRIAL BY COMBAT (1890).
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victory, recognizing the truth of the often-repeated dictum that God was
on the side of the strongest battalions.o
[M]any women, drawn to the law by its promise of fairness, shun
chronic engagement in battle. Bearing out the stereotyped image of
woman as peacemaker, not warrior, they tend to shy away from the
most adversarial arenas in the law and to gravitate toward those forms
of practice that are most consultative and conciliatory, or those that
are bound by harmonizing rules. This last includes fields such as se-
curities, antitrust, bankruptcy, and tax, in which doing the work is
like solving a puzzle.
Many women in big firms opt for a corporate law practice be-
cause it allows them to work cooperatively with groups of people
who have conflicting interests but also a common interest in putting
together a particular deal or solving a common problem.
But the more aggressively hard-edged the practice, with trial
work at the extreme, the fewer women are involved. This is a fact, but
the question is, Why. Has nature programmed men hormonally to do
battle and women to avoid it? Or do women shun competition be-
cause the larger culture socializes them to dislike it, teaches them the
their virtue lies in sympathy, understanding, patience, cooperation,
and peacemaking rather than in combat? Or is it mainly a lack of
practice? Would women feel more comfortable as competitors if their
families and schools and communities placed girls in the same
gladiatorial roles that boys assume from early childhood onward? Or
is it that women, entering the legal profession with more social train-
ing than men in quiet dispute-settling, see the lawyer's reliance on
adversarial procedures as excessive? Are women rejecting, as a mat-
ter of consciously formed critical judgment, the degree of competition
they find in the law?2°3
202. "J'ai toujours vu Dieu de c6t6 des gros battailons" ("I have always seen God on the side of
the strong battalions"). Statement of Marchal de la Fert6-Senneterre to Anne of Austria (Queen of
Louis XII9 of France), cited in BOURSAULT, Lmits NouvEaLEs DE MONSIEUR BOURSAULT 384
(1698). This statement is also often attributed to Napoleon, among others.
203. HARRINGTON, supra note 200, at 129-30. The author quotes two particularly telling
comments from successful women attorneys on the similarities between law practice and sports or war.
[A] state court judge who graduated from law schools in the 1950s remarked, "I think
doing trials isn't comfortable for women, as a trial draws on a playing-field mentality.
Women prefer to settle. They don't like the winner-take-all philosophy--and, I think,
rightly so .... " A former law-review editor... doing civil litigation in a large, well-
known firm . . . questioned the good sense of settling business disputes through
adversarial procedures. "Litigation is strange," she said. "It's a strange way to settle
problems. It's war. It's a game. I mean, there're these little battlefields and this is the way
you're supposed to shoot the other person. It's just absurd... I'm good at it. Probably
it's what I'm best at in the world, but it is sort of silly ... and it's incredibly wasteful."
Id. at 132.
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Deborah Tannen also points out that oral "ritual opposition" occurs
today both in business and in law.
A modem-day equivalent of the bonding that results from ritual op-
position can be found in business, where individuals may compete,
argue, or even fight for their view without feeling personal enmity.
Opposition as a ritualized format for inquiry is institutionalized most
formally in the legal profession, and it is expected that each side will
do its best to attack the other and retain friendly relations when the
case is closed.2"
We should not be surprised that male lawyers therefore expect this kind
of relationship, and feel uncomfortable when it is not forthcoming,
whereas for women lawyers verbal sparring is not only foreign but con-
sidered antithetical to "real womanhood."
B. Arguments For and Against the Admission of Women to the Profes-
sion
As we can see, the debate over the admission of women to the bar
had started long before Bebb stated her case and continued more viru-
lently afterward. Just as in France and the United States, the arguments
centered on two issues: (1) the fairness of refusing women admission to
the bar while allowing them to pursue other professional avenues, par-
ticularly given their willingness to share the burdens of political and so-
cial life with men; and (2) the question of women's ability to meet the
traditional standards of the profession (physical, psychological and in-
tellectual).
That the contributions of Englishwomen to the war effort were
taken as a demonstration of their intellectual and physical equality with
men was clear as early as 1915 (the second year of the First World
War).'n One journal suggested that women ought by right to be admitted
to the profession of solicitor if they were qualified by education and
ability.
If women who have qualified themselves for the unromantic, serious,
and responsible profession of a solicitor calmly and decorously re-
quest to be allowed to become solicitors, why should that request be
refused? So far as the profession is concerned, there is nothing im-
proper or inexpedient in allowing competent women to become so-
licitors. Why should woman be prevented from developing her life
along the lines for which her particular capabilities may fit her and in
which she is most interested, thus depriving the state of her services
204. DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 TO 5: How WOMEN'S AND MEN'S CONVERSATIONAL
STYLES AFFECt WHo GETS HEARD, WHo GETS CREDrr, AND WHAT GETS DONE AT WoRK 237
(1994).
205. The same justification was advanced in support of the admission of U.S. women, in an essay
which also disapprovingly cited the results in Hall, Cave and Bebb. See Sophonisba P. Breckinridge, A
Recent English Case on Women and the Legal Profession, 23 J. POL. ECON. 64, 67-70 (1915).
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in any rofession in which she may be fitted by nature or education to
excel?
The intellectual equality of women was also very much at issue
during this period, not only in England but in other countries wrestling
with the idea of integrating traditionally male professions. Critics ad-
vanced both attempts at serious study and anecdotal evidence to support
their views. In France, for example, some of the debate concerned the
supposed lack of intellectual capacity that theoretically accompanied
women's smaller brain Sizes.2
In the United States, female physicians and lawyers already worked
actively and publicly to champion the cause of women, and their work
was documented in the legal journals of the period.
For the first time in history a jury composed of women physi-
cians recently sat as judges of the court for the insane at the Detention
Hospital in Chicago. This jury saved two women from being com-
mitted to the insane asylum by their husbands. Women lawyers all
over the country are hoping that the example of this Chicago jury
may be followed in other cities, especially in cases in which the san-
ity of women in concerned. Sixty women lawyers of Chicago have
placed their services at the disposal of Judge Heap of the municipal
court, who is privileged to call any of them to defend girls brought
before him. The women lawyers have organized the Public Defenders
League for destitute girls, and they plan to appear for penniless
women who are arrested and brought into the morals court.2°
Another writer documented the work of women professionals, pri-
marily judges and lawyers, in many special courts in cities such as New
York and Philadelphia, for a meeting of the New Constitutional Society
for Women's Suffrage.' Law reviews and other periodicals eagerly re-
206. Flotsam and Jetsam: Women as Lawyers--Modern View, 51 CAN. LJ. 79, 79 (1915)
(quoting the LONDON LJ.).
207. See FRANK, supra note 116, at 158. On the arguments for and against women lawyers
generally, see Corcos, supra note 37, at 449-63.
208. Editorial Comment: Women Physicians and Lawyers Set Good Example, 22 CASE & COM.
63, 65 (1915). Husbands and fathers of women considered "insane," whether because of actual
mental disability or because they objected to the behavior of men in their families, traditionally
turned to the courts for permission to incarcerate these women. See HELEN SMALL, LovE'S
MADNESS: MEDIcINE, THE NovEL, AND FEMALE INSANrY 1800-1865, at 184-92 (1996) (discussing
famous cases and social reaction to wrongful incarceration of wives during the late 1850s in
England). The theme of non-conformist behavior as insanity runs through the literature of the
nineteenth century. See SANDRA GILBERT & SUSAN GuBAR, THE MADWOMAN IN THE Aric (1979)
(discussing nonconforming behavior as portrayed in nineteenth century poetry and fiction); SMALL,
supra (tracing the treatment during this period in medicine and literature of women who had gone
mad due to abandonment by loved ones). On the English judiciary's attitude toward insanity, see
JOEL PETER EIGEN, WITNESSING INSANITY: MADNESS AND MAD-DoCTORS IN THE ENGLISH COURT
(1995).
209. See G. Hopkins (Mrs. Herbert Musgrave), Women's Work in the Courts in the United States,
15 J. COMP. LEGIs. 198 (1915). French women attorneys apparently also attempted to set up a
children's court before the First World War. See Ully, supra note 120, at 433. G. Hopkins later visited
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ported the establishment and progress of law schools that admitted
women.210 However, some observers objected to the segregation of
women into a special school, such as the Cambridge Law School for
Women, even if it were "as nearly a replica of the Harvard Law School
as it is possible to make it."21' Said Mary Agnes Mahan, ex-president of
the Massachusetts Association of Women Lawyers,
Personally, I feel that women should have been admitted to the
Harvard Law School. There was no necessity for a separate organi-
zation.... The phrase "First graduate law school in America exclu-
sively for women" has no charms for me. The students will lose the
benefit of contact with men's views and opinions, and that benefit,
under the circumstances, is inestimable. There have been generations
of men lawyers; it's a new field for women, in a way. There have
been few Portias through the ages. I think coeducation in a graduate
law course is almost an essential.1 2
Even though women were firmly established in the U.S. legal pro-
fession, the old debate over their aptitude continued, demonstrating that
at least for some male attorneys, familiarity continued to breed contempt.
In some cases women lawyers contributed opinions that smacked of spe-
cial pleading. In the late 1800s, members of the Equity Club regularly
received advice about safeguarding their health. One attorney believed
that overwork had partly contributed to the death of her law partner,1 3
echoing the theories of Edward H. Clarke in his widely read Sex in Edu-
cation: Or, a Fair Chance for the Girls,24 which
explained the supposed weaknesses of female physiology to the gen-
eral reader. Wrapped in the banner of medical authority, Sex in Edu-
cation was an assault on the new phenomenon of coeducation. Clarke
warned that women's reproductive physiology made it unsafe for
them to undertake any intellectual activity with the same rigor as
men. Excessive study, he explained, diverted energy from the female
England and spoke of the work of the "women's courts" to interested members of the New
Constitutional Society for Women's Suffrage in Knightsbridge. See Courts for Women, 59 Souc. J. &
WKLY. REP. 274,274 (1915).
210. See Graduate Law School for Women, in 4 Am. L. ScH. REv. 54 (1918). Among them
were the Washington College of Law, whose motto "Equal Opportunities for Men and Women"
reflected its origin as an institution of higher education "founded primarily for women." Its faculty
included both male and female professors. Id. The Portia School of Law was in its seventh year of
operation in the fall of 1915. Its dean, Arthur W. MacLean, pointed out to the eager entering class,
61 strong, the "advantages to women of the modem tendency against coeducation of the sexes, and
toward the establishment of separate schools for men and women in all lines of intellectual
endeavor." Id. at 54-55. Apparently the advantages did not extend to an all-female faculty and
administration.
211. Id. at 54.
212. Id. (quoting Mary Agnes Mahan).
213. See VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS AND THE ORIGINS OF PROFESSIONAL
IDENTITY IN AMERICA: THE LETrERS OF EQurry CLuB, 1887 TO 1890, at 33 (1993) (construing Ellen
A. Martin in reference to the death of Mary Frederika Perry).
214. EDWARD H. CLARK, SEX IN EDUCATION: OR, A FAIR CHANCE FOR THE Gnus (1873).
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reproductive organs to the brain, causing a breakdown in women's
health and threatening the health of future generations."'
Additionally,
[t]he women lawyers of the Equity Club understood all too well that
the warnings to Clarke and other physicians threatened their desires
for professional careers. But, within the privacy of the Equity Club,
where they could openly discuss their concerns about health, Equity
Club members did not unanimously reject Clarke's ideas. Ellen Mar-
tin first brought the issue into the open in her letter to the Equity Club
in 1888 when she warned her fellow club members about the delicacy
of the female reproductive system. Sharing Clarke's view, she wrote:
"I refer to the close relation between the brain and the organs peculiar
to women, and to the fact that any trouble with those organs (and a
celebrated anatomist says they seem made to get out of order) seri-
ously affects the brain and the nervous system.
2 '16
Thirty years later, a 1915 address by attorney Selma Klein George
of New Orleans, Louisiana, encapsulated many of the arguments con-
cerning the necessity of women's participation in political and profes-
sional life.
If a moving picture could be made of the real influence exerted
by woman in love, politics and the home, man would come better to
understand the part she plays in the law. The far-reaching force and
effect of woman's influence in every sphere of life cannot be over-
rated .... Undoubtedly woman exercises a greater influence in the
making of laws which are calculated for the betterment of society
than the law-maker himself. She is the power behind the throne. And
if this be so as to the creation of law, why should she not play an im-
portant part in the interpretation of, and the carrying into effect of its
mandates?2 7
George was adamant that accusations that women were not the intellec-
tual equals of men were the direct result of fear. Like Helena
Normanton,"8 she identified much of the antagonism against women
lawyers as an unreasonable fear of competition in general or as fear that
men who are conscious of their social responsibilities toward the weaker
sex would be put at a disadvantage in the courtroom.2 9
215. DRAcHAN, supra note 213, at 31.
216. Id. at 33. For more on the debate, see id. at 34-37. French male opponents of women's
participation in the legal profession made similar arguments. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 471;
CoRcos, supra note 134, at 162.
217. Selma Klein George, Woman and the Law, 8 LAW. & BANK. 118, 118 (1915). The
reference to "moving pictures" is an interesting one, given the novelty of this medium and indicates
that it had already been recognized as a very powerful opinion-maker in early twentieth-century
culture, even among the professional elite.
218. See Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 428 (discussing Helena Normanton's view
that men feared competition with women in the legal profession).
219. Id.
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In those states where woman is forbidden to practice law, about
the only reason given by man is that they would persuade without ar-
gument.... Woman is in every sense the equal of man. The books
with which our libraries are filled, the arts, the academies, show that
their intelligence and learning nourishes all the world.... The law is
supposed to be founded on common sense. If it has that for a basis,
then it goes without saying that woman is equally as well prepared to
220interpret or to enforce the law as man.
In fact, George went so far as to say that because women inspired so
much of the "unwritten law," the custom, of the time, they
might have a like part in all that concerns the statute or written law...
. Any real rivalry of the sexes even in the practice of law, is the
sheerest folly and most unnatural nonsense. The genius of woman is
not alone in her heart; it is equally in her head .... Woman truly
commands. Contact with one that is highminded is acknowledged to
be good for the life of any man.... I submit in conclusion that you
must agree with me that in-sofar as the professions of life as con-
cemed, woman is the "better half."'2 '
The content of the debate in England was remarkably similar. Dur-
ing one particular open debate in London three years before Ivy Wil-
liams's admission, Helena Normanton argued that
if women were unfitted to enter the profession of the law they must
be equally unfitted to enter the medical profession as doctors, for the
mistakes of the doctor were very much more likely to be serious than
those of the lawyer. If women were by temperament incapable of pre-
cision, care, judgment, observation, all these were faculties which a
doctor needed. It came with a very ill grace from a lawyer to demand
that his profession should be closed to women, when it was remem-
bered that so many of the occupations which had been thrown open to
women had been so opened by lawyers. 22
Normanton charged that such reluctance on the part of the male attorney
suggested that he "feared the competition of women" and maintained that
such opposition was unknown outside the legal profession itself. 2"
[S]he could quite honestly say that she had never met anybody out-
side the legal profession who had in any way condemned her for
wishing to become a lawyer. On the contrary she had been most per-
sistently encouraged by a class of men whose opinion was impor-
tant-the law reporters of the newspapers. She could not tell how
many had urged her to persevere. They said they had seen many cases
in the courts where a woman lawyer would have been extremely use-
ful .... She took the profession of the law so seriously that she did
220. See George, supra note 217, at 118-19.
221. See id. at 120.
222. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 428.
223. Id.
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not desire to see women in it merely because they were women. She
desired to see them in it, and successful in it, because the work was of
so great importance that the whole of human ability should be an
open field from which the lawyer should be chosen."
Normanton's abilities as a debater must have surprised her opponents.
Traditionally upper-middle- and upper-class men, but not their socio-
economically middle- and lower-class sisters," received the kind of edu-
cation that permitted them both to formulate and to express powerful
argument.2"
Normanton's most vocal opponent at the debate was Mr. J.A. Sym-
monds, a Metropolitan Police Magistrate, who suggested that she did not
fully understand the nature of legal practice, an argument that she was at
a disadvantage to refute since neither she nor any other woman was a
member of the bar.
[W]omen had not the judgment that was necessary for practising as
lawyers. It was the man-in-the-street's, and ... perhaps, the woman-
224. Id. At least some of the encouragement may have been due to the traditional animosity of
journalists toward lawyers.
225. But see SUSAN J. LEONARDI, DANGEROUS BY DEGREES: WOMEN AT OXFORD AND THE
SOMERVILLE COLLEGE NOVELISTS (1989) (discussing a study of upper middle class women during the
period between the world wars and their record of accomplishment).
226. In her examination of the observable differences between U. S. men and women's scores on
standardized tests, Beryl Lieff Benderly suggests that a great deal of it is attributable to the lack of
emphasis which American education and culture generally place on verbal skills for men, as opposed to
the importance they have for the nm of the mill Englishman. See BERYL LIEFF BENDERLY, THE MYTH
OF TWO MINDS: WHAT GENDER MEANS AND DOESN'T MEAN (1987).
[I]n England and Scotland, grown men play word games on the radio; limericks and
anagrams rank as national pastimes; the witty Ronald Coleman, not the stolid Gary
Cooper, molded the notion of celluloid sex appeal. Schoolmaster-the admirable Mr.
Chips--remains an honorable masculine calling, immune to the scorn Americans heap on
ineffectual buffoons like the comic strips' Mr. Weatherbee or television's Mr. Peepers or
Mr. Conklin. British culture has traditionally tied social power and literary skill into a
single urbane, upper-middle-class package. It trains young politicians in the crackling
debates of the Oxford Union. It signals class and caste by subtleties of stress and syntax.
That highly verbal culture-not surprisingly-produces males who do as well as females
on verbal tests. But so do Nigeria, where British educational traditions continue, and
West Germany, where men often teach in the primary grades.
ld. at 216-17. In spite of attempts to glamorize the teaching profession for young American boys
through television series like Room 222 (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 17, 1969 to Jan. 11, 1974) and
Lucas Tanner (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 11, 1974 to Aug. 20, 1975), and films like STAND AND
DELiVER (American Playhouse 1988), they still prefer "active" occupations like policeman or fireman,
or if they are interested in teaching, college rather than elementary school teaching, as shown in their
reactions to th characters on television. See Tom Dorsey, Girls Searching for Role Models Get Little
Help from Television, CoURIER-J., July 22, 1996, at 3D. Further, men who evince an interest in
spending time with small children (as in child care) are automatically suspect. Men still outnumber
women in the legal profession, however, because of its high status, showing that they can acquire verbal
skills when they see a payoff in status or salary, preferably both. The challenge that "overeducated"
American women posed to the traditional dominance of the privileged males who earned the
"gentlemen's C's" and went on to law school remains to be examined; however, it is certainly
considerable. When I started law school, one male professor warned me not to expect more than a
"gentleman's C", which he described as an acceptable grade. Whether he meant "in general" or "for a
woman" I never knew.
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in-the-street's, idea of law that it consisted in a man standing up in
court and pleading. Every lawyer present would know that the most
important part of a practising barrister's work was done long before
he got into court. He had advised what should be done and how it
should be done .... It was he who said to a client what a woman
would not say. He would ask: "What do you want in this case?" The
client would not have thought of that. Then, when the lawyer found
that out it was often just what the other side wanted, and the case was
settled without further trouble. That would never happen with one
woman in the case, still less when there were two.2"
He failed to state that knowledge of a barrister's "real" work is acquired
through education and practice; men are not born with it. Even a law-
yer's child would be likely to have only an imperfect knowledge of the
actual content of a barrister's daily experiences.
Symmonds objected to what he considered to be a lack of under-
standing on the part of women of the shared background and experiences
of the barrister class, learned as the aristocracy might say, "on the play-
ing fields of Eton."m
227. See Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 428-29.
228. Popular commentators have identified men's shared experiences and expectations as a
continuing barrier to male empathy with female demands for equality. As one writer noted:
My brother, my father, and I were going for a walk.... My brother was asking my father
questions about joining the army. Would he have to go? How old would he be? Would
there be a war? Would he have to fight? I remember feeling very far away emotionally.
As they talked, I knew that their conversation would not ever include me. For the first
time, I was glad. I didn't want to be drafted and go to war, and I knew I would never have
to.... My brother would never be able to have that same kind of relief.... Men are
expected to be like soldiers all the time, and they come to expect this of themselves. They
act brave and take charge even if others, including we women, don't overtly ask them to
do so.... Understanding the metaphor of the soldier goes far in helping you understand
men. That they are the ones who go to war is invisibly woven into the fabric of men's
lives.
SHAPIRO, supra note 131, at 16-17. Similarly, in the area of sports, men share both language and
experience.
They're (sports analogies) everywhere, and, I believe, men love to use them. They
know they understand each other, a little bit like a secret code, although it's not so secret.
We are all becoming familiar with things like, "We'll keep going till we score," or "The
best defense is a good offense." These analogies are pervasive in all arenas. They are so
much a part of the language of business that we don't even recognize them as such.
Women in business soon learn to recognize them and use them. Men talk about
touchdowns, time-outs, fouls, and how about plain old win and lose! And in government,
there's always talk of being on the president's team or being a team player.
Id. at 211. Men use sports analogies as a traditional and effective way of keeping most women out of
the conversation. Graham and Maschio point out the number of times that sports references in the film
THE ACCusED (Paramount 1988) exclude or marginalize women. Graham & Maschio, supra note 12, at
1042.
Note also the analogy between sports and war in the "best defense is a good offense" remark. As
Mar~chal Foch wrote in a report to Mar~chal Joffre after the first battle of the Marne, July 1914: "Mon
centre c6de, ma droite r cule, situation excellente, j'attaque" ("My center is crumbling, my right is
retreating, situation excellent, I attack!"). It is difficult to imagine a woman making such a bold
statement; it ranks with the often-quoted remark about winning a case: "If the law is against you, argue
the facts. If the facts are against you, argue the law. If both the facts and the law are against you, bang
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Far was it from him to say that women were not conscientious. They
had a deeper sense of conscience than the average man. It was more
tender, more easily aroused, there was sympathy for right and justice.
But he did say that women were wanting in that kind of honour
which, speaking before many experts as he did, he ventured to call
the honour of the profession. It was a thing to be learned. It was a
thing learned on the playing-fields largely, on the cricket and football
grounds of the public schools and elsewhere. It was a thing that
women were greatly wanting in. She would do nothing that she
thought wrong intentionally, but she would not know when she was
doing that which was not quite right to do in the Profession. It was a
profession in which one had to fight, to take advantage of his oppo-
nent if he could, to resort to what might be called tricks and dodges
up to a certain point which was admissible, but there was a limit.22
Here Symmonds turned the "moral uplift" argument against women.
Their sense of justice, their innate tenderness, was misplaced as applied
to law. Because, as a practical matter, lawyers were not as concerned
with compassion and equity as they were with promoting the "business
of England" and with winning cases no matter what the rightness of the
opponent's cause, Symmonds was perfectly willing to concede women's
superiority in those areas.' Women's innate tendency to care for every-
one concerned and to look for alternative solutions' would necessarily
impair the proper workings of the system.2
While he did not specify it, he was also clearly concerned about a
woman's ability to "shift gears," to pursue a particular argument for the
good of the client without allowing it to carry over into the social or pro-
fessional sphere outside the courtroom. The ability to "play a part" is one
that male common law attorneys tend to learn relatively quickly, if only
to grease the wheels of professional practice. The aggressive, unforgiv-
ing lawyer does not get far when the time comes for negotiation or for
the granting of favors. "Playing a part" on a team is also part of the good
sportsmanship that boys learn early; it has not necessarily been part of
women's shared culture since until relatively recently girls have not par-
ticipated in team sports to the extent that boys do. Thus, although he
would not have identified it as such, Symmonds' fear that women would
not understand the unwritten rules of competition as practiced in law and
modelled on sports and war was based in an unarticulated but under-
standable appraisal of deficiencies in women's socialization.
on the table and yell like hell." See David L. Ratner, A Brief Word in Response, 16 CARDozo L. RE,.
1793 (1995).
229. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 429 (quoting remarks by J.A. Symmonds).
230. Id.
231. The classic statement of this quality is given in CAROL GiLuGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoicE 28-
31(1982).
232. See Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 428-29 (illustrating the failure of the settlement
process that would take place if women lawyers were involved in the negotiations).
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Note that the assumptions about women's habits of thought"3 are
linked to the particular characteristics of the English common law. While
opponents of the admission of women to the French Bar made the same
argument, that women would not be "tough enough" or intellectually
agile enough to make effective legal arguments on behalf of their clients,
they could not make the arguments that advocacy was of paramount im-
portance. Instead, they suggested that women's ability to think "ration-
ally" was less than men's, therefore they could not apply the principles
of French law adequately to defend their clients' interests." They would
instead fall back on traditional feminine wiles in order to influence
judges." Symmonds continued that he was not suggesting that
the woman's sense of honour in the ordinary affairs of life would not
be as high as man's, but that honour which dealt with and related to
the honour of the profession he thought she would be wanting in. It
was for those who were in the profession to warn those who wished
for this change of the danger of the course they were pursuing.m
But he objected to what he considered to be the lack of understanding
women had of the supremacy of the law.
Miss Normanton had not said a word about the common law of Eng-
land, which was the admiration of the whole world.... Another ob-
jection was that women were not law-abiding-that was of the deep-
est importance. There was no hope for the civilisation of the world
surviving without deep respect of the law of the country-surviving
the storms of world revolution which were sweeping from the East
and threatening to overwhelm us. In this country the man had a deep
reverence for the law, and was by nature a law-abiding creature. But
the woman did not respect the law simply because it was the law. She
showed this, it might be, by slapping a policeman's face. In his opin-
ion it would be endangering this wonderful system of ours if the
touch which was not law-abiding and not full of judgment should be
permitted to interfere with the Ark of the Covenant.
"
In this passage one sees not only a failure on the part of the speaker
to recognize that the law involved has traditionally disenfranchised
women while presuming to legislate their rights and conduct, but also an
attempt to justify it on the grounds of secular legitimacy, on the grounds
of tradition, on the grounds of natural law, on the grounds of political
necessity and national security, and on the grounds of religion. It is a
233. The question of real differences between male and female brains is still under discussion. See
BENDERLY, supra note 226, at 3, 6, 7, 217; ROBERT NADEAU, S/HE BRArN: SCIENCE, SExuAL
POLMcs, AND THE MYTHS OF FEMINISM (1996).
234. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 445 (discussing arguments to justify women's participation in
professions generally).
235. Id. at 472.
236. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 429.
237. Id.
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masterful (no pun intended) use of language to evade the very real ob-
jections that women of the period had to the existing system of law. His
suggestion that women would react with violence to the legitimate exer-
cise of authority ("slapping a policeman's face") might well be a reflec-
tion of his own actual experience as a police magistrate, possibly arising
from a notorious 1906 case, "8 but it failed to acknowledge the very real
possibility that a woman's sole defense against an unjust situation might
well be physical resistance. The slap, indeed, represents the woman's
traditional response to objectionable male (usually sexual) behavior. For
Symmonds, however, it signals an inappropriate, therefore illegal, use of
violence, as opposed to men's self-defining, therefore legitimate, use of
violence (restraint of the woman who slaps the police officer, for exam-
ple, even though he may be enforcing a law that disempowers women).
Symmonds went on to suggest that while women could serve per-
fectly well on the bench (thus addressing Normanton's suggestion that he
feared competition), they mistakenly assumed that participation in the
profession would benefit them. Nothing, he asserted, could be further
from the truth. Indeed, the practice of law might be injurious to their
financial and emotional health.
On the bench he did not dread woman, it was as a practising lawyer,
advising clients, that he feared her. Miss Normanton asked if it would
be good for the community and for the Profession that women should
be allowed to enter the Profession. He would ask whether it was good
for the woman. The profession of the Bar was the hardest apprentice-
ship of any profession in the world. Women desirous of entering it
were thinking of the successes they saw, he was thinking of the fail-
ures-not of the incompetent and unlearned, but of the men of ability,
men of the greatest intelligence, who had hung on for years and had
never attained the success they deserved, or even reached in many
cases, a merited competence. And this failure was due merely to ill-
luck, to having selected the wrong chambers, the wrong circuit, or
from a dozen such causes. He did not want to see the young women
of 19 to 27, 28, or 30 doing as he had seen the young fellows. They
were better able to bear it than the young women.3 9
His protestations are hard to take seriously, since judges need even
more common sense than practicing attorneys. It is difficult to see how a
woman, lacking the judgment necessary to counsel clients, could have
the judgment necessary to serve on the bench. Furthermore, it is a strange
238. Miss Billington wished an interview with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when a policeman
intervened, she "slapped and kicked him." See Miss Billington's Case, 159 PARL DEB. (4th ser.) 648-
49 (1906), cited in 5 A HISrORY OF ENGUSH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750
441 n.37 (Leon Radzinowicz & Roger Hood eds., 1968).
239. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 429. Symmonds may, however, have meant that as a
judge he did not fear women advocates. This interpretation, which bespeaks a patronizing attitude as
well, is not, on the whole, much more satisfactory.
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concession, since judges generally have much more power in the court-
room, and in the day-to-day control of the law, than attorneys.Y
To counteract these arguments, Normanton responded that the sup-
posed lack of honor among women was purely theoretical and specula-
tive. What she did not point out was, of course, that a male notion of
"honor" is considered. It was extremely hypothetical to say what people
would lack in circumstances not known for long centuries."' As for the
objection that women were not "law-abiding," although she did not quote
Shakespeare's famous line, "First thing we do, let's kill all the
lawyers," '' she made an analogous argument. Citing the chaos of con-
temporary Russia, she pointed out that "the first thing the Bolsheviks did
when they got power in Russia was to hang every lawyer, man and
woman."2 3 Giving women a stake in maintaining the legitimacy of the
legal order was a much more intelligent course than banning them alto-
gether.
She would suggest that women lawyers would be a strength to soci-
ety. If women once got these doctrines of anarchy into their heads and
hearts, it would be a thousand times worse than when they were con-
fined to the men. The more women were interested in the law the
better for society and for themselves.2"
As for Symmonds' thoughtful concern for the well-being of women:
[Wihat happened to a woman who failed in any profession? If a man
failed in any capacity he had to go to the wall. That was the inexora-
ble law, and it held good of the woman. Let every one be given any
equal chance. It had been said that the profession of the law would
take a great deal out of a woman. So did every profession-nursing
soldiers at the front, and in many other instances. When she (Miss
Normanton) made her application last year to the Middle Temple, it
was refused with unanimity, but immediately the largest organisation
of women in the country protested. That was an organisation which
numbered two and a half million members, the National Council of
Women Workers. There was a very large demand indeed amongst
women for women lawyers. The serious opposition, such as there had
been, had practically melted away, and she would like to leave the
question-and it was a great question-in the long run to the consid-
eration that it was for the good of the country as a whole and to the
highest service of the community that, if proper service was ready to
240. See, e.g., Delfs, supra note 15, at 322 n.169 and accompanying text (providing examples of
sexist behavior by male judges in contemporary courtrooms).
241. Admssion of Women, supra note 186, at 429.
242. WnmuAM SHAKEsPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIxTH act 4, sc. 2; see also
New York County Lawyers Association Honors Chief Judge John C. Knox, 39 A.B.A.J. 424 (1953)
(quoting the remarks of Edwin M. Ottenbourg which provide the real meaning and frequent
misinterpretation of these lines).
243. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 429.
244. Id.
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be rendered to the State by any individual of any kind, the State
should hesitate long and seriously before rejecting that proper
245service.
Like other supporters, Normanton was clearly offended by the sug-
gestion that women would be reduced to tears if they lost a case or faced
real opposition in the courtroom,2 Her words, and those of Miss Clon-
desley Brereton and others attending, ultimately persuaded the listeners
to the debate. 0
Among additional arguments advanced against both the right and
the advisability of women becoming attorneys was that of the likelihood
of marriage, which immediately conferred both a legal and social dis-
ability on the woman. 2' The small number of women likely to be inter-
ested in becoming attorneys, based on the number of impediments pre-
sented, itself became an argument against the admission of women to the
bar. Opponents argued that so few women would be affected that the
question was hardly worth addressing. 9 Even the supporters of female
membership in the bar acknowledged that their numbers were so few
that, as one Canadian commentator acknowledged:
I do not think that the most fervent advocate of women's rights could
claim that the admission of women to the practice of law has had any
appreciable effect on the bar, the practice of law, the bench, or the
people. It is claimed that it was a measure of justice and fair play, that
245. Id.
246. French opponents of admission advanced a similar argument. See Corcos, supra note 37, at
469 (listing complaints related to the question of women's physical and mental fitness for the bar).
247. "The motion was carried, 35 votes being given in its favour and 28 against." Admission of
Women, supra note 186, at 429.
248. Marriage was viewed as an impediment to other professions as well. When the Inter-
Departmental Committee of the British Foreign Service examined the question of the admission of
women to the service, it considered both the traditional prejudices against women in those positions,
which it deemed unfortunate, and the very real obstacles that marriage might present to those women.
[Elven if governmental regulations place no bar in the way of employing married women,
a normal attractive young woman who wishes to marry may, nevertheless, find herself in
the unfortunate predicament of being obligated to resign from the Service or to give up
the man of her choice. The consequence of placing its foreign service officer in this
dilemma is likely to result in a loss of efficiency for the Govemment, whether it be
because of the resignation of an experienced officer or because she may be handicapped
by the canker of a serious constraint, consequent upon her renunciation.
Ellery C. Stowell, Editorial Comment: The Admission of Women to the British Foreign Service, 30 Am.
J. INT'L L 499,500 (1936).
249. Likewise, the report of the Inter-Departmental Committee of the British Foreign Service
recommended against the admission of women.
Finally, His Majesty's Government do not consider that any injustice is being done
to women by their continued exclusion from the Diplomatic Service. It is, to say the least,
doubtful whether women are suited to this Service owing to the conditions prevailing; it
is equally doubtful whether the admission of women would contribute any special
advantage to the State; lastly, the size of the Service is so small that the general question
of the employment of women is in any event hardly affected.
Id. at 501 (quoting the government's official pronouncement). French opponents of women's admission
expressed the concern that only unattractive women would pursue a long-term career in the law,
apparently an outcome too dreadful to be contemplated. Corcos, supra note 37, at 468.
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it removed a grievance and has had no countervailing disadvantage.
That claim may be fairly be allowed; in other respects, the admission
of women is regarded with complete indifference by all but those
immediately concemed. °
Even the most committed supporter of women's rights must have
wondered how women raised in an intellectual, social and political ambi-
ance so different from men could adequately adjust to the standards of
behavior inculcated in the class of men who traditionally became mem-
bers of the English Bar. Women for whom the public school was foreign
territory, and the training grounds of the British armed forces, the City,
and the Houses of Parliament were complete mysteries, might very well
fail to understand those unspoken mores that formed the shared environ-
ment in which English lawyers operated. In addition, the legal profession
was anxious to maintain the status that it had spent centuries in acquiring
through an emphasis on its connection with the traditional medieval uni-
versity curriculum as well as the habits and fortunes of the landed gentry
and the aristocracy." Given that women's rights to hold land and titles
were circumscribed to various extents, contemporary male attorneys
were likely to accept intuitively that they should also be excluded from
the professions, particularly law.
To allow individuals who had traditionally had no part in formally
shaping that law to take part in its application and future development
was certainly a leap of faith for even the most fervent male advocates of
the equality of the fairer sex. The changes that these men anticipated
included the traditional expectation of "moral uplift": women would
bring a sense of moral purpose to the law, interesting themselves in
"women's issues" such as marriage and probate, the care of children,
domestic violence, prostitution, and education. Some women attorneys
found this interest natural as well.
To-day men and women alike rejoice in the record of scientific
achievements, in the progress made along educational lines .... But
women at the same time are "wondering why" about many things.
My point is this-that just as they, true to woman nature, have
worked in the past, indirectly, to mitigate the overshadowing evils
that have accompanied our advance every step of the way-so will
they, under new conditions-working without any handicap, in the
future and holding high positions in the state-concentrate upon cer-
tain problems which from their very nature appeal to womankind, and
which the rank and file of men deplore half-heartedly. ... [1]t is but
natural that our sex should be acutely conscious to-day of the burdens
250. Riddell, supra note 85, at 206.
251. See Wilfred Prest, Why the History of the Professions is Not Written, in LAW, ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY, 1750-1914: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY O ENGLISH LAw 300, 315-16 (G.R. Rubin & David
Sugarman eds., 1984) (elaborating on the meaning of the word "profession" to the lawyer).
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that rest most heavily upon women and little children. Because of
this, the evils of the industrial system loom up largely." '
Most men, however, did not recognize, or did not articulate, the possibil-
ity that women might actually refocus the attention of the law on other
issues, or force a change in the debate that contemplated as yet unfor-
mulated solutions to traditional problems. Such approaches might bring
about fundamental changes in the nature of the English common law; the
men who supported the entrance of women into the English legal profes-
sion would have had difficulty anticipating them.
C. Existing Legislation and Its Interpretation
1. Attempts to Obtain Admission Through the Courts
Finally, one Englishwoman who had completed the appropriate
education for the profession of solicitor and had been accepted as a clerk
in accordance with the requirement of the Law Society (the certifying
body for the profession), 3 requested admittance by taking her case to
court, initially to the Supreme Court of Judicature. Her attempt, like that
of Jeanne Chauvin in France,"4 Myra Bradwell in the United States (Illi-
nois),2" and Clara Brett Martin in Canada (Ontario),'s forced the courts to
252. Giles, supra note 6, at 356.
253. See EDMUND BROWN VINEY CHRISTIAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF SoUcrrORs 177 (1896)
(providing a history of the Law Society).
254. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 447.
255. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s, at 81-84 (1983). Joan Hoff gives a fuller
account of Mansfield's admission in LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S.
WOMEN 162-63 (1991). Hoff also rehearses the story of Ada H. Keply, the first American woman to
graduate from an accredited law school and the objections to Bradwell's admission, namely that she
was married. Id. at 163-70. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Shortridge Foltz: "First Woman", 28
VAL U. L REv. 1231 (1994) (discussing the first woman admitted in California).
For other U.S. cases in which the bar denied admission to a womam admitted in another state,
see In re Maddox, 50 A. 487 (Md. 1901); In re Leonard, 6 P. 426 (Or. 1885). But see In re Application
for License, 55 S.E. 635 (1906) (intimating that judges who deny qualified women admission to the bar
are lacking in common sense). See also Admission of Women, supra note 186; Some Judicial Views of
Woman's Sphere, 15 LAW NOTES 103 (1911); Women Lawyers and the Law, 16 LAW NOTES 141
(1912). By July 1915, Law Notes was suggesting to the Georgia legal profession that it was much too
late to deny women the right to enter the practice of law, no matter what its intentions. Right of Women
to Practice Law, 19 LAW NOTES 62 (1915); see also Virginia G. Drachman, Women Lawyers and the
Quest for Professional Identity in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 88 MICH. L REv. 2414 (1990)
(discussing attempts to create a gendered, professional identity). French opponents of women's
admission also objected that married women were barred from acting as attorneys, since their freedom
of action was subordinate to their husbands' will. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 462.
As early as 1886, however, some male attorneys were considering the possible impact of women
on the profession. In that year Mr. Charles C. Moore published a piece of overheated Victorian prose
called The Female Lawyer, in which he speculated on the arrival in the town of Litchfield (home of the
first U.S. law school) of a female attorney named Miss Mary Padelford, who, denied entrance to the
Massachusetts Bar, obtains her license in Connecticut. Miss Padelford is painted as a very competent
member of the profession, particularly in the area of "consultations, drawing deeds, bonds, will and
other legal documents," but is unfortunately done in by the unchivalrous behavior of an adversary. After
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consider whether admission to the practice of law is a public, not a pri-
vate function, and as such whether it may be regulated by the appropriate
jurisdiction. While the women requesting admission by court degree
were uniformly unsuccessful, 7 their requests forced the various govern-
ments involved to acknowledge the end of an era in which the right to
make law could no longer be determined simply by members of a very
select and self-selecting group. 8
2. Bebb v. Law Society: The Trial Court Case
After attending school in London and at Oxford University, where
she earned honors in jurisprudence 9 Gwyneth Marjorie Bebb decided to
attempt to qualify as a solicitor. In order to do so, she needed the spon-
sorship of a practicing solicitor, who would accept her as a clerk for a
a bout with brain fever, she returns to Litchfield to marry a colleague, join him in his practice and live
happily ever after. In deference to her feminine disabilities, however, the practice is divided up
"between the partners to the entire satisfaction of both." Charles C. Moore, The Female Lawyer, 26
GREEN BAG 525 (1914) (citing the DAILY TIMES (Hartford), May 17, 1886). Virginia Drachman takes a
rather sour view of this story, emphasizing Moore's assumptions about the woman lawyer's natural
physical frailty and the appropriateness of her limited practice after her marriage. See DRACHMAN,
supra note 213, at 32-33. While to late twentieth-century eyes the style of the story does seem outdated
and the sentiments somewhat patronizing, Moore's willingness to allow his protagonist hero, a
successful lawyer, to fall in love with and encourage the aspirations of the woman attorney in the story
is refreshing. Indeed, given the continuing prejudices against women attorneys documented in works by
Podmore & Spencer, supra notes 17, 19; SACHS & WILSON, supra note 3; and Kennedy, supra note
158; Moore may be more somewhat more progressive than he seems at first. But see D. Kelly
Weisberg, Barred From the Bar: Women and Legal Education in the United States 1870-1890, 28 J.
IEGAL EDUc. 485 (1977) (addressing women's struggle to gain entry into thelegal profession). Further,
the career path chosen by Miss Padelford is quite similar to those chosen by some Canadian women
lawyers up to the 1970s. See Kinnear, supra note 85, at 428-29.
256. See supra Part iiLA.1.
257. It is significant that these women thought the courts might be sympathetic to their claims,
since it suggests that they believed that their rights were at least as strong as those of men similarly
situated. On the realization of the ability of courts to empower women with civil rights previously
denied, see MICHAEL GROSSBERG, A JUDGMENT FOR SOLOMON: THE D'HATEVILLE CASE AND
LEGAL EXPERIENCE IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 155-67 (1996) (describing the attempt of a nineteenth-
century Philadelphia divore(e to obtain custody of her children from her Swiss ex-husband).
258. On the history and regulation of French lawyers, see MICHAEL P. FrrZIMMONS, THE
PARISIAN ORDER OF BARRISTERS AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1987); LUCIEN KARPIK, I.S
AVOCATS: ENTRE L'tTAT, LE PUBLIc Er LE MARCHI XXIII-XX SItCLE (1995). On U.S. lawyers, see
ANTON-HERMANN CHROUSTTHE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA (1965); THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: MAJOR HISTORCAL INTERPRETATIONS (Kermit L Hall ed., 1987); THE NEw HIGH
PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POsT-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984). A comprehensive
history of the Canadian legal profession has yet to be written; however, see Harry W. Arthurs et al.,
Canadian Lawyers: A Peculiar Professionalism, in 1 LAWYERS IN SOCEmTY, supra note 69, at 123-77.
On English lawyers, see 15 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, supra note 14, at 223-47;
Richard L Abel, England and Wales: A Comparison of the Professional Projects of Barristers and
Solicitors, in 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, supra note 69, at 23-75.
259. Bebb v. Law Society, 29 T.LR. 634, 635 (Ch. 1913). The case was tried in the Supreme
Court of Judicature, Chancery Division, on July 2, 1913, and appealed to the court of appeal, which
heard the case on December 9 and 10, 1913, and delivered its opinion on December 13, 1913. Bebb v.
Law Society, 30 T.L.R. 179 (C.A. 1913).
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stated period of time.' Ultimately, she also needed some kind of official
recognition from the Law Society that she would be admitted, once she
completed all the requirements satisfactorily as defined by the Solicitors
Act of 1843,26 which established the requirements of membership in the
English Bar, including minimum qualifications for training and member-
ship. 2 Section 3 required would-be solicitors to have been "bound as a




She understood that there were firms of solicitors who were willing to
take her as an articled clerk .... Mr. E.A. Bell, examined by Mr.
Wright, said that he practised in the City as a solicitor, and that he
belonged to the firm of Carter and Bell. He was willing to accept the
plaintiff as his clerk.2"
Section 2 of the Act required such work experience:
[N]o person shall act as an attorney or solicitor, or as such attorney or
solicitor sue out any writ or process, or commence, carry on, solicit,
or defend any action, suit, or other proceeding, in the name of any
other person or in his own name ... unless such person shall have
previously to the passing of this Act admitted and inrolled and other-
wise duly qualified to act as an attorney or solicitor under or by virtue
of the laws now in force, or unless such person shall after the passing
of this Act be admitted and inrolled and otherwise duly qualified to
act as an attorney or solicitor, pursuant to the directions and regula-
tions of this Act, and unless such person shall continue to be so duly
qualified and on the roll at the time of his acting in the capacity of an
attorney or solicitor as aforesaid. 265
Nothing in this section, or indeed in the rest of the Act, stated that
only men could become clerks. If a woman could complete the require-
ments laid out in the Act, she should theoretically be allowed to practice.
260. Bebb, 29 T.L.R. at 634.
261. 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 73, §§ 2, 3 (Eng.).
262. Id.
263. Bebb, 29 T.LR. at 634.
264. d at 635. Bell's willingness to assist Bebb would still have been unusual in the England of
the early 1980s.
A male sponsor will have mixed feelings about accepting a woman as prothg6 or as
presenting her to his colleagues as a good proposition in the long term for a law
partnership to take on. He will be unlikely to identify a woman as a potential partner or
successor and will tend to prefer a male prot~g6 who is assumed to be more committed to
a career. Sponsors (like selectors everywhere) tend to pick prottg6s "in their own image",
[sic] which automatically reduces the chances of women. Moreover, a woman prot~g6 is
assumed to be potential "trouble" in other ways and the ideal type close relationship
between sponsor and protg may be less easy to maintain between members of the
opposite sex, particularly when the views of the respective marital partners are taken into
account.
Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 29 (footnote omitted). John Mortimer's short stories Rumpole
and the Female of the Species, in THE SECOND RUMPOLE OMNIBus 324 (1987) and Rumpole and the
Miscarriage of Justice, in RuMPoL.E ON TRIAL 79 (1992), detail the difficulties of women in the
profession.
265. Solicitors Act of 1843,6 & 7 Vict., ch. 73, § 2 (Eng.).
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According to Bebb's attorneys, Messrs. Stanley Buckmasters and
R.A. Wright, the Law Society's difficulty stemmed from the admittance
of women to clerkships. If a woman could be admitted to a clerkship,
then, assuming she completed her training satisfactorily, nothing pre-
vented her from being admitted to the profession of solicitor. 7 They ad-
dressed the traditional objections to allowing women into the profession,
specifically custom and statutory language.268 Common law provided no
support for the contention that women were excluded from the profes-
sion. Prior to the reign of Edward II, women could, and did, appear as
advocates.2" Apart from the Act of 1888, the only prohibitions against
women entering the profession were inferred from tradition, and based
on no required denial of the right.
The only Act which was in mandatory form was the Act of 1888. By
section 10 of that Act the Master of the Rolls was bound to admit the
plaintiff if she presented a certificate. That being the position, then,
unless the Law Society could refuse to let her sit for the examination,
there was nothing to prevent her from being admitted as a solicitor.
The only right to inquire into the character and capacity of an appli-
cant was the right given at the time of the final examination.
Since Bebb was not requesting the right to exercise a public office, from
which women were disqualified,
266. Later, he became Lord Buckrnaster. See DICIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, 1931-1940,
at 119-21 (LG. Wickham Legged., Supp. 1949) (describing Lord Buckmaster's life).
267. Bebb v. Law Society, 29 T.LR. 634,635 (Ch. 1913).
268. Id. at 635.
269. The story of the woman who appointed another woman as her attorney and then removed her
is often told. 1 SELECr CIVL PLEAS, case 141, at 56 (William Paley Baildon ed., 1890). Generally
speaking, the "rtcmey" was not a member of a recognized profession but simply one who spoke for
another in court; thus any person could fulfill that role.
Originally the job is rather "casual." Even a woman could do it; in 1203 a woman
puts her sister in her place and then removes her, but she is not called attornata. But in
1313 a man claims "per Isabellam de Uptone attomatum suum". Katherine Bompuz in
1306 was "appointed" attorney to receive a gold ring. Thus the word is originally not
technical but lay, if not popularly coined, while all the words with which it soon has to
compete were by this time--though they, too, had once been of popular origin-stamped
with a jural character.
HERMAN CoHEN, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR AND ATrORNATus TO 1450, at 134 (1929)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter COHEN, A HISTORY]. Cohen also contributed an erudite two-part essay
on the subject, The Origins of the English Bar, 30 LAW Q. REV. 464, 467 (1914); 31 LAW Q. REv. 56,
62-63 (1915).
The case of women advocates during Roman times is also often cited as evidence that women
could and did serve as lawyers, although it also demonstrates the objections that men had to women
attorneys, namely that they could be too energetic (therefore ill-suited to the practice of law). Quoting
the Siete Partidas of Alfonso X, Cohen stated:
The code (1.8) is very emphatic in disqualifying any woman "however (wise or)
learned" (sabidora) from practising, "for two reasons; it is not decent for a woman to
compete publicly with men, in arguing for another: then because the sages in the past
prohibited it after their experience of Calfurnia." This story seems to have had a
fascination for Latin jurists.
COHEN, A HISTORY, supra at 422 (footnotes omitted).
270. Bebb, 29 T.L.R. at 634.
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there was nothing to prevent a woman from performing a private
duty, and the office of a solicitor was a private office. The disability
extended only to the exercise of public functions. That women had
not hitherto desired to exercise these functions merely meant that
their qualifications had lain dormant, not that they did not exist.
There was no disqualification either at common law or by statute."
The two advocates also presented a carefully constructed case on
the question of statutory language, arguing that since women were not
specifically exempted from becoming solicitors by the Act, that Bebb
should be allowed to qualify, or in the alternative, that if women were
not allowed to practice as solicitors by the terms of the Act, they could
not be held to be in violation of it, should they fail to be admitted and
enrolled by the Law Society. "If the use of the masculine gender and the
word 'person' in other parts of the Act did not include women, then
women were not included under that section, and they could act as so-
licitors without being admitted and enrolled, and could not be punished
for so doing."' Indeed, Ivy Williams, who would later become the first
woman admitted to practice law in England, had challenged the profes-
sion with that argument in 1904:
There will be a band of lady "University lawyers." These University
lawyers will say to the Benchers and the Law Society: "Admit us, or
we shall form a third branch of the profession, and practise as outside
lawyers." There is no law to prevent it. Ladies holding University law
degrees, learned and skilled in the law, deservedly enjoying public
confidence, could legally compete in vast fields of the solicitor's and
counsel's most lucrative domains, and without infringing the law.
And they need not trammel themselves with lawyers' trade union
rules.2 73
Bebb, however, professed herself willing to comply with certain of the
requirements, such as apprenticeship, although she maintained that she
could be exempted from taking the preliminary examination." Further
legislation of 187727 and 1888 " set forth clarification in regard to the
271. Id. at 635. Interestingly, no one seems to have remarked that the office of sovereign, the most
public office in the realm, had been repeatedly and until 12 years before, spectacularly occupied by a
person of the female sex. But see infra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
272. Bebb, 29 T.LR. at 634.
273. Obiter Dicta, 39 LAw J. 1 (1904) at 1. The reporter also quoted an American attorney who
opined:
My own observation of women lawyers, based upon thirty years' experience at the
Bar of Illinois and of the Supreme Court of the United States, is that they do not succeed;
indeed, hardly appear as advocates, however useful they may become as office
practitioners .... The few women I have ever seen in the Courts did not appear to me to
be conspicuous examples of success; and one of them, who had, I believe, gained some
notoriety, had done so in the Police courts by the sacrifice of qualities usually considered
as feminine.
d
274. Bebb, 29 T.LR. at 635. She was undoubtedly making reference to the Solicitors Act of 1894,
57 & 58 Vict., ch. 9, § 3 (Eng.).
275. Solicitors Act of 1877, 40 & 41 Vict., ch. 25, §§ 5,7, 8 (Eng.).
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fitness of applicants to sit for the required examinations and the necessity
for a certificate to be presented to the Master of the Rolls attesting to
acceptable completion of the requirements for entering the profession.
Like many other questions in which the exact classification of
women figured, the meaning of the word "person" was crucial to the
interpretation of the statute, and therefore to the entry of women into the
profession.
Section 48 was the interpretation clause, and was very important. It
enacted that "every word importing the masculine gender only shall
extend and be applied to a female as well as a male; and the word
'person' shall extend to any body politic, corporate, or collegiate,
municipal, civil, or ecclesiastical, aggregate or sole, as well as an in-
dividual; unless in any of the cases aforesaid it be otherwise specially
provided, or there be something in the subject or context repugnant to
such construction.
This "repugnancy" applied to section 2, the section setting forth the
qualifications for the position of solicitor. 2" Further, Bebb's attorneys
argued, nothing in section 48 was repugnant to section 2.' Note also,
that the Interpretation Act of 1889, required that "unless the contrary
intention appears,-(a) words importing the masculine gender shall in-
lude females; and (b) words in the singular shall include the plural, and
words in the plural shall include the singular.'
The Law Society also pleaded custom and the interpretation of lan-
guage as well as an inability to make such a momentous decision in ob-
jecting to Bebb's request."' Mr. Hughes, one of the barristers represent-
ing the Law Society, argued that
in this matter the Law Society was in the position of a public official.
It was the registrar and was responsible for the register of solicitors.
When the plaintiff and three other ladies presented their application
the society felt that it was impossible to admit them without taking
the opinion of the Court. With regard to the period before the modem
Acts, there was no known instance of a woman practising as an attor-
ney or solicitor. The right to have an attorney, instead of the obliga-
tion to appear in person, only developed very gradually .... The Act
of 1843 was negative throughout. It proceeded on the footing that up
to that time men, and men only, had acted as solicitors. Ordinarily,
where words importing the masculine gender were used, they in-
276. Solicitors Act of 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., ch. 65, § 10 (Eng.).
277. Bebb, 29 T.LR. at 634 (quoting the Solicitor's Act of 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 73, § 48 (Eng.)).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Interpretation Act of 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., ch. 63, § 1 (Eng.). On English statutory
interpretation, see PETER BENSON MAXWELL., ON THE INTERPRETATiON OF STATUTES 349 (G.F.L
Bridgman ed., 7th ed. 1929) (reprinting the Interpretation Act).
281. Bebb, 29 T.LR. at 635.
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cluded women, but that would not apply in this case, because it was
not the custom for women to act as solicitors.
2
Notice here the reversal of the traditional anti-female position that if a
word is not used, this omission is deliberate and necessarily means that
women are excluded. The Law Society acknowledged here that failure to
specify that women were included was not fatal to the plaintiff's case. 3
Instead, it took the position that the omission resulted from the failure of
the drafters to recognize that women might actually request inclusion.'
Such tortuous logic suggests bad faith on the part of a Law Society
that knew the temper of the times was slowly turning against it. In sup-
port of its position, it could only cite a Scottish case interpreting a voting
statute, Nairn v. University of St. Andrews,'m in which women graduates
of the University of Edinburgh were denied the right to vote for Parlia-
mentary electors, and another Scottish case, Hall v. Incorporated Soci-
ety of Law-Agents,' whose reasoning ultimately paralleled that in Bebb,
the Scottish equivalent of the Law Society had not opposed the admis-
sion of the petitioner.'
Similarly, when addressing the question of section 35,m Hughes
argued that since the legislature did not specifically mention women, it
could not have contemplated their inclusion in the profession.' "Person"
within the meaning of the Act necessarily meant "male." '
For Mr. Justice Joyce, the question seemed to turn on whether the
position of solicitor had any public duties associated with it.' If so, then
women, being disqualified from exercising public offices, were neces-
sarily disqualified from the profession. "According to common law, a




285. 25 T.L.R. 160, 160 (Sess. 1908).
286. Nairn, 25 T.LR. at 160.
287. 3 Fr. 1059 (Sess. 1901).
288. Hall, 3 Fr. at 1060.
289. Hughes stated:
That from and after the passing of this Act, in case any person shall in his own name or in
the name of any other person sue out any writ or process, or commence, prosecute, or
defend any action or suit or any proceedings in any court of law or equity, without being
admitted and inrolled as aforesaid, or being himself the plaintiff or defendant in such
proceedings respectively, every such person shall and is hereby made incapable to
maintain or prosecute any action or suit in any court of law or equity for any fee, reward,
or disbursements on account of prosecuting, carrying on, or defending any such action,
suit, or proceeding, or otherwise in relation thereto; and such offense shall be deemed a
contempt of the court in which such action, suit, or proceeding shall have been
prosecuted, carried on, or defended, and shall and may be punished accordingly.
Solicitors Act of 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 73, § 35 (Eng.).
290. Bebb v. Law Society, 29 T.L.R. 634,635 (Ch. 1913).
291. Bebb, 29 T.LR. at 635.
292. Id.
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that a solicitor did not exercise a public function, but he was very much
mistaken if solicitors of standing were not qualified to exercise certain
public functions. '"" His Lordship did not believe he was mistaken.' In-
deed,
[h]is Lordship entertained no doubt as to the position of women be-
fore the modem legislation. He did not doubt that they were disquali-
fied by reason of their sex from acting as solicitors. Then there was
the Act of 1843. His Lordship read section 48, and said that such a
clause as that was only to enable the drafting of the Act to be done
more concisely than it might otherwise be. The same remark applied
to the Interpretation Act. It was never intended to make such a revo-
lution. There was no statute which showed any intention of the Leg-
islature to alter the common law. The disability therefore still existed,
and would exist until it was changed by the Legislature. The action
must therefore be dismissed. 295
Apparently, his Lordship felt no compunction about so actively inter-
preting the intention of the legislature, in contravention of the Interpreta-
tion Act of 1889.' To suggest that statutory language that specifically
includes women was written simply for the sake of efficiency is to make
a mockery of any possible legislative intent.'
3. The Court of Appeals Case
Bebb pursued the matter, and in 1913 the court of appeals upheld
the finding of Mr. Justice Joyce.Y
The action was brought by Miss Gwyneth Marjorie Bebb asking for a
declaration that she was a "person" within the meaning of the Solici-
tors Act, 1843, and the amending Acts, and a mandamus to compel
the Law Society to admit her to the preliminary examinations held by
the Law Society under such Acts with a view to her becoming a so-
licitor.'"
The appellate court focused on the question of interpretation of the
statute, as the appellant's new counsel, Lord Robert Cecil, requested.'
Further, the issue of the disqualification of women to hold public office




296. 52 & 53 Vict., ch. 63 (Eng.).
297. This kind of Humpty-Dumpty jurisprudence (that a word means what a person chooses it to
mean, LEwis CARROL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND, AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
(1912)) recalls a 1947 Louisiana case in which the court refused to find the existence of undisclosed
agency in spite of the fact that the relevant statute specifically provided for undisclosed agency. See
Sentell v. Richardson, 29 So. 2d 852 (La. 1947).
298. Bebb. v. Law Society, 30 T.L.R. 179 (C.A. 1913).
299. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179.
300. Id.
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His contentions were (1) that unmarried women had the same legal
rights as men; (2) that at Common Law there was nothing to prevent
women from becoming attorneys; and (3) that on the fair construction
of the statutes on the subject they favoured the view that women were
entitled to be admitted as solicitors. In Pollock and Maitland's His-
tory of English Law (first edition), Vol. I, p. 468, it was laid down
that women had the same private rights as men, but that there was no
place for women in public offices. If that was to be taken as being
true as regards public functions, the words must be construed nar-
rowly.3'
Surprisingly, Mr. Cozens-Hardy, the Master of the Rolls, the official
appointed to accept certificates from aspiring solicitors, volunteered from
the bench that "women had acted as churchwardens. ' ' m
Cecil also made the rather obvious point that women had ruled the
country, both as queens regnant' ° (i.e., in their own right) and as regents
for absent kings or child sovereigns.'
Queen Eleanor had acted in 1253 as Keeper of the Great Seal....
Counsel then cited authorities to show that a woman had also acted as
a hereditary Lord High Constable, by deputy, and as Marshal and
Lord Chamberlain. There was authority that she could act as governor
of a workhouse ... a sexton ... or an overseer. Thus there was no ab-
solute sex disqualification which prevented women from holding
public offices, but their right to do so depended on the circumstances
of each case. They were excluded from military offices for want of
physical capacity and could only hold them by deputy.O
301. Id.
302. Id. This comment was unpersuasive to at least one commentator. See Notes: Women and the
Profession, 26 JuR1D. REV. 130, 131 (1914). On the duties of churchwardens as officers of the state, see
generally WLAM LAMBARDE, THE DUETmS OF CONSTABLES, BORSHOLDERS, TYTHINGMEN, AND
SUCH OTHER LowE AND LAY MINISTERS OF THE PEACE (1599); JOHN LAYER, THE OFFICE AND DUTIE
OF CONSTABLES, CHURCHWARDENS AND OTHER THE OVERSEERS OF THE PooRE (1641); GEORGE
MERITON, A GUIDE FOR CONSTABLES, CHURCHWARDENS, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR, SURVEYORS OF
THE HIGH-WAYS, TREASURERS OF THE COUNTY-STOCK, MASTERS OF THE HOUSE OF CORRECTION,
BAYLUFFS OF MANNORS, TOLL-TAKERS iN FAIRs &c (1679).
303. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179. The most recent example was of course Victoria (1837-1901), who is
the subject of many biographies, including CAROLLY ERICKSON, HER LrrrLE MAJESTY: THE LIFE OF
QUEEN VicrORiA (1997).
304. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179. Among the most notable were Eleanor of Aquitaine, the wife of
Henry n1, who governed the kingdom during his absences fighting on the continent, Margaret of Anjou,
the unpopular wife of Henry VI, who governed during his bouts of insanity, and Catherine of Aragon,
who was named Regent while Henry VIII was off to fight with Francis I of France. Some historians
have now begun to study the roles of queens as rulers, advisors and educators from the earlier Christian
period through the middle Renaissance (roughly 500 C.E. to 1500 C.E.). See PAULINE STAFFORD,
QUEENS, CONCUBINES, AND DOWAGERS: THE KING'S WIFE IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 115-90
(1983).
305. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179 (citations omitted). The "Queen Eleanor" of Cecil's reference was
Eleanor of Provence, the Queen of Henry III (reigned 1216-1272).
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Cecil also addressed the case of Beresford-Hope v. Sandhurst,' one of
the cases on which the Law Society had relied to demonstrate that
women could not exercise any public office.
Lord Esher had expressed the view that a woman could not exercise
any public function, and had relied on Chorlton v. Lings, but Lord
Esher's dictum could not be supported by what was said by Willes, J.,
in that case, and was incorrect. If it was correct it would be difficult
to see how female inspectors could be appointed under the Factory
and Workshop Act, 1901, section 118."'
The case of Chorlton v. Lings' was a suffrage case, an early at-
tempt to obtain the right to vote for women through an error on the part
of the election commissioners. Mrs. Lilly Maxwell, a resident of Man-
chester, discovered that she had been erroneously entered on the electoral
register and with the assistance of barrister Chisholm Anstey attempted
to exploit that mistake by demanding the right to vote.' As Anstey de-
veloped the argument, the right to vote had traditionally been attached to
property ownership rather than to gender.Y° More than five thousand
other women eagerly seized on the opportunity, also claiming the right of
suffrage."' The court of appeals rejected Mrs. Maxwell's petition, pri-
marily because even if the right had ever existed, women had lost it by
failing to exercise it."2 This malicious argument paralleled the position
that opponents of women's admission to the bar used to justify their ex-
clusion. How can one exercise a right that one has been assured one does
not possess? Such reasoning had the effect of codifying the custom of
denying women the vote, forcing the decision back into the legislative
arena. But it appealed to the Bebb court which adopted the "custom"
argument in rejecting her position."'
At least one of the presiding magistrates, Lord Justice Phillimore,
did not find Cecil's historical argument persuasive. Although the barris-
ter cited both the Pollock and Maitland work,""4 a classic statement of the
development of English legal history, and some of the Yearbooks of Ed-
306. 5 T.L.R. 472 (C.A. 1889).
307. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179 (citation omitted).
308. 4 L.R. 347 (C.P. 1868).
309. Norman St. John-Stevas, Women in Public Law, in A CENTURY OF FAMILY LAW 1857-1957,
supra note 18, at 256, 263-64.
310. Id.at263.
311. Id. at 263-64.
312. Chorlton, 4 L.R. at 347.
313. Bebb v. Law Society, 30 T.L.R. 179, 180 (C.A. 1913). Eventually women did obtain a
limited right to vote with the passage of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & 10 Geo.
5, ch. 71, § 1 (Eng.).
314. FPEDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERiC WLLAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
216 (2d ed. 1903). On the difference between "countor" (or serjeant) and attorney, see EDMUND
BROWN VINEY CHISTAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF SOLICrrORS 3-4 (1896).
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ward II, 3 5 his Lordship objected that "at that time there was no profes-
sion of attorneys, but a litigant could appoint anyone to be his
attorney."3 " Cecil acknowledged that was true, but that after the profes-
sion had formally emerged, women had still been employed as advo-
cates. "Other authorities were Select Civil Pleas, Vol. 1., case 141, p. 56,
when a woman appointed another woman to represent her, and Bracton's
Note Book, Vol. ii., case 342, p. 283, and Vol. iH., p. 335."'' Cecil reit-
erated that the use of the word "person" in section 2 of the 1843 Act "in-
cluded a woman""3 8 and that section 48 mandated that the use of the mas-
culine gender incorporated women as well.
[Elvery word importing the masculine gender only shall extend and
be applied to a female as well as a male; and the word "person" shall
extend to any body politic, corporate, or collegiate, municipal, civil,
or ecclesiastical, aggregate or sole, as well as an individual, unless in
any of the cases aforesaid it be otherwise specially provided, or there
be something in the subject or context repugnant to such
construction.3 9
Again Lord Phillimore questioned Cecil, this time on the question of
the rights of unmarried as opposed to married women to exercise the
profession of solicitor."2 Cecil pointed out that
his view was that it was a well-settled general rule of the Common
Law that married women had no ordinary rights, and he did not con-
tend that section 2 of the Act of 1843 conferred any new right, but
that it confirmed and corroborated the right of an unmarried woman
at Common Law to act as an attorney.32'
As in France, the question of a married woman involved in a profession
raised huge questions of autonomy and of conflict of interest, since a
315. Bebb, 30T.L.R. at 179. See 13 Y.B. EDw. 3186(1339).
316. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179. The role of attorney seems to have been an ill-defined and fluid one
during the period.
[A] man is allowed to put forward some one else to speak for him, not in order that he
may be bound by that other person's words, but in order that he may have a chance of
correcting formal blunders and supplying omissions. What the litigant himself has said in
court, he has said once and for all, but what a friend has said in his favour he may
disavow. The professional pleader makes his way into the courts, not as one who will
represent a litigant, but as one who will stand by the litigant's side and speak in his
favour, subject however to correction, for his words will not bind his client until that
client has expressly or tacitly adopted them .... Just because the pleader makes his
appearance in this informal fashion, as a mere friend who stands by the litigant's side and
provisionally speaks on his behalf, it is difficult for us to discover whether pleaders are
commonly employed and whether they are already members of a professional class.
POLLCK & MArn.AND, supra note 314, at 190-91.
317. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179; see also supra note 269.
318. Bebb, 30 T.LR. at 179.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. d. at 179-80.
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married woman was expected to conform to the wishes of her husband in
matters of behavior, residence and other areas of life.2
"Person" was also used in section 26 of the Solicitors Act, 1860, which
imposed penalties for wrongfully acting as a solicitor, and it was
reasonable to suppose that it included a woman there.... In view of
the rights possessed by women at Common Law it would require an
express prohibition to prevent them from becoming solicitors. In
several of the Colonies and in certain foreign countries women were
permitted to act as solicitors.3
R.B. Finlay, who represented the Law Society, requested a clarifi-
cation of the appellant's position regarding the 1843 Act.
[H]e understood that the appellant did not contend that there was
anything in the Act of 1843 which conferred on women the right to be
admitted as solicitors. Lord Robert Cecil said that he did not say there
was sufficient in the Act of 1843 to remove any existing prohibition
at Common Law, but that, in the absence of such a prohibition, it did
confer on women the right to be admitted.324
From the discussion of the meaning of the statutes involved, the
crucial issue clearly became the question of whether women were cus-
tomarily advocates, or had customarily attempted to exercise such a role.
Sir R.B. Finlay said that he relied on the fact that there was not a sin-
gle instance of a woman's having been admitted as a solicitor. This
inveterate usage was of great weight, and the existence of such a long
usage was relied on in Miss Bertha Cave's case noted in The Times of
December 3, 1903, which was a case where Miss Cave had applied to
be admitted to Gray's Inn, and in the Scotch case, Hall v. Incorpo-
rated Society of Law Agents in Scotland. If the appellant's contention
was right, women would equally be entitled to be admitted to the Inns
of Court, and no doubt this would make dining in hall far more
amusing; but the real answer was that no one had ever been
admitted.
3n
This type of specious argument is of course of the kind that was ad-
vanced to oppose the candidature of the daughter of Henry I to succeed
her father as sovereign 3 ' and of the daughters of Henry VIII to succeed
322. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 462; Lilly, supra note 120, at 431.
323. Bebb v. Law Society, 30 T.L.R. 179, 180 (C.A. 1913).
324. Id.
325. Id (citation omitted).
326. This claimant was the Empress Maud, or Matilda, the only surviving and somewhat
disagreeable child of Henry I, who challenged King Stephen for the throne. She eventually abandoned
her claim in favor of her son, the future Henry IH, but clearly his claim derived as much from his descent
from her as the rightful queen as from his successful conquest. However, Stephen's claim was not
without merit. He was male, and also had a male heir, and was considered amiable. Although the barons
had sworn fealty to Matilda, they had not swom obedience to her husband, Geoffrey of Anjou, and
some preferred a known quantity (Stephen) to an unknown and younger man (Geoffrey). See
CHmsroPHER BROOKE, FROM ALFRED TO HENRY II: 871-1272, at 166-72 (1961).
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him, " not only because their sex seemed to disqualify them, but also
because of the dangers of their marriage.
Finlay's reduction of Bebb's application for equal admission to a
prestigious profession to a simple request for social privileges suggests
the desperation of an advocate who senses the shifting temper of the
times. He did attempt to address the question of custom as it was codified
in learned treatises and in contemporary case law:
The passages in Coke Litt. were really conclusive on the law. They
contained definite statements that a woman could not be an attorney..
. There was, in fact, something repugnant to the word "person" in-
cluding a female-namely, the well-settled usage at Common Law.
The cases showed that long usage ought to govern the law in these
cases--Chorlton v. Lings and Jex-Blake v. Edinburgh University.a
The attraction of the argument of custom and the inertia of "well-settled
usage" was enough to overcome Cecil's arguments:
Three grounds were alleged as proving disability. First, it was
said that Lord Coke, in language which his Lordship said seemed to
327. These queens were Mary I (reigned 1553-1558), the daughter of Henry's first wife, the
divorced Catherine of Aragon, whose marriage to her cousin Philip, the King of Spain, seemed to
validate all the country's fears about having a Catholic and a married woman as head of state, and
Elizabeth I (reigned 1558-1603), the daughter of Henry's second wife, the beheaded Anne Boleyn, who
learned from her sister's difficulties that too much religion and a husband were a sure road to disaster
for a queen regnant On the children of Henry VIII, see CAROLLY ERICKSON, BLOODY MARY (1978);
ELizABETH JENKINS, ELIZABETH THE GREAT (1958); J.E. NEALE, QUEEN ELIZABETH (1934). I omit the
ill-fated Jane Grey, whose claim derived from a badly drawn will of Edward VI, the son and heir of
Henry VIII, and from acclamation by a Parliament that abandoned her after nine days. Her claim is
actually interesting legally. See generally DAVID MATHEW, LADY JANE GREY: THE SETTING OF THE
REIGN (1972); AISON PLOWDEN, LADY JANE GREY AND THE HOUSE OF SUFFOLK (1985).
The next queen regnant was Mary II, of William and Mary fame, whose claim derived as much
from Parliament as from her own descent from the discredited James II. After her death, her sister Anne
should have succeeded but she very thoughtfully waited until the death of her brother-in-law, William
IlL. See generally HENRI VAN DER ZEE & BARBARA VAN DER ZEE, WILLIAM AND MARY (1973).
Queens have been few and far between in English history, but females have passed their claims
to the throne with very little question about their legitimacy to their descendants. Indeed, Princess
Elizabeth, the daughter of James I and sister of James IT, passed her claim, such as it was, through many
generations to the Electress Sophia of Hanover, who was the ancestress of the Hanoverian (Windsor)
line still on the throne today. See JOHN CANNON & RALPH GRIFFIHS, THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY OF THE BRITISH MONARCHY (1988). Recently, the Queen has expressed her support for a new
law to end male primogeniture. See David Hughes, New Law to End Male Right to the Throne, DAILY
MAIL, Feb. 28, 1998, at 5.
328. Bebb, 30 T.LR. at 180 (citation omitted); see also Jex-Blake v. University of Edinburgh, 45
M. 549 (1873). Much of the opinion reflects similar concerns, and similar justifications, to those of the
opponents of women's admission to the Bar.
As to the expediency of ladies becoming medical practitioners it is enough to say that it is
a fair subject for difference of opinion. To suggest jealousy of the rivalry of women as
entering into the objection would be altogether absurd. Those who entertain the objection
no doubt conscientiously believe that the result would be to diminish the delicacy and
respect by which the female character in well-bred society is so advantageously
surrounded.
Id. at 564. See also SACHS & WILSON, supra note 3.
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him not to be so doubtful as was suggested by counsel for the appel-
lant, had laid it down 300 years ago that a woman was not allowed to
be an attorney.... Lord Coke was speaking of attorneys not in the
old sense in which the word would be used but of attorneys as a pro-
fessional body regulated by statute and recognized and created by
statute between four and five hundred years ago. It might be that the
Mirror of Justice was not a work of the highest authority, but the ref-
erence to it did not in the least take away from the value of Lord
Coke's opinion. An opinion of his as to what was the Common Law
required no sanction from anybody else. That alone, therefore, was
evidence of what the Common Law was, and at Common Law
women were under a disability which prevented their being attorneys.
Apart from this opinion of Lord Coke there was the fact that no
woman had ever been an attorney. There had been a long, uniform,
and uninterrupted usage. Such usage was the foundation of the greater
part of the Common Law and the Court ought to be very loth to de-
part from anything supported by long usage. Although, therefore,
there had been a most interesting discussion as to what was or was
not a public office, his Lordship could not help thinking that all this
discussion was beside the mark. His Lordship said that he decided
this case on the fact that at the time of the passing of the Act of 1843
there was an existing disability which prevented women from being
attorneys and which had not been destroyed by that Act.3 9
Such an argument would, of course, allow absolutely no change in
the common law whatsoever. It certainly would not allow the revolution-
ary decision by Lord Mansfield granting freedom to a slave brought to
England after the argument that "[t]he air of England is too pure for a
slave to breathe, ' ' ° or of Chief Justice Holt in refusing to give effect to
slavery in English domestic law, though the government of England
might recognize it as part of the law of nations: "As soon as a negro
comes into England he becomes free.' '3 While the legality of slavery
was still an unsettled question through the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, such decisions called the practice into question, making the
work of judges much less clear than the court of appeals in the Bebb case
seemed to find it." 2 The judicial position was clear. Parliament could
simply not have meant what it said, because if it had, the result would
have been the admission of women to the bar. Women had never been
lawyers; therefore, Parliament simply could not have been serious. In-
deed, Mansfield and his like-minded brethren gave effect to a basic hu-
329. Bebb, 30 T.LR. at 180 (citation omitted).
330. Sommerset v. Stewart, 98 K.B. 499, 509 (1772). For a discussion of the impact of the "free
air" language, see Jonathan A. Bush, The First Slave (and Why He Matters), 18 CARnozo L REV. 599,
626,629 n.82 (1996).
331. Stephen Sedley, Persons Aggrieved, LONDON REv. OF BooKs, May 22, 1997, at 26. On
Chief Justice Holt's continuation of Mansfield's jurisprudence, see Bush, supra note 330, at 626, 629
n.89. For more of Holt's language, see Smith v. Gould, 92 L.B. 338, (1706); Smith v. Brown & Cooper,
90 LB. 1172, (1702).
332. Bebb v.Law Society, 30T.L.R. 179, 179-81 (C.A. 1913).
[Vol. 75:2
PORTIA GOES TO PARLIAMENT
man right through precisely the opposite conclusion. Absent a specific
statement by Parliament regarding the acceptability of slavery, common
law prohibited it.33
The legal historian Nicolaus Benke identifies this kind of intellec-
tual behavior as one of his "Basics of the Patriarchal Program.""' These
"basics" include:
5. Be irrational. Establish some issues beyond rational discourse.
Create your myths. 6. Be irrational. Create your logic, but break your
own rules occasionally to assert your overwhelming power. 7. Immu-
nize your fundamental concepts against critical attack by calling these
concepts "natural" or "essential," thus disguising norms as phenom-
ena or some physical reality and pretending they are valid regardless
of historic conditions. 8. Whenever you express your concept of na-
ture, exercise a monopoly in interpreting it.33
By deciding as it did, the court of appeals followed Benke's patterns of
patriarchy. In interpreting the relevant statutes as requiring denial of
Bebb's request for admission, the court followed rules 5, 6, and 7, thus
mandating its adoption of rule 82' To do otherwise seemed to relinquish
the power over who could speak in English courts, thus relinquishing
control over whose speech was official and legitimate. In denying admis-
sion to women, the court of appeal demonstrated that it believed the only
official and legitimate speech was exclusively male, modelled on shared
norms of education, experience and expectation. In Benke's analysis, the
court's power created truth. It "express[ed] ... truth and power as if they
were crucial for the existence and welfare of society as a whole. 3..
Contemporary reaction ranged from great support for the Bebb deci-
sion to great criticism of it, both for its reasoning and for its result. One
commentator noted with disapproval the introduction of legislation into
Parliament but conceded that the profession as a whole was very unlikely
to admit women sua sponte:
We venture to think that the majority of the Benchers in the Inns
would be opposed to the innovation, and that, even among those who
are in favour of it, there would not be many who would interpret their
333. For an analysis of the meaning of the Somerset decision, particularly with regard to the
tradition of slavery in American common law, see William R. Cotter, The Somerset Case and the
Abolition of Slavery in England, 79 HISTORY 31 (1994). After examining the various texts of the
decision and the application of Somerset in the English courts through the first third of the nineteenth
century, Cotter agrees that the opinion effectively ended de jure slavery in England. Id. at 54-56. For
other discussions of the meaning of Somerset, see id. at nn.5-8; Edward Fiddes, Lord Mansfield and the
Somerset Case, 50 LQ. REV. 499 (1934); Jerome Nadelhaft, The Somerset Case and Slavery: Myth,
Reality and Repercussions, 51 J. NEGRO HIST. 193 (1966); William Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield
and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 43 U. Ci. L REV. 86 (1974).
334. Benke, supra note 195, at 201.
335. Id.
336. Bebb, 30 T.LR. at 179-81.
337. Benke, supra note 195, at 201.
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powers as justifying a course which is generally taken to be contrary
to the common law. The claim of women to be admitted as solicitors,
so far as it is founded upon the common law, has now been rejected
definitely both by the English and the Scottish Courts. The Inns of
Court claim absolute discretion as to whom they will call to the Bar,
subject to a somewhat nebulous visitatorial authority of the judges, by
whom the discretion to call to the Bar has, in theory, been delegated
to them. The Benchers would probably, much as they dislike interfer-
ence by the Legislature, refuse to make an innovation so entirely
contrary to precedent except under the authority of an Act of Parlia-
ment.33
Making a sly allusion to Lord Robert Cecil's historical argument in favor
of his client's position, this writer went so far as to suggest that even
should women be admitted to the Law Society, this admittance might
still not be sufficient to guarantee them a place in the profession:
Throughout the controversy it seems to be fairly generally assumed
that if once the doors of the Law Society are thrown open to women,
their demand to be called to the Bar must be admitted. We venture to
suggest that such an assumption is unwarranted, and that few mem-
bers of either branch would admit that the same qualities are required
in each. Speaking for ourselves, we are still among the unconverted.
Even the fact that a woman has acted as Constable of England, as
sexton, or as churchwarden, leaves us cold.339
On the other side was a writer for the Green Bag,"' the U.S. journal
of legal comment, who suggested that the court of appeal had ducked the
real issue, and in addition was guilty of extremely poor legal reasoning in
coming to its decision. Quoting the Master of the Rolls, the writer sug-
gested a failure to acknowledge the importance of at least some of the
facts presented:
"We have been asked to hold," said Cozens-Hardy, M.R., in Bebb v.
The Law Society, "what I for one quite assent to, that in point of in-
telligence and education and competency, women-and in particular
the applicant here, who is a distinguished Oxford student-are at least
equal to a great many, and probably far better than many of the can-
didates who will come up for examination. But that is not really for
us to consider." This fact, though not for the court to consider, might
therefore be sufficiently significant to be judicially noticed if not con-
sidered. But it would not have been a fact of sufficient importance for
passing remark if a high standard of professional attainments for
women had not become a commonplace of modem society, and if a
situation did not exist in England to-day, the character of which is at-
tested by the fact that a considerable body of professional and lay
338. Notes: Women and the Profession, 26 JURID. REv. 130, 130-31 (1914) (citations omitted).
339. Id. at 131.
340. Editorial, The Admission of Women as Solicitors, 26 GREEN BAG 298, 298 (1914).
341. Id.
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opinion-it would be sufficient to cite Lord Haldane, Mr. Asquith,
Sir John Simon, and Sir Stanley Buckmaster-favors the admission
of women as solicitors.
3 42
This commentator came close to suggesting that women's intellectual
attainments were in fact commonly so much higher than men's in similar
situations that this fact in itself had become custom:
[I]nstead of holding that the mental qualifications of women are not
for the court to consider, the Court of Appeal, without going far out
of its way, might properly have devoted some attention to contempo-
rary conditions, with a view to determining whether the position of
women in the modem world constitutes a situation to which the
courts must give heed. The decision in this case was based on the
"usage of the realm." But the "usage of the realm" is not simply a
mass of ancient precedents which have come down from the earlier
common law; it is made up of the vital, contemporaneous customs of
an actual world. The entrance of women into innumerable pursuits to
which they were formerly denied access has become, it would appear,
one of those existing usages which a court may carefully consider in
attempting to ascertain what the "usage of the realm" really is.3' 3
To bolster this contention, the writer, like the advocates in the Bebb case,
appealed to a learned writer, although his choice is the American Roscoe
Pound:
The common law consists of positive rules and remedies, of general
usages and customs, and of elementary principles, and the develop-
ments of applications of them, which cannot now be distinctly traced
back to any statutory enactments, but which rest for their authority
upon the common recognition, consent, and use of the state itself ....
In truth, the common law is not in its nature and character an abso-
lutely fixed, inflexible system, like the statute law, providing only for
cases of a determinate form which fall within the letter of the lan-
guage in which a particular doctrine or legal proposition is
expressed).'4
For this writer, the Bebb case illustrates an exchange of the tradi-
tional roles of the statutory and the common law. Instead of inflexibility
and immutability, statutes such as the acts of 18771' and 1888'4 represent
the new, that is, the opportunity of admitting women to the profession.
The common law, for the judges involved, becomes the justification for
the old, and loses the very character that has traditionally been its great-
est strength-its flexibility and ability to accommodate social and politi-
cal change when codified law cannot. Even so, suggests the Green Bag
342. Id. (citation ormitted).
343. Id.
344. Id. at 298-99.
345. Id. at 299.
346. Id.
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author, had the judges wanted to give the proper effect to changing cus-
tom, they could have done so and still have ruled against Bebb:
The altered relation of women to trade and the professions does un-
questionably constitute a new modem usage or custom which the law
cannot ignore. It need not follow, however, that this custom has so
fully established itself as to affect the legal profession as it has some
other professions, and the Court of Appeal, if it had chosen to give it
consideration, would not have had to decide in favor of the admission
of women as solicitors. It could have said: "We are not led, by a sur-
vey of the situation now existing, to conclude that there has been any
definite change in the custom of the realm with regard to the relation
of women to the legal profession, notwithstanding certain tendencies
that seem to be in that direction; these tendencies, in our judgment,
have not had such an unmistakable result that we should deem our-
selves at liberty to affirm the right of women to practise law; by doing
so we should be substituting a custom of our own choosing for one
already existing, and that we have no power to do." Thus the court
could have come to the same result as that actually reached, by a
sound process of judicial reasoning; and probably a greater number of
people would be satisfied with the decision, as it would have demon-
strated more cogently why this is a question for Parliamentary action
and not one with which the courts are called upon to deal." 7
The Green Bag further faulted the court for relying on a "casual dictum
of Lord Coke which he may have borrowed from the Mirror of
Justices"' and criticized it for bringing the system of justice into disre-
pute? 9
So long as the employment of such reasoning survives, courts will
continue to subject themselves to the danger of having their conclu-
sions discredited when reached by crooked paths, even though the re-
sults may be intrinsically sound, and would be accepted if they were
approached along a straight line of argument.
3?
In spite of the suggested line of reasoning that would have preserved the
result, the implication is clear: the court could not legitimately reach a
347. Id. at 298.
348. Id. at 299.
Pleaders are serjeants wise in the law of the realm who serve the commonalty of the
people, stating and defending for hire actions in court for those who have need of them.
Every pleader who acts in the business of another should have regard to four things:-
First, that he be a person receivable in court, that he be no heretic, nor excommunicate,
nor criminal, nor man of religion, nor woman, nor ordained clerk above the order of
subdeacon, nor beneficed clerk with the cure of souls, nor infant under twenty-one years
of age, nor judge in the same cause, nor open leper, nor man attainted of falsification
against the law of his office.
THE MIRROR OF Jus'ncEs 47 (The Publications of the Selden Society, William Joseph Whittaker ed.,
1895) (emphasis added).
349. Editorial, supra note 340, at 299.
350. Id.
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conclusion that would endure for any length of time, regardless of refer-
ence to statutory or common law.
V. CHANGES IN THE POLMCAL AND SocIAL ENVIRONMENT
Supporters of women's admission were undaunted by an abortive
attempt to pass a bill, introduced by Lord Wolmer, overruling the Law
Society's actions in 1912.32' After the decision of the court of appeals in
the Bebb case, various women's rights advocates as well as the Commit-
tee for the Admission of Women to the Solicitors' Profession35 requested
support from the Lord Chancellor and the Prime Minister, Lord
Haldane, 3 for a bill to admit women. The Committee consisted of such
luminaries as Lord Robert Cecil, Sir Frederick Pollock (the historian),
Mrs. Humphrey Ward, Mrs. Garrett Anderson (the physician) and other
notables, as well as the four women involved in the Bebb case.3"" One
member quoted Edward Bell's comment that 20,000 women were law-
yers in the United States3.. and reminded the Lord Chancellor that all the
universities in England admitted women except Oxford and
Cambridge." Other arguments advanced included those of emotion
(women should have the opportunity of hiring solicitors of their own
sex)," ' and positivism (women should be allowed to do anything not
strictly prohibited)." The Lord Chancellor was sympathetic but cautious:
"When he was in the other House he used to bring in a Bill for the re-
moval of disabilities from women going far beyond that which they
asked, and he still held to the principle of that .... Personally he was
entirely in favour of the principle of the Bill ... ."' However, as a mem-
ber of the House of Lords, the Lord Chamberlain could not predict what
might happen in the Commons,' but he pronounced His Majesty's Gov-
ernment generally in favor of the bill."
A few days later the City of London Solicitors' Company passed a
resolution to request the Law Society to oppose the bill,2" and eventually
it failed to pass,' undoubtedly because of the active opposition of both
professional societies.
351. BIAN ABEL-SMm & ROBERT STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS: A SOcIoLOGICAL
STUDY OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 1750-1965, at 193 (1967).
352. BRKS, supra note 18, at 277.
353. ELIE HALEvy, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE
RULE OF DEMocRAcY 1905-1914, at 505 (2d ed. 1961).
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The bill's defeat simply exacerbated tempers on both sides. One
correspondent to the Solicitors' Journal suggested that the issue ought to
be further debated in the magazine: "One contributor, I notice, has
grounded his objections upon considerations of the harm it will do us
and, if you will allow me, I will endeavour to shew why such a view, in
the special circumstances of the case, should not be allowed to prevail."'
After pointing out the economic advantages of allowing women to pur-
sue careers for which they were suited, he blasted the profession for
failing to do as much for women as had physicians:
The doctors, as a community, have set a chivalrous example in wid-
ening the field of women's opportunities. The lawyers should do the
same. If women are left to realise that their only hope lies in them-
selves, they should at least be able to count upon men to put no ob-
stacles in their way.365
However, he objected to the admission of married women: "[I]n an over-
stocked profession in which there is barely enough work to go round, it is
unfair that any home, through the joint contribution of husband and wife,
should, as it were, enjoy double rations."3
Lord Buckmaster made additional futile attempts to reverse the
Bebb decision through legislation in 1917 and 1918, but was defeated
by the Law Society's letter-writing campaign.' The First World War put
further action on the issue on the back burner. By the end of the war, the
amount of significant political opposition to the admission of women had
dwindled to the point that the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Bill
aroused much less comment.'
Ultimately two factors caused the change in the attitude of most
members of the bar, most members of the government, and most mem-
bers of the public. One was women's full participation in the war effort
during the period- from 1914 to 1918. Though proponents of women's
entry into the legal profession might reject the notion as demeaning, the
fact remained that women's contribution in every sphere of life and
death3" demonstrated that they understood and were willing to uphold the
364. Douglas M. (rane, The Admission of Women to the Law, 58 SoIc. J. & WKLY. REP. 468,
468(1914).
365. Id. at 469. But see the comments of Helena Normanton asserting the contrary in Barristers
and Solicitors (Qualification of Women) Bill, 63 SoLIc. J. & WKLY. REP. 500,501 (1919).
366. Gane, supra note 364, at 469.
367. ABEL-SMITH & STEvENs, supra note 351, at 193.
368. Id. On the Law Society's opposition, see LAW SOCIETY, ANNUAL REPORT 26-27 (1917);
LAW SOCIETY, ANNuALREPORT 36-37(1919).
369. AEL-SMrrH & STEvENs, supra note 351, at 194.
370. Edith Cavell, an English nurse, was executed in Belgium by the Germans as a spy. This
outrage galvanized even more willingness on the part of the British, if that were possible, to win the war
against the arrogant Hun. See ROWLAND RYDER, EDrm CAVELL 223 (1975).
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notions of duty and sacrifice. This participation seemed to answer the
question of women's willingness to accept responsibility satisfactorily.
The second factor was the entrance of women into the legal profes-
sion in other countries whose traditions and standards of living seemed
equivalent, or at least comprehensible, to the English, and the resulting
commentary over the desirability of giving qualified women the same
opportunity. In France, as in many of the United States and provinces of
Canada, women had already been admitted, so that their wartime contri-
butions, while valued, were more expected.37" ' Likewise, their presence in
the law was no longer quite such a disturbance.
There are probably only a few women, comparatively speaking, to
whom the practice of law is congenial or fitting; the same to but a
slightly less extent is true of men. It is but rarely that any other type
will seek admission. The number of women in active practice will
probably never be large. But we have passed the period when only a
few especially qualified women braved the difficulties of securing
admission."2
To the British, the contributions of its female citizens were a great,
and pleasant, surprise. As a contributor to the Solicitors' Journal and
Weekly Reporter noted, not only had many men died in various wars
over the past century, so that the numbers of persons who traditionally
populated the professions had diminished greatly, but the very lack of
available men to support women and children meant that women needed
to be able to earn their own livings.373 Thus, the entry of women into the
legal profession was a temporary necessity.
[Slituated as men now are, with their numbers diminished and their
careers thwarted, the support of women collectively... is probably
outside their competence, and the sole alternative left to them is to
admit women to all those centres of activity whence the means of
subsistance is derived by the individual's own effort. The demand is
upon every guild and body of men, and the profession of the law is
not an exception.37'
The author advocated a short experiment, allowing women to enter the
solicitors' branch for a period of time, and then projecting an evaluation
of their success to see if they should be encouraged to continue.Y
This writer was not willing to countenance the complete equality of
men and women in the profession for various reasons, most of which are
371. The question of women's fitness for the bar was not settled until relatively late in the
nineteenth century however, and it was a matter for judicial opinion until then. See In re Kilgore, 17 Pa.
W.N.C. 563 (1886); In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 246 (1875); Women at the Bar, 27 LAw NOTEs 124 (1923).
372. Women at the Bar, supra note 371, at 124.
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discussed in this article. Among them were serious doubts as to the abil-
ity of women to represent their clients as zealously as possible and the
ability of men to represent their clients' interests in the face of such at-
tractive distractions as a female adversary." 6 However, he (and this arti-
cle was probably written by a man) found himself in agreement with the
writer for the Bench and Bar," a U.S. legal journal, that women could
certainly perform many of the less "unfeminine" duties of the solicitor. 8
Like other commentators of the period, he used the military analogy to
explain women's physical and intellectual shortcomings and to justify
any inequality of treatment:
[T]he profession of law, like the profession of arms, has a strictly
polemical basis, the sole difference lying in the choice of weapons.
Litigation is warfare in which the property, the liberty, and even the
life of the individual is at stake; as, in the case of war itself, the pos-
sessions, the freedom, and the very existence of the State are in-
volved. The qualities called for in the defence of the individual are
just those required for the protection of the community, only they op-
erate through a different medium. Fundamentally, they reside in
force, and it remains to be seen whether women are competent to ex-
ercise force in competition with men in one sphere when they have
been shewn incapable of exercising it in another.... These consid-
erations, however, apply only to the contentious side of professional
life. Happily there is much that is pacific.... [C]onveyancing and the
wide range of practice falling under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act
is well within the moral and intellectual competence of women, and it
would be better that they should apply themselves to this side of pro-
fessional work. 9
Even in the 1980s, this attitude was still prevalent: "Associated with
this 'club' analogy is the 'masculinity' of the law and legal practice. This
serves to make more difficult the successful performance of the occupa-
tional role by women."3' Further, unlike E.A. Bell, many male barristers
and solicitors in the 1970s and 1980s overtly or quietly blocked women's
efforts to join their chambers:
[T]he main stumbling block is simply prejudice, and this reveals itself
most strongly at the crucial stage in a woman's career, when she is
looking for a tenancy. Many chambers openly admit a "no woman"
policy, and continue to do so despite the Sex Discrimination Act 1975
(which does not apply to the Bar, since sets of chambers are not part-
nerships and tenants are not employed). One particular set of cham-
bers which has always been known to have a no woman policy
(amended to a "no other woman" policy after the daughter of the
376. Id
377. Editorial Woman in the Law, 17 BENcH & B. 7 (1909).
378. Emergency Measure, supra note 373, at 787.
379. Id
380. Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 30 (footnote omitted).
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Head of Chambers was admitted) has blatantly refused a woman ap-
plicant on the grounds of her sex. 8'
The situation was similar in Canada:
For almost all the years before 1970 legal education was dominated
by the Law Society of Manitoba. Its essential feature was practical
training: students were required to find a law office which would
agree to admit them as articling clerks. It was advantageous for stu-
dents to have contacts, generally through a family member or close
family friend, within the number of established lawyers. Someone
who had no ready-made contact would have difficulty finding a law
firm to take her or him at the age of 20 or 21. The law firm would be
testing the clerk as a potential long-term colleague. For women this
system was more of a problem than for men. Because there were so
few women already in the profession, there was no regular network.
Women were regarded as a risk and widely expected to abandon the
investment made in their training upon marriage.2
Women who were members of minority groups had an even more diffi-
cult time.383 Those firms which eventually did agree to take on women
clerks tried to limit their careers by offering them positions with little
possibility of advancement."
One American commentator attempted to turn the suggestion that
women did not have as much reasoning ability as necessary to their ad-
vantage in the debate:
We are told that women are not logical, not analytical; that they jump
at conclusions. Well, sometimes it is a good thing to jump---you get
there quicker. After you get there you can reason backwards and in-
variably find you are right, just like proving an example in arithmetic.
Again, it is all a question of habit, we haven't been trained in those
lines. Is there any difference between the brain of the average woman
and the brain of the average man, and is the gray matter in a man's
brain so different that he alone can take up the profession of medicine
or law?385
However, this approach is not particularly persuasive. To suggest that
legal reasoning can be created after the fact is the kind of result-driven
decision-making that women themselves found objectionable.
A. Attempts to Legislate Admission
In order to address the question of the inequality of women's politi-
cal rights, the post-war government prepared a series of legislative ini-
381. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 151.
382. Kinnear, supra note 85, at 423.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 425.
385. Women in the Law, supra note 15, at 134.
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tiatives which removed the most crucial disabilities: the right of women
to stand for election, the right of women to vote and the right of women
to enter into the practice of law. Not all of these initiatives were unquali-
fied successes. For example, initiatives limited the right to vote to
women over the age of thirty,' although men were entitled to vote when
"of full age and not subject to any legal incapacity" in addition to other
residency requirements." '
1. The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act of 1918'
The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act attempted to enfran-
chise women by allowing them to participate in the making of law as part
of the House of Commons: "A woman shall not be disqualified by sex or
marriage for being elected to or sitting or voting as a Member of the
Commons House of Parliament.""3 9 The Act thus addressed the concerns
of a worried little article in the Solicitors' Journal and Weekly
Reporter," which rehearsed the history of women in public offices, and
opined that:
Lord Esher's dictum as to the common law disqualification of women
for the exercise of any public functions . . . is obviously much too
wide. Women may hold the sovereignty, and have done so. They may
hold certain lay offices in the Church... and, of course, may be pa-
tronesses of livings. But these are scarcely public offices in the State.
They may be impanelled on a jury of matrons and not very infre-
quently this is done. There are also records of historical cases in
which ladies have acted as sheriffs, returning officers, parish consta-
bles, overseers of the poor, and even commissioners of sewers. But it
is doubtful whether their tenure of those offices was ever lawful. All
the recorded instances occur in troubled times--between the Wars of
the Roses and the conclusion of the Civil War, when every manner of
illegality was occasionally committed by the powerful. It is probably
the true constitutional view that, except as regards the succession to
the throne, no right to hold any of these offices was really possessed
by women at common law. The right to inherit the Crown is peculiar.
It is wholly the result of the mediaeval doctrine that the King was
paramount lord of all land in the kingdom, and therefore the rules of
inheritance which applied to land applied also to the Crown. To-day,
of course, the succession to the throne is regulated by a parliamentary
386. Representation of the People Act of 1918,8 Geo. 5, ch. 64, § 4 (1) (Eng.).
A woman shall be entitled to be registered as a parliamentary elector for a constituency
(other than a university constituency) if she-(a) has attained the age of thirty years; and
(b) is not subject to any legal incapacity; and (c) is entitled to be registered as a local
government elector in respect of the occupation in that constituency of land or premises.
.or is the wife of a husband entitled to be so registered.
d
387. Id. §§ (1)(a), (3).
388. 8 & 9 Geo. 5, ch. 47 (Eng.).
389. Id. §1.
390. The Eligibility of Women For Parliament, 62 SoLic. J. & WKLY. REP. 532 (1918).
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entail, the Act of Settlement, and the limitations which govern an or-
dinary tail general are applied to the Crown by the terms of that stat-
ute.
It may be assumed, then, that women were at common law dis-
qualified from sitting in either House of Parliament. Such a funda-
mental rule of the common law cannot be altered by the judges; it is
not one of those minor principles-mostly existing in the realm of
commercial law and the law of torts--which are capable of undergo-
ing expansion and development by mere judicial decision. Therefor
an Act of Parliament is required to remove this disqualification....
[And t]here must be an express enactment in clear terms conferring
the privilege claimed.39'
2. The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919"9
Parliament may have intended the Sex Disqualification (Removal)
Act to address all remaining questions on the disparity between the civil
inequality of men and women. Apart from specifying that women could
not be prevented from holding public office, it also addressed the ques-
tion of women who wished to be admitted to the bar, but who had at-
tended universities not conferring degrees on women. This was a com-
mon enough occurrence for older students who had pursued legal studies
before education, let alone admission to the profession. The Act contem-
plated the following for females:
A woman shall be entitled to be admitted and enrolled as a so-
licitor after serving under articles for three years only if either she has
taken such a university degree as would have so entitled her had she
been a man, or if she has been admitted to and passed the final ex-
amination and kept, under the conditions required of women by the
university, the period of residence necessary for a man to obtain a de-
gree at any university which did not at the time the examination was
passed admit women to degrees.39
The Act also applied to Scotland39' and Ireland.. through alteration of
statutes governing local practice," and Parliament intended it to be read
391. Id. at 532-33 (citations omitted).
392. 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71 (Eng.).
393. Id.§ 2.
394. Note its immediate effect. See Paterson, supra note 69, at 93.
395. IRisHtL TIMES, March 15, 1919, at 66.
396. In the case of Scotland, the Act affected statutes such as The Local Government (Scotland) Act
of 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., ch. 58 (Eng.); The Qualification of Women (County and Town Councils)
(Scotland) Act of 1907, 7 Edw. 7, ch. 48 (Eng.); The County, Town and Parish Councils (Qualification)
(Scotland) Act of 1914,4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 39 (Eng.).
In the case of Ireland, it affected The Juries Act (Ireland), 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., ch. 65 (Eng.); The
Local Government (Ireland) Act of 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., ch. 37 (Eng.); The Local Authorities (Ireland)
(Qualification of Women) Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 35 (Eng.).
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with the Solicitors Act of 18432" The relevant text of the Act reads as
follows:
A woman shall be entitled to be admitted and enrolled as a solicitor
after serving under articles for three years only if either she has taken
such a university degree as would have so entitled her had she been a
man, or if shehas been admitted to and passed the final examination
and kept, under the conditions required of women by the university,
the period of residence necessary for a man to obtain a degree at any
university which did not at the time the examination was passed ad-
mit women to degrees.3
3. Barristers and Solicitors (Qualification of Women) Bill'
The Law Society met on March 28, 1919, to discuss the implica-
tions of the Barristers and Solicitors (Qualification of Women) Bill
drafted by Lord Buckmaster, one of the lawyers who had represented
Bebb, and backed by the Lloyd George Government." The President of
the Society suggested that the contributions of women in wartime (al-
though they had been dismissed by some detractors as being of little evi-
dence that women were intellectually capable of the demands of legal
practice) were a great impetus toward the support of the bill by many
members of the profession, who might not have been so inclined at the
time of the Bebb decision:
If the Bill had been introduced five years ago he did not believe such
a meeting as this would have been held, but since then a great deal
had happened and the war, which had made so many changes in the
country, had made few changes so great as that in the relationship of
women to the economic work of the country. He thought it was no
exaggeration to say that, had it not been for the women of the country
and the services they had rendered, the war might never have been
won-it certainly would have been very much protracted.4'°
Even Sir Homewood Crawford, a solicitor who opposed the bill,
wrote that,
provided the Bar will by statutory enactment be as free to women as it
is sought to make our branch, we ought not to place any further ob-
stacle in the way of women attaining the object of their ambition. It
should, however, be most clearly provided for by statute that both
397. See Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919,9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71, § 2(3) (Eng.).
398. 1l § 2.
399. See Women as Barristers and Solicitors, 53 IRISH L TIMEs & SoLIc. J. 66 (1919). This
bill does not seem to have passed, but the enactment of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act
accomplished the same end. Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71, § 1
(Eng.).
400. The Law Society: Admission of Women as Solicitors, 146 LAw TIMEs J. & REC. 409 (1919)
[hereinafter Law Society: Admission].
401. Id
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branches are open for the admission of women, and Lord Buckmas-
ter's Bill in that respect requires strengthening.4
Samuel Garrett, who spoke in favor of the bill, pointed out that to
deny women entrance into the profession of solicitor reflected
the want of touch, between their Profession and the public. That want
of sympathy and want of touch was, in his view, at the root of most of
the evils from which the Profession suffered, and he could not imag-
ine anything more calculated to accentuate that want of sympathy and
of touch than that they, in this moment of the country's history, when
the large body of women had just been enfranchised and had taken
part in a general election and had made their political opinion and still
more their influence felt, that at this moment the society should pun-
ish to the world that they were going to seek to maintain an obstacle
in the way of women earning their livelihood, if they choose to do so,
in the solicitor profession. The whole sympathy, of the country would
be against them .... They could not stop the Bill, any more than a
bumble bee could stop an express train, and the choice before them
was whether they would welcome it and receive it with open arms, or
whether they would be dragged at its tail, struggling and screeching
like an angry child.... He begged them to remember that this was a
matter which vitally affected the good name, the credit, and the repu-
tation of the Profession. '3
Garrett's pragmatic argument was not the only one advanced in favor of
the bill. Sir Walter Trower, another supporter, sidestepped the question
of women's intellectual ability by characterizing the opening of the Pro-
fession as "a question of equality of opportunity." For him the possible
complications brought on by a woman's lack of intellect or physical
stamina, or marital status, would eventually disappear.
Whether women were better or worse than men, morally, physically,
or intellectually, did not concern them. The question whether they
would be hampered by matrimonial ventures did not arise. All these
questions would be dealt with and tested by competition and experi-
ence. If women proved themselves to be as good at business as men,
they would succeed; if not, they would fail. Men had no more to say
on the subject; he hoped that in any case they would afford the
women a cordial welcome. It had been said in that hall on previous
occasions that the Profession was overcrowded, and that solicitors
dreaded the competition of women in the field in which they were
engaged. He did not think there was any man present who would
venture to say personally that he objected to women's competition;
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E.A. Bell, the solicitor who had agreed to accept Gwnyeth Bebb as a
clerk, suggested that women would have an uplifting effect on the at-
mospheres of court and law office." Finally, a Mr. Braby suggested that
although it might be true that women might not be suited to the practice
of law, they would never have the opportunity to learn the profession if
they had no access to it:
[P]eople could never learn to govern themselves, or to do the work
they wanted to do, until they were given the opportunity of learning
how to do it. Women must be given the opportunity of showing what
they could do. He was quite sure that in a very short time, when they
found the necessity for doing this class of work as it should be done,
they would fit themselves for doing it as well as had the men. He be-
lieved there was one country, Thibet, where the entire government
was in the hands of women; they even acted as policemen, and men
were not allowed out after eight o'clock in the evening.4
One speaker with the unfortunate name of G.B. Crook announced
himself against the bill, finding the objections to female solicitors over-
whelming:
He was very sorry to have to say it, but the proposer and also the sec-
onder of the motion had entirely failed to make out any case. The first
argument which had been put forward was that the ladies had helped
to win the war. Let that be admitted; if they had not done so would
they have been worthy of companionship in any sense whatever? Was
it not their hearths and their homes that the men went out to defend?
Were not they as interested in the success of the war as were men?..
. Were [the ladies] anxious to become soldiers, or sailors, or police-
men, or to do anything to support by force that law which they were
seeking to administer? If ladies were to come in equally with men in
the administration of the law and they were then to put upon men the
enforcement of that law, would that be equality? No, it would be a
case of privilege, and he understood that in these days privilege was
to be abolished and not established."
Crook's objection that women ought not to be solicitors until they
showed themselves willing to take on the same roles as men was viewed
as spurious by his listeners, who pointed out that as soon as women were
allowed to do so, they did.' He finally attempted to justify his fallback
position, the differentiation of the law as a profession completely sepa-
rate from any other, by asserting that
All honour to Miss Nightingale and those nurses who had been Miss




409. Id. at 411. Note that in the matter of military language, for'example, women lawyers now tell
"war stories," that is, accounts of their experiences, as readily as their colleagues who are men.
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was another. Everyone present, as lawyers, knew that the business of
the country came ultimately to the advice of the lawyer.... Parlia-
ment itself would have to shut up to-morrow if there were no lawyers
there.... Unless the administration of the law was in the highest pos-
sible hands, how could it be expected to continue? If ladies were to be
admitted to the membership of the Bar, of course it would follow that
the Bench would be open to them, and there would be lady judges.
How would the idiosyncrasy of the sex be got over in that case? ""
For Crook, as for a dwindling number of opponents, pleasing differ-
ences of dress symbolized frightening differences in quality of thought."'
Unable to demonstrate the truth of his assertion that the quality of the
female thought process is deficient, Crook categorized it as different,
therefore inadequate, and presented misreadings of history and his own
opinion of divine intent as evidence:
Let them consider for a moment whether they would abandon allure-
ments of dress. If ladies abandoned these and other allurements pecu-
liar to them and depended upon their brains and not their bodies, then,
of course, they would be equal persons with men. But ladies would
never do so. There would be in the administration of the law all kinds
of mixed motives, and how that would work out he would leave to the
judgment of his hearers. It was certain it would not work out to the
dignity of the law. When Queen Mary was on the throne she could
not keep her axe off the neck of Lady Jane Grey, nor could Queen
Elizabeth keep the axe off the neck of Mary Queen of Scots, any
more than Eve could keep her hand off the apple. The judicial factor
was not a part of woman; the Almighty never intended to instil it in
her.1 2
A returnee from the Great War, Lieutenant Wood, responded that if
women were poor lawyers they would have no clients, ' 3 a point also
410. Id
411. Id.
412. d Crook's representation of the acts of these two queens of course misstated both the facts
and the law in these cases. Mary had originally stayed Lady Jane's execution even though a court of law
had condemned her for treason. Only after a second rebellion in her name (though admittedly without her
knowledge or consent) was mounted to dethrone Mary had she agreed to the execution. As for Elizabeth,
she had ample proof that the Queen of Scotland had plotted against her and had delayed for years
agreeing to her execution, even though her counselors and Parliament urged her to do it. We may agree
with Crook that neither Jane Grey nor Mary Stuart should have been executed, but the Queens involved
were not more bloodthirsty, and arguably much less vengeful than their father Henry VIII, or coldly
calculating than their grandfather Henry VII, or any number of male monarchs before them, who
executed hundreds without even the semblance of fair trials. On Mary's relationship with Jane, see G.R.
ELTON, REFORM AND REFORMATNON: ENGLAND 1509-1558, at 373-75 (1977). On Elizabeth and Mary,
see, for example, CARoLY ERICKSON, Tha FIRST EuZABETH (1983) and ANTONIA FRASER, QUEEN OF
ScOTs (1969).
On the question of professional dress, see infra Part VLB. Mona Harrington also discusses the
hidden messages of dress for female attorneys. MONA HARRINGTON, WomcEN LAwYERs: REWRITING
TE RuLrs 103 (1993). Deborah Tannen also points out the symbolism of dress, makeup and wording of
marital status that convey meaning for both men and women. See TANNEN, supra note 204, at 107-31.
413. Law Society: Admission, supra note 400, at 411.
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made by Normanton" and by the American lawyer Gertrude Handrick. '15
"If women as solicitors turned out to be incapable, he was sure the gen-
eral public would not consult them .... The public said they believed in
equality of opportunity; they believed that women should have equal
rights with men, therefore that they should be allowed to enter the Pro-
fession."" Neither Lieutenant Wood nor any other speaker found accept-
able the suggestion that women should be admitted as a "reward" for
their service and support during the Great War:
[T]hey ought not to speak of their willingness to give the privilege to
ladies of coming into the Profession as a war bonus. He abhorred the
thought that it was giving something as a reward. He wanted women
to have the privilege because he believed they had an inherent capac-
ity and ability equal to that of men, and he could not see any possible
valid reason why they should so long have been debarred from earn-
ing their living, as probably they were well able to do, in the same
way as the other sex.... Why because a human being was born a
woman should she be compelled to retire into oblivion and be de-
barred from exercising the gifts and talents with which she had been
endowed?
41'7
Some supporters of the bill nevertheless questioned whether women
were generally capable of performing the duties necessary. W.A. Sharpe,
Vice-President of the Law Society, while voicing support, admitted that
like Mr. Crook he "criticised the sphere and the powers and the abilities
of women. Those criticisms seem to be true .... "' However,
he thought that, whatever women might be, they had never been
given the opportunity of trying how they could develop themselves
and improve and expand their powers in the practice of the law. He
was not an advocate for a woman becoming a solicitor, because in
many respects he did not think the solicitor's a suitable occupation for
a woman, any more than he thought a woman would make a good
soldier. But he was not in the position of the man who would never
go into the water until he could swim and therefore never learned to
swim at all. He wanted to find out what those abilities were .... ,9
Neither Sharpe nor R.W. Dibdin, a member of the Society's gov-
erning council and an opponent of the bill, believed that many women
would avail themselves of the opportunity of entering the profession.'
Dibdin, furthermore, rearticulated the idea of a "reward" for women who
had participated in the war effort, and suggested that perhaps women
414. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 429.
415. WomenintheLaw, supranote 15, at134.
416. Law Society: Admission, supra note 400, at 411.
417. Id (statement of H. Monger).
418. Id
419. Id
420. Id. at 411-12.
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would now want to be soldiers and a great many other things that they
were no more suited for than for the practice of law:
What they had to decide upon, as being eminently acquainted with
the needs and duties of the law, was either that women were suitable
to be members of the Profession or they were not.... Personally, he
believed they were quite unfit-for many reasons. This was saying
nothing against them. They were quite unfit to serve in the army as
soldiers, but many of the arguments ought to go as far as to say that if
they wanted to go into the army we should be compelled in the same
way to let them go. It was quite absurd .... They were all agreed that
women should have equal opportunities with men in matters which
they could manage equally well; but he did not think it would be to
the interest of the country, to the interest of the Profession, or to the
interest of women themselves, that they should become members of
the solicitor branch ....
Neither was evidence that women, who had already entered the medical
profession successfully, particularly persuasive. Sharpe pointed out that
few women actually practiced medicine 22 and Charles Mackintosh, an-
other speaker, asserted that
the evidence of the medical profession would go to prove that women
would not be likely to do better in the solicitors' profession, and that
it was not likely that the solicitor's profession would attract them.
The council had considered the matter, and they were satisfied that
women would raise the tone of the Profession as a whole and that
they would not be litigious when they had the opportunity. The so-
licitor's was a contentious profession, the medical profession was not.
Women, as a rule, did not shine as litigants, and probably would not
423shine as advisers.
With these comments, Mackintosh combined the "moral uplift"
argument with the argument that women simply did not understand legal
thinking, particularly in litigation, and thus found himself in a quandary.
He could not conceive of a legal profession in which disputes might be
resolved other than through the traditional (read: "male") means of ar-
gumentation and discussion. That a woman lawyer might approach a
dispute differently and offer alternatives to litigation was not within his
understanding. Indeed, such alternatives may not actually have existed at
the time, since their origins would have been nurtured by lawyers who as
yet did not exist. This lack of empathy with the possibility that the law as
practiced by women might afford new and innovative methods of dispute
resolution prevailed among the leaders of the profession forty years later.
As expressed by the Bar Council in 1969, "'[t]he fact has to be faced...
that the profession of barrister requires the masculine approach (however
421. Id. at 412.
422. Id at 411-12.
423. ld at 412.
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fallacious it may be) to reasoning and argument, and women only suc-
ceed in such activities if they have a masculine disposition." 2' The Bar
Council thus asserted its belief in a flawed but traditional legal argument
than an attempt to reconfigure or reinterpret law to create new political
and social opportunities.
H. Westbury Preston, the final speaker, agreed that most women
would not prove to be capable of law practice and that the very require-
ments of entrance to the profession would keep them out.' His objection
to the bill was that it did not go far enough. To him it was more logical
that the bill be an
omnibus Bill. It was asked why should women be admitted to the Le-
gal Profession and not to the profession of the architect, the account-
ant, or the Churoh [sic], and he failed to understand why it should be
so. If there was any right behind the proposal it should apply to all
professions.... Women in the past had been forced into one or two
channels. It was very desirable in the interest of the country that the
channels should be increased .... 42
The debate ended with a vote of 50 for the admission of women and 33
against, including two members of the Council of the Law Society, R.W.
Dibdin and W. Melmoth Walters.'
Certainly, English solicitors were not alone in their concern over
women's abilities in the traditional area of litigation. The U.S. publica-
tion Bench and Bar noted that
[t]here may be some women who are adapted to advocacy, but we
believe that the majority of those who obtain admission to the Bar are
not, and further, that the time is hardly ripe for the entrance of many
women into this particular department of practice. It still savors of the
incongruous and jars upon what are called the "conservative" sensi-
bilities, to see a woman plead in court, however ably she may per-
form her part.428
424. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 158 (quoting BAR CouNcIL, SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM 4
(1969)).
425. Law Society: Admission, supra note 400, at 412.
426. Id. Mr. Preston proposed an amendment to that effect. Id. Apparently, the first woman to
receive the doctorate in architecture was Marie Frommer in 1919. See Spotlight on Women
Architects, SAN DIEOo UNION & TRiB., Oct. 18, 1987, at F28. Women were admitted into the
priesthood of the Church of England, not without controversy, in 1994. See Bells Ring as Church of
England Ordains Women Priests: Ceremony Follows Long Debate and Sometimes Bitter
Opposition, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 13, 1994, at 1 A.
427. Societies: The Law Society: Admission of Women as Solicitors, 63 SoLIc. J. & WKLY. REP.
414,418 (1919).
428. See Editorial, supra note 377, at 8.
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However,
[i]n the other departments of legal work... women may find a wide
field for usefulness, where they can easily compete with, and in some
of which they may perhaps excel, the men. We refer especially to the
field or fields of legal writing. These, as it seems to us, offer a splen-
did opportunity at the present time to the talents of the trained women
lawyers.... Women lawyers, also, could hold their own with men,
and might perhaps surpass them, as brief-writers. Large offices would
find bright, reliable young women lawyers of great service in prepar-
ing lists of authorities and briefs of cases at all stages, and independ-
ent women practitioners could undoubtedly obtain much employment
of this nature from busy lawyers with smaller establishments. 49
Even some supporters of women lawyers, both in England and in
the United States, believed that they ought to be channelled into areas of
practice that made the most of their traditional image of femininity, just
as supporters of women physicians believed that they were best suited to
the practice of obstetrics, gynecology and public health. Some women
attorneys even voiced this uncertainty:
One would suppose.., that the majority of a woman lawyer's clients
would be women. This has not been my experience, nor apparently
the experience of most women lawyers. The average woman seems to
prefer the legal advice of a man. Not infrequently she will ask the
woman lawyer of her acquaintance for her opinion as to the matter in
which she is interested and for hints as to how to proceed, but when it
comes to taking definite legal action, she will retain a man.... In my
opinion, there are certain branches of legal work which men are better
equipped to handle than women, and this sphere should not be in-
vaded by the latter. For instance, the vast majority of our criminal
cases, and, more especially, general trial work and political litigation.
But there is one field which, while it does not distinctly offer women
a choice for legal practice, yet finds its most patent appeal among
women lawyers. I refer to campaigns for and against legislation
which directly affects the welfare of women and children, both in
their legal status and their economic rights.430
Others, however, asserted that there were no essential differences be-
tween the capacities of men and women.
B. The Admission of Women to the Legal Profession
Ivy Williams, a graduate of the Universities of Oxford and London,
was called to the Inner Temple, May 10, 1922, as England's first female
barrister. 3' Williams "surpassed all previous records in the Bar Examina-
429. Id. at 8-9.
430. Jean H. Norman, Increasing Opportunities for Women Lawyers, 12 OHiO L REP. 255 (1914).
431. Occasional Notes, 153 LAw TIMES 336, 337 (1922). American legal journals of the period
also heralded her admission. See English Notes: Women Learned in the Law, LAW NOTES, July
1922, at 76.
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tions, '32 and had been active in the fight to gain women's admission.33
Yet even the excellence of women advocates could not overcome lan-
guage that implied that women could adequately represent only certain
types of clients:
In the ten years following the enabling Act we read of women suc-
cessfully pleading cases and on December 3rd., 1926, a woman advo-
cate appeared with a brief in the Privy Council. To indicate the atti-
tude towards women in Law we quote from an article in the Man-
chester Guardian (Weekly) of February 4th, 1927: "It is gratifying to
find that so much of the work of the ordinary practising barrister is
suitable for women. Some cases, indeed, involving the interests of
women and children may be more sympathetically and successfully
conducted by a woman.' '0
Shortly after Williams's admission, Carrie Morrison was admitted
as a solicitor, after she passed all appropriate examinations and com-
pleted her clerkship."3 She profited from the "reward" aspect of women's
participation in the war. "Miss Morrison, in virtue of distinguished serv-
ice in the Intelligence Department during the war, has been treated as an




Gray's Inn, which had tossed Bertha Cave's application aside nearly
twenty years before, recognized the inevitability of admitting women on
January 28, 1920 after the passage of the Sex Disqualification (Removal)
Act. Francis Cowper enthusiastically stated:
Mrs. M.E. Share-Jones, the first woman student, joined the Inn. But
the distinction of being the first woman was not to be hers. That was
to be achieved by Miss Edith Hesling, admitted in October, 1920, and
called on June 13, 1923. She became Mrs. Bradbury and her daughter
Anne was herself admitted in 1948 and called on June 6, 1951. At
Gray's Inn, more than any other Inn, women established themselves
as part of the community on a footing of unembarrassed equality and
a day came in Trinity Term, 1937, when the Treasurer, Lord Atkin,
called to the Bar his daughter Mrs. Rosaline Youard. 37
That the climate surrounding the question of female admission to
the bar had changed to a certain extent was evident from a rather rueful
editorial in the Law Times which compared Williams to a woman equally
learned in the law who did not have the opportunity to practice." The
432. Ruby M. Wigle, Sisters in Law, 6 CAN. B. REv. 419,420 (1927).
433. As early as 1904, Williams had objected loudly to the exclusion of women from the
profession. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
434. Wigle, supra note 432, at 420.
435. The First Woman Solicitor, 86 JuST. PEACE 647(1922).
436. Id
437. COwPER, supra note 161, at 126.
438. Occasional Notes, supra note 431, at 377.
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Honourable Charlotte Sugden, daughter of Lord St. Leonards, "assisted
her father in the writing of the well-known text-books in which opinions
find their expression which are scarcely less authoritative than the judg-
ments of Lord St. Leonards." ''3 Miss Sugden appeared as a witness in the
proving of Lord St. Leonards's will, and "proved herself fully conversant
with all legal technicalities and niceties, [and] in large measure deter-
mined the issue in the establishment of the will and of an important prin-
ciple of the law of evidence .... ,
The question of married women at the bar continued to be a sticky
one.
Until recently, women had to sacrifice marriage as well as mother-
hood to become solicitors: in 1921, 18 per cent of women solicitors
were married compared with 74 per cent of men; in 1951, the propor-
tions were 24 and 70 per cent; and as late as 1966, only a third of all
women lawyers were married."'
As Theresa Doland (Cornelius), an American lawyer of the period,
noted, when she eventually married:
[I had been practicing law about four years and I had accumulated
somewhat of a practice, and I thought the name "Theresa Doland"
was just as much stock in trade as anything I had and I was loath to
give it up. I have looked up the subject very carefully and have stud-
ied the law upon it and I am of the opinion, if I understand it, that
there is only one person in the state of Michigan that can stop me and
that is Mr. Cornelius." 2
VI. CONTINUING DEBATE
A. Women as Members of Circuit and Session Messes
The "'old boys' network" in the English legal profession extended
to the circuit and session messes, which were both professional and so-
cial organizations allowing members of the profession to join together in
congenial surroundings and share conversation, meals and experiences."
These messes were described as "primarily social clubs," and partially
served the same function as does membership in a private country club
today." As one American lawyer explained:
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. ABEL, supra note 18, at 174.
442. Theresa Doland, Remarks at the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Michigan Bar
Association, 6 MIcH. ST. BJ. 44,45 (1926).
443. Women Barristers and Bar Messes, 155 LAw TIMES 151 (1923) [hereinafter Women
Barristers and Bar Messes I].
444. Id.
445. "It's hard to imagine that a woman could have been pushed out of her job in favor of a man
who could golf, but that's what happened to Susan Nichols in the early 1980s in a Philadelphia suburb."
1998]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Every London barrister, early in his career, joins a circuit. He usually
selects one where he may be somewhat known to the solicitors, and
where, perhaps, his family have property or associations. Formerly
and, in fact, long after the advent of steam, judge and counsel "rode
the circuit"-as was done in the early days of our own county Bars...
. Each circuit has its "mess" with interesting traditions of midnight
carousels and records of fines of bottles of port inflicted upon mem-
bers for various delinquencies. The modem mess, besides procuring
special rates at the hotels, constitutes a sort of itinerant club; render-
ing possible a discipline for breaches of professional propriety by ex-
pulsion or denial or admission, which is the most drastic punishment
short of disbarment.44
Membership in a circuit was both restricted and exclusive."7 In order
to maintain control of their members, the circuits increasingly imposed
practices, including a type of blackballing, that allowed them to regulate
appearances in particular courts and by particular barristers.'"
Women barristers quickly realized that exclusion from these socie-
ties meant exclusion from a very important part of the routine activities
of their colleagues."9 Thus the question of women's entrance to these
dining halls and reception areas became of great concern both to them
and to their male colleagues. '
Immediately the limitations of legislation became apparent. The Sex
Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919,' which required formal profes-
sional acceptance of women, could not mandate their personal or social
acceptance by the vocal minority of men who did not want them there.
The debate began almost immediately and writers waged it enthusi-
astically in the pages of the nation's legal journals. Intoned the Law
Times: "The Law Society has admitted women members to all the privi-
leges of membership and so have the Inns of Court. It is to be regretted
that Circuit and Sessions Messes have not so far shown themselves
Carolyne Zinko, Los Altos Hills Company Helps Put Women on Par, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 1997, at P1
(discussing the role of country clubs to enhance business relationships).
446. THoMAs LARNING, A P~miADELPtIA lAWYER IN THE LONDON COURTS 171-72 (1911).
447. ABEL, supra note 18, at 97.
448. Raymond Cocks, The Bar at Assizes: Barristers on Three Nineteenth Century Circuits, 6
KINGSTON L REV. 36, 40 (1976).
449. Kinnear, supra note 85, at 411.
450. Exclusion was a problem for some Canadian women students at exam time.
One woman who graduated in the 1950s recollected that when the final examinations
came to be written, the women were separated from the other students lest the men be
distracted. "I was told by the Dean that... their whole lives depended on their success in
the exams . ... It would have been funny if it hadn't been so sick. Creating a stink would
have done no good at all."
Id. at 433. At my own law school, "ladies' day," an occasion during the school year when only women
were called on (or harassed, depending on one's view), was a vanished but still remembered tradition in
the early 1980s.
451. 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71 § I(b) (Eng.).
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equally generous." ' 2 However, it pointed out that women would find it
difficult to join a group that did not want them as members. 3 It sug-
gested a compromise: women should not have to pay for circuit sub-
scriptions if they cannot be admitted into the mess, but they might want
to wait until more men were comfortable with the idea of their presence
before pressing the issue.' 4 After all, they lost little by so doing except
"the doubtful pleasure of dining in inadequate numbers at what is a
men's dinner."''
Like the suggestion that women were incapable of understanding
the "rules of the game," attitudes that echoed these comments were still
in evidence fifty years later.
The atmosphere of legal practice is strongly coloured by attitudes in-
dicative of male arrogance. ... [M]ale condescension is expressed
through archaic courtesy and banter and by a refusal to take women's
ideas and actions seriously. This phenomenon may be a generalised
feature of our society, but it is emphasised by the club-like character
and mannered quality of the legal profession and by the absence of
women in positions of power within it. By all accounts the manners
that maketh the legal man can in certain circumstances be most op-
pressive to the legal woman.4-
The Solicitors' Journal and Weekly Reporter agreed with the Law
Times's correspondent:
[Tihere are privacies of mess life which render it inconvenient to mix
the sexes. On the other hand, it is obviously not equitable to exclude
women altogether from the opportunities of gaining experience thus
afforded to the Common Law Bar, and no one has proposed to do so.
Various circuits and sessions are adopting slightly different plans, but
the general scheme seems to be the admission of women to full rights
of membership, but without the right to attend mess, and conse-
quently without any subscription or a reduced subscription. In this
way women receive all the usual benefits as regards notice of sittings,
postal arrangements, attendance in court, court briefs, admission to
the poor persons' defence list, and the like; while the seclusion of the
masculine mess is preserved. Women, of course, can form a mess of
their own and adopt a Bar hotel of their own in each circuit town; al-
though, except perhaps on the Home Circuit, their numbers are not
likely to justify such a plan in the near future. On the whole, the pro-
posed compromise-which falls [sic] to be considered by most Bars
at an early date-seems fair and liberal."
452. Women Barristers and Bar Messes !, supra note 443, at 151.
453. Women Barristers and Bar Messes, 155 LAw TliMEs 196 (1923) [hereinafter Women
Barristers and Bar Messes 11). Not being Groucho Marx, the ladies insisted on exclusion.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. SAcHs & WILSON, supra note 3, at 179.
457. Women Barristers and the Circuits, 67 SoLic. J. & WKLY. REP. 179 (1922).
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The suggestion that women barristers ought to be satisfied with the
idea of either limited membership in an existing order or full member-
ship in a new order is a traditional one familiar to any minority group.
Limited membership in the existing group consisted of privileges which
the women were due in any case as full members of the profession. It
carefully did not include those intangible but real benefits of membership
that enhance professional relations through social interaction and nourish
a career in a profession built on shared values and the ability to reach
compromises through congenial and ongoing relationships. Likewise,
creating a barristers' group consisting only of women members, while
minimizing the problem of difficulties with males who did not want to
associate with them, did not address the very question of the creation of
and nurturing of professional and social relationships. Women barristers
might very well get along famously, but they did not, to begin with, have
the personal and professional connections that they needed to advance in
the profession. Either suggestion required nothing more from the men
involved than that they tolerate the existence of women in the profession,
and that they grant only those privileges that a majority might well feel
were not sufficient, but that a significant minority felt were far and away
the most that women could expect. Both journals implicitly recognized
this fact.
Neither the Law Times nor the Journal suggested that women might
band together with like-minded men and start a mess which included
both sexes, a suggestion that would have addressed the problem admira-
bly and would have sent a clear signal to the holdouts. Further, it negated
the impression that a separate women's mess would simply be the result
of childish pique at not being included in an exclusive club. Eventually,
one mess admitted women and breached the social wall:
[Alt a Grand Night of the Bar Mess of the South-Eastern Circuit, held
at Lewes on the 2nd inst., the question of admitting women barristers
to the mess was discussed, and decided by a majority in favour of
their admission. The election of two women candidates-Miss Bright
Ashford and Miss Llewellyn Davies-was then proceeded with, and
both candidates were elected.s58
Some restrictions continued until 1964, including exclusion from
activities other than meetings and some meal functions.59 In that year, the
Midland Circuit still banned women from all activities, presumably be-
cause they "'inhibit[ed] the atmosphere' and 'completely alter[ed] the
character and nature' of the messes" ° and amazingly disapproved of
female participation in the mess "because they felt 'that in so doing [the
458. Women Barristers and Bar Messes II, supra note 453, at 196.
459. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 156; see also ABEL-SMrrH & STEVENS, supra note 351, at 431-
32 (noting that some circuits only allowed women to attend meetings and some dinners).
460. ABEL-SMrII & STEVENS, supra note 351, at 432.
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women] are in some way advancing their professional chances."'" The
Northern Circuit allowed women into meetings and selected dinners."
This combination of bad faith and misogyny resulted in the excoriation
and expulsion of one young female who secreted herself in the hall dur-
ing a males-only concert at Gray's Inn during which
vulgar jokes and songs combine[d] with large quantities of drink....
This kind of episode typifies the traditional flavour of the Bar which,
with few exceptions, is an echo of the public school, the military
mess and the gentlemen's club. Women are just not "chaps"; and the
men are certainly not prepared to make any concessions to make
women feel more welcome. 63
Podmore and Spencer note, however, that even in the 1980s women
solicitors and barristers continued to suffer from exclusion and hence,
exclusion from the intangible but real advantages that membership in a
profession dependent on social interaction could provide:
In some professions-particularly in the law, but in medicine also-
the nature of social interaction is modelled on that of exclusive men's
clubs. This "clubbable" atmosphere, which permeates the courts, bar-
risters' chambers, solicitors' practices and local law societies, is a
considerable barrier for women to overcome.... Exclusion from full
participation in the "club" and its activities is certain to inhibit the ca-
reers of women lawyers.4"
B. The Issue of Women's Dress in Court
The obvious symbolism inherent in allowing women to take meals
with their male colleagues while riding the circuits was only one of the
gender-related issues that confronted the profession. The garb of the
English lawyer is one of the most distinctive symbols of that walk of life.
The debate over whether women called to the bar should either be re-
quired or allowed to affect the robe and wig of the English barrister was
somewhat heated. ' For male opponents, the traditional barrister's dress
symbolized exclusivity both through gender and through profession.'
The traditional dominance and power of the male was reinforced through
his control of the legal apparatus.' To allow women to practice law
might have become a necessary evil. It did not follow that they should
also be permitted to wear the costume of the law, thus creating an an-
drogynous look that made it more difficult for onlookers to determine
461. Id.
462. Id. at431.
463. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 156-57.
464. Podinore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 29-30.
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which of the barrister class were legitimate and which were recent inter-
lopers.
In Ireland, women wore the traditional wig, apparently without any
comment, an outcome which the Justice of the Peace found "ludicrous..
. It is generally assumed that no such outrage will occur here, and that
women practitioners will be required to substitute for the wig a black
biretta. The principle is clear. A women [sic] in Court as in church
should have a head-covering, which technically a wig is not.'" Entrusted
with the duty of making this momentous decision was a committee of
five "eminent judges," including the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of
the Rolls.' Citing the Daily News, the Barristers' and Solicitors' Jour-
nal continued:
The five judges have so far had no feminine adviser to assist them at
their deliberations. One of the proposals made by the Judges'
Committee is that women barristers should wear a cap similar to that
worn by the women graduates and undergraduates at Oxford, but the
women students who are reading for the Bar are said to be in favour
of wearing wigs, and it is probably that they will be asked their
opinion before the judges' decision is made absolute. Some definite
rules will also have to be laid down in regard to the dress to be worn
under the gown. As it is against etiquette for barristers to wear light
suits, it is probably that women will be prohibited from wearing
coloured blouses and skirts, low necks, and short sleeves, when in the
courts .... 470
The editor of the Irish Law Times and Solicitors' Journal added that
"[tihe question has not created any difficulty in Ireland, where lady bar-
risters wear the same style of wig and bands as men. The effect is cer-
tainly far from ludicrous. It is regarded as very becoming to the lady
wearers." 7' In the early 1990s, barristers were still debating the wig
question:
The Commercial Bar Association, representing 500 commercial
lawyers, argues that many consider wigs to be uncomfortable and
outmoded, and that they can alienate and intimidate people in court.
They have backing from the highest echelons of the legal pro-
fession. In an interview with the BBC yesterday, the new Lord Chief
Justice, Baron Taylor of Gosforth, admitted that the "18th century
image enshrouding the law is one of the factors which makes us seem
out of touch."
He added: "I do not believe we are really out of touch, but I
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shed wigs and robes. However, I would not fire into doing that with-
out consultation and without seeing what we are going to do, which is
not quite as simple as it may seem.
"One could just have ordinary suits or one could have the kind
of gown they have in the United States, or various other alternatives
which we have to look at closely.' 072
However, some male barristers now find a female colleague's wig an
incredible attraction:
But for many the wig is an evocative and inseparable element of
the practice of law, with all its faults. One male barrister said: "It's
about the sexiest thing a woman can wear. There is something about
the severity of a wig that makes any woman look attractive."
Woman lawyers, understandably, wish to distance themselves
from such antediluvian attitudes. Helena Kennedy, one of the coun-
try's best-known female QCs, said: "I feel strongly that part of the
mystification of the law is added to by the wearing of the garb which
alienates many people from the legal process.
"I want to see the wig go, particularly in criminal courts, where
people can be very fearful. I think the majority of people in the pro-
fession are confident of their own success and don't need the prop of
fancy dress."' 3
The Committee of Judges and Benchers of the Inns of Court ended
by recommending the same dress for both men and women barristers,
which upset some people in the legal press:
The Committee of Judges and Benchers of the Inns of Court
who have been considering what would be the appropriate robes for
women to wear in court after their call to the Bar have "expressed a
wish" that the dress of women barristers in court shall conform to the
following rules:--1) Ordinary banister's wigs should be worn and
should completely cover and conceal the hair. (2) Ordinary barrister's
gowns should be worn. (3) Dresses should be plain, black or very
dark, high to the neck, with long sleeves, and not shorter than the
gown, with high, plain white collar and barrister's bands; or plain
coats and skirts may be worn, black or very dark, not shorter than the
gown, with plain white shirts and high collars and barrister's bands.'7'
472. Gervase Webb, The Law Wants a Verdict on Wigs in Court, EvENiNG STAAIRD (London),
Apr. 28, 1992, at 14.
473. Id. Sexuality as an undercurrent in the relationship of (male) lawyers to their chosen
profession should be obvious from the traditional saying that the law is a jealous mistress. "I will not
say, with Lord Hale, that 'The Law will admit of no rival .... ' but I will say, that it is a jealous
mistress, and requires a long and constant courtship. It is not to be won by trifling favors, but by lavish
homage." Joseph Story, The Value and Importance of Legal Studies, in MiscELLANrous WRrrTNGS OF
JOSEPH STORY 503,523 (William W. Story ed., 1852).
474. Women Barristers, 66 SOuC. J. & WKLY. REP. 411,411 (1922).
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After reporting this unsatisfactory compromise, the Solicitors'
Journal and Weekly Reporter objected to the sight of women in the tra-
ditional barrister's garb." The wig was traditionally a man's head cov-
ering, not a woman's, sniped the Journal, and "as much out of place on a
woman's head as any masculine article of attire-we forbear to particu-
larize-on her body."'
This disapproval was as much a function of its unwillingness to deal
with the niceties of the wig's positioning on the head as its objection to
this change in custom. Sir Herbert Stephens' concerns about the manner
of wearing the wig evoked the Journal to fuss:
The wig must "completely cover and conceal the hair." How shock-
ing should a stray lock emerge! Sir Herbert says it cannot be done
when the hair is "bobbed"; but how does he know what that means?
And with other modes the wig will give a "hydrocephalous, ungainly,
and ludicrous appearance." "Hydrocephalous" sounds forcible,
though we are glad it is not of our using.4
The Journal defensively concluded:
It may be said that our criticism is destructive .... What have we to
say constructively? But that is really for the Committee when the
matter is referred back to the them-as it ought to be-for re-
consideration. At any rate, they need not encourage the women to ape
the men in their dress. Both Sir Herbert Stephens and Lieut-Col.
Hawkes... offer suggestions-a biretta, or toque, or coif. But, no
doubt, the best solution would be just his or her own natural hair for
everybody.478
By contrast a New York judge objected to female hat-wearing in his
court.' As one legal reporter pointed out, women traditionally wore hats
even in places of worship; to fimate on the headgear, rather than on the
thoughts coming out of the head it covered, seemed inordinately petty.'
Indeed, the traditional garb associated with the English Bar dates
only from the 17th century.' Before that, the long gown seems to have
475. Women Barristers and Wigs, 66 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 401, 401 (1922).
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. (citation omitted). Hair seems to be a continuing concern for critics of women attorneys.
Note the inane discussions of Marcia Clark's new hairstyle during the O. Simpson trial. See CNN &
Company (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 12,1995). See also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Johnnie Cochran
& Marcia Clark: Role Models?, in POSTMoRTEm: THE OJ. SIPsoN CASE 117, 121, 124. (Jeffrey
Abramson ed., 1996) (discussing undue attention given Clark's hairstyle and clothing throughout trial).
479. Women Lawyers at the Bar with Hats On, 14 LAw NoTEs 122,122 (1910).
480. Id. Virginia Drachman quotes nineteenth-century U.S. attorney Lelia Robinson as remarking
that the hat was a tremendous tactical problem for a woman lawyer. "Shall the woman attorney wear
her hat when arguing a case or making a motion in court... or shall she remove it?" Drachman, supra
note 255, at 2414.
481. J.H. Baker, The Origin of the Bar Gown, 49 LAw GuARDIAN 17 (1969).
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been worn traditionally by both "learned" persons and the male lay
population.' Further, it seems that lawyers in general wore simple long
gowns of various colors.' The familiar black robe seems to have gained
favor only after the reign of Henry VII (1485-1509).4" After the reign of
Charles II (1660-1685), when it represented mourning for the dead king,
the profession fimally formally adopted it as official lawyers' garb.'
Wigs seem to have come into fashion after the Inns of Court prohibited
benchers, particularly the ebullient young adventurers of the Tudor and
Stuart courts, from wearing "hats, cloaks, boots spurs, swords, daggers
and long hair"' which symbolized the aggressive practices antithetical to
a dispassionate and nonviolent dispute resolution regime. Because those
so regulated were male, we may postulate that wigs became more associ-
ated with that sex than with the other, thus the argument that wigs are a
male and not a female "head covering." Such an argument smacks of the
contemporary assertion among French male avocats that a decree of the
Paris Parlement of 1540 forbidding lawyers from sporting facial hair is
proof that women should continue to be barred from the profession, since
women have none.'
Once the committee made the decision that women and men barris-
ters should dress alike, the bar discouraged women from retaining any
marks of female attire:
Meticulous rules are imposed and their strict interpretation endlessly
discussed. To be the very model of a perfect lady barrister means
looking as indistinguishable as possible from one's male colleagues.
Warnings are given at an early stage in one's career to remove dress
rings and nail polish when appearing before a certain lady judge.
"Dresses or blouses should be long-sleeved and high to the neck....
Wigs should, as far as possible, cover the hair, which should be
drawn back from the face and forehead, and if long enough should be
p u t u p .
''8
Clearly the "sex kitten" or "siren" look is out of place.
482. Id.
483. J.H. Baker, The History of the Gowns Worn at the English Bar, 9 CoSTuME 15 (1975).
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Baker, supra note 481, at 17.
487. The argument states:
On invoqua sirieusement un arr&it du Parlement de 1540 qui 'interdit aux avocats de
porter la barbe et la moustache.' C'itait donc que les femmes ne peuvent itre avocates. Et
cette objection nous itonne; l'arriti suppose au contraire que lesfemmes ont, par avance,
respecti le texte, puisqu'elles ne portent ni la barbe ni la moustache.
[They cite seriously a decree of the Parliament from 1540 that "prohibits lawyers from
having a beard or a moustache." This meant that women could not be lawyers. And that
objection astounds us; the decree assumes on the contrary that women have in advance
complied with its words, because they wear neither beards nor moustaches.]
CoRcos, supra note 134, at 19 (translation by author); see Corcos, supra note 37, at 455.
488. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 159 (citing Notes for Guidance on Dress in Court, in BAR
CouNciL's ANNUAL STATEMENT 52(1973)).
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These. rules are sacred to the heart of the older woman practitioner,
going back to the days when admission to a man's world was such a
privilege that women conformed even in their mode of dress.4 9 To its
credit the Special Committee refused to act as a watchdog of skirt
lengths and referred the question of dress straight back to the Bar
Council. It is extraordinary how much time is wasted on trivia of this
kind while the real problems continue to be ignored.u
Like dress, language did and does carry meaning beyond the literal.
The arrogance of the male lawyer continued to diminish the efforts of
women attorneys into the 1970s and 1980s:
One County Court judge in Berkshire who had a notorious reputation
as a misogynist used to refer to women banisters in open court as
"chorus girls" and "silly girls". During a road accident case, where
the woman driver was represented by a woman barrister, the judge
gratuitously gave the court the benefit of his jaundiced view of
women drivers. The male counsel for the plaintiff obsequiously in-
quired if the judge held the same views of women barristers. This sort
of male togetherness is frequently used in a competitive way to un-
dermine the professional confidence of women practitioners. 49'
VII. THE ENTRY OF WOMEN INTO PROFESSIONS RELATED TO LAW
In general, the objections to women's entry or full participation in
the legal profession paralleled objections to their entry or full participa-
tion in other professions.
489. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 159-60. To a great extent this seems to continue to be true both
in court and in law school. Christine Farley tells the story of a male colleague who counseled her to
modify her style of dress in order not to convey the wrong impression to students concerning her
expectations for class performance.
As he saw it, I either needed to in fact be nice, or, alternatively appear not to be nice. I
explained to him that I had already decided that it was not my goal to be nice, and I
wondered why students would draw the contrary conclusion when my actions had not
betrayed my intentions. Then he commented on my appearance. Noting that I was
wearing a sweater, he told me that as a young woman I could not afford to wear anything
"soft" He suggested instead that I wear dark, "severe-looking" suit jackets.
Farley, supra note 11, at 344.
During a break from a winter 1995 CL.E session a female Cleveland Heights judge admired my
deep purple wool coat, then told me she hoped I realized I could never wear that color in court. On
another occasion, a male colleague at my former law school and I were discussing dress with a law
student. My colleague pointed out that my turtleneck sweater, blazer and wool skirt were quite
appropriate and attractive for an academic environment but "of course" would never do in court, and
that his own dark suit was marginal for a court appearance, but gave him a somewhat more severe
image than he would have liked for classroom teaching.
490. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 159-60. However, some women as well as men regretted the
loss of women's special, protected status. Mary Lathrop, the first woman admitted to the American Bar
Association, commented: "I'm rather tired of rights. I'd love to have a few privileges." Virginia G.
Drachman, The New Woman Lawyer and the Challenge of Sexual Equaliay in Early Twentieth-Century
America, 28 IND. L REv. 227,227 (1995).
491. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 157. See also Delfs, supra note 15 (discussing gender bias in the
cournoom).
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A. The Judicial Branch
The horror that solicitors such as G.B. Crook felt at the thought of
females on the bench' and the ambivalence that J.A. Symmonds ex-
pressed' were only two of the reactions to the thought of female magis-
trates. The English legal journal Justice of the Peace observed that the
reception accorded the recently introduced Justices of the Peace (Qualifi-
cation of Women) Bill
justifies the anticipation that this reform in our judicial system may
be looked for at an early date.... The principle which is thus to have
legislative effect given to it is an important one, although its adoption
into the law of the land would not be likely to have anything like the
direct result which followed from the recent concession of the par-
liamentary franchise to women.4
In its discussion of the proposed legislation, the journal pinpointed the
problem with much of the long term parliamentary attempt to grant
women equal civil and political rights.' The legislation drafted suffered
from one of two flaws.' Either it was ineffectively written, so that those
so inclined could find, with the assistance of like-minded judges, ways to
circumvent the intended application of the statute,'n or it was written so
that it granted women a severely limited scope of participation.' Thus,
Parliament often needed to revisit questions it had already considered:
[Wihile there is in theory no limit to the number of justices who may
be appointed in any county, in practice the number is adjusted to what
are likely to be the demands on the time of the holders of the office,
and new members are appointed only as and when the step is neces-
sary to keep the roll at its normal strength. The Bill merely provides
that in making a selection to fill up such vacancies the claims of a
woman to selection shall not be ignored because of the fact that she is
a woman. The removal of the disqualification of women to sit as jus-
tices where they would but for their sex become justices ex officio is
all the more notable that the common law disability of women in this
respect has been so recently affirmed by Parliament. The Qualifica-
tion of Women (County and Borough Councils) Act, 1907, section 1,
when granting admission to local offices to women provided that a
woman if elected as chairman of a county council or mayor of a bor-
ough should not by virtue of holding or having held that office be a
justice of the peace.499
492. Law Society: Admission, supra note 400, at 410-11.
493. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 429.
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The journal predicted that women would, by virtue of newer legislation
written to remove impediments to their occupation of judicial seats, de-
cide cases before they argued them, although it expressed this thought in
language that could be taken either as admiration or as disapproval: "It
would not be out of keeping with their traditional disregard for common-
place paths of progress if women attained to the bench before reaching
the bar. ''"
B. Juries
While participation on a jury is not a professional occupation, it
does serve as a basic part of the English legal system. Thus, female par-
ticipation on juries was a matter of continuing debate throughout the
period. The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act allowed the excuse of
women "because of the character of the issues involved or the evidence
to be given."' Some men apparently went to great lengths to avoid jury
duty themselves, even putting their property in their wives' names.?
C. The Legislature
1. House of Commons
The right of women over the age of thirty to vote for members of
the House of Commons was granted through the Representation of the
People Act of 1918'° and their right to be elected to the Commons was
established through the Parliament Act of 1918, even though it was
"not a fit place for any respectable woman to sit in. ' '" In 1919, Nancy,
Viscountess Astor,' became the first woman to be elected to that branch
of the legislature, succeeding her husband, who had been elevated to the
House of Lords.' The Law Times noted that in Lady Astor's case,
500. Id.
501. Sex Disqualification (Removal) Bill, 83 JuST. PEACE 330 (1919). See Sex Disqualification
(Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, Ch 71, § 1(b) (Eng.) (stating women may be exempted "by
reason of the nature of evidence to be given or the issues to be tried"). The Jurors (Scotland) Act was
amended in 1920 to allow women to serve as jurors. See The Jurors (Scotland) Act of 1920, 10 & 11
Geo. 5, ch. 53, § I(1) (Eng.).
502. See Barristers and Solicitors (Qualification of Women) Bill, 63 SoLic. J. & WKLY. RE'. 500,
501 (1919).
503. Representation of the People Act of 1918,8 Geo. 5, ch. 64 (Eng.).
504. The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act of 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, ch. 47 (Eng.). As one
American commentator pointed out, while women under 30 could not vote, they could be elected to the
Commons at any age, which was also true of the Netherlands. See Women Members of Parliament, 13
Am. POL Sa. REv. 114, 115 (1919) [hereinafter Women Members].
505. See Women Members, supra note 504, at 114.
506. Lady Astor was the former Nancy Langhorne, a member of an old, established Virginia
family. See DIcIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, 1961-1970, at 43 (Supp. 1981).
507. See Occasional Notes, 148 LAw TIMES 218,219 (1919) [hereinafter Lady Astor]. The custom
of women succeeding their husbands to a legislative position has since become somewhat notorious in
the United States. In 1972, Lindy Boggs of Louisiana succeeded her husband, the late Hale Boggs, in
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the personal equation invests her presence in the House of Commons
with surroundings absolutely unique and unparalleled. The first
woman member... who has been elected to that assembly for the
discharge of Parliamentary duties was not, strange to say, born a
British subject. Lady Astor is by birth an American citizen, and has
become a British subject by marriage. She is accordingly qualified for
election and sitting and voting in the House of Commons under the
provisions of recent legislation by the fact of her marriage with a
British citizen.-"
That Lady Astor would not have been eligible for her seat had she
not been married was an ironic circumstance not lost on the article's
author. Further, her husband was the son of a naturalized British subject
who only obtained his right to sit in the Lords upon the passage of the
Naturalization Act of 1870,' which allowed naturalized citizens not born
the U.S. House of Representatives. See Lindy Boggs to the Vatican, THE HonTiNE, Apr. 18, 1997, at
142. Muriel Humphrey was named to her late husband's Senate seat on January 25, 1978. See Patricia
Grice, FYI: Time Capsule, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 20, 1997, at lB. Lurleen Wallace was
elected governor of the state of Georgia in 1966, succeeding her husband George who could not
succeed himself. See The Associated Press, Jan. 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4408437 (listing key
dates in the life of former Alabama Governor George C. Wallace). Much earlier, Rose McConnell Long
finished out her dead husband's Senate term. See Jane McKee, The Roll Call Quiz, ROLL CALL, July 17,
1995. Later, another Long widow, Cathy, succeeded her husband, U. S. Representative Gillis Long. See
Mitchell Locin, Clout Southern Style: When It Comes to Politics, Chicago Ain't Got Nothin' on the
Pelican State, CQ. TRin., June 2, 1985, at C18.
Some of these women were undeniably able, and had simply put their husbands' careers ahead
of their own political ambitions, as women have traditionally been expected to do. The jury is still out
on others. One commentator wrote:
mhe United States, in a strange and sentimental nepotism, prefers widows. Perhaps it is
our idea that the American woman is a kind of clinging ivy to her husband's oak; that
they are two minds with but a single thought, and that a constituency which has found
itself admirably represented by a husband, unfortunately deceased, can have equal and
identical perfection by electing his widow to take his place. Perhaps it takes a particular
kind of ability to live with one of our masculine representatives at Washington; the
characteristic of being a good mixer, say; of being able to deal with refractory and wilful
personalities; and any one who survives that association may have durable and excellent
personal qualities. Or perhaps we merely wish to pay a sentimental tribute, of the kind we
offer when we subscribe to a memorial window: something to please the family.
Alzada Comstock, Women Members of European Parliments, 20 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 379, 383-84
(1926). At least one influential contemporary commentator interprets this tendency more cynically,
calling it the "Flashdance" phenomenon, after the popular film of the same name in which an aspiring
dancer has her way to the top smoothed by a sympathetic, attractive, and wealthy suitor (a late-twentieth
century retelling of the Cinderella story, CHARLES PERRAULT, CINDERELLA, OR THE LrITLE GLASS
SLIPPER (1954)). See FARRELL, supra note 15, at 91-100 (1988).
In real life, almost all of America's one hundred wealthiest women made their
personal fortunes on their husband's or father's death, and many women with power
flashdanced to it on their husband's death, such as Helen Copley, who quit her job as a
secretary when she married the president of Copley Enterprises on her husband's death,
or female U.S. Senators such as Muriel Humphrey, elected with no prior experience upon
the death of Hubert Humphrey; or Margaret Chase Smith, elected after the death of
Senator Smith; or Katherine Graham of the Washington Post, or Joan Kroc of
McDonald's.
Id. at 58-59. While parts of Farrell's book appear to be special pleading, he does point out many of the
critical areas in which men's and women's socialization tend to promote misunderstanding.
508. Lady Astor, supra note 507, at 219.
509. The Naturalization Act of 1870,33 VicL, ch. 14 (Eng.).
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of English parents to sit in either House . 5 " Further, as the wife of a peer
and a member of the aristocracy, Lady Astor could be tried for crimes by
the Lords by virtue of her sex, and yet she could not occupy a seat there.
Her membership in the Commons, coupled with her husband's seat in the
Lords, made legal nonsense of the old idea that husband and wife were
"one person in law:"
A statute of Henry VI. declares the law to be that peeresses in their
own right or by marriage shall be tried before the same judicature as
other peers of the realm .... It would be an interesting question
whether a peeress by marriage who was also a member of the House
of Commons would, on a charge of felony, be of trial of nobility or
trial as a commoner by a judge and jury. A wife in the House of
Commons with a husband in the House of Lords upsets absolutely
and completely the old idea of the rights and obligations involved in
the marriage status. From the earliest times it has been laid down as a
fundamental principle of law, a principle upon which the whole law
relating'to husband and wife.., has depended, that by virtue of the
marriage a husband and wife become one person in law.... Viscount
Astor in the House of Lords and Lady Astor as the occupant of a seat
in the House of Commons... are, though husband and wife, not one
person in law .... The election of a married woman to the House of
Commons may be regarded as a death warrant to all the disabilities
entailed by coverture on the persons, the property, or the transactions
of married women.
An American observer of the period quoted Lady Astor's wry commen-
tary on her political style and that of a female colleague:
Lady Astor's own description of her own methods is given in the
following words by Marjorie Shuler in the American Review of Re-
views for January 1924: "I get very keen on a thing and go after it.
The men say 'There's that terrible woman'; and they run away from
me. They turn to Mrs. Wintringhamn and say, 'There's that good, kind,
homely women; let's talk to her'. And Mrs. Wintringham just smiles
and smiles, and skins them alive-but they don't know it.''
512
510. Id.
511. Lady Astor, supra note 507, at 219 (citation omitted). Nancy, Viscouness Astor, was the
woman, who once told Winston Churchill, "Winston, if you were my husband I should flavor your
coffee with poison." "Madam," Churchill replied, "if I were your husband I should drink it." Catherine
Fitzpatrick, Well Equipped, MiLWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 13, 1997, at 1.
512. Comstock, supra note 507, at 380. Comstock also discusses women members of the German,
Swedish, Czechoslovakian, Finnish, Hungarian, U.S., Dutch, and Norwegian legislatures, noting that
There is something odd about the geographical position of the countries in which these
women members, deputies and senators, are to be found. They exist in a fringe around the
north and east of Europe. France, Italy, Spain, and the other countries along the
Mediterranean are out of it entirely.... To find the group of women legislators of longest
standing, one must go up beyond the Scandinavian countries, to the Finns, who live
farther north than any other civilized people in the world.
What is there about the barren north which stimulates women to go into law,
medicine, and politics? And what is there about blue Mediterranean skies which keeps
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Lady Astor soon had a third colleague, Mrs. Clara Phillipson. Political
wags nicknamed the three female members of the Commons "Society"
(Lady Astor), "Sobriety" (Mrs. Wintringham) and "Variety" (Mrs. Phil-
lipson, who had been an actress)."' The 1924 Labour Government
brought in Margaret Bondfield, a former shop assistant whose interests
were workers' rights and who became the first woman member of a
British goverment.
4
2. House of Lords
After the passage of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act,55 the
question arose concerning women's eligibility for the House of Lords as
well. The Solicitors' Journal pointed out that the Sex Disqualification
(Removal) Act was "framed in very general and wide terms" 6 and
agreed that Parliament had only envisioned election to the House of
Commons."" It may have seemed that the spirit of legislation like the
Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act"' and the Sex Disqualification
(Removal) Acte19 which seemed to confer on women the same political
rights as men should have addressed the problem of peeresses like Vis-
countess Rhondda," but discussion in the Lords resulted in a decision to
consign that issue to a specific enabling statute.
A committee appointed in 1922 found that no existing piece of leg-
islation, including the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919,52 '
specifically removed the disability. In its eyes, membership in the House
of Lords was neither a civil or judicial office or post, nor a profession or
vocation:
them out of the professions and out of politics, and induces them to spend their days
running little shops?
Id. at 379. Weather may have something to do with it, but the religious and political orientations of
these countries also encourage or discourage the recognition of and respect for women's achievements
to varying degrees.
513. Id. at 380.
514. Id. at 380-81.
515. Sexual Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71, § I(b) (Eng.).
516. Alteration of Women's Legal Status, 64 SOLIc. J. & WKLY. REP. 250 (1920).
517. Id. The journal further clucked that a very similar piece of legislation passed in New South
Wales did not correspond exactly with the British statute. "This question of sex-equality legislation
seems to be one of those in which uniformity throughout the Empire would be desirable." li
518. The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act of 1918,8 & 9 Geo. 5, ch. 47 (Eng.).
519. Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919,9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71, § 1(b) (Eng.).
520. Regarding peeresses, Francis Palmer stated:
Peeresses, whether they be peeresses by birth, by creation, or by marriage, are
entitled to the same privileges as peers, but if a peeress by marriage should afterwards
intermarry with a commoner, she forfeits her privileges. By the Lords' Standing Orders,
No. 53, it is ordered and declared by the Lords that privilege of Parliament shall not be
allowed to minor peers, noble women, or widows of peers, saving their right of peerage.
FRANCIS BEAUFoRT PALMER, PEERAGE LAW IN ENGLAND 152 (1978). Peeresses could, however, be
tried in the House of Lords. Id. at 18 (citing 20 Hen. 6, ch. 9 (Eng.); 6 Geo. 4, ch. 66, § 12 (Eng.)).
521. 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71, §1 (Eng.). Viscount= Rhondda commented rather sourly that the
word "removal" "had never succeeded in getting outside its brackets." SHItLEY M. EOFF, ViscouwTEsS
RHONDDA: EQUALTARIAN FEMNS'r 87 (1991).
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A person shall not be disqualified by sex or marriage from the exer-
cise of any public function, or from being appointed to or holding any
civil or judicial office or post, or from entering or assuming or carry-
ing on any civil profession or vocation, or for admission to any incor-
porated society (whether incorporated by Royal Charter or otherwise)
522
The committee's procedure in reaching its decision was met with some
derision:
[N]o report, however ably drafted, can alter the fact that the proce-
dure adopted is open to grave objection. At the first hearing the then
Attorney-General intimated that he could not dispute the soundness of
Lady Rhondda's construction of the statute, and the Committee re-
ported accordingly, whereupon the House recommitted the matter in
order that a full Committee might hear the present Attorney-General
argue against a submission that his predecessor in office had pro-
nounced unassailable! Naturally the proceedings wore a certain air of
unreality.522
Apparently, the committee also made the suggestion that legislative
history was necessary to determine the exact intent of Parliament with
regard to the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act. 4' Since the Interpreta-
tion Act was intended to address just such questions, appeal to parlia-
mentary debate was unusual and probably illegitimate." Early in the
debate over the 1919 Act, however, the Justice of the Peace sniffed that
the press had misunderstood the intent of the bill and addressed itself
particularly to the question of Viscountess Rhondda and other women
holding titles in their own right:
If we may judge from the Press notices, clause 2 seems to be a good
deal misunderstood. It merely provides that in the patent of any peer-
age granted in the future there may be a valid limitation authorising
the holder, if a woman, to sit and vote in the House of Lords. The po-
sition of women who are now peeresses in their own right is not in-
tended to be affected. 2 6
It also noted that the Government might legitimately continue to close
the civil and foreign services to women."
The House of Lords proved the Justice of the Peace right in its in-
terpretation. The Committee of Privileges of the House of Lords did not
read the wording of this statute to include a peeress's right to sit as an
522. 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71, § 1 (Eng.).
523. Lady Rhondda's Case, 86 JuST. PEACE 255, 255 (1922).
524. 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71, § I (Eng.).
525. Lady Rhondda's Case, supra note 523, at 255.
526. The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Bill, supra note 501, at 330.
527. Id.
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equal among that body" While Viscountess Rhondda could both vote
for and serve in the House of Commons, she could not take her seat as a
peeress of the Realm. For the Committee, the Sex Disqualification (Re-
moval) Act of 1919, was "not sufficient to carry out so momentous a
revolution in the constitution of the House of Lords."" For the Law
Times this result was understandable but regrettable:
When such acknowledged experts [as Lord Haldane and Lord Birk-
enhead] differ, it is difficult to express any opinion, but it must now
be taken that the House of Lords is the only place where women are
forbidden to exercise any public function, and where men alone have
"a seat, place, and voice." In this country we have no Salic law, and a
woman may fill the highest place in the Empire. Women as common-
ers may give their services to the State in the House of Commons,
and no logical or other reason exists why a woman, a peeress in her
own right, should be excluded from the other estate of the realm.3°
In 1925, Lord Astor attempted to remedy the situation with a bill, which
was defeated by a two-vote majority, 3' even though backers attempted to
make a strong historical argument in support:
Ladies of birth and quality sat in council with the Saxon Witas. In
Wightred's great council at Beconcild, A.D. 699, the Abbesses sat
and deliberated, and five of them signed the decrees of that council
along with the king, bishops, and nobles. In Henry III and Edward I's
time four Abbesses were summoned to Parliament, viz.: of Shaftes-
bury, Berking St. Mary, of Winchester, and of Wilton, In the 35th
[sic] of Edward Ill were summoned by writ to Parliament to appear
there by their proxies Countess of Norfolk, Countess of Ormonde,
Countess of March, Countess of Pembroke, Countess of Oxford, and
Countess of Atholl. These ladies were called ad colloquium et tracta-
tum: "The old prerogatives of the Crown have not perished, nor can
they become obsolete through desuetude. Nullum tempus occurrit
Regi." Mr. Bagehot on one occasion recommended a persual of the
pages of Comyn's Digest, or any other such book, under the title Pre-
rogative; and Mr. Freeman has observed that it is hard to see how, ex-
cept when they have been taken away by Act of Parliament, any pow-
ers which were exercised by Edward I (among them the summoning
of women to the House of Lords) could be refused to Queen Victoria.
If writs of summons to peeresses in their own right were issued in the
exercise of the prerogative, the House of Lords would have no power,
and probably no desire, to prevent the entry of these ladies into the
Gilded Chamber.!
528. Id.
529. The Law and the Lawyers: Peeresses and Parliament, 154 LAw TIMES 1, 1 (1922).
530. Id. Note the reference to the French, who admitted women in 1900. Shirley M. Eoff devotes
several pages to the fight to enter the House of Lords. See EOFF, supra note 521, at 81-88.
531. Peeresses in the House of Lords, 29 LAw NOTES 97 (1925).
532. Id.
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Note the rejection of the argument advanced in the Chorlton and Bebb
cases, that a sort of latches barred women's rights in this area.
D. The Police
In February 1920, the Home Secretary established a committee to
inquire into the entry of women onto the police force."' Its report ap-
peared on July 24, 1920.' Commenting favorably on the performance of
women during the war, the committee recommended that they be used
particularly in cases of violence against women or children.3 In a com-
ment that seems to reiterate the suggestion that women simply "did not
get it," the committee believed that women police officers should be
strongly impressed, as indeed all police officers should be, with the
necessity of getting the victim's story unadulterated with the sugges-
tions of the statement taker. Specializing in work of this kind is apt to
give the latter a subconscious desire to get a statement so complete
that it will exclude the defences which his or her experience teaches
are usually set up, with the unhappy result, at least in the case of a
child, that by the time she comes to give evidence in court, she is no
longer telling her experience, but reciting a statement:3
It is tempting to see in this caution a suggestion that women police offi-
cers would be more sympathetic, thus less objective and less profes-
sional, in obtaining statements from young victims of abuse or violence.
If this inference is accurate, was the committee also slyly suggesting that
women police officers are not as intellectually or psychologically capa-
ble as male officers overall?
Certainly at least some of the members of the committee thought
that women police officers were not as physically able to carry out all
duties required of an officer. "The committee think [sic] that police-
women should not be required to perform duties which necessarily in-
volve the exercise of physical force and exposure to physical danger, and
upon this they base a recommendation that, normally, the pay of police-
women should be lower than that of policemen. ' '3 7 But, "[they will find
it difficult to convince the women of the justice of their view on this
point. The women will probably argue that while men are fitter for some
duties, they are fitter for others, and that both kinds of fitness should be




537. Id. Apparently women did not eat as much as men, or pay as much in rent, or care for as
many children. This attitude was current among opponents of the avocates as well. See Corcos, supra
note 37, at 468.
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equally remunerated." ' Indeed, such women would find support for that
argument in the pages of the committee's own report.
The Justice of the Peace pointed out another contradiction in the
committee's report regarding the responsibilities of women police offi-
cers:
The committee recommend [sic] that women employed to perform
police duties should make the declaration of a constable in the same
form as men, and that they should be invested with the legal powers
and status of constables, but that regulations should be made in each
force clearly defining the duties they will and will not be primarily
expected to perform. It is a little difficult to see how constables sworn
"to act as constables for preserving the peace, and preventing robber-
ies and other felonies, and apprehending offenders against the peace,"
can be dispensed from the performace of part of their vow by regula-
tions made to save them from the danger of carrying it out in its in-
tegrity. However, probably no one will quarrel with the practical
compromise.539
VIII. CONCLUSION
Like movements to admit women to the legal profession in other
European countries, the English movement represented a natural out-
growth of the increasing demands of half the population for admittance
to a system that both creates and reflects the political and social envi-
ronment. The arguments for and against the admittance of women to the
bar greatly resembled those advanced in other societies. Yet some argu-
ments were more forcefully put forward because of the reliance on advo-
cacy by the common law legal system. For example, the suggestion that
the naturally aggressive stance of the English barrister and solicitor was
not one that the English woman could easily replicate or understand. Yet
proponents of women's participation countered this by asserting that
women could add their own particular brand of kindness and under-
standing to the mix, an argument was also made in other instances,"' and
that is still heard today."'
538. Women Police, supra note 533, at 360.
539. d.
540. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 455.
541. Many new "self help" books dramatize the differences in male and female thinking. See
generally FARRELL, supra note 15; JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS
(1992); SHAPIRO, supra note 131; TANNEN, supra note 204; DEBORAH TANNEN, THAT'S NOT WHAT I
MEAN: How CONVERSATIONAL STYLE MAKES OR BREAKS RElATIONSHipS (1986); DEBORAH
TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WoMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSAnON (1990). That some
men continue to translate their wish to dominate into workplace behavior is documented in such serious
but never solemn books as EMILY TOTH, MS. MENTOR'S IMPECCABLE ADVICE FOR WOMEN IN
ACADEMIA (1997), which includes a description of a phenomenon which she calls "peacocking": the
tendency of males to "show off" at academic conferences by asking "questions" of female speakers that
actually have nothing to do with the subject.
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The English legal profession furiously discussed the issue of the
admittance of women for over fifty years, and this resulted from both a
lack of support at the governmental level for feminist causes and the
power of the organized English Bar. ' While women in the United States
and Canada had only to convince one state or province at a time to admit
them (no easy task), admission in one state was still, in a sense, total
victory. While they had several routes open to them for admission,
women in England still needed to convince an already sensitized major-
ity of the nation's legal profession, including the most influential mem-
bers of the legislature, the Inns, and the Law Society. In the end, what
convinced a majority of the profession, if not to support, at least not to
oppose the admission of women, was their contribution in the war effort
and their clear willingness to share the burdens that men had heretofore
formally recognized as theirs alone.
The battle for women's admission to the bar in England was harder
and longer than in France. Two factors were crucial to its success. The
performance of women during the war was an obvious justification, even
though some male and female supporters maintained that political rights,
in particular admission to a profession, should not be a reward for doing
one's civic duty. As one analyst points out with regard to the suffrage:
The effect of the war was, however, precisely the opposite of that ex-
pected. Within two years and a half the conflict brought the suffra-
gists an advantage which no amount of agitation had ever won for
them, i.e., the official support of the government, and a few months
more carried their cause to a victorious conclusion which would
hardly have been reached in a full decade of peace. There were two
main reasons for this turn of events. One was the necessity which the
war imposed of undertaking a wholesale revision of the electoral
system, leading to the decision to base the franchise upon personal
right rather than property relationship, and inevitably suggesting an
equality in rights, as individuals, of women with men. But the funda-
mental reason brought forward by the war for enfranchising women
was the great variety and value of women's services to the nation
during the conflict. This was the thing that won over thousands of
former opponents, from Mr. Asquith down. 43
For many men, including lawyers, actions speak louder than words.
Even more important were the decades of debate, during which all
arguments for and against were trotted out and examined, and the weaker
arguments against admission finally though quietly dismissed as insuffi-
cient to deny women an opportunity that equally qualified men had for
centuries. The government which shepherded through the Sex Disquali-
fication (Removal) Act had a much easier job than it would have had
542. EL HALEVY, 2 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLSH PEOPLE 478-482 (1934).
543. F.A.O., The British Representation of the People Act, 12 Am. POL. SC. REV. 498, 500
(1918).
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twenty or ten years before because more of the sentiment of the profes-
sion, as well as the mood of the public, was behind women's admission.
Some women thus began to think of the law as a possible career even
though some social and professional barriers remained to be removed,
and when the opportunity presented itself had readied themselves to take
advantage of it.
In France, by contrast, the liberal government had no difficulty in
righting what it considered to be a grievous wrong three years after it
occurred. Yet the opinion of the majority of members of the profession
was not yet in sympathy with the government's policy. Questions about
women's competence lingered and fewer women pursued the possibility
of a legal career during the first twenty years that it was open to them.
The arguments advanced against women's ability to practice law
seem intuitively to mitigate against the equal ability of women to prac-
tice law, and to lend a semblance of legitimacy to the idea of "separate
but equal." But this impression is mistaken. That women practice law
differently from men is not an indictment, but a recognition of the differ-
ences of biology, gender, and socialization, and is particularly apt in the
practice of the common law.
Facts and interpretations matter at common law. Thus is old law
rethought and new law made. That the arguments used against the admis-
sion of women to the profession were so similar in England, the United
States and France demonstrates that the pervasive opposition based on
certain assumptions about the abilities and rightful place of women in
society had no geographical or political boundaries. Further, legislation
could not alter these shared societal assumptions any more than it af-
fected the beliefs of male supporters of the women's movement that fe-
males should be allowed to practice law. In France, the debate took place
after the admission of women; in the United States, before and during the
admission, because it was accomplished jurisdiction by jurisdiction; and
in England, before the admission finally came about. But in each case,
the debate served as an emotional and psychological exercise necessary
to the maturation of the profession.
Women like Gwyneth Bebb in England and Jeanne Chauvin in
France, along with their male supporters, were ahead of their time by a
few years, but their efforts eventually made possible the entry of women
into the legal profession. They defined the scope of the debate that still
goes on. Today's young women attorneys, who face the same kinds of
pernicious arguments, may not recognize the danger for marginalized
groups who wish to participate in the ongoing legal, political and social
discussion that shapes our society. Some contemplation of the nature of
the recurring arguments over gender issues that trivialize real differences
in thinking and conceptualizing legal concepts will yield additional in-
sights into the interactions of male and female attorneys as well as men
and women in all spheres of life. The opponents of women lawyers may
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have been right, after all, and the supporters wrong, primarily because
the law continues to be "constructed as male:" that is, it is presumed to
be "rational, logical, dispassionate, objective, professional, intimidating,
and demanding."5"
Further, the social skills that women cultivate in order to attract
husbands serve them ill in the workplace.
"Time tested secrets for capturing Mr. Right," such as "don't call him
first," "be quiet and mysterious," or always "let the man take charge,"
are not time-tested strategies for attracting clients' business and sen-
ior lawyers' admiration.
[T]his contradiction between feminist stereotypes and professional
success has long left women in a double bind. They risk seeming too
assertive or not assertive enough. The competitiveness and self-
promotion that legal cultures reward are not the characteristics that
society most values in women or that many women value in them-
selves.-"5
Until law, like society, finds a way to value the thought processes and
contributions of one-half of the population, it will continue to see women
as lesser partners if they maintain their "female" qualities and lesser
women if they adopt "male" characteristics in order to succeed.
As long as success in law is identified with those characteristics,
and women are not, women will continue to have difficulty in obtaining
recognition for their achievements as well as the right to be mediocre,
not superior, as practitioners. The double standard that dictated the ex-
clusion of women from the legal profession in England and continues to
underlie evaluations of women attorneys by some of their male col-
leagues is a standard that celebrates and condemns what we normally
term "masculine" values, those which women are necessarily lacking.
[A] woman can be criticized both for being too powerless as a
woman, and for being too forceful for a woman.... [W]hat is seen as
assertive in a man is seen as aggressive in a woman. And even ag-
gressiveness, which may be admired in men, is penalized in women.
Rather, women should be deferential and they should smile. They
should not tell people what they know .... They should be attractive
544. Farley, supra note 11, at 389. Farley points out that adjectives consistently used to describe
"law" as a discipline are also consistently used to describe male law professors. Id. at 349-50. See also
Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in ThE PoLmcs OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRrnQUE 453 (David
Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990).
545. Deborah L. Rhode, Fluttering Eyes Won't Cut It with Clients, NAT'L LJ., June 23, 1997, at
AI5 (quoting sociologist Cynthia Epstein). On continuing bias against female lawyers' styles in the
workplace and its effect on their success, see JEANNE Q. SVIKHART, FAIR MEAsURE: TowARD
EFFEctrvE ATrORNEY EVALUATIONS (1997).
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but not too pretty, agreeable but not too accommodating, assertive but
not too aggressive, and knowledgeable but not too erudite.54
Whether women are better suited than men to an active search for
alternatives to traditional means of legal dispute resolution than to the
angry advocacy that sometimes prevails, or whether they are simply ac-
culturated to prefer outcomes other than "win or lose," whether these
alternatives are desirable, and which of them we can and should institu-
tionalize are subjects which demand further exploration by both women
and men. Women, like all traditionally marginalized groups, necessarily
must change both the form and the substance of a profession they enter.
What evaluation and use we make of this observation will inevitably
shape the evolution of the law and of society.
546. Farley, supra note 11, at 339 (foomotes omitted).
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The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Reform Act)'
contains a provision which requires auditors to detect fraudulent finan-
cial reporting and illegal acts and to report such illegal acts in their audit
procedures.2 Auditors now seemingly have an obligation to whistle blow
on their clients. This represents a significant departure from existing ju-
dicial and professional auditing standards in terms of auditors' potential
fraud liability.
Before the adoption of the Reform Act, auditors' responsibilities in
this area were governed by Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
(GAAS) issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants (AICPA) and judicial decisions under section 10(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).'
Two auditing standards issued prior to the passage of the Reform
Act are critical: (1) Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 53 enti-
tled "The Auditors' Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Ir-
regularities" and (2) SAS No. 54 entitled "Illegal Acts by Clients."
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Stem School of Business, New York University,
New York, B.A., Cornell University, 1975; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1978.
f Assistant Professor of Business Law, Stem School of Business, New York University,
New York, B.A., Cornell University, 1977; J.D., Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, 1981.
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as additions and amendments to 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (Supp. I 1995))
[hereinafter Reform Act].
2. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. I 1995) (amending the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994)).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1994). The full text of section 10(b)
makes it unlawful for any person:
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
4. AMERICAN INSTrurrE OF CERTmIED PuBLIc AccouNTANTs (AICPA), CODIFICATION OF
STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS § 316.03 (1995) (codifying AUDrrING STANDARDS BOARD,
STATEMENT ON AuDITNG STANDARDS No. 53 (1988)) [hereinafter SAS NO. 53]. The STATEMENT
ON AUDmNG STANDARDS consists of standards promulgated by the AICPA's Auditing Standards
Board for future assimilation into the CODnncArnON OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS.
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Shortly after the enactment of the Reform Act, in SAS No. 82 entitled
"Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit," the AICPA
promulgated new guidance on auditors' responsibilities to detect fraud in
conducting a financial statement audit.'
Unlike the Reform Act's whistle blower provision, neither SAS No.
54 nor SAS No. 82 requires the auditor to make a public disclosure of a
client's wrongdoing, although SAS No. 82 refers to the Reform Act's
disclosure requirement as a circumstance in which public disclosure of
illegal acts by the auditor may be required. Although the Accounting
Standards Board (ASB) formed its fraud task force to develop SAS No.
82 long before the Reform Act was enacted9 and does not consider SAS
No. 82 to be a response to the Reform Act,"0 there appears to be an un-
mistakable relationship between the legislation and these professional
auditing standards.
Furthermore, auditors' whistle blower responsibilities have been
defined and developed in a growing body of judicial decisions adjudi-
cating securities fraud claims under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act."
Securities fraud litigation has proven to be quite costly to the accounting
profession which was one of the Reform Act's earliest and strongest ad-
vocates. 2 The accounting profession heavily lobbied for such provisions
of the Reform Act as the safe harbor for forward-looking information,'3
the heightened pleading requirements for alleging securities fraud,"' the
5. AMERcAN INsTnurE op CERTwiED PuBic AccouNTANTs, CODIFICATION Op
STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS § 317.08 (1995) [hereinafter AU].
6. AuDrrING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 82,
CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AuDrr (1997) (superseding SAS No. 53,
effective for audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after December 15, 1997)
[hereinafter SAS No. 82].
7. Id.
8. Id. at 140; see infra Part HUB.
9. Jane Mancino, The Auditor and Fraud, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, Apr. 1997, at 32 (noting the
AICPA board of directors, in its June 1993 report, supported the recommendation of the Public
Oversight Board (POB) of the AICPA division for CPA firms, SEC practice section, to undertake
initiatives to detect and prevent fraud, particularly in financial statements).
10. See PuBLIc OVERSIGHT BOARD oF THE SEC PRACrIcE SECrION OF THE AICPA, IN THE
PUBUC INTEREST (Mar. 5, 1993) (special report); Board of Directors of the AICPA, Meeting the
Financial Reporting Needs of the Future: A Public Commitment from the Public Accounting
Profession, J. OF ACCOUNTING, Aug. 1993, at 17; Mancino, supra note 9, at 32.
11. See generally Robert A. Prentice, Locating that "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent"
Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691 (1997)
(providing extensive analysis of court treatment of section 10(b)).
12. Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, For Outside Accountants, the New Obligations
Imposed by the Securities Litigation Reform Act Go Way Beyond Classical GAAS, NAT'L LJ., Mar.
25, 1996, at B4 (discussing the accounting profession's active role in lobbying for the Reform Act).
13. See Reform Act sec. 102(a), § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Supp. 1 1995) (adding a safe
harbor provision to the Securities Act of 1933); Reform Act sec. 102(b), § 21E, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5
(adding a safe harbor provision to the Exchange Act).
14. Reform Act sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(2). 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
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elimination of joint and several liability" and the adoption of a modified
system of proportionate liability for securities fraud cases."
In 1992, securities fraud litigation costs for the six largest account-
ing firms accounted for $783 million or more than 14% of their audit
revenues, and today these firms face billions of dollars in securities fraud
claims.' The Big Six accounting firms'" are more aggressively protecting
themselves by dumping audit clients that they deem to be a high risk for
generating costly securities fraud litigation over allegedly faulty audits.'9
According to Dan Guy, vice president of professional standards and
services at the AICPA, "[miore than ever, accounting firms don't want to
expose themselves to clients who will harm their reputations or generate
costly litigation."'
This may be especially true in light of a recent empirical study con-
ducted by Stanford University Law School Professors Grundfest and
Perino (Grundfest study) of class action securities fraud litigation which
were filed during calendar year 1996, the first year that the Reform Act
took effect.2' It concluded that "allegations of accounting irregularities or
trading by insiders now explain the lion's share of federal class action
litigation.""' According to the Grundfest study, the frequency of ac-
counting-driven allegations in post-Reform Act complaints has decidedly
increased.23 This increase may be attributed to the Reform Act's height-
15. Reform Act sec. 201(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2)(A) (adding § 21D(g) to the Reform Act's
amendments established by the addition of section 101).
16. Reform Act sec. 201(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2)(B).
17. George B. Yankwitt & Susan A. Moldovan, Reform Act: Panacea or Paper Tiger for
Accountants and Auditors?, N.Y. L.J., June 27, 1996, at 1, 1 n.2 (citing Private Litigation Under the
Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. No. 103-431 (1993) (statement of
Jake L. Netterville), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1696, § 407 (Jan. 10, 1996)).
18. The "Big Six" accounting firms consist of Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte
& Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick, and Price Waterhouse. Elizabeth MacDonald,
More Accounting Firms Are Dumping Risky Clients, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1997, at A2.
19. Id. (recognizing that the Big Six accounting firms have dropped 30 publicly traded
companies as audit clients from January through April, 1997, 92 such clients in 1996, 68 clients in
1995, and 85 clients in 1994).
20. Id.
21. Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's
Experience, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1997, at 955 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 1015, 1997).
22. Id. at 959.
23. The Grundfest study stated:
[O]ne of the most common forms of fraud alleged in the sixty-five [Post-Reform Act
federal] complaints analyzed are misrepresentations or omissions in financial statements
which appear in 58.5% of the complaints. Thirty complaints (or 79% of those alleging
false and misleading financial statements) allege a violation of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP). Of the thirty-eight complaints alleging
misrepresentations or omissions in financial statements, thirty-six (or 95%) allege
improperly recorded sales, revenues, or earnings. Allegations of misstated financials
account for 67.4% of the forty-six complaints that are based solely on alleged section
10(b) violations.
Grndfest & Perino, supra note 21, at 973.
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ened pleading requirement that plaintiffs "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the re-
quired state of mind."' Plaintiffs may believe that by making particular
allegations involving misrepresentations or omissions in financial state-
ments or violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP), courts will more likely find that they have met their pleading
requirements for fraud.'
Two new studies indicate that the number of securities fraud class
action suits filed in federal court during 1997 have reached the high lev-
els of the early 1990s despite the Reform Act's efforts to curb such law-
suits.' Plaintiff's lawyers have also returned to federal court after making
adjustments to the higher pleading standards and other barriers, such as
the new safe harbor provision for forward-looking statements," created
by the Reform Act. The number of shareholder lawsuits filed in state
courts, previously viewed as a more amenable forum for such lawsuits,
was down sharply in 1997.'
This article discusses the current legal issues pertaining to the audi-
tors' duty to detect fraud and illegal acts and disclose such illegal acts
under the Reform Act, professional auditing standards and court deci-
sions. Part I provides the judicial framework for auditors' duty to whistle
blow on their client's illegal activities. Part II describes auditors' statuto-
rily prescribed duty to detect fraudulent and illegal acts and report illegal
acts pursuant to the Reform Act and auditing standards promulgated by
the accounting profession. Part ImI delineates the legal standards plaintiffs
must meet to properly plead that auditors have committed securities
fraud. Part IV assesses the current legal environment that auditors are
working within and suggests a future course for auditors facing fraud
liability.
I. JUDICIAL BASIS FOR AuDITORS' DUTY TO DISCLOSE
An auditor's whistle blowing duty was recognized by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,' where the Court, while
denying a federal law privilege for independent auditors' workpapers,
stated:
An independent certified public accountant performs a different role
[than an attorney whose job is to serve the client]. By certifying the
24. Reform Act sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. I 1995).
25. Grundfest & Perino, supra note 21, at 974.
26. Dean Starkman, Securities Class-Action Lawsuits Make Comeback in Federal Court,
WALL ST. J., July 9, 1997, at B4 (discussing two studies performed by the National Economic
Research Associates Inc., a White Plains, N.Y., consulting firm, and the Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse, a research project run by Stanford University Law School).
27. Reform Act sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
28. Starkman, supra note 26, at B4.
29. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
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public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status,
the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending
any employment relationship with the client. The independent public
accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance
to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the in-
vesting public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the ac-
countant maintain total independence from the client at all times and
requires complete fidelity to the public trust.0
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has reiterated this
duty3' enunciated by the Supreme Court. Congress codified this approach
by enacting the Reform Act's whistle blower provision.
Shareholder securities fraud actions are generally brought under
section 10(b)32 of the Exchange Act which makes it unlawful "[t]o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security... any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance ... The SEC prom-
ulgated Rule 10b-5, ' commonly known as the general anti-fraud provi-
sion prohibiting fraudulent activity in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security, in order to implement section 10(b). Most share-
holder lawsuits also allege section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations since
federal law implicitly, but not expressly, recognizes a private civil cause
of action under these sections.' As will be discussed below, however,
under the Reform Act auditors are specifically protected from private
causes of action for any reports of illegal acts by management that are
reported to the SEC.
To maintain a securities fraud cause of action under Rule lOb-5, the
plaintiff must prove five elements: (a) the defendant made a false state-
30. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 817-18.
31. In re American Finance Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043,1049 (1962).
32. Grundfest & Perino, supra note 21, at 973 (stating that review of sixty-five post-Reform
Act federal court complaints alleging fraud found that forty-six of the complaints were based solely
on section 10(b) violations).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
35. Rule lOb-5 states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ... (b) [t]o make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
36. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Court stated:
Although sec. 10(b) does not by its terms create an express civil remedy for its violation,
and there is no indication that Congress or the Commission when adopting Rule lob-5,
contemplated such a remedy, the existence of a private cause of action for violations of
the statute and the Rule is now well established.
425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975)); see also R. Douglas Martin, Basic Inc. v. Levinson: The Supreme Court's Analysis of Fraud
on the Market and Its Impact on the Reliance Requirement of SEC Rule lOb-5, 78 KY. L.J. 403, 405-
407 (1990).
37. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(c).
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ment or omission; (b) of a material fact; (c) with scienter; (d) in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of securities; (e) upon which the plaintiff
reasonably relied; and (f) that reliance proximately caused damages
The Rule lOb-5 requirements mirror the elements of the common law
tort action of deceit.39
The federal securities laws provide that there is no general duty to
speak and "silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under
Rule lOb-5."' Most courts have held that mere silence or inaction will
not even give rise to secondary securities fraud liability as an aider and
abettor under section 10(b) and Rule IOb-5 of the Exchange Act.'
Prior to the 1994 Supreme Court decision rendered in Central Bank
v. First Interstate Bank,43 courts held that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
impose liability not only on those who themselves commit fraud, but also
upon those who assist, aid, and abet, others who do so. " According to a
majority of courts, aiding and abetting liability existed if someone com-
mitted a primary violation, the alleged abettor had knowledge of the
wrong and his role in it, and the alleged abettor substantially assisted in
the violation.'5 In Central Bank, the Supreme Court eliminated the most
common approach to suing secondary defendants by eliminating aiding
and abetting liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. ' The Central
Bank decision has been viewed as a tremendous legal victory for ac-
countants and other professionals since now they only face securities
liability as primary violators. Congress chose not to overrule Central
Bank under the Reform Act, although the statute authorizes the SEC to
proceed with civil administrative actions against those who aid and abet
a securities fraud.'7
38. Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331 (7th Cir. 1995); Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534,543 (5th Cir. 1981); Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Co., 654 F. Supp. 1246,
1250-51 (N.D. 111. 1997); James J. Armstrong et al., Securities Fraud, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 973,
976-83 (1996) (discussing in detail these fraud elements); Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the
Market and an Unwarranted Extension of Section 10(B) and Rule lob-5, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
359, 360 (1995).
39. Martin, supra note 36, at 408; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984).
40. Dileo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624,628 (7th Cir. 1990).
41. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,238 n.17 (1988).
42. See, e.g., Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 490-94 (4th Cir. 1991); Robin v. Arthur
Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1990); Dileo, 901 F.2d at 628-29; Latigo Ventures
v. Laventhal & Horwath, 876 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1989); Prentice, supra note 11, at 761 &
n.314.
43. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
44. Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934,
69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 80-85 (1981); see, e.g., Dileo, 901 F.2d at 628.
45. See, e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982).
46. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
47. Reform Act sec. 104(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (Supp. 11995).
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. Prior to the Reform Act, courts did not take a consistent approach as
to whether auditors have a duty to report fraud to third parties.' In some
cases where auditors had been sued for aiding and abetting liability under
Rule lOb-5, courts found that accountants had no duty to blow the whis-
tle on their clients unless a law imposed such a duty or if the accountant
certified financial statements with knowledge of their material falsity.49
[I]f an accountant does not issue a public opinion about a company,
although it may have conducted internal audits or reviews for por-
tions of the company, the accountant cannot subsequently be held re-
sponsible for the company's public statements issued later merely be-
cause the accountant may know those statements are likely untrue.w
According to the Seventh Circuit, accountants owe a duty to exercise
reasonable care in discharging their professional obligations to provide
accurate and adequate financial statements, but they do not owe a
broader duty to "search and sing" out fraud." Imposing primary fraud
liability upon accountants for failing to disclose would create adverse
consequences in the accountant-client relationship: clients would (1) not
repose in accountants the trust necessary to encourage accurate audits;
(2) withhold documents if they feared such access would lead to destruc-
tive or misunderstood disclosure; and (3) face increased accounting costs
as accountants raised their fees to cover anticipated liabilities. 2
The Eleventh and Ninth Circuits, unlike the Seventh Circuit, recog-
nized the possibility of such a duty where the auditor has actual knowl-
edge of the fraud and allows its name to be used in its client's offering
memoranda. 3 In Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,' the Eleventh Circuit
found a duty to disclose where the auditor's audit reports were believed to
be accurate when first included in its client's private placement offering
memorandum, but learned subsequently that the partnership's funds were
not used for the purposes initially stated in the offering and failed to cure
any public misapprehension about the partnership's situation." According
to the Eleventh Circuit standards, an auditor may have a duty to blow the
48. See Edward Brodsky, The Auditor's New Duty to Blow the Whistle on Its Client, N.Y. L.J.,
June 12, 1996, at 3.
49. In re Cascade Int'l Sec. Litig., 894 F. Supp. 437, 442 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
50. Cascade Int'l, 894 F. Supp. at 443.
51. Dileo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Latigo Ventures v.
Laventhol & Horwath, 876 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1989)).
52. Dileo, 901 F.2d at 629.
53. See Prentice, supra note 11, at 761-68 (discussing various judicial approaches to the
accountant's duty to blow the whistle on its client's fraudulent activities).
54. 800F.2d 1040 (llth Cir. 1986).
55. Rudolph, 800 F.2d at 1044. The Rudolph court found the existence of a duty, reasoning that
"[sitanding idly by while one's good name is being used to perpetuate a fraud is inherently misleading."
Id. Furthermore, "[ilt is not unreasonable to expect an accountant, who stands in a 'special relationship of
trust vis-a-vis the public' and whose 'duty is to safeguard the public interest,' to disclose fraud in this type
of circumstance." Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Gold v. DCL Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1123, 1127
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) and In re Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629,670 (1957)).
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whistle on its client's fraud when the auditor (1) possesses superior infor-
mation than that of the investors; (2) incurs minimal costs from fraud dis-
closures; and (3) exposes investors to potentially enormous costs by failing
to make such disclosures.'
A five-part test has been applied by the Ninth Circuit in Roberts v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.7 and several other courts in determining
an auditor's duty to disclose his client's fraud." The five factors consid-
ered are: (1) the defendant's relationship to the plaintiff; (2) a compari-
son of the defendant's and the plaintiff's access to information; (3) bene-
fits obtained by the defendant from his relationship with the plaintiff; (4)
defendant's awareness of plaintiff's reliance; and (5) defendant's in-
volvement in initiating the securities transaction. 9
In Roberts, the Ninth Circuit held that Peat Marwick may have had
a duty to disclose as a secondary aider and abettor violator of section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5.' Peat Marwick's consent to the use of its name on
reports and offering memoranda that it knew were fraudulent could give
rise to a duty to disclose fraud especially where the accountant possessed
superior information and the cost to the accountant of disclosure was
minimal.6 ' The Roberts court applied the five-part test to find no duty to
disclose by a co-defendant law firm that was retained only to determine
marketable title by reviewing the title records, omitted information which
had nothing to do with marketability of title, provided equal access to
information and did not initiate the securities transactions.62
In In re American Continental Corp.ILincoln Savings and Loan,'
auditors were held to a stringent whistle blowing standard." The court
indicated that when auditors stand around in silence while knowing of
their client's fraud this may constitute "substantial assistance" of that
fraud even if the auditors had never completed their audits, never issued
a report and were not named in any SEC filed document.' However, an
opposite result was reached in Allard v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,' where
56. Id. at 1044-45; see also In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 1239,1251 (V.D. Mich. 1991)
(following the Rudolph standard).
57. 857 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1988).
58. Roberts, 857 F.2d at 653-54; see also Pegasus Fund, Inc. v. Laraneta, 617 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th
Cir. 1980); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977); Prentice, supra note 11,
at 764-65 & n.332 (citing Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455,460 (8th Cir. 1991)); cf. Arthur Young & Co. v.
Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1330-31 (8th Cir. 1991) (providing a different articulation of the five elements),
affdsubnon. Reves v. Ernst& Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
59. Roberts, 857 F.2d at 653-54.
60. Id. at 653, rev'g in part Roberts v. Heim, 670 F. Supp. 1466, 1482, 1497 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(reversing the district court's dismissal of an aiding and abetting claim for failure to state a claim).
61. Id.
62. Id at 653-54.
63. 794 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Ariz. 1992).
64. American Continental Corp.lLincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. at 1442.
65. Id. at 1442-46.
66. 924 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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the court stated that "[a]lthough accountants may have a duty to 'correct
their own statements which later become false or misleading,' an ac-
countant's mere possession of non public information as to client mis-
conduct does not necessarily give rise to a duty to disclose." 7
Several scholars argue that the whistle blowing duties judicially
imposed upon auditors in these earlier cases do not survive the abolition
of secondary aiding and abetting Rule lOb-5 liability in the Central Bank
decision ' unless an independent duty to disclose is created by profes-
sional accounting standards.' In one post-Central Bank case, In re ZZZZ
Best Securities Litigation," the court allowed a primary liability lawsuit
to proceed against the auditor based upon the auditor's duty to withdraw
or disclose its client's misstatements due to the public's reliance upon its
previously reported information.7
Securities fraud suits against auditors frequently have included
claims alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act (RICO).' Inclusion of such a claim in an auditor liability
action subjects the auditor to treble damages." In Reves v. Ernst &
Young, " however, the Supreme Court limited auditor liability under
RICO, adopting a narrow interpretation of the relevant liability section. '5
Furthermore, in the Reform Act, Congress eliminated violations of the
federal securities laws as predicate acts under RICO. 6
Of course, as discussed below, duties to detect fraudulent reporting
and report illegal acts have now been statutorily created in the Reform
Act and professionally promulgated in new auditing standards." How-
ever, judicial decisions continue to provide a framework for determining
under what circumstances a duty to disclose will be found. This is espe-
cially true in light of ambiguities created under the Reform Act and the
professional auditing standards. In the face of ambiguity in the language
set forth in the Reform Act and the professional auditing standards,
67. Allard, 924 F. Supp. at 492 (internal citation omitted) (quoting In re MTC Elec. Tech.
Shareholders Utig., 898 F. Supp. 974,988 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)).
68. James D. Hansen & Michael J. Garrison, The Significance of "Central Bank" on Auditor
Liability, 54 OmIo CPA J., 20, 20-23 (1995); Prentice, supra note 11, at 765; cf ischel, supra note 44, at
103 (proposing that the courts should eliminate secondary liability and, therefore, the "whistle blowing"
theory of liability, but preceding the Central Bank decision).
69. Hansen & Garrison, supra note 68, at 23; see Prentice, supra note 11, at 765.
70. 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
71. Z Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. at 976 (denying, in part, defendant's motion for summary
judgement).
72. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (Supp. 1 1995); see. e.g.,
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993) (involving both securities fraud and RICO claims brought
against accountants).
73. Reform Act sec. 107, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. 11995).
74. 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
75. Reves, 507 U.S. at 182-83.
76. Reform Act sec. 107, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
77. See infra Part IL
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auditors may resort to judicial decisions, as well as legislative history, for
future guidance.
II. STATUTORY DUTY AND PROFESSIONAL AUDITING STANDARDS FOR
DETECTING FRAUDULENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSING ILLEGAL ACTs
A. The Reform Act
Section 10A of the Reform Act specifies procedures to be followed
by auditors in connection with the discovery and subsequent reporting of
fraudulent financial reporting and illegal acts."8 Accountants are required
to include in their audits:
(1) procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting
illegal acts that would have a direct and material effect on the deter-
mination of financial statement amounts; (2) procedures designed to
identify related party transactions that are material to the financial
statements or otherwise require disclosure therein; and (3) an evalua-
tion of whether there is substantial doubt about the ability of the is-
suer to continue as a going concern during the ensuing fiscal year.79
If an auditor determines that an illegal act has or may have occurred,
then the Reform Act requires the auditor. (1) to make a determination as
to the likelihood that the illegal act has in fact occurred;'m (2) if so, to
determine the possible effect on the issuer's financial statements, giving
consideration to any contingent effects such as fines, penalties, and dam-
ages; and (3) to inform management. If management does not take
"timely and appropriate remedial action" and the auditor determines that
the illegal acts will have a material effect on the client's financial state-
ments by being clearly not inconsequential, the auditor is required to
report this information to the client's board of directors or the board's
audit committee.
This provision does not refer to disclosure of fraudulent acts al-
though the title of the provision is "Fraud Detection and Disclosure."'
Furthermore, the Reform Act does not define the meaning of the phrase
"timely and appropriate remedial action." Thus, the auditor must use his
discretion in this regard. The failure to take remedial action may rea-
sonably warrant the auditor's resignation or departure from a standard
audit report.'
78. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 10A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a) to (b) (Supp. 1 1995).
79. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 10A(a) to (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a).
80. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 10A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(1)(A)(i).
81. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 1OA(b)(1)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(bXl)(AXii).
82. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 10A(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(l)(B)
83. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 1OA(bX2), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(2).
84. Reform Act sec. 301, 109 Stat. 737,762 (1995).
85. Pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC imposes detailed requirements for reporting a
change in accountants in item 304 of Regulation S-K. 17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (1997). Item 304 requires the
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Pursuant to the Reform Act, the company must then inform the SEC
not later than one business day after receipt of the report and must give
the auditor a copy of the notice that has been sent to the SEC. If the
company fails to give such notice, even if the auditor elects to resign, the
auditor still must furnish a copy of its report to the SEC within one busi-
ness day.' This provision has been pejoratively referred to as the "whis-
tle blower provision."' Although the SEC's Regulation S-K already re-
quires the company to report any alleged impropriety or illegality," the
Reform Act now clearly requires the auditor to make such a disclosure.!
As our discussion of the applicable auditing standards will emphasize,
SAS No. 54 and SAS No. 82 do not require the auditor to make a public
disclosure.9 ' Pursuant to those standards, if the auditor detects fraudulent
acts, and the client refuses to take corrective action, the auditor need not
make a disclosure to the SEC or to any other party, but simply must
withdraw from the engagement.' Nonetheless, SAS No. 82 refers to the
Reform Act's disclosure requirement as a circumstance in which public
disclosure of illegal acts by the auditor may be required.93
An auditor could face direct fraud liability pertaining to matters
found but not included in the report and an auditor found to have "will-
fully violated" the statute by failing to make the required disclosures will
be liable for civil penalties." However, the Reform Act provides the
auditor with protection from liability in a private action for any "finding,
conclusion, or statement expressed in a report" received by the SEC. No
implied private right of action is provided by the Reform Act," but the
statute does not eliminate the preexisting implied private right of action
pursuant to Rule 10b-5. Nothing in the Reform Act or its legislative his-
tory supports such elimination. The conference report to the bill that be-
came the Reform Act provides that "[p]rivate securities litigation is an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their
company to report a change of accountant, as well as four categories of "reportable events" which include
that the auditor has advised the company that the internal controls needed to develop reliable financial
statements do not exist or that the auditor has determined that he can no longer rely on management
representations. 17 C.F.R. § 2 29.304(a)(1). Pursuant to the Exchange Act, the SEC requires this
information to be discussed in item 4 of Form 8-K. Item 304 also requires the issuer to provide the former
auditor with a copy of the disclosure and request that the former auditor furnish the SEC with a letter
stating whether the auditor agrees with the disclosures and, if not, stating the matter on which there is
disagreement Id. § 229.304(a)(3).
86. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(3).
87. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(4).
88. Karen Donovan, Bean Counters in a Bind: Trade-off Expands Duties, NAT'L U., Apr. 29,
1996, at BI.
89. 17 C.F.R. § 229.304.
90. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I(b).
91. See infra notes 110-77 and accompanying text
92. SAS No. 82, supra note 6,at 40; AU, supra note 5,at § 317.18-.20,.23.
93. SAS NO. 82, supra note 6, at 40.
94. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I(d).
95. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-!(c).
96. Reform Act sec. 203, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 note (Construction).
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losses without having to rely upon government action." Many of the
Reform Act's other provisions, including the ones that change the joint
and several liability rules, indicate that Congress had no intention of
eliminating the implied right of action.
The issue arises as to what happens if the auditor reports an alleged
illegal act to the SEC and he turns out to be wrong. Obviously, the com-
pany's stock price will be affected. In addition, the future relationship of
the auditor and the company will be affected and probably destroyed."
As set forth above, however, the Reform Act provides that the auditor
will not be subject to liability in a private action for such a mistake." In a
1993 hearing on this provision, Representative Markey, one of its spon-
sors, stated that this provision "[was] designed to protect auditors [who]
comply with the reporting requirements of the bill from exposure to pri-
vate litigation."' "® Representative Markey went on to state that "we cre-
ate[d] a whistle blower safe harbor for the auditor as he or she goes to the
SEC so that they don't feel as though they are going to be necessarily
exposing themselves to additional legal ramifications if they do so."''
In addition, the potential for auditor exposure to liability still exists
even if he issues an adverse opinion or disclaims an opinion on the fi-
nancial statements. A plaintiff can argue that once the auditor was in a
position to know that management was not taking appropriate remedial
actions in response to a significant fraudulent or illegal act, such as re-
porting the matter to an appropriate governmental agency, the law re-
quired the auditor to notify the directors and make sure that they notified
the SEC. By not so reporting, the auditor arguably allowed the illegal act
to continue unabated, thereby increasing the financial damage to the
company and providing insufficient warning to investors.
Finally, the Reform Act may expose auditors to increased litigation
for failure to discover and disclose illegal acts other than management
fraud.'" These situations could expose auditors to securities fraud law-
97. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,730.
98. While the Reform Act provides a safe harbor from liability for any auditor who makes a report
to the SEC pursuant to the Reform Act section 301, § 10A(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(c), this statutory
provision may compel companies to publicly disclose defenses to alleged illegal actions in a very short
time frame and with incomplete knowledge of the underlying facts at issue.
99. Reform Act sec. 301(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(c).
100. Financial Fraud Detection: Hearings on H.R. 574 Before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House of Representatives Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1993) (opening statement of Representative Markey).
101. Id. at 85 (response of Representative Markey to questions following the presentation of H.R.
574).
102. Robert Sidorsky, Auditor's Duty to Blow the Whistle Under the Litigation Reform Act, N.Y.
LJ., Feb. 9, 1996, at 1,7.
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suits based upon direct primary liability under Rule lOb-5.1°3 As stated
above, section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 impose a duty to disclose a mis-
leading omission. The Reform Act's disclosure requirement arguably
runs to investors. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that an audi-
tor's breach of a duty to blow the whistle on his client will give rise to
Rule lOb-5 liability.
The Cronos Group has become the first company whose outside
accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, applied this new whistle blower pro-
vision of the Reform Act.'" Cronos, a Luxembourg corporation based in
England, manages fleets of shipping containers and was a sponsor of
more than $400 million in limited partnerships investing in containers.
Arthur Andersen found what it believed to be illegal activity and,
after informing the board of directors (which did not provide the ac-
counting firm with an adequate explanation, refused to investigate the
matter, and did not cause "senior management to take timely and appro-
priate remedial actions with respect to these matters"), submitted a re-
port, which Cronos filed with the SEC in February, 1997, as required by
the Reform Act." Arthur Andersen simultaneously resigned as Cronos's
auditor.'"
According to Arthur Andersen's report, the accounting firm
questioned a $1.5 million dollar "disbursement."'" That disbursement,
along with subsequent correspondence from Cronos's bank concerning
the repayment of the disbursement to the company "may have violated
laws and regulations to which the [clompany is subject including U.S.
securities laws, and that these matters may have a material effect upon
the 1996 financial statements of the [c]ompany."'
As of this date, we are not aware of any other accounting firm that
has applied this new whistle blower provision. Furthermore, to date, the
SEC has had only limited experience with section 1OA because the new
provision becomes effective in two stages. For companies that file se-
lected quarterly financial data with the SEC, section 1OA applies to an-
nual reports for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 1996. For
103. After the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164
(1994), accountants no longer face secondary liability under Rule lOb-5 for aiding and abetting their
clients' securities fraud violations. See infra Part .
104. Letter from Arthur Andersen to the Board of Directors for the Cronos Group (Feb. 3, 1997)
(visited Nov. 14, 1997) <htp://www.sec.gov/Archivesledgar/data/912605/0000950149-97-000229.txt>
[hereinafter Andersen Letter]. This letter was submitted to the SEC as required by the Reform Act section
301(a), § IOA(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(bX4).
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companies that do not file these reports, the provision applies to annual
reports for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 1997."
B. GAAS Requirements: SAS No. 82 and SAS No. 54
Although the Reform Act's new section 10A is entitled "Fraud De-
tection and Disclosure," much of it is worded in terms of disclosure of
"illegal acts."" Section 10A(f) defines an "illegal act" as "an act or
omission that violates any laws, or any rule or regulation having the
force of law.""' Management fraud typically does involve illegal acts,
such as violation of securities and tax laws, money laundering, embez-
zlement, bribery and price fixing.
However, the terms "fraud," "illegal acts," "errors," and "irregulari-
ties" also are terms of art in the auditing community. As stated earlier,
the Reform Act's new statutory provision must be discussed in conjunc-
tion with two auditing standards: (1) SAS No. 82, entitled "Consideration
of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit,""2 and (2) SAS No. 54, entitled
"Illegal Acts by Clients."
'" 3
1. SASNo. 82
The enactment of SAS No. 82 is a result of the AICPA's multi-year
study to improve the auditing profession's ability to detect fraud."'4 In
early 1993, the Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section of
the AICPA concluded that
to a greater extent than it now does, the profession must accept re-
sponsibility for the detection of fraud by management. The profession
cannot, and it cannot be expected to, develop methods that will assure
that every fraud, no matter how cleverly contrived, will be unearthed
in the course of the audit, but it must develop means of increasing
significantly the likelihood of detecting fraud."
Later in 1993, the AICPA Auditing Standards Board formed a task force
to study SAS No. 53 and develop a new SAS that focused on financial
statement fraud."6
109. Reform Act sec. 301(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I note (Effective Date); see aLso 143 CONG. REC.
S1412-01 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1997) (letter from SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt to Sen. Wyden (Jan. 31,
1997)).
110. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
111. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(f).
112. See generally SAS No. 82, supra note 6.
113. AU, supra note 5, at § 317.08.
114. See Mancino, supra note 9, at 32.
115. PUBLIC OVERSIGirr BOARD OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION OF THE AICPA, supra note
10, at 42.
116. AMERICAN INSrrrUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, MEETING THE FINANCIAL
NEEDS OF THE FuruRt- A PUBuC COMMENT FROM THE ACCOUNING PROFESSION (1993).
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The AICPA had adopted SAS No. 53 in 1988. It required that the
auditor design the audit to provide "reasonable assurance" of detecting
material irregularities."" In exercising his professional skepticism, the
auditor was no longer permitted to assume honesty by management in
the absence of evidence to the contrary."8 SAS No. 53 stated that the
auditor "neither assumes that management is dishonest nor assumes un-
questioned honesty.""' 9 It also made more explicit the requirement that in
developing an audit plan, an auditor consider factors that affect audit
risk."°
In May 1996, the Accounting Standards Board released an exposure
draft of a proposed SAS."' After reviewing comment letters, the draft
was .revised, and in November 1996, the ASB voted to issue SAS No.
82.22 It was adopted in February 1997.'"
SAS No. 82 provides clarification of the auditor's responsibility to
detect fraud. It does not change the auditor's responsibility to detect
fraud which is still framed by the key concepts of materiality and reason-
able assurance.'2" However, Edmund Noonan, the chairman of the Ac-
counting Standards Board and an audit partner at KPMG Peat Marwick,
in addressing an AICPA conference in December 1996, said: "If you
don't want to make changes to your practice, you're at grave risk.'"" He
described SAS No. 82 as "a free-standing, performance or field work
standard [that] is intended to drive auditor performance and drive it
hard."'' " At the same AICPA conference, Michael Sutton, the chief ac-
countant of the SEC, stated that with the enactment of SAS No. 82,
auditors "'should not be able to skip lightly' over the issue of fraud or to
117. See Joseph L. Goldstein & Catherine Dixon, New Teeth for the Public's Watchdog: The
Expanded Role of the Independent Accountant in Detecting, Preventing, and Reporting Financial Frau4
44 Bus. LAw. 439,476 (1989).
118. See id
119. AU, supra note 5, at § 316.16.
120. Goldstein & Dixon, supra note 117, at 476-77.
121. Mancino, supra note 9, at 32.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. SAS No. 82, supra note 6, at app. A 2 (amending AU § 110, "Responsibilities and Functions
of the Independent Auditor"). This section provides:
The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement,
whether caused by error or fraud. Because of the nature of audit evidence and the
characteristics of fraud, the auditor is able to obtain reasonable, but not absolute,
assurance that material misstatements are detected. The auditor has no responsibility to
plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that misstatements, whether
caused by errors or fraud, that are not material to the financial statements are detected.
Id
125. Steven Burkholder, New Fraud Reporting Rules are Not Mere Clarification, ASB Chairman
Warns, 28 SEc. REG. & L REP. 1528,1528 (1996).
126. Id. at 1529 (alteration in the original). Burkholder writes that the chairman warned that "newly
enacted rules increasing the duties of auditors to detect and report fraud are not merely a clarification of
existing standards, but instead represent a raising of the bar that puts auditors at peril if ignored." Id at
1528.
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assert that it is not the mission of the audit to discover fraud that is mate-
rial to the financial statements."'" Soon after the enactment of SAS No.
82, several knowledgeable commentators wrote that this new SAS raised
the standard for an auditor's duty to detect fraud.
'2
In contrast, according to Glenn Vice of the ASB, there is no change
in the duty to detect fraud. At an AICPA National Conference on Fraud
held in June 1996, he stated: "The proposed standard reaffirms the audi-
tor's present responsibility--that is, to plan and perform the audit to ob-
tain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are
materially misstated."'"
The title to SAS No. 82 directly refers to fraud instead of the title to
SAS No. 53, its predecessor, which used the terms "errors" and "irregu-
larities." The original standard, SAS No. 16 entitled "Errors or Irregu-
larities," was issued by the AICPA in 1977.'" It established the basic
framework in which the auditor has the responsibility to: (1) plan his
examination to search for errors or irregularities that would have a mate-
rial effect on the financial statements; (2) exercise an attitude of profes-
sional skepticism; and (3) evaluate internal controls before placing reli-
ance thereon in conducting the audit.
31
SAS No. 82 concentrates on two types of misstatements: those
arising from intentional falsification of financial statements and those
arising from misappropriation or theft of assets. 2 It provides a more ex-
tensive and detailed listing of the warning signals that should alert an
auditor to the possibility of fraud than its predecessor, SAS No. 53. It
also provides more specific guidance as to the types of auditing proce-
dures that the auditor should employ in response to the presence of an
increased risk of fraud.
a. Fraud Risk Factors Under SAS No. 82
As part of the auditor's fraud risk assessment in designing the audit
procedures, the auditor must inquire of management to obtain its under-
standing of the risk of fraud.13 1 In addition, the auditor must document in
127. Id. at 1529 (quoting statement made by Michael Sutton, chief accountant of the SEC, during
AJCPA conference).
128. See Douglas R. Carmichael & James L Craig, Proposal to Say the "F" Word in Auditing
Standards, CPA J., June 1996, at 22, 22; Gary D. Zeune, Auditors Will Be Required to Detect Fraud,
Bus. CREDTr, Sept 1996, at 16.
129. AICPA, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FRAuD (June 1996) (visited Nov. 1. 1997)
<http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/auditstd/frconf~lm at 12 of 15>.
130. See AICPA, CODiCATION OF STATEmENUs ON AuDmNG STANDARDS, STATEMENT ON
AUDrING STANDARDS Pt. I (1995) (providing historical table).
131. AuDrTNG STANDARDS BoARD, STATEMENT ON AUDrTING STANDARDS No. 16, ERRORS OR
IRREGULARmES (1977), reprinted in AU, supra note 5, at § 337.
132. SAS No. 82, supra note 6, at (112.
133. Id at Iff 12-13.
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his working papers "the assessment of the risk of material misstatement
due to fraud" and if, during the performance of the audit, that assessment
changes, the changed circumstances and the response also must be
documented.'"
SAS No. 82 states that fraud risk factors "cannot easily be ranked in
order of importance or combined into effective predictive models.'
35
However, it emphasizes the necessity to evaluate risk factors in combi-
nation." Unlike its predecessor, it distinguishes between risk factors
relating to fraudulent financial reporting and those relating to misappro-
priation of assets.' It also provides examples of specific responses to the
risk of fraudulent financial reporting in the areas of revenue recognition
and inventory,'" as well as examples of specific responses to an identi-
fied risk of misappropriation of assets.
3
1
Under SAS No. 53, risk factors relating to fraudulent financial re-
porting were grouped according to Management Characteristics, Oper-
ating and Industry Characteristics and Engagement Characteristics. SAS
No. 82 now sets forth more detailed examples arranged under similar,
but not identical, categories: Management's Characteristics and Influence
Over the Control Environment, Industry Conditions, and Operating
Characteristics and Financial Stability." These risk factors may provide
strong circumstantial evidence of management's conscious misbehavior
or recklessness which could establish the requisite scienter to support a
securities fraud cause of action against either management or the
auditor.'
4'
In discussing risk factors relating to Management Characteristics,
SAS No. 82 lists specific indicators of management's motivation to en-
gage in fraudulent financial reporting, such as when management com-
pensation is tied to the achievement of aggressive financial targets. 5
Specific evidence that management had the motive and opportunity to
commit fraud will satisfy a plaintiff's fraud cause of action against either
management or the auditor.'" More emphasis is placed on risks arising
from management's failure to act appropriately with respect to internal




137. Compare id at fl 16-17 (fraudulent financial reporting), with I 18-20 (misappropriation of
assets).
138. Id at% 30.
139. Id at I 16(a)-(c).
140. Id at 131.
141. See infra Part lI.
142. SAS No. 82, supra note 6, at % 17(a).
143. See infra Part I.
144. SAS No. 82, supra note 6, at$ 17(a).
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limit the scope of the auditor's work is another type of risk factor to be
taken into account by the auditor.'"
SAS No. 82 also sets forth specific examples of risk factors relating
to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.'" These factors
are grouped under the category of Susceptibility of Assets to Misappro-
priation and Controls." The auditor also may become aware of financial
pressures on employees or dissatisfaction on the part of employees,
which may bear on the risk of misappropriation of assets.'"
For example, in Herbert H. Post & Co. v. Sidney Bitterman Inc., 9
the jury rendered a verdict of $17.1 million against an accounting firm
for its accountant's malpractice due to his failure to discover an em-
ployee embezzlement of more than $3 million that occurred over a four
year period. The New York State Appellate Division subsequently re-
versed and remanded the case for a new trial largely due to procedural
errors.'5 However, the substance of the accountant's defalcations is in-
formative in relationship to SAS No. 82, especially since the damage
award was significant.
The defendant accounting firm may have avoided liability by ex-
amining management controls, or the lack thereof, as dictated by SAS
No. 82. The accounting firm could have inquired
of the elderly principals whether they had adequately evaluated the
employee they appointed to manage the import department. The ac-
countants should have insisted that the company follow the required
procedures for check cashing. When the gap in the transaction docu-
ments became obvious, the accountants should have meaningfully in-
quired into the genuineness of the transactions. Instead the account-
ants looked the other way ....
b. Duty to Detect Fraud and Possibly Resign from the Audit
Under SAS No. 82
SAS No. 82 retains and expands upon the basic principle that if the
auditor believes that there has been fraud that is material to the financial
statements, he must discuss the matter with an "appropriate level of man-
agement that is at least one level above those involved and with senior
management."' 3 By requiring that any fraud that causes a material mis-
145. 'Id
146. l at 118.
147. Id at I 18(a), (b).
148. Jd at 120.
149. 639 N.Y.S.2d 329 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
150. Herbert H. Post & Co., 639 N.Y.S.2d at 331-32.
151. Id at 339.
152. Norman B. Amoff & Sue C. Jacobs, Accountants' and Employee Defalcations, N.Y. L.J., Apr.
8,1997, at 3,7 (discussing in detail the relationship of Herbert H. Post & Co. to SAS No. 82).
153. SAS No. 82, supra note 6, at 35(b).
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statement of the financial statements must be reported directly to the
audit committee of the board of directors, SAS No. 82 expands upon
SAS No. 53's requirement that only fraud involving senior management
should be reported to the board's audit committee.'"
SAS No. 82, however, maintains the AICPA's position that an
auditor is not required to disclose the existence of such fraud to third
parties and, in fact, is "precluded by the auditor's ethical or legal obliga-
tions of confidentiality unless the matter is reflected in the auditor's re-
port."' Instead of requiring whistle blowing, SAS No. 82 promulgates
an opt out provision-where, if the auditor's evaluation of risk factors
and results of audit tests indicate that a significant risk of fraud exists,
"the auditor should consider withdrawing from the engagement and
communicating the reasons for withdrawal to the audit committee.""
With respect to illegal acts, however, SAS No. 82 provides that the
auditor may be required to disclose outside the client entity in circum-
stances such as "comply[ing] with certain legal and regulatory require-
ments."'' In a footnote to this paragraph, the SAS refers to the Reform
Act's required report to the SEC.' 8
2. SAS No. 54
Although SAS No. 54, entitled "Illegal Acts by Clients," covers the
auditor's responsibility for detection of illegal acts, it states that an audit
in accordance with GAAS normally "does not include audit procedures
specifically designed to detect illegal acts.' ' 9 In contrast, SAS No. 82
requires the auditor to make a fraud risk assessment in designing audit
procedures,"'5 and the Reform Act requires that audits of public compa-
nies' financial statements include "procedures designed to provide rea-
sonable assurance of detecting illegal acts that would have a direct and
material effect on the determination of financial statement amounts.""'
According to SAS No. 54, whether an act is illegal "is a determina-
tion that is normally beyond the auditor's professional competence.""
SAS No. 54 distinguishes between (i) illegal acts that have a direct and
material effect on the financial statements, requiring a different method
of classification of a material balance such as tax laws and the determi-
nation of revenue earned under a government contract in which case the
auditor's responsibility for detection is the same as for fraud'63 and (ii)
154. Id. at 38.
155. Id. at$40.
156. d at 36.
157. Id. at I40(a).
158. Id. at s 40(a) n.24.
159. AU, supra note5, at § 317.08.
160. SAS No. 82, supra note 6, at I1J 12-13.
161. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I(a)(1) (Supp. I 1995).
162. AU, supra note 5, at § 317.03.
163. Id. at § 317.05.
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illegal acts that have a material but indirect effect on the financial state-
ments, such as violations of laws or regulations that relate to the operat-
ing aspects of the company, like "securities [issuance and] trading, occu-
pational safety and health, food and drug administration, environmental
protection, equal employment, price fixing or other antitrust
violations."" Violations of these laws ordinarily do not have a direct
impact on the financial statements but may be material because they ex-
pose the company to potential legal liability for damages, penalties and
fines.16
Since U.S. businesses are subject to so many laws and regulations
that, if violated, could lead to material consequences, it is questionable
whether an audit can be designed to provide reasonable assurance of
detecting all illegal acts that may have a material effect on financial
statements. "As a practical matter auditors have little chance of detecting
most illegal acts unless informed of them by the client" or by available
corporate documents which disclose the existence of a government in-
vestigation or enforcement proceeding.'"
SAS No. 54, like SAS No. 82 with respect to fraud, provides that if
the auditor concludes that the illegal act is material to the financial
statements and has not been properly accounted for or disclosed, he must
express a qualified or adverse opinion.67 If the auditor is precluded from
obtaining the necessary information to evaluate whether an illegal act has
occurred, the auditor normally should disclaim, i.e., not render an opin-
ion.'" The auditor should resign if the client refuses to accept the audi-
tor's report as qualified, adverse, or disclaimed.'"
Regarding fraud, SAS No. 54 takes the position that the auditor or-
dinarily has no responsibility to disclose illegal acts to third parties, "un-
less the matter affects his opinion on the financial statements."'"0 The
auditor can withdraw from the engagement if management fails to make
appropriate disclosures in the financial statements without directly re-
porting the misconduct to the SEC or to the public. However, as dis-
cussed above, SAS No. 82 refers to the Reform Act's requirement of
disclosure of illegal acts.
The Reform Act now requires an auditor to determine whether the
directors have taken appropriate remedial actions to assess the conse-
quences of actual or likely violations of numerous administrative rules
and federal regulations, including those issued by the Federal Trade
164. Id. at § 317.06.
165. 1& at §§ 317.05-.07.
166. Mancino, supra note 9, at 36.
167. AU, supra note 5, at § 317.18.
168. Id. at § 317.19.
169. 1& at § 317.20.
170. Id. at § 317.23.
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Commission, Federal Drug Administration, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. The
auditor will also have to make similar assessments concerning violations
of state, local, and foreign laws.
Senator Ron Wyden, one of the members of the congressional
committee that drafted the new whistle blower provision of the Reform
Act, stated that SAS No. 82
takes an important step forward by making clear for the first time an
auditor's responsibility to detect material fraud in financial statements
and by offering various fraud risk factors to be considered in planning
and performing all audits. The new revised SAS, read in conjunction
with the AICPA's SAS No. 54 relating to an auditor's responsibility
to detect illegal acts, is not only consistent with Section 10A [of the
Reform Act] but also promotes the intent of that provision to put pro-
cedures in place to help detect fraud early.'
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt also stated, with respect to whether
new SAS No. 82 and existing SAS No. 54 are consistent with the pur-
pose and intent of the Reform Act, that "[w]e believe that both these
standards improve the ability of auditors to detect management fraud and
are consistent with the purposes of Section 10A."''
Auditors claim to be confused about what, if anything, they should
do to detect illegal acts. Though auditors must follow the strictures of the
Reform Act, they also have an ethical obligation to follow GAAS.
In a 1994 judicial decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an auditor did not have a duty to investors to disclose deficiencies in
the company's internal controls in its audit report because he relied in
good faith on GAAS." However, other courts have held that GAAS are
not determinative of the auditor's standard of care.'
74
Patrick McDonnell, vice chairman of Business Assurance Services
at Coopers & Lybrand, stated, "[i]f auditors follow the [AICPA] rules,
but miss the fraud, one could argue that they still have protection from
lawsuits,"'' 5 but they also may not as indicated by current litigation.
171. 143 CoNG. REc. S1412 (daily ed. Feb. 13,1997) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
172. Id (letter from Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman, to Sen. Ron Wyden (Jan. 31,1997)).
173. See Monroe v. Hughes, 31 F.3d 772,775-76 (9th Cir. 1994).
174. See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Emst & Emst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1113 (7th Cir. 1974) C"[WIe recognize
that we are not constrained to accept faulty standards of practice otherwise generally accepted in an
industry or profession."), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112,122 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affid in part and rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 27
(2d Cir. 1976); see aLso Maduff Mortgage v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 779 P.2d 1083,1086 (Or. Ct. App.
1989) (concluding that GAAS is useful in determining the standard of car for an accountant, but not
contolling).
175. Elizabeth MacDonald, Auditors are Ending up Between a Rock and a Hard Place over
Securities Law, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24,1996, at Cl.
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For example, under the Reform Act, it may be difficult for an audi-
tor to assess the "materiality" of an illegal act, its possible effect on the
issuer's financial statements, or the likelihood that the illegal act has ac-
tually occurred. Similarly, SAS No. 82 lists fraud risk factors and SAS
No. 53 required that audits provide "reasonable assurance" of detecting
material irregularities, concepts which will be susceptible to judicial in-
terpretation. These are necessarily gray areas which may have the net
effect of
tying up the auditor in expensive litigation in instances where hind-
sight shows that the effect of a fraudulent accounting practice was
more or less substantial than the auditor's judgment originally fore-
cast.
Auditors [may] be placed in the impossible position of acting not
merely as detectives, obliged to seek out and report illegal acts, but
clairvoyants, open to liability for a failure to report acts that seem
prospectively to pose no material consequence to the financial state-
ments of the issuer.'76
Besides developing an awareness of prior judicial precedents, accounting
firms should plan ahead by creating internal management strategies for
dealing with auditor liability under the Reform Act and professional
auditing standards.'"
III. PROVING AUDITOR FRAUD
A. The Scienter Requirement
The scienter'7 ' requirement is currently a controversial element in
lawsuits brought against auditors, as well as others, under the Reform
Act for violations of section 10(b), Rule lOb-5, and professional auditing
standards. The Reform Act does not define scienter or indicate the stan-
dards for alleging scienter, and post-Reform Act judicial decisions have
formulated different interpretations of how the scienter requirement can
be satisfied. Furthermore, various sections of the Reform Act reflect a
congressional ambiguity concerning the scienter requirement. For exam-
ple, the Reform Act's safe harbor rules for statutorily defined forward-
176. Brodsky, supra note 48, at 36.
177. Harvey L. Pitt et al., More Than "Classical GAAS": Audits and Corporate Illegality Under the
Litigation Reform Act, in 28TH ANNUAL INSTrTi ON SECUREs RErULATiON, at 269, 273-81 (PLI
Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 962,1996).
178. Scienter "is frnuently used to signify the defendant's guilty knowledge." BLACK'S LAW
DICrnONARY 1345 (6th ed. 1990).
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looking statements" provide that "no liability will attach under the Re-
form Act in a private action unless the plaintiff proves actual knowledge
of the false or misleading nature of the statement on the part of a natural
person making the statement,"'" or on the part of an executive officer
approving the statement made on behalf of a business entity.'"' In its joint
and several liability section, the Reform Act restricts a defendant's li-
ability to an amount corresponding to its proportionate degree of fault if
the defendant did not act "knowingly."'1'
Prior to the Reform Act, the Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, Inc.," held that "scienter," which it defined as "a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, mampulate, or defraud,"'" was a pre-
requisite to fraud liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The
Hochfelder Court expressly rejected plaintiff's contention that the defen-
dant's accountants could be liable under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
based solely upon their negligence.'" However, the Court left open the
question of whether recklessness could satisfy the newly-created scienter
requirement: "In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be
a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some
act. We need not address here the question whether in some circum-
stances reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5."''
After Hochfelder, the lower courts were left with the task of deter-
mining whether reckless conduct is sufficient to satisfy the scienter re-
quirement of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The Supreme Court has not
subsequently addressed this issue.
In a recent Supreme Court case, United States v. O'Hagan" the
Court upheld the federal "misappropriation theory" for prosecuting in-
sider trading cases under section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5." The misappro-
priation theory of insider trading is broader than classical insider trading
liability as it imposes fraud liability on any individual who misappropri-
ates material, non-public information by breaching a fiduciary duty and
179. Section 102 of the Reform Act created a safe harbor provision for forward-looking information
by adding section 27A to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Supp. 1 1995) and by adding
section 21E to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 u-5 (Supp. I 1995).
180. Reform Act sec. 102(a), § 27A(c)(1)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added);
Reform Act sec. 102(b), § 21E(c)(1)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
181. Reform Act sec. 102(a), § 27A(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(ii)(I); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
5(c)Xl)(B)(ii)(I).
182. Reform Act sec. 201(a), § 21D(g)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2)(A).
183. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
184. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 117 S. CL 2199 (1997).
188. O'Hagan, 117 S. CL at2213-14.
1998]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
uses that information in a securities transaction.'89 The O'Hagan Court, in
its discussion of the misappropriation theory, emphasized the continued
importance of the scienter requirement in securities litigation:
To establish a criminal violation of Rule 1Ob-5, the government must
prove that a person 'willfully' violated the provision.' 90 In addition the
statute's requirement of the presence of culpable intent as a necessary
element of the offense does much to destroy any force in the argu-
ment that application of the [statute] in circumstances such as
O'Hagan's is unjust.'9'
It has been suggested that O'Hagan's requirement that the govern-
ment establish a clear intent to defraud in criminal securities fraud prose-
cutions may raise the "level of scienter enormously .... Now, when the
SEC tries to deal with the lower standard of intent, recklessness, they
may find O'Hagan comes back to bite them."'
Since Hochfelder, commentators and ten courts of appeal have con-
cluded that a reckless misrepresentation or omission satisfies the scienter
requirement. 3 In addition to wide ranging judicial support for the con-
cept that recklessness satisfies the Hochfelder scienter requirement,19
there is authority under the tort of common law fraud for this proposi-
tion.' Accountants have unsuccessfully attempted to convince the courts
that recklessness is not enough to prove scienter. The courts have con-
189. John C. Coffee, Jr., In 'O'Hagan.' The Supreme Court Gets a Second Chance to Adopt, and
Define the Scope of. SEC's 'Misappropriation Theory' of Insider Trading, NATL. L.J., Feb. 17, 1997, at
B5.
190. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)).
191. Id (quoting Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,342 (1952)).
192. Dominic Bencivenga, The Right Set of Facts: 'O'Hagan' Court Affirms SEC Rule-Making
Power, N.Y. LJ., July 3, 1997, at 5, 43 (quoting Harvey L Pitt, law partner in Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson).
193. Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations and Omissions Under Section
10(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CN. L. REv. 667, 673-74 n.22 (1991).
194. See Armstrong et al., supra note 38, at 980-81 n.38 (citing the following cases in support of the
recklessness standard for meeting the scienter requirement SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641-42
(D.C. Cir. 1992); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Phillips
Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3rd. Cir. 1989); McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863
F.2d 809, 814-15 (11th Cir. 1989); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982);
Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 517 (1st Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.
1977); In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Savings and Loan Sec. Iitig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1434
(D. Ariz. 1992)); see also Paul Vizearrondo, Jr. & Andrew C. Houston, Liabilities Under Sections 11, 12,
15 and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10, 18 and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, in UNDERSTANDING THE SEcutmES LAws 1996, at 585, 645 (PU Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 956, 1996) (providing survey of cases to illustrate that only the Fourth Circuit holds
that recklessness will not satisfy the scienter requirement of Rule lOb-5; all other circuits and several
district courts in the Fourth Circuit require either general or severe recklessness).
195. See Armstrong et al., supra note 38, at 986 (discussing history of common-law fraud in the
context of securities litigation).
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sistently refused to strengthen their scienter requirements by eliminating
recklessness.'"
The recklessness standard in relationship to accountants has been
evaluated in various ways. Some courts define accounting recklessness
as accounting practices that are such "an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care"" or "so deficient that the audit amounted to
no audit at all."'"8 Other courts find recklessness in a failure to investigate
the obvious or doubtful.' Some courts allow gross departures from
GAAP or GAAS as merely negligent actions which do not meet the sci-
enter standard,' and other courts conclude that this same conduct may
prove reckless enough to establish scienter.2° Even if accountants heed
the professional auditing standards set forth in SAS No. 82 and SAS No.
54, it is not clear whether or not this will absolve or insulate them from
securities fraud liability in all jurisdictions, although "auditors who do
adhere to the new standard [SAS No. 82] but fail to detect a material
fraud will be in a better position to avoid liability on the grounds that
SAS No. 82 provides a 'safe haven."' The Reform Act, together with
its legislative history, left "the definition of scienter [intent] an open
question for the courts to work out."2'
B. Pleading Requirements
The Reform Act's failure to codify the definition of scienter has
focused judicial attention upon the requirements for pleading fraud as a
means of clarifying the conduct that gives rise to scienter. Already there
exist several types of post-Reform Act cases that differ in their standards
for pleading scienter and in their interpretation of the Reform Act's
pleading requirements."
Rule lOb-5's scienter requirement is now being measured against
the Reform Act's new pleading section enacted by Congress to
196. Coopers & Lybrand pursued this argument unsuccessfully in In re Phar-Mor Inc. Sec. Litig.,
892 F. Supp. 679,685 (W.D. Pa. 1995).
197. SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,1045 (7th Cir. 1977)).
198. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. at 1240.
199. E.g., Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 762 F. Supp. 599,601 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
200. E.g., In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 627-28 (9th Cir. 1994); In re In-
Store Advertising Sec. Litig., 878 F. Supp. 645, 648-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see Yankwitt & Moldovan,
supra note 17, at 4 & n.21. See generally id (providing a further discussion of how courts have been
inconsistent in their application of a recklessness/scienter standard in securities fraud litigation against
accountants).
201. E.g., Ades v. Deloitte & Touche, 799 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see Yankwitt &
Moldovan, supra note 17, at 4 & n.22.
202. Robert Sidorsky, Independent Auditor's Consideration of Fraud, N.Y. LJ., Jan. 24,1997, at 1,
32.
203. Karen Donovan, Securities Law Review on Tap, NAT'I. LJ., Apr. 14,1997, at A6 (alteration in
original) (quoting Donald C. Langevoort of Vanderbilt University School of Law).
204. See infra notes 220-61 and accompanying text.
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strengthen existing pleading requirements by requiring plaintiffs to plead
with particularity the facts giving rise to the allegations of fraud. One
year after the Reform Act's enactment, lawyers report that they have
altered their pleading strategies to meet the Reform Act's heightened
pleading requirement by making more detailed and specific allegations
so that their complaints will survive motions to dismiss. °'
The Reform Act requires that in securities fraud actions the plain-
tiffs "complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to
violate this title, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong infer-
ence that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." This
represents a departure from the pre-Reform Act standard of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b) which requires that fraud be alleged with par-
ticularity, but expressly allows "[m]alice, intent, knowledge and other
condition of mind of a person [to] be averred generally."2
The Reform Act's legislative history indicates in its House confer-
ence report two major drawbacks to Rule 9(b).' ° Rule 9(b) did "not pre-
vent.., abuse of the securities laws by private litigants" and "courts of
appeals have interpreted Rule 9(b)'s [broad and lenient pleading] re-
quirement in conflicting ways, creating distinctly different standards
amongst the circuits. ' ' For example, the Seventh Circuit has established
that a sufficient level of factual support for a Rule 1Ob-5 claim is found
when the circumstances of fraud are pled "in detail" which "means the
who, what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph of any newspaper
story.""' However, some courts have interpreted Rule 9(b) to allow
plaintiffs to generally allege fraud without setting forth specific facts in
support of their allegations.2 1 ' The Reform Act's new pleading require-
ment was intended to curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits by estab-
lishing more stringent and uniform pleading standards.22
The pre-Reform Act pleading standard, set forth in Rule 9(b), was
given its strictest interpretation by the Second Circuit. The Second Cir-
cuit required a plaintiff to plead facts sufficient to raise a "strong infer-
205. Dominic Bencivenga, Litigation Re-Formed Lawyers Report on 'Year )' Under Securities Act,
N.Y. LJ., Jan. 16, 1997,at 5.
206. Reform Act sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 11995).
207. FED. R. Cxv. P. 9(b).
208. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,740.
209. id.
210. Dileo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Williams v. WMX
Techs., 112 F.3d 175, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Aug. 20,
1997) (No. 97-333).
211. Thisis true in the Ninth and Sixth Circuits. See Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078,1082-83 (9th
Cir. 1995); In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F3d 1541, 1546-49 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Rospatch Sec.
Litig., 760 F. Supp. 1239, 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1991); Edward Brodsky, Scienter Under the Reform Act of
1995, N.Y. LJ., Jan. 8,1997, at 3,3 n.5.
212. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,740.
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ence of fraudulent intent. '21 3 This "strong inference" of fraudulent intent
could be "established either (a) by alleging facts to show that defendants
had both the motive and opportunity to commit fraud ["motive and op-
portunity" test], or (b) by alleging facts that constitute strong circum-
stantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness ["circumstan-
tial evidence" test]. 't4
The difficulty in applying the Second Circuit's stringent pleading
standard, particularly the motive and opportunity test, is demonstrated by
the case law which has led to "arbitrary line-drawing by the courts. 12 5 In
some situations where a plaintiff alleges that the defendant gained per-
sonal benefits from inflated stock prices, the motive and opportunity test
to commit fraud has been satisfied, 6 whereas in others such evidence has
been found insufficient.
In In re Time Warner, Inc. Securities Litigation, the Second Circuit
found a motive to commit fraud adequately pled where plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants artificially maintained a higher stock price in order to
raise capital more easily.1 8 In contrast, in San Leandro Emergency Medi-
cal Group Profit Sharing Plan, the same court held that plaintiffs had not
adequately pled sufficient motive to commit fraud by alleging that de-
fendant maintained high stock prices in order to issue bonds because "if
scienter could be pleaded on this basis alone, virtually every company in
the United States that experiences a downturn in stock price could be
forced to defend securities fraud actions."' 9
The Reform Act's pleading standards have created a judicial split
over what types of allegations are sufficient to support the scienter re-
quirement in a securities fraud claim.2 ° Three types of post-Reform Act
213. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
214. Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128; see also San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan
v. Philip Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801, 813 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259,
268-69 (2d Cir. 1993); O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676-77 (2d Cir.
1991), affg O'Brien v. Price Waterhouse, 740 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (affirming the district
court's dismissal after implicitly recognizing that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the circumstantial evidence
test).
215. Brodsky, supra note 48, at 3.
216. Time Warner, Inc., 9 F.3d at 269-70; Hallett v. L & Fung Ltd., No. 95 Civ. 8917, 1996 WL
487952, at *3 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1996); Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal Inc., 792 F. Supp. 244
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also Brodsky, supra note 48, at 3 & n.21.
217. San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan, 75 F.3d at 813-14; Acito v.
IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Brodsky, supra note 48, at 3 & n.22.
218. Time Warner, Inc., 9 F.3d at 269.
219. San Leandro Emergency Med Group, 75 F.3d at 814 (quoting Acito, 47 F:3d at 54); see also
Brodsky, supra note 48, at 3 (providing a further discussion of the Hallett and Acito cases to illustrate the
difficulties experienced by courts in determining when the motive and opportmity test has been
adequately pled to support the scienter requirement).
220. William R. Maguire & Reid A. Muoio, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Anniversary,
N.Y. L., Dec. 12, 1996, at 2.
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cases have evolved:2' first, cases holding that pleading scienter under the
Reform Act is satisfied by establishing reckless conduct and the motive
and opportunity to commit fraud;" second, cases rejecting the reckless-
ness standard and holding that scienter is only proven by pleading a de-
liberate and conscious intent to commit fraud;'m and third, cases holding
that although the recklessness standard is still applicable, the motive and
opportunity test does not satisfy the Reform Act's heightened pleading
requirements." '
Some courts have held that allegations of reckless behavior or mo-
tive and opportunity may be sufficient in relation to corporate insiders to
prove an intent to commit fraud.'m In Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chan-
tal Pharmaceutical Corp.,' a federal district court in California held that
the Reform Act did not clearly eliminate the Second Circuit's motive and
opportunity test since this was not explicitly done in the statute and this
test remains "consistent with both the language and purpose of the [Re-
form Act]" and is a "suitable standard to employ. 227
The Marksman court, as well as other courts, determined that the
Second Circuit pleading standard survived passage of the Reform Act.m
It refers to the Reform Act's legislative history which states that "[t]he
conference committee language is based in part on the pleading standard
of the Second Circuit" which is "regarded as the most stringent pleading
standard. The Second Circuit requirement is that the plaintiff state facts
with particularity, and that these facts, in turn, must give rise to a 'strong
inference' of the defendant's fraudulent intent.
29
The SEC also supports this position as it did in an amicus brief sup-
porting the plaintiff's complaint in In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities
Litigation (Silicon Graphics 1),m wherein it asserted that although Con-
gress intended to adopt a stricter procedural pleading standard in securi-
ties fraud cases, Congress did not intend to substantively change securi-
ties laws by eliminating recklessness as a basis for scienter. 3' As of Janu-
221. Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Scienter Requirement Under Securities Litigation
Reform, N.Y. LJ., July 17, 1997, at 5 (recognizing and discussing the three post-Reform Act approaches
to scienter).
222. See infra notes 225-32 and accompanying text.
223. See infra notes 233-48 and accompanying text.
224. See infra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
225. E.g., Zeid v. Kimberley, 930 F. Supp. 431,437-38 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Marksman Partners, LP.
v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1310, 1313 (C.D. Cal 1996).
226. Marksman Parmers, LP., 927 F. Supp. at 1297.
227. Id at 1312.
228. Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1311; see, e.g., Zeid, 930 F. Supp. at 434.
229. Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1311 (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted
in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,740).
230. No. C96-0393, 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Silicon Graphics 1].
231. Donovan, supra note 203, at A6 (discussing the SEC's amicus brief filed in Silicon Graphics
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ary 1997, out of seven courts that have addressed the new pleading stan-
dard, six courts have concluded that the Reform Act simply adopted the
Second Circuit's rule that a strong inference of fraud is adequately pled if
the complaint pleads specific facts establishing circumstantial evidence
of reckless or conscious behavior or a motive and opportunity to commit
fraud.232
Other courts have interpreted the Reform Act as eliminating reck-
lessness as a basis for scienter, requiring instead that scienter be proven
by evidence of a conscious or deliberate intent, rather than a motive and
opportunity, to commit fraud under more stringent pleading standards
than those provided for by the Second Circuit.13 This position was re-
flected in Silicon Graphics f" where the District Court of Northern Cali-
fornia, after a detailed review of the Reform Act's legislative history,
concluded that Congress did not intend to adopt the Second Circuit's
scienter pleading standard."3
The Silicon Graphics I court decided that Congress intended to
adopt a stricter scienter pleading requirement requiring plaintiffs to al-
lege conscious or intentional misconduct, or a deliberate intent to deceive
or actual knowledge by the defendant.' In the Silicon Graphics I case,
the court dismissed, with leave to file an amended complaint, the plain-
tiff's original securities fraud complaint, which alleged that the corporate
officers sold stock despite their knowledge that public statements con-
cerning their company's revenue growth were false."
Recently in In Re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation"s (Sili-
con Graphics II), decided May 23, 1997, Judge Smith, of the federal
district court in San Francisco, dismissed the amended complaint, ruling
that under the Reform Act's heightened pleading standards plaintiffs had
not adequately alleged the details of the company's negative internal
reports 9 and that "recklessness" in issuing inaccurate reports was insuf-
ficient to hold corporate officers liable.2" Judge Smith dismissed plain-
tiff's amended complaint, ruling that pleading "deliberate recklessness"
would meet the Reform Act's higher standard of "a strong inference of
knowing or intentional misconduct." '' As one commentator noted in
reference to Judge Smith's decision in Silicon Graphics II, "Congress
232. See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 21, at 24-27 (discussing the seven cases that addressed the
new pleading standard as of January 1997).
233. See Block & Hoff, supra note 221, at 5 (discussing cases adopting the more stringent pleading
standards).
234. Silicon Graphics 1, 1996 WL 664639, at *5.
235. Id. at *5-*6 & n.4.
236. Id. at *6-*7.
237. d. at *16.
238. 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Silicon Graphics I1].
239. Silicon Graphics 1I, 970 F. Supp. at 767.
240. Id. at 757.
241. id.
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intended plaintiffs to show harder factual evidence when bringing cases
rather than relying on secondhand information and beliefs based on that
information, which has been the foundation of such suits in the past."2 "2
Silicon Graphics 11 clearly rejects mere recklessness as the scienter stan-
dard as well as the motive and opportunity test for pleading scienter. "3
Silicon Graphics H advocates a "deliberate recklessness" scienter stan-
dard which must be pled through evidence of intentional, conscious or
deliberate misconduct sufficient to raise a strong inference of fraud.' "
The plaintiffs plan to appeal Judge Smith's ruling to the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. 5 An appellate court ruling in this closely watched
case is expected to provide the first appellate decision concerning the
future of the recklessness standard and the scope of the scienter pleading
requirements under the Reform Act.
Both Silicon Graphics decisions reiterated that if Congress had in-
tended to adopt the Second Circuit's approach it would have done so
clearly." They refer to the conference report which states that the "Con-
ference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements,
it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this
pleading standard" and "[flor this reason, the Conference Report chose
not to include in the pleading standard certain language relating to mo-
tive, opportunity, or recklessness."" Although Congress did not ade-
quately define a new scienter or pleading standard, the Reform Act may
indicate its intent to go beyond rules already in effect.4 9 Even President
Clinton, in his veto of the Reform Act, noted that in his view the legisla-
tive history indicated that Congress sought to adopt a more stringent
pleading standard than that of the Second Circuit.'
Yet another judicial perspective on pleading scienter was declared
by Judge Raskoff of the Southern District of New York in In re Baesa
242. Paul Beckett, Silicon Graphics Gains Dismissal of Suit Alleging Securities Fraud, WAIL ST.
J., May 30, 1997, at B2; see Silicon Graphics I, 970 F. Supp. at 763-64. In finding that the plaintiffs
failed to adequately allege the details of the company's negative internal reports under the Reform Act's
heightened pleading standards, the court noted that "[t]hese allegations should include the titles of the
reports, when they were prepared, to whom they were directed, their content, and the sources from which
plaintiffs obtained this information." Id. at 764.
243. See Silicon Graphics I1, 970 F. Supp. at 757.
244. Id. at 757. See generally Brodsky, supra note 48, at 3.
245. Beckett, supra note 242, at B2 (noting statement by Bill Lerach, a partner at the law firm
representing the plaintiffs).
246. Silicon Graphics 11, 970 F. Supp. at 756; Silicon Graphics I, No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
247. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,740.
248. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 48 n.23 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 747
n.23.
249. Brodsky, supra note 211, at 3.
250. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995--Veto Message from the President of the
United States, reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. H15214-06 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1995). Congress overrode the
veto on December 22, 1995. 141 CONG. REc. D1507 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
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Securities Litigation.f' Judge Raskoff found that the Reform Act did not
increase the scienter requirement for securities fraud beyond the reck-
lessness standard because "'recklessness', in its classic formulation, de-
scribes a conscious state of mind that is inherently deceptive, i.e., a con-
scious and purposeful disregard of the truth of a known risk." 2 Judge
Raskoff also held that pleading only motive and opportunity is no longer
sufficient for proving an inference of scienter under the Reform Act."3
Instead, the pleadings must set forth sufficient particularized information
to raise a strong inference of the required scienter." ' Based upon this
formulation, the Baesa court dismissed plaintiff's complaint due to the
lack of factual support for plaintiff's allegations that the defendants had
knowledge of the fraud.
The Baesa ruling runs counter to the Silicon cases which elevated
the scienter requirement to a deliberate recklessness standard. Further-
more, another federal judge in New York ruled otherwise in Norwood
Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc.,' holding that Congress intended to
adopt a higher scienter requirement requiring a plaintiff to plead defen-
dant's knowing misrepresentation." The First Circuit in Friedberg v.
Discreet Logic, Inc."8 recently adopted a conscious behavior approach to
pleading scienter which is consistent with the Silicon approach. '
These different judicial standards for pleading scienter under the
Reform Act reflect the inherent ambiguities within the statute. Con-
gress's failure to define a clear standard for pleading and proving scien-
ter impede "the Reform Act's further objective of establishing uniform
and more stringent pleading requirements with respect to the scienter
element of [section] 10(b)."' Until the various courts of appeals formu-
late a clear scienter standard, possibly with the Supreme Court's assis-
tance, this standard "will remain confused and inconsistently applied
among the federal district courts."'"
IV. CONCLUSION
Accountants may believe that the new pleading requirements will
curtail litigation against them but that remains to be seen. For example,
plaintiffs' attorneys may cite the auditor's new duty under the Reform
Act to detect and disclose illegal acts to support their securities fraud
251. 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
252. Baesa Sec. Utig., 969 F. Supp. at 241.
253. Id. at 242.
254. d
255. The Baesa plaintiffs were given thirty days to replead their complaint. Id. at 243.
256. 959 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
257. Norwood Venture Corp., 959 F. Supp. at 208.
258. 959 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997).
259. Friedberg, 959 F. Supp. at 50.
260. Block & Hoff, supra note 221, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
261. Id.
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allegations which now must be pled with factual particularity. Plaintiffs
may allege that an auditor's failure to detect fraudulent or illegal acts
demonstrates the requisite scienter or recklessness to sustain a primary
section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 fraud liability claim. 2 In fact, recent suc-
cessful federal securities lawsuits against accountants alleging direct
primary fraud violations may fuel future litigation under the Reform
Act.
263
However, in one post-Reform Act case, Duncan v. Pencer,2" a secu-
rities fraud complaint which had been lodged against the accounting firm
of Coopers & Lybrand, was dismissed after being evaluated under the
Second Circuit's motive and opportunity and circumstantial evidence
pleading standards rather than the heightened pleading requirements of
the Reform Act.' In Duncan, the plaintiffs alleged that Coopers & Ly-
brand had a motive to commit fraud due to its desire to maintain a profit-
able business relationship with the defendant corporation and continue
receiving its professional fees." Therefore, the complaint alleged that
Coopers falsified corporate financial statements regarding profitability
causing investors to buy stock at inflated prices and enabling insiders to
sell their stock at inflated market prices.2" The Duncan court dismissed
this motive argument, stating that it is "highly unlikely" to assume that
any accounting firm would "knowingly condone a client's fraud in order
to preserve a fee that, at best, is an infinitesimal percentage of its annual
revenues, and by doing so, jeopardize its reputation and.. . subject itself
to potential damages literally tens of thousands of times as large as its
fees...."'
Numerous courts have discredited the argument that every time a
professional is paid and then sued for securities fraud a finding of scien-
ter can be made.' In discussing the fraud complaint, the Duncan court
also held that the circumstantial evidence test of conscious misbehavior
or recklessness was not satisfied by summarily alleging GAAP violations
without making supporting allegations of fraudulent intent.2 70 The fact
262. Lisa S. Kahn & Laura M. Metcalfe, Accountants, No Longer at Risk of Being Sued for Aiding
and Abetting Securities Law Violations, Have Recently Been Found Directly Liable for Their Clients'
Fraud, NAT'L LJ., May 20, 1996, at B6.
263. Id. (referring to the Coopers & LybrandlPhar-Mor Inc. case where a federal jury found the
auditors liable, see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 928 F. Supp. 557, 559-60 (W.D.
Pa. 1996) (discussing scope of appropriate damages after a finding of liability), and the Deloitte &
Touche case where a jury found the accounting firm liable for over $81 million, see Robbins v. Koger
Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1445-46 (reversing jury finding because plaintiff failed to establish the
loss causation element of Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997)).
264. No. 94 Civ. 0321, 1996 WL 19043, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18,1996).
265. Duncan, 1996WL 19043, at*10-*11.
266. Id. at *9.
267. Id. at *11-*12.
268. Id. at *10.
269. See, e.g., Yankwitt & Moldovan, supra note 17, at 4.
270. Duncan, 1996 WL 19043, at * 10.
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that Coopers violated a basic and fundamental accounting principle, i.e.,
giving someone money as an expense, not an asset, does not mean that
Coopers necessarily acted recklessly and does not satisfy the requirement
to plead fraud with particularity and circumstantial evidence. 7'
The Reform Act has not clarified either the substantive or proce-
dural issues pertaining to the recklessness/scienter requirement in federal
securities fraud litigation. Auditors continue to be named as defendants
in federal securities lawsuits but face uncertainties as the courts continue
to grapple with what constitutes fraud within the accounting context. The
Reform Act has created a duty for auditors to report illegal acts but has
insulated such reports from private causes of action. However, account-
ants remain susceptible to private causes of action for fraud and illegal
acts not included within their reports to the SEC. Such outside fraud or
illegal acts may be sufficient to meet the Reform Act's heightened
pleading standards.
Despite the Reform Act, the courts, almost without exception, con-
tinue to apply the Second Circuit's amorphous motive and opportunity
test and circumstantial evidence test. The question remains whether an
auditor's failure to report significant fraudulent and illegal acts could
provide sufficient circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior and
recklessness or motive and opportunity to support a Rule 1Ob-5 cause of
action. The professional auditing standards of SAS No. 82 and SAS No.
54 create a duty to consider fraud and illegal acts in the audit process. It
is now up to the judiciary to determine whether these professional stan-
dards will be a benchmark for alleging auditor fraud within the federal
securities law context. Until now the case law has been inconsistent. It
remains to be seen whether these professional standards, in concert with





THE PROGRESSIVENESS OF THE LOCHNER COURT
MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS*
In 1913, the legal historian Charles Warren published an article en-
titled "The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court."' Con-
trary to charges that the Court was a reactionary obstacle to social legis-
lation, Warren maintained that it had actually "been steady and consis-
tent in upholding all State legislation of a progressive type."2 According
to Warren, the Court had rejected over ninety-five percent of the Four-
teenth Amendment due process and equal protection challenges it con-
sidered during the years 1887 to 191 . Of the successful challenges,
furthermore, the vast majority involved "private rights of property," and
very few concerned "social justice" legislation.' This record, Warren
concluded, showed "the responsiveness of the Court to the changing
needs of the times," and revealed it as "a bulwark to the State police
power, not a destroyer."
Needless to say, Warren's view of the old Court's (or Lochner
Court's)6 Fourteenth Amendment decisions has not been the dominant
view. Indeed, "progressive" is one of the last labels most past or present
* Professor of Business Law, School of Business, Indiana University. B.A., 1968, Johns
Hopkins University; J.D., 1973, Columbia University; LL.M., 1975, George Washington University;
SJ.D., 1981, George Washington University.
1. Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L.
REV. 294 (1913) [hereinafter Warren, Progressiveness]. Warren later analyzed the Court's Contract
Clause and burden-on-commerce decisions for the period 1887-1911. See Charles Warren, A
Bulwark to the State Police Power-The United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 667
(1913).
2. Warren, Progressiveness, supra note 1, at 295.
3. Specifically, Warren said that the Court considered 560 Fourteenth Amendment due
process and equal protection cases during this period, and that the Court struck down the challenged
law in only 37 of these cases. See id. at 294-95, 309; see generally id. at 296-307, nn.7-27 (listing
the relevant cases).
4. Id. at 308-09. Specifically, Warren's assertion was that 34 of the 37 successful challenges
involved rights of private property. These cases concerned matters such as: deprivations of property
without notice or a hearing; taxation of property outside the state's jurisdiction; confiscatory rate
decisions by state legislatures or utility commissions; and various other deprivations of railroad
property. In addition, there were three "social justice" cases: Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64
(1905) (using due process to strike down a state maximum hours law for bakery employees),
overruled by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 565 (1902) (invalidating a state
antitrust law on equal protection grounds), overruled in part by Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141
(1940); and Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590-93 (1897) (finding invalid a state law that
forbade the obtaining of marine insurance on in-state property from any carrier which had not fully
complied with state law).
5. Warren, Progressiveness, supra note 1, at 310.
6. The reference, of course, is to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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observers would attach to the old Court.7 Yet if Warren's numbers are
correct and if they exemplify the entire Lochner era,8 maybe this consen-
sus is wrong. To resolve the disagreement, this article examines the Su-
preme Court's substantive due process decisions for the years 1902-
1932.0 Although it is widely recognized that the old Court rejected more
substantive due process challenges than it granted," to my knowledge no
one has explored the actual numbers in much detail.
The article begins by sketching some standard perceptions and criti-
cisms of the Lochner Court, views that already were prevalent by the
time Warren wrote. The article then lays out the Supreme Court's sub-
stantive due process decisions during the period 1902-1932. This section
considers most of the doctrine's many applications, emphasizes the nu-
merous decisions in which the Court upheld the challenged government
action, and estimates the ratio of rejected challenges to successful ones.
The article next summarizes its findings, which support Warren's general
message if not his specific numbers. After that, it discusses those find-
7. Although it may be vain to define so amorphous a term as "progressive," as used in this
article "progressive" includes the following elements: (1) the perception that America's
industrialization created significant disparities in bargaining power between business firms and
individuals, as well as other social problems; (2) the belief that positive government intervention was
needed to correct these problems; and (3) the belief that advances in social science knowledge gave
such intervention good prospects of success. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY
OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTrTUnONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 101-02, 104 (1992) (mentioning
these three elements while describing turn-of-the-century-progressivism).
8. A later Warren study, based on the years 1889-1918, found that of the 422 Supreme Court
cases involving Fourteenth Amendment due process or equal protection challenges during that
period, in only 53 did the Court strike down the challenged regulation. Of the 53, only 14 concerned
legislation affecting the general rights of individuals. CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 741 (rev. ed. 1928). But this study does not include the 1920s, the decade when
the Court was most prone to strike down social legislation on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. See,
e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888-
1986 at 133-34 (1990); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT: FROM TAFr TO WARREN
70-71 (1968) (noting the Court's increased activism during the 1920s).
However, it is doubtful whether the Court's 1920s activism would have changed Warren's
conclusions much. The reason for such doubt is that the increase in the number of laws invalidated
on substantive due process grounds during the 1920s, while significant, probably would not have
greatly affected his overall numbers. A 1927 study limited to due process challenges to exercises of
the police power suggests as much. The study found that the Supreme Court struck down six of 98
such laws during the period 1868-1912 and seven of 97 during the years 1913-20, but only 15 of 53
over the years 1921-27. Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court,
40 HARV. L. REv. 943-44 (1927).
9. In this article, substantive due process means courts' use of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments' due process clauses to assess the constitutionality of substantive government action.
Often, but not always, this assessment is conducted through some kind of means-ends analysis. Of
course, a successful substantive due process claim also requires that the challenged government
action deprive someone of life, liberty, or property; but finding such a deprivation rarely was a
problem in the cases we shall consider. As we shall see, finally, the deprivation in question need not
have involved, and in fact usually did not involve, freedom of contract. See infra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text.
10. I explain my choice of these particular years at infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
11. E.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUIrONAL LAW 567 (2d ed. 1988).
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ings' implications for the standard attacks on Lochner era substantive
due process. I conclude by briefly speculating about the reasons why the
old Court's qualified progressiveness has not been more widely recog-
nized.
I. THE STANDARD CRITIQUE OF LOCHNER ERA SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS
The most common criticisms of Lochner era substantive due process
often come conjoined with, or presuppose, a familiar picture of the cases
that best represent the era. Because the criticisms make more sense
against the backdrop the picture provides, I briefly discuss the latter be-
fore considering the former in more detail.
A. The Usual Account
Standard accounts of Lochner era substantive due process tend to
tell the same story with the same fifteen to twenty cases.'2 After discuss-
ing some precursor decisions,'3 those accounts usually identify the
Court's 1897 decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana" as the first Supreme
Court case using due process to invalidate a substantive regulation of the
economy." Then the discussion usually shifts to Lochner v. New York"
itself, where the Court struck down a maximum-hours law for bakery
employees. Usually mentioned in connection with Lochner are three
maximum hours cases in which the Court upheld the challenged law-
Holden v. Hardy," Muller v. Oregon,'8 and Bunting v. Oregon.'9 Also fre-
quently mentioned in this connection are the old Court's controversial
decisions in Adair v. United States'" and Coppage v. Kansas,' each of
12. See generally, GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 437-39, 444-57 (12th ed.
1991); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 153-57 (1960); JOHN E. NOWAK
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 340-50 (3d ed. 1986); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBFRTS
AND THE CONSTITrTON 110-55 (1980); TRIBE, supra note 11, at 567-86; Michael J. Phillips,
Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 265, 270-82.
13. See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 433-39. For other, sometimes contrasting, accounts
of substantive due process's evolution in the Supreme Court after the Civil War, see CURRIE, supra
note 8, at 41-47; ELY, supra note 7, at 86-91; BENJAMIN F. WRIGHTr, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
CONSTrUTIONAL LAw 95-105 (1946).
14. 165 U.S. 578, 593 (1897) (striking down a state law forbidding procurement of marine
insurance on in-state property with any insurer that had failed to comply with state law).
15. Id. at 590-93. Receiving less attention today, however, is an 1898 case whose practical
impact was considerably greater than that of Allgeyer. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1898)
established the courts' power to use due process to review the substantive fairness of railroad rates
and rates for other regulated industries. For more on Smyth and its numerous progeny, see infra notes
77-90 and accompanying text.
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. 169 U.S. 366, 395-97 (1898) (upholding a state maximum hours law for workers in
underground mines).
18. 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908) (upholding a state maximum hours law for women).
19. 243 U.S. 426, 438 (1917) (upholding a state maximum hours law for factory workers).
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which struck down laws limiting management's power to exclude or
discharge union employees.
During the 1920s, the Court became more aggressive in its use of
substantive due process.' Perhaps the clearest and most notorious exam-
ple is its 1923 decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,' which invali-
dated a minimum wage law for women. But the 1920s witnessed other
well known applications of substantive due process as well. These in-
clude the trio of Tyson & Brother v. Banton,"' Ribnik v. McBride,' and
Williams v. Standard Oil Co.,' each of which struck down a state price
regulation.' They also include two "personal rights" decisions: Meyer v.
Nebraska28 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.' Also getting some mention
are Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan" and Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co.3
Getting relatively short shrift but some occasional brief attention, finally,
are the old Court's decisions striking down restrictions on entry to a
trade, business, occupation, or profession; the most-noted examples are
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann"2 and Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge.3
20. 208 U.S. 161, 179-80 (1908) (striking down a federal law that forbade the firing of
railroad workers due to their union affiliation), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
313 U.S. 177 (1941).
21. 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (striking down a state law that forbade "yellow dog" contracts
conditioning an employee's employment on his not becoming or remaining a union member),
overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Co., 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
22. See Brown, supra note 8, at 944-45.
23. 261 U.S. 525, 559, 562 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937). The law struck down in Adkins also covered children. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 539-40.
24. 273 U.S. 418, 445 (1927) (invalidating a state law regulating the resale price of theater
tickets), overruled in part by Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236
(1941).
25. 277 U.S. 350, 357 (1928) (invalidating a state law regulating the fees charged by
employment agencies), overruled in part by Olsen, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
26. 278 U.S. 235, 245 (1928) (striking down a state law fixing the price of gasoline),
overruled in part by Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
27. Additionally, these cases indirectly relied upon another much discussed due process
decision that preceded the Lochner era: Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). Generally, Munn
established that the states have considerable power to regulate businesses "affected with a public
interest." Munn, 94 U.S. at 130. The trio of cases discussed here might be said to have pursued a
negative implication of Munn: that for businesses not so affected, the regulation of prices is
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Tyson, 273 U.S. at 430.
28. 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923) (striking down a state law that forbade both the teaching of
any subject in any language other than English, and the teaching of any such language as a language
until after the eighth grade).
29. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down a state law which required that all children
between 8 and 16 attend a public school).
30. 264 U.S. 504, 517 (1924) (striking down a statute which regulated the weights at which
bread loaves could be sold).
31. 270 U.S. 402, 409-15 (1926) (overturning a law that forbade the use of "shoddy," or
various torn or cut up fabrics, in beds, pillows, furniture, and other goods).
32. 285 U.S. 262, 278-79 (1932) (striking down a state law restricting entry to the ice
industry).
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The standard account naturally includes two important 1930s cases
marking the end of the Lochner era. The first, Nebbia v. New York,' ef-
fectively negated the price regulation cases mentioned earlier.'5 The sec-
ond, the Court's 1937 decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,36 over-
ruled Adkins while upholding a state minimum wage law for women."
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish is widely regarded as the case that deci-
sively signalled the end of Lochner era substantive due process.38
B. The Most Important Criticisms
Although the pie can be cut differently, here I divide the many at-
tacks on Lochner era substantive due process into three groups. The first
basically criticizes the old Court for its excessive activism. The second
and third criticisms fault it for the result of that activism: the invalidation
of progressive social legislation designed to protect workers and other
powerless individuals from the predations of big business. According to
the second critique, this was due to the Court's innocent but misguided
embrace of traditional economic liberties that had outlived their time.
According to the third, the Court knew perfectly well that it was serving
the interests of corporate America when it used due process to strike
down social legislation, and did so for precisely that reason. Of course,
not all critics of the old Court's substantive due process decisions make
each of these three criticisms, and the third seems less common today
than formerly.
1. The Illegitimacy of Substantive Due Process
Traditionally, critics of Lochner era substantive due process have
attacked it for including freedom of contract within the liberty protected
by due process.39 But whatever history may or may not say about the
33. 278 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1928) (striking down a state law requiring that drug stores be
wholly owned by a licensed pharmacist or pharmacists), overruled by North Dakota State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
34. 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (upholding a state law authorizing the fixing of milk prices by a
state body).
35. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 533-37.
36. 300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937).
37. West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 398-400. A year earlier, however, a divided Court had
upheld a minimum wage law for women. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587
(1936), overruled in part by Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236
(1941).
38. E.g., Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34, 36-37. However, the somewhat aggressive
Supreme Court review of railroad and utility rate regulation did not die until Federal Power Comm'n
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 619 (1944). RICHARD J. PIERCE & ERNEST GELLHORN,
REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A NUrSHELL 98-99 (1994).
39. See Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARv. L. REv. 495,
495 (1908) (".[L]iberty' gauranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment has come to mean the right to
pursue one's individual purposes as one likes and to make contracts for that end .... [Sbo to construe
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term's meaning, on its face the word liberty is a capacious one. And if
that term is broad enough to contain the right to an abortion, ' why should
it not include freedom of contract? Questions of constitutional interpre-
tation aside, this traditional criticism is misplaced for another reason: its
irrelevance. Whatever people may think, relatively few of the Lochner
era cases using substantive due process to strike down government action
explicitly proceeded on the assumption that the challenged law restricted
freedom of contract." And even if many cases had done so, they could
have achieved the same result by construing the term "property" broadly.
If property is conceived as a bundle of rights regarding a thing, among
them the right to alienate that thing, then one's having property rights in
x includes one's freedom to contract it away. '2 Here, x could include
one's own labor.
A more promising interpretivist attack on Lochner era substantive
due process emphasizes the term "due process of law" rather than the
word "liberty." This is the familiar objection that substantive due process
is illegitimate because the traditional meaning of Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process is procedural. '3 On this view, "'substantive due
process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness.'"
And activist courts that employ it are unjustifiably frustrating the major-
ity will expressed in legislation. ' Almost any of the previous cases in our
standard account could serve as an example. To one observer, for exam-
ple, Lochner "is still shorthand in constitutional law for the worst sins of
subjective judicial activism." The modem (post-193,7) Court has con-
the term 'liberty' is entirely to disregard the whole juristic history of the word."). See generally
Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454 (1909).
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the constitutional right of privacy is
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty).
41. See Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process
Effective? 48 MERCER L. REV. 1049, 1086 n.197 (1997) (concluding tentatively that only 11 such
cases exist). By "explicitly" I mean using the words "liberty of contract" or their like. In doing the
research for the present article, however, I frequently came upon freedom of contract claims in the
cases rejecting due process attacks on government regulation.
42. For example, one might naturally assume that cases like Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278
U.S. 235 (1929), which struck down a state law regulating the price of gasoline, id. at 245, made
freedom of contract the protected right. In fact, however, the statute was successfully attacked on the
theory that it deprived the claimant of property. Id. at 239. Although the Williams court did not
elaborate, perhaps this could be justified on the theory that ownership of gasoline includes the
freedom to sell it at a price of one's choosing. See Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 429
(1927) (noting that an owner's right to fix a price for sale of property is an attribute of the property).
43. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 269-82 (1977); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDIcI. REVIEW 14-21 (1980); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 43-49 (1990) (attacking Lochner-era substantive
due process on interpretivist grounds).
44. ELY, supra note 43, at 18.
45. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 43, at 44-45 (attacking Lochner on much the same basis).
46. Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United
States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAw & HIST. REV. 249, 250 (1987).
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tinually embraced this first criticism by saying that it does not sit as a
superlegislature to judge the wisdom or justice of social and economic
regulations."
2. The Ratification of Private Power
The deferential stance just described once typified Justices such as
Black and Douglas, but today it better describes the Court's conservative
wing.' As Hadley Arkes recently observed, "the conservatives have of-
ten been turned into moral skeptics and relativists, and they have brought
about the strangest turnabout in jurisprudence: The most conservative of
our judges have absorbed the jurisprudence of the New Deal and the jural
reflexes of Hugo Black." 9 The liberals, on the other hand, have reaf-
firmed substantive due process with a vengeance-mainly, but not exclu-
sively, through the constitutional right of privacy.' So far as social and
economic regulations are concerned, however, the Court continues its
post-1937 practice of deference? This creates a problem for modem
progressives honest enough to confront it: how to justify the resulting
constitutional double standard. One possibility is to affirm the greater
intrinsic importance of personal rights, but this seems arbitrary. Another
justification-maintaining that in practice economic rights become
meaningless in a way that personal rights do not-probably has been
more helpful. It also is another influential basis for condemning the
Lochner Court.
As Laurence Tribe once maintained, "Lochner's downfall did not
represent a denigration of economic liberties but a recognition that such
liberties were not meaningfully protected by the 'free' market, at least for
those who were more its victims than its masters." '52 To Tribe, in other
words, the double standard is justified not because personal rights are
intrinsically superior, but because the exercise of economic rights tends
toward their suppression. The main way in which this is said to occur is
47. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726,729 (1963).
48. E.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 590
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
49. HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE
OF NATURAL RIGHTS 28 (1994).
50. See GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 491-583 (putting a discussion of the privacy cases inside
a chapter entitled "Substantive Due Process" and introducing it with a heading that begins "The
Revival of Substantive Due Process"). For a discussion of some little-known contemporary
applications of substantive due process, see Michael J. Phillips, The Nonprivacy Applications of
Substantive Due Process, 21 RUrGERS L.J. 537, 542-77 (1990).
51. See Phillips, supra note 50, at 544-46 and cases cited therein. But see BMW of N. Am. v.
Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (holding a grossly excessive punitive damages award unconstitutional).
This may be the first case since the 1930s to strike down government action involving an economic
matter on substantive due process grounds). See Phillips, supra note 41, at 1051-52 n.6.
52. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1374.
53. For another statement of what is essentially the same view, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
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through the superior bargaining power afforded by superior size and or-
ganization." Due to this superior power, "freedom of contract means the
freedom of the rich to impose terms."" And by invalidating progressive
social legislation whose aim was to rectify the imbalance, Lochner era
substantive due process ratified such exercises of private power.
Lochner, Adkins, Adair, and Coppage, which struck down legislation
designed to protect workers against the superior power of their employ-
ers, are obvious examples. Similarly, the old Court decisions striking
down price regulations and other consumer protection measures ratified
business power in other spheres.
3. Knowing and Willing Subservience to Business
The preceding argument--that Lochner era substantive due process
ratified private economic power-comes in two versions. The first says
that this consequence was the unintentional by-product of the Court's
belief in individual rights, limited government, facially neutral legisla-
tion, and the like. According to a 1951 biographer, for instance, the
problems with Justice George Sutherland's thinking were its excessively
abstract, speculative character, and its failure to focus upon the facts of
sociology and economics. The result was Sutherland's failure to see that
"when he talked of... freedom of contract, he was speaking of some-
thing that did not exist."' In much the same vein are suggestions that the
Lochner-era Justices decided the way they did because they grew up in a
simpler world where large corporations were few and laissez-faire there-
fore had meaning, or because of the socialization accompanying their
previous service as corporate lawyers.
But other characterizations of the old Court suggest less innocent
motives. During the 1920s, Alpheus Thomas Mason once remarked, the
Court "could be counted on to save the businessmen from the folly of
JURISPRUDENCE 63-64, 76-86, 147-60 (paperback ed. 1993). See also James L. Kainen, The
Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 87, 92 (1993) (capsulizing but not necessarily endorsing the same position).
54. See, e.g., WiLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 164-65 (1995); MELVIN 1. UROFSKY, A
MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 503 (1988).
55. WnI.AM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE
126 (1988).
56. JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE 241
(1951).
57. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 135-37 (1987)
(suggesting that Lochnerian decisions flowed partly from the Justices' attachment to the simpler
world of their youth, a world in which laissez-faire made sense); ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, THE
MODERN CORPORATE STATE 46 (1976) (quoting Justice Samuel F. Miller to the effect that years of
serving as counsel for the railroads and for other forms of associated capital naturally biased judges
to decide in their favor); UROFSKY, supra note 54, at 502 (asserting that the old Court's conservative
justices were "intellectual prisoners" of outdated formalistic, laissez-faire ideas).
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legislators."58 Robert McCloskey enlarged on this implicit suggestion that
the Lochner era justices knew what they were doing by characterizing
their decisions as "an unadorned endorsement of the strong and wealthy
at the expense of the weak and poor."59 Archibald Cox went still further
in 1987 when he asserted that "the Lochnerian decisions flowed partly
from the willful defense of wealth and power." Others seem to claim
that this was the sole motive for those decisions.6' As a dissenting writer
once summarized the consensus on this subject, "most standard histories
and accounts of the Court between the 1880s and 1940s assume a pro-
business, anti-labor bias on the part of the majority." 2 Such assertions,
however, seem less common in recent years than they were a generation
ago.
II. SUBSTANTIVE DuE PROCESS IN THE LOCHNER COuRT: 1902-1932
Each of the three criticisms just sketched depends heavily upon the
belief that Lochner era substantive due process was a potent weapon
against government regulation of social and economic matters. Surely the
severity of the charge that the old Court offended against original intent
and democratic values varies with the number of occasions on which it
did so. The same is true for claims that the Court intentionally or inad-
vertently ratified business power over workers, consumers, and other
natural persons. Today, it remains widely accepted that the Lochner
Court used due process to strike down substantive government action on
some two hundred occasions.63 No matter how one defines substantive
due process, however, the real number is significantly lower.'
58. MASON, supra note 8, at 40-41; see also UROFSKY, supra note 54, at 631 (noting that
during the 1920s the Court "did all it could to placate industry").
59. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRIsE, 1865-
1910, at 84 (1951).
60. Cox, supra note 57, at 135.
61. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 57, at 45-46 (positing that Lochner Court Justices knew
what they were doing and did not care).
62. Mary Cornelia Porter, That Commerce Shall be Free: A New Look at the Old Laissez-
Faire Court, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 135, 138-40 & nn.10-30; see also GILLMAN, supra note 53, at 3-4,
207-08 n.8 (providing other such sources).
63. "The substantive due process/freedom of contract theory reached its apogee in 1905 in
Lochner v. New York .... and for the next thirty years provided the rationale for the Court to strike
down nearly two hundred regulations." UROFSKY, supra note 54, at 501. See also GUNTHER, supra
note 12, at 445 (discussing nearly 200 regulations struck down during the Lochner era);
MCCLOSKEY, supra note 12, at 101 (citing an observer who estimated that 184 decisions between
1899 and 1937 invalidated state laws on the basis of either the due process or the equal protection
clauses); TRIBE, supra note 11, at 567 n.2 (estimating that the Court invalidated state or federal
regulations wholly or partially on due process grounds 197 times between 1899 and 1937). Except
for UROFSKY, these sources do not explicitly say that the 200 or so invalidations they mention
proceeded on substantive due process grounds. Because they occur within discussions of Lochner
era substantive due process, however, they are most naturally read as referring to cases of that kind.
For more on such claims and their genesis, see Phillips, supra note 41, at 1056-59.
64. See generally Phillips, supra note 41, at 1060-80. In that article, I found approximately
100 decisions that I characterized as peripheral, penumbral, or borderline applications of substantive
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Even if the absolute number of laws invalidated by Lochner era
substantive due process is less than advertised, there might be other rea-
sons for regarding it as a major check on progressive social legislation.
One of these, the deterrent effect of some decisions on legislatures'
willingness to enact such legislation, obviously is difficult to quantify.
But Justice Souter has implicitly suggested another test of Lochner era
substantive due process's impact: the stringency of the judicial scrutiny it
imposed. Although the Lochner line of cases "routinely invoked a correct
standard of constitutional arbitrariness review," he has recently written,
"they harbored the spirit of Dred Scott in their absolutist implementation
of the standard they espoused." As Souter's remark suggests, we cannot
determine the severity of Lochner era substantive due process review by
looking at the relatively lenient verbal standards the old Court applied,'
which do not at all resemble the rigorous review now employed when
government action restricts fundamental rights.67 Instead, we must ex-
amine the actual implementation of those standards. The obvious way to
do so, one would think, is to estimate the percentage of substantive due
process challenges that actually succeeded during the first third of the
century: the doctrine's kill ratio.
The present section tries to estimate this ratio. It concludes that
during the years 1902-1932, the Supreme Court decisions upholding
government action challenged on substantive due process grounds con-
siderably outnumbered those striking down such laws. I limit myself to
Supreme Court cases decided during the period 1902-1932 for three rea-
sons. The first is simply to make the article more manageable. The sec-
ond is that these years mark the Court tenure of substantive due process's
most illustrious critic, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The third rea-
son is that the years 1902-1932 approximate the period when Lochner
due process. See id. at 1080. These cases used due process to advance values associated with other
constitutional provisions. Examples include the early incorporation cases (most of which involved
the First Amendment), the many decisions striking down rate regulations and other orders imposed
on railroads and other businesses affected with a public interest (which mostly involved values
proper to the Takings Clause), and a host of tax cases involving federalism and burden-on-commerce
concerns.
The article also identified 55 cases that it considered "core" applications of substantive due
process. Id. at 1080. These decisions applied values-mainly, the command that government action
not be arbitrary or that it not offend rights of special importance-that have no evident home other
than due process. Examples include cases involving land use, civil remedies, taxation, price
regulation, entry restrictions, other miscellaneous economic regulations, employment, and personal
rights. The present article mainly discusses the second group of cases, while including decisions in
which the Court rejected the substantive due process challenge. But it also includes two categories
from the "peripheral" group: the cases involving rate decisions and other sovereign commands
directed at regulated industries.
65. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2279 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
66. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (stating that the challenged law must
have a direct relation to an appropriate and legitimate end).
67. E.g., Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268 (stating that laws infringing upon fundamental liberty
interests must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest).
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era substantive due process had its greatest impact. Very few laws were
struck down on that basis before 1902," and the doctrine lost much of its
punch after 1932.'
Lest there be any confusion on the point, this section limits itself to
substantive due process cases: decisions using the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to attack the substantive fair-
ness of government action." For the most part, the section ignores other
constitutional attacks on the challenged law (most often equal protection
challenges) that are contained within the same case or intertwined with
the substantive due process discussion. Furthermore, this section tries to
limit itself to cases that clearly proceed under due process and that use
68. The main such cases are: Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684 691-99
(1899) (using due process to strike down a state law ordering a railroad to sell certain tickets for a set
fee) overruled in part by Pennsylvania R.R. v. Towers, 245 U.S. 6 (1917); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S.
466, 522-50 (1898) (striking down railroad rates on combined due process/takings grounds)
overruled by Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline, 315 U.S. 575 (1942) (narrowing
Smyth to the point that it was no longer good law); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-93
(1897) (upholding state statute forbidding obtaining of marine insurance on in-state property from
any carrier not fully complying with state law). See also Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. v.
Minnesota ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n, 134 U.S. 418, 456-58 (1890); Phillips, supra note 41,
at 1050 n.4, 1052 n.6 (discussing Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry); cf. Duluth & Iron Range R.R.
v. St. Louis County, 179 U.S. 302, 304-05 (1900) (holding state law that deprived railroad of
consideration due under an earlier grant did not violate Contract Clause due to reserved right to
amend, but did offend equal protection and due process); Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193, 196-
204 (1899) (striking down on due process grounds a tax assessment against an out-of-state party
owning in-state property, where the assessment was for the amount by which the liability exceeded
the amount realized from the in-state property's sale); Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 275-97
(1898) (assessing costs of property's condemnation for road on a landowner whose land the road
crossed violates principle that the land must be specially benefitted by the activity the assessment
funds).
69. The most important successful post-1932 substantive due process challenges are:
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 603-18 (1936) (striking down a state
minimum wage law for women); Great N. Ry. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 145-53 (1936) (using pre-
Depression numbers to value claimant's property for tax purposes violates due process); Railroad
Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 346-61 (1935) (striking down provisions of the
Railroad Retirement Act on what are ostensibly Commerce Clause grounds, but in reality are
substantive due process grounds); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 533-36 (1933) (striking
down portion of chain store tax that imposed an additional tax on chains with stores in different
counties because it violates due process). Cf. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S.
55, 68-81 (1937) (holding that a gas proration order limiting production of a utility's wells violates
due process); Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 194-98 (1936) (holding that a state
law changing business's obligation to maintain a fund to pay shareholders violates due process and
the Contract Clause); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613, 618-23
(1935) (striking down on combined due process/takings grounds highway commission order making
pipeline company change its transmission lines without compensation); Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158, 161-63 (1933) (holding that a tax on out-of-state railroad
tank cars violates due process).
In addition, the Court struck down several state utility rate decisions after 1932. See West
Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 79, 80-83 (1935); West v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 668-80 (1935); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63,
67-77 (1935); Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 292 U.S. 398, 404-14 (1934);
Central Ky. Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 290 U.S. 264, 275 (1933).
70. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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due process to assess the substantive fairness of government action. The
Court did not verbally distinguish between procedural and substantive
due process during the Lochner era," and some of its due process deci-
sions are difficult to classify under these concepts. In the vast majority of
cases discussed and cited below, however, the Court used the term "due
process," identified some asserted deprivation of liberty or property, and
applied some kind of substantive review to the challenged law. In the
relatively few cases that did not explicitly rely on due process, the
Court's decision usually followed or resembled certain specific decisions
of the kind just described.
A. The Main Classes of Substantive Due Process Cases
During the Lochner era, the cases employing the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses to evaluate the substance of
government action were of various kinds. Many of these decisions used
due process to advance values that either are identified with other spe-
cific provisions of the Constitution, or at least are extraneous to due pro-
cess. Examples include decisions incorporating the First and Sixth
Amendments within Fourteenth Amendment due process, 2 as well as due
process cases employing Contract Clause reasoning, 3 fusing due process
and burden-on-commerce rationales,"4 and adopting Takings Clause
tests. 5 Except for the regulated industries cases discussed immediately
below, this article does not discuss situations where due process was
used to advance values whose real constitutional home is elsewhere.76
Instead, it focuses on decisions that promote values more or less intrinsic
71. Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of Livelihood, 82
KY. LJ. 397, 406 (1993) (explaining that no member of the Court used the phrase "procedural due
process" until 1934 or the phrase "substantive due process" until 1948). Of course, the Court granted
many procedural due process claims during the Lochner era. See Phillips, supra note 41, at 1062-63
& n.60.
72. E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 63-73 (1932) (involving the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707-23 (1931) (involving the First
Amendment freedom of the press); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-70 (1931) (involving
the First Amendment freedom of speech). For several other such cases, see Phillips, supra note 41, at
1065 n.68.
73. E.g., Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 441-48 (1932); Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v.
Oklahoma, 271 U.S. 303, 306-10 (1926). See Phillips, supra note 41, at 1066 n.70 (providing a fuller
list of such cases).
74. E.g., Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 216-20 (1925) (striking
down a state excise tax on foreign corporations), overruled by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274 (1977); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 249-62 (1911) (striking down a
state law forbidding foreign corporations from building pipelines across highways and using them to
transport natural gas outside the state); Phillips, supra note 41, at 1067 n.74 (presenting additional
cases on the blending of due process and burden-on-commerce theories).
75. See Delaware, Lackawanna, & W. R.R. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182, 193-95
(1928); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-16 (1922); Phillips, supra note 41, at
1065 n.65.
76. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text for additional examples of such cases.
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to due process: most importantly, the protection of liberty and property
against arbitrary government action.
1. Utility Rates and Utility Regulation
One reason why this article ignores the "incorporation" cases just
discussed is that, for the most part, these cases do not trigger the standard
criticisms of Lochner era substantive due process discussed earlier. But
one conspicuous exception to this generalization deserves discussion in
any treatment of the old Court's substantive due process decisions. This
is the sizable group of due process/takings cases assessing rates and other
regulations of railroads and other businesses affected with a public inter-
est.
In Munn v. Illinois,' decided in 1876, the Supreme Court upheld a
state law regulating the rates charged by grain elevators. 8 Munn can and
has been read as affirming that the states have considerable power to
regulate businesses "affected with a public interest."'  Among the busi-
nesses traditionally so classified are railroads, electric utilities, gas utili-
ties, street railways, telephone companies, and water utilities.' During
the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Court began to place some
substantive restrictions on the states' rate-making powers.' It did so un-
der due process tests containing a significant admixture of Takings
Clause criteria. 2 This process culminated in the Court's 1898 decision in
77. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
78. Munn, 94 U.S. at 135-36.
79. See id. at 125-36. For further discussion of Munn and the affected-with-a-public-interest
doctrine, see Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE LJ. 1089 (1930); Breck
P. McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HARv. L. REv. 759
(1930). Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531-39 (1934), is generally regarded as marking the
doctrine's demise. See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 38, at 82-83.
80. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 156. See also Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus.
Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 534-40 (1923) (containing Chief Justice Taft's attempt to define the classes
of businesses affected with a public interest).
81. See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy
over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REv. 187, 199-223 (1984).
82. For example, three 1890s decisions quoted with approval Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116
U.S. 307, 331 (1886), in which the Court declared the states' inability to "do that which in law
amounts to a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, or without due
process of law." Covington & L. Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 593 (1896); Reagan v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 398 (1894); Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. v.
Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 456 (1890). In Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), discussed below, one
of the Court's inquiries was whether the challenged rates were "so unreasonably low as to deprive
the carrier of its property without such compensation as the Constitution secures, and therefore
without due process of law." Id. at 526.
In 1897, moreover, the Court explicitly made it a violation of Fourteenth Amendment due
process for a state to take property without just compensation. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897), as interpreted by ELY, supra note 7, at 91. Whether
this amounts to the Takings Clause's incorporation within Fourteenth Amendment due process is
unclear. On the conceptual confusion between substantive due process and the Takings Clause
around this time, see JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-
1910, at 104 (1995) [hereinafter ELY, CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE FULLER].
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Smyth v. Ames,"3 which affirmed judicial power to review the reasonable-
ness of rate regulations while striking down the challenged railroad rates
on combined due process-takings grounds."
For the forty-odd years following Smyth v. Ames," Christopher
Wolfe once observed, the Court "became a kind of Super-Railroad-Rate-
Commission" that was "knee-deep in the business of setting railroad
rates." Wolfe exaggerated only slightly; indeed, the Court's mandate
extended beyond railroad rates to include water, gas, electric, and tele-
phone rates, as well as street railway fares. Until the early 1940s, it used
due process to strike down rate decisions that denied railroads and vari-
ous public utilities a reasonable rate of return; the theory was that by
undercompensating these businesses for the use of their property, exces-
sively low rates deprived them of that property without just compensa-
tion.'
In order to make such determinations, the Court had to both value
the company's property and establish a fair rate of return on that value.'
On slightly over thirty occasions during the period 1902-1932, it held or
assumed that state or federal rate orders took property without due proc-
ess." This compares with a bit more than half as many decisions up-
holding rate orders.'
83. 169 U.S. 466,522-50 (1898).
84. Ames, 169 U.S. at 522-50.
85. The style of review set in motion by Smyth v. Ames is generally regarded as having ended
with Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). See, e.g., ELY, supra
note 7, at 130; PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 38, at 98-99.
86. CHISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REvIEw 151 (1986).
87. "The established principle is that ... the due process clauses . . . safeguard private
property against a taking for public use without just compensation .... [W]here by legislation
prescribing rates or charges the use of the property is taken, just compensation assured by these
constitutional provisions is a reasonable rate of return upon that value." West v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662,671 (1935).
88. See, e.g., PIERCE & GEa.LiORN, supra note 38, at 95-98.
89. Railroad Comrn'n v. Maxcy, 282 U.S. 249, 250-51 (1931) (water rates); United Rys. &
Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 249-54 (1930) (street railway rates); Denny v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co. 276 U.S. 97, 101-04 (1928) (telephone rates); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Public
Utils. Comm'n, 274 U.S. 344, 350-52 (1927) (railroad rates); Ottinger v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co.,
272 U.S. 579, 580-81 (1926) (gas rates); McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 410-21
(1926) (water rates); Patterson v. Mobile Gas Co., 271 U.S. 131, 134-35 (1926) (gas rates); Board of
Pub. Util. Comm'rs v. New York Tel. Co., 271 U.S. 23, 31-32 (1926) (telephone rates); Smith v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 590-92 (1926) (telephone rates); Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268
U.S. 413, 419-25 (1925) (street railway fares); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Department of Pub. Works, 268
U.S. 39, 42-45 (1925) (railroad rates); Ohio Utils. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 267 U.S. 359, 362-
64 (1925) (railroad rates); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403,
405-16 (1924) (gas rights); Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262
U.S. 679, 684-95 (1923) (water rights); Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 287-89 (1923) (telephone rates); Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262
U.S. 43, 50-51 (1923) (telephone rates); City of Paducah v. Paducah Ry., 261 U.S. 267, 275 (1923)
(electric street car fares); City of Houston v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 259 U.S. 318, 321-25
(1922) (telephone rates); Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U.S. 165, 174-78 (1922) (gas rates);
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Also struck down as unconstitutional deprivations of property dur-
ing the Lochner era were sovereign commands that a regulated firm un-
dertake some burdensome or expensive act without compensation. For
example, in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska,' the Court con-
sidered a due process challenge to a Nebraska statute requiring that, at a
grain elevator's request but at its own expense, a railroad must construct
and maintain a side track to the elevator.' Writing for a seven-two Court
majority striking down the statute, Justice Holmes93 first observed that it
forced the railroad to incur expenses without compensation and therefore
took the railroad's property. Then, after admitting that the states can re-
strict property rights under the police power, Holmes declared that "there
are constitutional limits to what can be required of [railroad] owners un-
Vandalia R.R. v. Schnull, 255 U.S. 113, 118-22 (1921) (railroad rates); Groesbeck v. Duluth, S.
Shore & Ad. Ry., 250 U.S. 607, 611-15 (1919) (railroad rates); Detroit United Ry., v. City of
Detroit, 248 U.S. 429, 434-37 (1919) (street railway fares); City & County of Denver v. Denver
Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178, 185-94 (1919) (water rates); Rowland v. Boyle, 244 U.S. 106, 107-
11 (1917) (railroad rates); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Conley, 236 U.S. 605, 608-14 (1915) (railroad
rates); Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota ex rel. McCue, 236 U.S. 585, 595-605 (1915) (railroad
rates); San Joaquin & King's River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. County of Stanislaus, 233 U.S. 454,
458-61 (1914) (water rates); The Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 474, 507-09 (1913) (railroad rates);
The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 433-73 (1913) (railroad rates); see also Chicago, Rock
Island, & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 96-100 (1931) (striking down ICC order regarding
charges for switching cars between railroads); City of San Antonio v. San Antonio Pub. Serv. Co.,
255 U.S. 547, 555-58 (1921) (assuming confiscatory nature of rates and holding that government
and utility had not made contract on this subject); Southern Iowa Elec. Co. v. City of Chariton, 255
U.S. 539, 542 (1921) (stating that confiscatory rates "cannot be enforced unless they are secured by
a contract obligation"). For some additional rate cases occuring before and after the 1902-1932
period, see supra note 69.
90. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 275 U.S. 440, 446-48 (1928) (insurance rates); Lincoln Gas &
Elec. Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256, 266-69 (1919) (gas rates); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Towers, 245 U.S. 6, 8-17 (1917) (railroad rates); Damell v. Edwards, 244 U.S. 564, 568-70 (1917)
(railroad rates); Newark Natural Gas & Fuel Co. v. City of Newark, 242 U.S. 405, 407-09 (1917)
(gas rates); Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 157, 162-73 (1915) (gas
rates); Wood v. Vandalia R.R., 231 U.S. 1, 3-8 (1913) (railroad rates); Mayor & Alderman of
Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1, 6-7, 15-19 (1909) (water rates); Seaboard Air Line
Ry. v. Florida ex rel. Ellis, 203 U.S. 261,268-70 (1906) (railroad rates); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Florida ex rel. Ellis, 203 U.S. 256, 259-60 (1906) (railroad rates); County of Stanislaus v. San
Joaquin & King's River Canal & Irrigation Co., 192 U.S. 201, 213-17 (1904) (water rates); San
Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439, 441-47 (1903) (water rates); Minneapolis & St.
Louis R.R. v. Minnesota, 186 U.S. 257, 264-69 (1902) (railroad rates); see also Oklahoma Natural
Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 258 U.S. 234, 237-39 (1922) (holding commission order reducing gas bills
due to gas company's poor service does not violate due process); Producers' Transp. Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 251 U.S. 228, 229-32 (1920) (holding oil pipeline is devoted to public use and hence state
can regulate its rates); Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U.S. 372, 374-77
(1919) (rejecting a consumer's challenge to a commission order raising electric rates); cf. The New
England Div. Case, 261 U.S. 184, 195-96 (1923) (upholding ICC regulation of railroad rates);
O'Keefe v. United States, 240 U.S. 294,304 (1916) (upholding ICC regulation of railroad rates).
91. 217 U.S. 196 (1910).
92. Missouri Pac. Ry., 217 U.S. at 205-08.
93. For a brief summary of the many cases in which Holmes participated in Lochner Court
decisions striking down government action on substantive due process grounds, see Phillips, supra
note 41, at 1083-86. On Holmes's progressive reputation, see G. Edward White, The Canonization of
Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 576 (1995).
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der either the police power or any other ostensible justification for taking
such property away.""9 In fact, he continued, the statute would offend due
process even if it applied only when a grain elevator made a reasonable
demand for a side track." This, Holmes said, "still ... requires too much.
Why should the railroads pay for what, after all, are private connections?
We see no reason." During the years 1902 to 1932, the Court struck
down twelve other laws of this kind on due process grounds.97 But here,
unlike the rate cases, the decisions upholding such laws were over twice
as numerous. Many such cases involved commission orders," somewhat
94. Missouri Pac. Ry., 217 U.S. at 206.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 207.
97. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. v. Holmberg, 282 U.S. 162, 166-67 (1930)
(striking down order that railroad install underground pass to connect two portions of farmer's farm);
Great N. Ry. v. Cahill, 253 U.S. 71, 73-77 (1920) (striking down order for railroad to install scales at
its stockyard); Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 396, 398-400 (1920) (striking
down order to operate narrow-gauge railroad at a loss); City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas &
Elec. Corp., 251 U.S. 32, 37-40 (1919) (striking down order that electric company remove its poles
and property so that city could build its own system); Mississippi R.R. Comm'n v. Mobile & Ohio
R.R., 244 U.S. 388, 393-96 (1917) (striking down order that financially distressed railroad restore
six passenger trains to service); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S.
491, 497-502 (1915) (striking down statute requiring that railroad not let down upper berth in
sleeping cars before berth actually sold); Great N. Ry. v. Minnesota ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse
Comm'n, 238 U.S. 340, 345-47 (1915) (striking down order for railroad to install scale at its
stockyards); South Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. v. City of Covington, 235 U.S. 537, 548-49
(1915) (striking down regulation that temperature of railroad cars never should fall below 50
degrees); Washington ex rel. Oregon R.R. & Navigation v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 527-33 (1912)
(striking down order that tracks of competing railroads be connected at various points); Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Central Stock Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132, 143-45 (1909) (striking down
constitutional provision compelling railroad to deliver cars to, and accept cars from, other railroads);
Cleveland Elec. Ry. v. City of Cleveland, 204 U.S. 116, 142 (1907) (striking down compelled
transfer of street railway's rails, poles, and appliances to another street railway after termination of
first railway's franchise); see also Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 235-41 (1904)
(striking down arbitrary ordinance forbidding construction of gas works that city previously granted
company right to build). For one such case occurring after 1932, see Thompson v. Consolidated Gas
Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 68-81 (1937).
98. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 283 U.S. 380, 394-97 (1931)
(upholding state commission order requiring interstate railroads to build passenger station in Los
Angeles); New York ex rel. Woodhaven Gaslight Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 269 U.S. 244, 245-
46, 248-49 (1925) (upholding commission order requiring gas company to extend its service to new
territories); Western & At. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 267 U.S. 493, 496-98 (1925) (upholding
commission order requiring railroad to continue to furnish switching service to a shipper on an
established industrial siding); Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bourland, 267 U.S. 330, 332-33
(1925) (upholding city commission's refusal to allow street railway to abandon part of one of its
lines); United States v. New River Co., 265 U.S. 533, 542 (1924) (upholding ICC order regarding
distribution of coal from mines by carriers); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 265 U.S.
70, 74-75 (1924) (upholding commission order requiring railroad to furnish facilities for shippers,
including a crossing, at a siding); Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 249 U.S. 422, 424-
25 (1919) (upholding commission order requiring railroad to restore a siding); Chicago & N.W. Ry.
v. Ochs, 249 U.S. 416, 418-22 (1919) (upholding commission order requiring railroad to alter and
extend a side track to a manufacturing plant); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minneapolis
Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1918) (upholding commission order that two
railroads owning a third railroad charge shippers the same rates over the third railroad's tracks that
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fewer concerned ordinances,w and in a relatively small number a statute's
constitutionality was at issue."
they charge over their own tracks); New York ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245
U.S. 345, 348-51 (1917) (upholding commission order requiring gas company to extend its service
area; procedural and substantive due process); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 242
U.S. 603, 606-08 (1917) (upholding order that railroad begin passenger service on a branch line);
Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Geary, 239 U.S. 277, 280-83 (1915) (upholding commission order to railroad to
double track a portion of its line); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Michigan R.R. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 615,
630-34 (1915) (upholding commission order that two railroads physically connect their tracks);
Wadley S. Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651, 658-59 (1915) (upholding commission order requiring
railroad to cease demanding prepayment from one carrier, but not from another); Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Iowa, 233 U.S. 334, 344-45 (1914) (upholding commission order
requiring railroad to accept coal cars from other railroads and transport them as directed); Grand
Trunk Ry. v. Michigan R.R. Comm'n, 231 U.S. 457, 463-73 (1913) (upholding commission order
that interstate railroads use their intracity tracks for the interchange of intrastate traffic); Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Kansas ex reL Taylor, 216 U.S. 262, 273-83 (1910) (upholding commission order that
railroad institute passenger service between two points); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. North Carolina
Corp. Comm'n, 206 U.S. 1, 19-27 (1907) (upholding railroad commission order that railroad arrange
through service between two points); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage
Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 581-95 (1906) (upholding drainage commission order that railroad remove
bridge over stream); New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Comm'n, 197 U.S. 453, 460-62 (1905)
(upholding drainage commission order that gas company change location of gas pipes to
accommodate a new drainage system).
99. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682, 686-87 (1930)
(upholding ordinance requiring street railway to remove viaduct and construct double tracks across
railroad tracks); Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. White, 278 U.S. 456, 458-60 (1929)
(upholding ordinance requiring railway to keep a flagman on duty on every street crossed by its
tracks); Sullivan v. City of Shreveport, 251 U.S. 169, 171-73 (1919) (upholding ordinance requiring
that street cars be operated by a motor-man and a conductor); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of
Sacramento, 251 U.S. 22, 25-26 (1919) (upholding ordinance requiring street railway to sprinkle
streets near its tracks); Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. City & County of Denver, 250 U.S. 241,
243-45 (1919) (upholding ordinance requiring railroad to remove track crossing crowded city
thoroughfare); Columbus Ry., Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus, 249 U.S. 399, 407-14 (1919)
(upholding ordinance requiring street railway to continue to operate at unremunerative rates for
which it had previously contracted with city); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. City of Omaha, 235 U.S. 121,
127-31 (1914) (upholding ordinance requiring that railroad construct viaduct over streets); Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 555-62 (1914) (upholding ordinance regulating
trains and their tracks within a municipality); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. City of
Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430, 437-42 (1914) (upholding city's condemnation of a portion of railroad
right-of-way and compelling railroad to build a bridge over that portion at its own expense, without
compensating railroad); Detroit United Ry. v. City of Detroit, 229 U.S. 39, 45-46 (1913) (upholding
ordinance compelling street railway to remove its tracks and property from the streets upon city's
failure to renew franchise); West Chicago St. R.R. v. Illinois ex rel. City of Chicago, 201 U.S. 506,
522-27 (1906) (upholding ordinance requiring street railway to lower tunnel beneath a river).
100. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 254-56 (1931) (upholding state statutes
regulating the size of freight train and switching crews); Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Board
of Improvement, 274 U.S. 387, 390-91 (1927) (upholding state statute requiring that street railway
pave street between its tracks); Great N. Ry. v. Minnesota ex rel. Village of Clara City, 246 U.S.
434, 436-39 (1918) (upholding state statute requiring railroad to construct sidewalk across right of
way); St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & S. Ry. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1916) (upholding state
statute requiring full switching crews on railroads exceeding 100 miles in length); Chicago & Alton
R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 76-78 (1915) (upholding state statute requiring outlets for water
across rights of way); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Minnesota ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse
Comm'n, 193 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1904) (upholding state statute requiring railroads to establish stations
at all villages and boroughs on their roads).
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2. Liability and Damages
In addition to the regulations just discussed, the states often sub-
jected railroads and other carriers to enhanced civil liability and damages
for injuries and other losses connected with the services they provided.
Such statutes occasionally came under substantive due process attack
during the first quarter of this century. On five occasions, the Court
struck down the challenged measure. ' In St. Louis, Iron Mountain, &
Southern Railway Co. v. Wynne,'" for instance, a unanimous Court re-
jected an Arkansas statute imposing double liability plus attorney's fees
on railroads that refused a demand for compensation for the killing of
livestock. 3 The law, it said, was an arbitrary exercise of government
power and a denial of due process because, by imposing onerous penal-
ties for a railroad's refusal to pay extravagant demands, it deprived the
railroad of property merely because it exercised an undoubted right.'" As
if to signal the Court's ambivalence about these provisions, though, it
distinguished Wynne two years later in a case involving the same Arkan-
sas statute. 5 The Court also upheld a few other state laws imposing spe-
cial liability and/or damages on railroads'" and other businesses.'" In two
101. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35, 46-48 (1922) (striking
down a statute allowing recovery of attorney's fees against carrier upon appeal, under certain
circumstances); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1914) (striking
down a statute imposing double liability on a railroad unless it pays the full judgment within 60 days
from notice); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Kennedy, 232 U.S. 626, 627 (1914) (following
Polt); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340, 346-51 (1913) (striking down civil liquidated
damages provision for violating rate schedule for shipping petroleum products); St. Louis, Iron
Mountain & S. Ry. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354, 358-61 (1912) (striking down a statute giving double
liablity plus attorney's fees to owner of livestock allegedly killed by railroad, if railroad refused
demand for compensation).
102. 224 U.S. 354(1912).
103. Wynne, 224 U.S. at 359-61.
104. Id. at 359-60.
105. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Anderson, 233 U.S. 325 (1914). The basis of the distinction was that
in Wynne, the plaintiff initially recovered less than the amount of his demand and then was awarded
over twice this amount under the statute. Id. at 328. This meant that Wynne only held the statute
unconstitutional under the facts presented there. Id. at 329-30.
106. Southern Ry. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 320-22 (1922) (upholding state law requiring
railroads to pay or reject claims for loss or damage to freight within 90 days, or else suffer liability
for such claims); St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & S. Ry. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919)
(upholding as not arbitrary or unreasonable a state statute imposing civil penalties on railroads
whose passenger fees exceed those set by state law); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Glenn, 239 U.S.
388, 392-94 (1915) (upholding state statute making shipping carrier liable for certain damage to
shipped property even if the loss occurred while the goods were under another carrier's control,
where the defendant had tried to contract out of this liability); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson
Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 218-20 (1912) (upholding state law penalizing common carriers for
failing to settle claims for lost or damaged freight within a reasonable time period, the penalty being
in addition to actual damages).
107. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 114-17 (1927) (upholding a state
law allowing imposition of punitive damages against employers for deaths caused by the negligence
of their employees); Eiger v. Garrity, 246 U.S. 97, 102-04 (1918) (upholding a state statute allowing
wife whose means of support is damaged by sale of liquor to her husband to recover against tavern,
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of these cases, liability was imposed even though the defendant had tried
to contractually disclaim it."
In their remedial aspects, the preceding cases bear some resem-
blance to the Court's recent decision in BMW of North America v.
Gore," where it used due process to strike down a $2 million state puni-
tive damages award on what looked like substantive grounds."0 But while
most liability and damages determinations probably deserve to be called
substantive, the same may not be true of another matter that sometimes
preoccupied the old Court: evidentiary presumptions. On the one hand,
the evidentiary nature of these presumptions suggests procedure."' But
the old Court used a rational basis test to determine whether they satisfy
due process,"2 and such means-ends tests normally are a tool for substan-
tive evaluation. In any event, the Court struck down at least two pre-
sumptions during the Lochner era,"3 while upholding a slightly greater
number.""
3. The Tax Cases
In addition to the "incorporation" cases discussed earlier,"5 state tax
legislation gave rise to another group of decisions in which the Lochner
Court used due process to advance values whose original constitutional
home is elsewhere. At least one of these tax cases basically was a Con-
and creating a lien against the owner of the premises to enforce the judgment); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406, 421 (1910) (validating a state statute imposing
liability for misdelivery of telegram); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 67-70
(1910) (finding constitutional a state statute criminalizing the cutting of timber on state lands and
imposing multiple damages therefor, even if the cutting was involuntary); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111-12 (1909) (affirming penalties for a violation of state antitrust statute).
108. Glenn, 239 U.S. at 391; Western Union, 218 U.S. at 408.
109. 116S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
110. In Gore, Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court did not use the terms "procedural due
process" or "substantive due process." However, by basing the decision on the state's failure to
provide fair notice about the penalties BMW could expect for its behavior, Stevens might be thought
to have been applying the former. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1598. But the criteria he used to determine
whether the state provided such notice belie this assumption. These criteria were: (1) the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm
suffered by the claimant and the size of the punitive damages award; and (3) the size of the award
compared to state civil penalties in comparable cases. Id. at 1598-1603. These criteria appear to be
substantive, and the Court did little to explain how the state's failure to meet the first and second of
them amounted to inadequate notice. Even if the state had given BMW all the notice in the world,
furthermore, it still might have violated due process under these criteria. As if to underline these
points, both dissents in Gore characterized the Court's opinion as an application of substantive due
process. Id. at 1611 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1617 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
111. Indeed, one of these cases explicitly stated that the presumption in question involved a rle
of evidence rather than a substantive right. Reitler v. Harris, 223 U.S. 437 , 441-42 (1912).
112. See Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 5 (1929) (stating that a factual presumption "is valid if
there is a rational connection between what is proved and what is to be inferred").
113. Western & Atl. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639,642-44(1929); Manley, 279 U.S. at 5-7.
114. Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88, 93-95 (1928); Reitler, 223 U.S. at 441-42; Mobile, Jackson,
& Kansas City R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35,42-44 (1910).
115. See supra notes 72-74, 77-92 and accompanying text.
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tract Clause decision,"' several more essentially used burden-on-
commerce analysis,'1 and a much larger group involved more general
federalism-related concerns."' Like their earlier counterparts, these cases
are of no concern to this article. Instead, I emphasize the many Lochner
era tax decisions that advance notions of fairness either intrinsic to due
process (e.g., nonarbitrariness), or at least not readily derivable from
some other constitutional provision.
Perhaps the largest group of such cases involved the assessments
made by state laws apportioning the costs of public improvements among
the private landowners most benefited by those improvements. As the
Court declared in a 1924 case,"9 the states may require that the cost of a
local public improvement be distributed over the lands particularly bene-
116. Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582, 595-606 (1931) (holding that the application of an estate
tax to a succession under a trust created before passage of the tax violates due process and the
Contract Clause). This article does not consider cases upholding state tax laws that were challenged
on due process/Contract Clause grounds.
117. The cases striking down state tax laws on this basis generally involved state taxation of
foreign corporations. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460, 464-67 (1929) (striking down a
filing fee and license tax for out-of-state corporations); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v.
Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 216-20 (1925) (invalidating a state excise tax on out-of-state
corporations); Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 67-70 (1920) (striking down'a tax on out-of-state
businesses); Union Tank Line v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275, 282-86 (1919) (holding invalid a tax on
railroad's rolling stock used in state); International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135, 142-
45 (1918) (striking down an excise tax on out-of-state corporations); Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S.
178, 187-91 (1917) (invalidating permit charges and franchise tax on foreign corporations); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 18-48 (1910) (striking down a law
conditioning out-of-state corporation's doing business on its paying a charter fee based on some
percentage of its authorized capital).
118. These cases mainly involved state power to tax out-of-state property, income, and
activities. As Benjamin Wright once remarked, they concerned "what is essentially one phase of
federalism.. . the relationship between state and state, or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say,
between state and property located in other states." WRiGrr, supra note 1,3, at 160. For a list of the
Lochner Court cases striking down state tax laws on these grounds, see Phillips, supra note 41, at
1067-68 & n.76. Impressionistically, I would say that the old Court's decisions upholding such laws
against such challenges outnumber the 23 cases cited in that note.
The article also does not consider a related group of cases with perhaps a greater claim to be
classified as substantive due process decisions. To a greater or lesser extent, each seems to resemble
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-93 (1897) (striking down a state statute forbidding the
obtaining of marine insurance on in-state property from any carrier that had not complied with state
law). See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426, 433-36 (1926) (striking down a state
law that forbade any state-authorized insurance company from paying anyone not so authorized to
place insurance on in-state risks); St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 348-49
(1922) (invalidating a state statute that imposed a five percent tax on monies paid to insure in-state
property through an insurer that was not registered to do business within the state); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 367-77 (1918) (discussing Allgeyer while holding that a state
statute regarding insurance policies with unpaid premiums could not constitutionally control a
contract made out-of-state which asserted that it would be governed by another state's law). Tafoya
and St. Louis Cotton Compress apparently did not employ due process; the statute in Dodge,
however, was attacked on the theory that it denied freedom of contract. Dodge, 246 U.S. at 377. For
some related cases that also concern the permissible extraterritorial reach of state power, see Phillips,
supra note 41, at 1064 & n.63.
119. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Road Improvement Dist. No. 3,266 U.S. 379 (1924).
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fited thereby; and may make this distribution according to the property
value, the geographic area, or the benefits involved.2' "Only where the
legislative determination is palpably arbitrary, and therefore a plain
abuse of power," the Court continued, "can it be said to offend the due
process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 2 ' The main abuse
presented by the three cases in which the Court struck down such as-
sessments over the period 1902-1932 was the imposition of liability on
landowners who either did not benefit from the improvement, or did not
benefit in proper proportion to their tax burden.'22 But the Court upheld at
least twice as many assessments during this period.' 3
The old Court also upheld various other state tax measures despite
claims that they offended due process. Some of these cases involved is-
sues of valuation or of property's susceptibility to taxation, 4 two in-
120. Kansas City S. Ry., 266 U.S. at 386.
121. Id.
122. See Standard Pipe Line Co. v. Miller County Highway & Bridge Dist., 277 U.S. 160, 161-
63 (1928) (declaring an assessment arbitrary because claimant received relatively little benefit from
the road financed by the assessment); Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 274 U.S.
188, 189-95 (1927) (concluding that amount assessed against railroad for road paralleling its tracks
exceeds benefit railroad received from the road); Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 239 U.S.
478, 479-85 (1916) (holding that a drainage district's taxation of claimant's land was
unconstitutional because that land did not benefit from the district's undertakings).
123. See Memphis & Charleston Ry. v. Pace, 282 U.S. 241, 246-49 (1931) (sustaining a road
tax's application to a railroad having part of its line and other property within the road district);
Kansas City S. Ry., 266 U.S. at 386-89 (upholding road assessment because, inter alia, benefits to
property owner may be matter of forecast and estimate, so long as not speculative); House v. Road
Improvement Dist. No. 2, 266 U.S. 175, 177-78 (1924) (rejecting as without merit a claim that an
assessment was arbitrary because the improvement could not benefit the claimant's lands, while
lands that were benefited were not assessed); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Western Crawford Rd.
Improvement Dist., 266 U.S. 187, 189-90 (1924) (holding that apportionment of expenses associated
with discontinued road improvement district not invalid because it was based on assessed value of
property rather than benefit to property); Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 260-67
(1915) (upholding a tax on landowners within drainage district despite various substantive
objections); Phillip Wagner, Inc. v. Leser, 239 U.S. 207, 215-20 (1915) (rejecting challenges to an
assessment against landowners for resurfacing of highway); Briscoe v. Rudolph, 221 U.S. 547, 549-
51 (1911) (upholding against various substantive arguments assessment against property owner for
benefits from extension of District of Columbia street; syllabus suggests claims based on procedural
and substantive due process).
124. Salomon v. State Tax Comm'n, 278 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1929) (holding methods of valuing
contingent remainder in inheritance tax are consistent with due process); Baker v. Druesedow, 263
U.S. 137, 140 (1923) (holding that due process does not prevent state from taxing railroad's
intangible property, or from ascertaining property's value by subtracting value of tangible property
from value of all property); Southern Ry. v. Watts, 260 U.S. 519, 527-28 (1923) (rejecting claim that
valuations made in administration of state property tax violate due process; case seems to involve
mixture of procedural and substantive claims); Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576, 587-90 (1914)
(stating that a levy on intrastate earnings of railroads does not deny due process on theory that
privilege tax cannot exceed value of privilege, because tax only caused hardship in isolated cases);
Paddell v. City of New York, 211 U.S. 446, 448-51 (1908) (holding that land subject to mortgage
can be taxed at full value).
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volved gasoline taxes,' one considered whether the challenged tax was
for a public purpose,' 26 and (like many of the assessments for improve-
ments) one concerned a claim that those subject to the tax did not benefit
from it.'" During the late 1920s and early 1930s, however, the old Court
struck down five federal tax provisions on due process grounds. Three
involved presumptions," one concerned a gift tax,2 9 and another assessed
against a husband a tax based on his income plus his wife's income."
Earlier, though, it had upheld a few miscellaneous federal tax
provisions.'
4. General Police Measures
The tax decisions excepted, most of the cases discussed thus far
involve applications of the police power. The police power, of course, is
the states' power to regulate to protect the public health, safety, morals,
and welfare. This section considers due process challenges to laws that
claim justification under one of these desiderata, and that do not fit
within one of the specific applications of the police power discussed in
other sections. The Lochner Court rejected over thirty such challenges
during the period 1902-1932, and granted relatively few.
One way to argue against the accusation that most Lochner era jus-
tices were knowing tools of business is to maintain that instead they were
across-the-board libertarians concerned with protecting both economic
and noneconomic rights. For example, the Bill of Rights' incorporation
within Fourteenth Amendment due process got its start during the 1920s,
the same decade in which substantive due process's kill ratio reached its
125. Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137, 138-39 (1924) (upholding law requiring gas
stations to collect gas tax); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642, 649 (1921) (holding that
excise tax on sale of gasoline does not offend due process as applied to domestic sales).
126. Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217, 220-25 (1917) (holding that a tax to create
municipal coal and fuel yard for sale to city's inhabitants is for a public purpose and therefore does
not violate due process).
127. Knights v. Jackson, 260 U.S. 12, 14-15 (1922) (rejecting claim that state's income tax
distribution to cities for increases in teacher salaries violated due process because it imposed a public
charge upon a special class of property and on persons not specially benefited by the resulting
outlay).
128. Handy v. Delaware Trust Co., 285 U.S. 352, 354-55 (1932); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S.
312, 322-29 (1932); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 239-40 (1926).
129. Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440,445-46 (1928).
130. Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206,214-18 (1931).
131. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 138-39 (1929) (noting that graduation and
exemption schemes in federal gift tax are consistent with due process); Barclay & Co. v. Edwards,
267 U.S. 442, 447-51 (1924) (holding that taxation of certain foreign corporations differently from
their U.S. counterparts in federal income tax does not violate the Fifth Amendment); La Belle Iron
Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392-94 (1921) (finding no arbitrary discrimination and no
violation of Fifth Amendment due process in provisions of federal excess profits tax). None of these
cases formally incorporated equal protection standards within Fifth Amendment due process.
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peak.'32 More importantly, the 1920s witnessed two important substantive
due process decisions involving noneconomic rights. Meyer v.
Nebraska'" and Pierce v. Society of Sisters'"6 affirmed and protected par-
ents' substantive due process right to control the upbringing and educa-
tion of their children.' In Meyer, moreover, Justice McReynolds defined
due process liberty in broad terms:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God ac-
cording to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.16
During the modem era, Meyer and Pierce provided some support and
inspiration for the modem constitutional right of privacy.'
37
But while this aspect of Lochner era substantive due process de-
serves emphasis, the old Court was not a consistent defender of "per-
sonal" or "lifestyle" rights during the first third of the century. This is
most evident in its substantive due process decisions regarding the regu-
lation of alcohol, where it invariably bowed to the Prohibition era zeit-
geist. ' Also displaying an antilibertarian spirit were four old Court deci-
sions that upheld state laws requiring able bodied men to work on public
132. See supra notes 9, 72-75 and accompanying text. However, one might say that the
incorporation process really began around the turn of the century with the inclusion of Takings
Clause standards within Fourteenth Amendment due process. See supra note 82.
133. 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923) (striking down a state statute that forbade the teaching of
any subject in any language besides English in both public and private schools, and that also forbade
the teaching of any such language as a language to any student who had not completed the eighth
grade); see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 409-11 (1923) (striking down several similar statutes
on the authority of Meyer).
134. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down a state law requiring that all students between
the ages of eight and 16 attend a public school).
135. In Pierce, the Court said that "[ulnder the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it
entirely plain that the [law at issue] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35
(citation omitted). Actually, though, Justice McReynolds's Meyer opinion emphasized a panoply of
rights, including a language teacher's right to teach a particular language to children, the parents'
right to retain him to do so, a pupil's right to acquire knowledge, and the parents' right to control
their child's education. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-01.
136. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
137. E.g., GuNTHER, supra note 12, at 446, 491-92.
138. See Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304, 306-08 (1917) (upholding a state statute forbidding,
inter alia, the personal possession of liquor); James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242
U.S. 311, 319-20 (1917) (upholding a state prohibition law that, inter alia, forbade the importation
of liquor by carriers); Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 700, 706-07 (1914) (upholding a local option
law regarding the sale of liquor within a county against various claims that it deprived brewers and
merchants of various property rights); Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 199-205
(1912) (upholding state statute forbidding the sale of malt liquor).
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roads,' 9 banning fraternities in state schools,'" prohibiting billiard halls,''
and attacking gambling.' 2 Last but hardly least, we have Buck v. Bell,'
in which six Justices joined Justice Holmes's opinion upholding a state
statute that permitted the sterilization of certain mental defectives.'"
As the term might be defined today, I suppose, the preceding deci-
sions are anything but progressive. At the time they were decided, how-
ever, these cases attracted few objections from progressive heroes such
as Holmes and Brandeis.' 5 The same pattern of deference continues
when we move from cases involving traditional morality to those con-
cemed with health and safety. Indeed, one of these decisions upheld the
challenged law despite the majority's apparent disbelief in its health ra-
tionale. In Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City and County of San Francisco,'"
the Court considered a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to an ordinance
forbidding burial of the dead within a city and its surrounding county. 7
The challenger's main argument in this apparent substantive due process
case was that the law's asserted health rationale lacked scientific support
and was based on superstition." Without ever challenging the substance
of this argument, however, Justice Holmes's opinion for a unanimous
Court upheld the ordinance. It did so partly on grounds of deference to
the legislature.' 9 Furthermore, Holmes opined, "[tiradition and the habits
of the community count for more than logic.""
It is hardly surprising that Holmes would write as he did in Laurel
Hill. More interesting for present purposes is the fact that eight other
justices joined his highly deferential opinion. And if the old Court was
prepared to uphold laws whose health and safety rationale was feeble, we
should not be surprised that it routinely rejected substantive due process
challenges where that rationale was stronger. In at least three cases, for
example, the Court upheld laws requiring particular methods for dispos-
139. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 329, 333 (1916).
140. Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589, 593-97 (1915).
141. Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623,628-30 (1912).
142. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 224-25 (1905). Among other things, this law allowed the
loser of a wager to recover his loss from the winner. To enforce any judgment received, moreover,
the law gave the loser a lien against the winner's property and also against the building in which the
wager occurred (if the owner knowingly permitted gambling to occur there). Id. at 216-17.
143. 274 U.S. 200(1927).
144. The law was challenged on both due process and equal protection grounds. Buck, 274 U.S.
at 205. The substantive due process discussion occurs near the conclusion of Justice Holmes's
opinion. Id. at 207.
145. Of the cases cited supra in notes 138-43, the only dissent by Holmes or Brandeis was
James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311, 332 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
146. 216 U.S. 358 (1910).
147. Laurel Hill Cemetery, 216 U.S. at 364-66.
148. id. at 364-65.
149. Id. at 365.
150. Id. at 366.
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ing of garbage and other waste.'"' In two others, it upheld laws regulating
the storage of flammable fluids.' Other unsuccessful challenges to
health and safety measures involved laws requiring vaccination,' in-
demnifying property owners for damages from mobs and riots,'4 requir-
ing that toll roads be kept in repair,' requiring electric headlights on
trains,'" forbidding the emission of dense smoke in certain areas of a
city,'" and requiring that diseased trees be cut down.' 8
As the last example suggests, the health and safety cases shade off
by degrees into a series of cases regulating the use of land to promote
aesthetic or quality of life values. Here too the old Court invariably up-
held the challenged regulations. The laws in question restricted or limited
the locale of activities such as the erection or maintenance of stables,' 9
the herding and grazing of sheep,'" the manufacture of bricks,'6 ' and the
placement of billboards.' 2 A somewhat distinguishable trio of cases up-
held laws aimed at the conservation of resources such as natural gas,' 3
mineral waters containing carbonic gas,"6 and the supply of game.' 5
151. Hutchinson v. City of Valdosta, 227 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1913) (upholding an ordinance
requiring people near sewer lines to install water closets and to connect with the sewer); Gardner v.
Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 330-33 (1905) (rejecting a challenge to an ordinance requiring all
occupants of buildings to place waste in a suitable watertight vessel and to place it where it could be
picked up, and letting the city give some party the exclusive right to collect the waste); California
Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 317-25 (1905) (upholding an ordinance
requiring the cremation of garbage and refuse at a designated place).
152. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 279 U.S. 582, 586 (1929); Pierce Oil Corp. v. City
of Hope, 248 U.S. 498, 499-501 (1919).
153. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12-13, 37-39 (1905).
154. City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313,321-22 (1911).
155. Norfolk & Suburban Turnpike Co. v. Virginia, 225 U.S. 264,270-71 (1912).
156. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280, 287-89 (1914).
157. Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486, 489-92 (1916).
158. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277-81 (1928).
159. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 172, 177-80 (1915) (upholding an
ordinance forbidding livery stables within certain parts of a city); Fischer v. City of St. Louis, 194
U.S. 361, 362, 372 (1904) (rejecting a challenge to an ordinance forbidding erection of cow stables
and dairies).
160. Bown v. Walling, 204 U.S. 320, 320-21 (1907); Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 314, 317
(1907).
161. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 407-12 (1915) (upholding a law prohibiting the
manufacture of bricks within certain areas).
162. Thomas Cusak Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 529-31 (1917). This case did not
specifically use the words due process, but it did distinguish Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S.
137 (1912), which was a substantive due process case. Thomas Cusak Co., 242 U.S. at 531.
163. Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 309-10, 323-24 (1920) (upholding a statute
forbidding, inter alia, various uses of natural gas without its heat being fully utilized).
164. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 76-78 (1911) (rejecting a challenge to
a statute regulating the pumping of mineral waters containing an excess of carbonic gas with the aim
of selling such gas as a separate commodity; aim of law is to preserve the common pool).
165. New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 36-37, 40 (1908) (upholding a statute
prohibiting the possession of game during the closed season for such game, as applied to game killed
in England).
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Some of the previous cases might better be described as land-use
decisions. In any event, the old Court's substantive due process cases
included a number of decisions which clearly deserve that label. Here,
the Court sometimes used due process to strike down the regulation. In
two of these cases, the offending law effectively gave one set of private
landowners control over the uses to which others' land could be put, did
so in a fairly standardless fashion, and bore no obvious relation to any
police-power purpose. Eubank v. City of Richmond"M struck down an
ordinance requiring that, at the request of two-thirds of the property
owners on a street, the city set a specified building line on that street.'6"
And Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge" invalidated
an ordinance conditioning construction of a home for the aged poor on
the consent of two-thirds of the property owners living within four hun-
dred feet of the planned home."M Involving much the same themes was
Buchanan v. Warley,"70 where the Court struck down an ordinance whose
practical effect was to block the sale of a house to a black person if over
half the property owners on the block were white.'7
Given decisions like these, one might expect that the old Court
would take a dim view of zoning. But its 1926 decision in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 2 which upheld various portions of a subur-
ban zoning ordinance against a due process challenge, showed
otherwise.' To be sure, Justice Sutherland's opinion for a six to three
Court majority said that clearly arbitrary zoning provisions-those with-
out a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare-would be invalidated."" And two years later, in Nectow v. City
of Cambridge,' the Court did strike down one classification within a
generally valid zoning scheme.' 6 One year earlier, however, it had up-
held two land-use regulations on the authority of Euclid.'" Five years
before Euclid, finally, it also had upheld wartime rent regulations in two
acrimonious five to four decisions.'
166. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
167. Eubank, 226 U.S. at 143-44.
168. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
169. Roberge, 278 U.S. at 120-23.
170. 245 U.S. 60(1917).
171. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 73-82. The relevant portion of the ordinance made it unlawful for
any black person to move into and occupy any house located in any block in which the majority of
homes are owned by white people.
172. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
173. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384-95.
174. Id. at 395.
175. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
176. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187-89.
177. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 610 (1927) (upholding a setback provision); Zahn v. Board
of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927) (upholding a zoning ordinance).
178. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 154-58 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman,
256 U.S. 170, 197-99 (1921).
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5. The Regulation of Business and Trade
In addition to the cases just discussed, the Lochner Court also up-
held a few general police power measures that are less easily
categorized.'" More importantly, cases involving some of the specific
police power purposes that organized the previous section can be classed
in other ways. Truck weight limits,8 for example, may be regarded as
public safety measures, or as regulations of business. Some measures that
are intended to promote the public health, furthermore, might also be
called consumer protection laws. During the period 1902-1932, the Court
sustained at least three consumer protection regulations against substan-
tive due process attacks.'8 ' In Weaver v. Palmer Brothers,'2 however, it
struck down a state law banning the use of "shoddy" in mattresses, pil-
lows, bolsters, feather beds, upholstered furniture, and so forth.'83 It did
so in part because the law could not be defended as a health measure.'"
Sometimes the public health might be promoted by labelling laws
requiring disclosure of the ingredients contained in food products. In a
1919 case, for instance, the Court upheld a state statute that mandated the
labelling of syrups and a description of their ingredients on the label.'
But some consumer disclosure laws mainly promote buyers' economic
interests, and the old Court upheld several measures of this kind as well.
Despite those laws' anticompetitive potential,'" for example, it rejected a
few substantive due process challenges to state antideception measures
requiring that products be described (or not described) in certain ways.'7
However, the old Court was less consistent in its treatment of laws regu-
179. Ten-ace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 216-18 (1923) (upholding a statute preventing aliens
who have not declared intention to become a U.S. citizen from taking or holding interests in land);
Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1920) (allowing a license fee for dog owners); Western
Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1907) (permitting a statute that prevented, with
some exceptions, places of public entertainment from forbidding entry to those over 21).
180. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1932) (upholding weight limits for trucks
against a due process attack).
181. Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158, 161-64 (1918) (upholding the validity of a law
requiring inspection of gasoline and illuminating oil before sale); Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446,
451-53 (1915) (upholding a law forbidding sale of food preservatives containing boric acid); Adams
v. City of Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572, 582-84 (1913) (upholding a portion of an ordinance regulating
the sale of milk that required nonconforming milk to be confiscated, forfeited, and destroyed).
182. 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
183. Weaver, 270 U.S. at 409, 412-15. "Shoddy is any material which has been spun into yam,
knit, or woven into fabric, and subsequently cut up, torn up, broken up, or ground up." Id.
184. Id. at 414.
185. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427,431 (1919).
186. Laws restricting or regulating the sale of oleo, for instance, may well benefit producers of
butter. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 53, at 73-75.
187. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, 242 U.S. 153, 157-60 (1916) (upholding a state law
forbidding sale of "ice cream" that does not contain a certain percentage of butter fat); Capital City
Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U.S. 238, 245-47 (1902) (upholding a law allowing manufacture and sale of
oleo so long as it was free of any coloring or ingredients that would make it appear to be butter); see
also Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 38-43 (1907) (rejecting a challenge to a state statute
forbidding, inter alia, sale of merchandise bearing representation of the American flag).
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lating the packaging of consumer products. After upholding three such
measures approximately a decade earlier," in 1924 it struck down a state
statute regulating the weights at which bread loaves could be sold.'
Another way for government to protect consumers is to. directly
regulate the substantive terms of consumer contracts. Here, as one might
expect, the Lochner Court was more apt to strike down the challenged
regulation. As noted earlier, relatively few of its cases invalidating gov-
emment regulation expressly did so on the ground that the law restricted
freedom of contract.'" Nonetheless, several can be regarded as freedom
of contract cases in substance. The main examples are three well known
1920s decisions striking down laws fixing the prices of consumer goods
or services-Tyson & Brother v. Banton,'9' Ribnik v. McBride," and
Williams v. Standard Oil Co. 3 Technically, each involved a deprivation
of property, with one presenting a denial of contractual liberty as well.'
During roughly the same period that the Court decided Tyson, Ribnik,
and Williams, however, it sustained two federal price fixing measures
against due process attacks.'95 It also upheld a state law directly regulat-
ing a contract's nonprice terms. In Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v.
Jackson,'" the Court considered a measure giving purchasers of harvest-
ing and threshing machinery a reasonable time for inspection and a war-
ranty of fitness for the machinery's purposes, and forbidding disclaimers
of this implied warranty.'" After stating some bromides about freedom of
contract and its importance, ' Justice Butler's opinion for the Court up-
held the measure in terms almost indistinguishable from those used by
contemporary liberal judges. '
188. Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510, 511, 516-17 (1916) (upholding a state law
requiring that lard be sold in containers holding a specified number of pounds, or whole multiples
thereof); Schmidinger v. City of Chicago, 226 U.S. 578, 584-85, 590 (1913) (upholding a state law
regulating sizes of bread loaves for sale); House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270, 277, 282-85 (1911)
(upholding a state law requiring grain traders to sell at actual weight).
189. Jay Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504,513-17 (1924).
190. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
191. 273 U.S. 418, 429-45 (1927) (striking down a state law regulating the resale price of
theater tickets).
192. 277 U.S. 350, 355-59 (1928) (invalidating a state law regulating the fees charged by
employment agencies).
193. 278 U.S. 235,239-45 (1929) (striking down a state law fixing the retail price of gasoline).
194. Williams, 278 U.S. at 239 (property); Ribnik, 277 U.S. at 358 (property and freedom of
contract); Tyson, 273 U.S. at 429 ("[Rjight of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be
sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself....").
195. Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 431, 437-39 (1930) (upholding
the regulation of fees and prices under the Packers and Stockyards Act); Highland v. Russell Car &
Snowplow Co., 279 U.S. 253,258-62 (1929) (upholding federal price fixing during World War I).
196. 287 U.S. 283 (1932).
197. Jackson, 287 U.S. at 287.
198. Id. at 288.
199. See id. at 289-91 (justifying the need for this particular consumer protection measure).
[Vol. 75:2
19981 LOCHNER COURT PROGRESSIVENESS
Tyson, Ribnik, and Williams all proceeded on the theory that the
states lack the power to regulate prices for businesses not affected with a
public interest." ° Insurance, on the other hand, had long been regarded as
a business so affected." In part for this reason, the old Court upheld sev-
eral different regulations on the subject. These included a law regulating
the impact of misrepresentations in life insurance applications, " a meas-
ure penalizing insurers that collude to fix rates 3 a statute ensuring the
insurer's continued liability despite the insured's insolvency,"' a provi-
sion compelling arbitration of policy disputes,' and a law making insur-
ance contracts for hail loss take effect twenty-four hours after the appli-
cation.' The Court also upheld two statutes requiring that certain busi-
nesses insure.'" Although banking probably never attained "affected with
a public interest" status," the old Court generally rejected substantive
due process challenges to regulation of that industry. The main examples
are Noble State Bank v. Haskell' and two companion cases," ' in which
the Court upheld laws charging banks a fee to create guaranty funds for
their customers."'
Pushing the category of consumer protection to its furthest exten-
sion are three Lochner era cases upholding regulations of the securities
200. See Williams, 278 U.S. at 239-40; Ribnik, 277 U.S. at 355-58; Tyson, 273 U.S. at 430-31.
On the affected-with-a-public-interest doctrine, see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
201. The leading case is German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 405-18 (1914).
202. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 249, 252-55 (1906) (upholding a
statute saying that no misrepresentation in a life insurance application is material, or can void the
contract, unless the matter misrepresented contributed to the contingency insured against;
intertwined equal protection and due process challenges).
203. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307, 313, 315-19 (1911) (upholding a statute
allowing insured to recover twenty-five percent of covered loss from insurer connected with a tariff
association that fixed rates).
204. Merchants Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Smart, 267 U.S. 126, 128-30 (1925) (upholding a
statute saying that, in auto insurance contracts, the insurer remains liable dispite the insured's
insolvency or bankruptcy).
205. Hardware Dealers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 157-59 (1931)
(upholding a statute compelling arbitration where the parties cannot agree on the loss payable under
a fire insurance policy, and imposing an arbitration clause in the standard fire policy).
206. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71,73-77 (1922).
207. Hedge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335, 336-37 (1932)
(upholding a law requiring that auto rental companies pay license fees on vehicles and insure against
their negligent operation); Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 145 (1924) (finding valid a law
requiring that taxi companies be insured).
208. During his exhaustive 1923 attempt to make sense of the affected-with-a-public-interest
doctrine, Chief Justice Taft cited as one example of its application Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
U.S. 104 (1911), a banking case. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S.
522, 535 (1923). But I do not read Noble State Bank as specifically reaching this conclusion.
209. 219 U.S. 104, 110-13 (1911) (upholding a law imposing one percent fee on bank deposits
to establish fund to pay for protection of customers of failing banks).
210. Assaria State Bank v. Dolley, 219 U.S. 121 (1911); Shallenberger v. First State Bank, 219
U.S. 114(1911).
211. Assaria State Bank, 219 U.S. at 125-27; Noble, 219 U.S. at 113; Shallenberger, 219 U.S.
at 120.
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industry against substantive due process attacks.22 These laws involved
bans on practices-futures contracts and stock purchases on margin-
that hardly any legislature would think to prohibit today. Advertising is
another area in which the old Court's treatment of government regulation
was more deferential than contemporary beliefs would lead one to ex-
pect. Today, of course, government regulation of commercial speech is
subjected to a fairly stringent form of intermediate First Amendment
scrutiny. 3 During the Lochner era, however, the Court applied little
more than rigorous rational-basis review while upholding two laws re-
stricting commercial advertising."' Even though the First Amendment
had already been incorporated within Fourteenth Amendment due proc-
ess by the time one of these cases was decided,2 ' both were more or less
normal Lochner-era substantive due process decisions that did not in-
volve the free speech guarantee.
By now, we have moved away from laws best characterized as con-
sumer protection measures, and toward measures ordinarily regarded as
government regulation of business. Relatively clear examples of Lochner
Court decisions upholding the latter include two cases involving lien
laws, 16 two more concerning the regulation of bulk sales,27 and several
involving miscellaneous business matters.2 8 A more common kind of
212. Broadnax v. Missouri, 219 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1911) (upholding a state statute forbidding
maintenance of any place where futures contracts traded); Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608-10
(1903) (upholding a state constitutional provision voiding all margin sales of, and futures contracts
for, corporate stock, as applied to margin sales); Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425, 428-32 (1902)
(rejecting a challenge to a state statute criminalizing and voiding certain options and futures
contracts).
213. See, e.g., 44Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1505-08 (1996).
214. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1932) (dismissing a substantive due process
challenge to a state law forbidding tobacco advertising on billboards, street car signs, and placards,
because the subject was within the police power, an evil existed, and the means for its suppression
were appropriate); Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. City of New York, 221 U.S. 467, 481-83 (1911) (finding
that the prohibition of advertising on buses is within the police power); cf. supra note 162 and
accompanying text (citing a case involving limitations on the placement of billboards).
215. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
216. Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285, 290 (1924) (upholding
a statute creating lien against future wages of judgment debtor); Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v.
Jones, 193 U.S. 532, 548-50 (1904) (finding a state mechanics' lien law to be valid).
217. Kidd, Dater & Price Co. v. Musselman Grocer Co., 217 U.S. 461, 471-74 (1910)
(following Lemieux). Lemieux v. Young, 211 U.S. 489, 494-96 (1909) (upholding a state law
requiring notice of sale of a merchant's entire stock-in-trade).
218. James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 123-24 (1927) (upholding a
statute expanding fraud liability to include not only misrepresentations regarding past or existing
facts, but also false promises); Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R.R. v. United States, 231 U.S. 363,
369-70 (1913) (addressing a federal law forbidding railroads from transporting their own property in
interstate commerce, unless the property was necessary for their business as common carriers);
Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260, 266-69 (1912) (upholding a state statute forbidding junk
dealers from buying wire or copper used by a railroad, telephone or telegraph company, without first
determining that the seller had a right to sell); Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225, 232-35
(1911) (rejecting a challenge to a state law restricting certain assignments of wages by employees);
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business regulation during the years 1902-1932, albeit one with its con-
sumer protection aspects, was state antitrust regulation. In this area as in
many others, the old Court tended to defer to the legislature, rejecting
due process attacks on five of the six measures it considered."9 And the
lone antitrust law that it struck down was decided on narrow grounds. In
Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota,m the Court considered a state law
forbidding price discrimination between localities in dairies' purchase of
milk products.' Because the law forbade price discrimination irrespec-
tive of motive, the Court said, it lacked a reasonable relation to the pre-
vention of predatory bidding and thus violated due process." This leads
one to believe that the Court would have upheld an earlier version of the
statute that did require an anticompetitive purpose.
6. Restrictions on Entry
Sometimes states pursue their consumer protection mission by ban-
ning a particular trade, industry, or line of commerce. Such laws obvi-
ously interfere with the right to pursue a trade, profession, or business.
On much that same basis, the Lochner Court's 1917 decision in Adams v.
Tannerm struck down Washington's virtual ban on employment agen-
cies. Another way that the states sometimes try to protect consumers-
and restrict the right to pursue an occupation-is by banning the sale of
particular products by particular parties. The old Court upheld at least
one of these laws against a substantive due process challenge." '
The most common limitations on occupational freedom the old
Court encountered, however, were not outright bans on the pursuit of
some business, but limitations or restrictions on entry to it. Entry restric-
tions take several forms, but perhaps the most common is the familiar
Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.S. 302, 308-11 (1910) (upholding a Philippine law forbidding
the exportation of silver coins from the Islands).
219. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157, 162 (1912) (upholding a state statute
forbidding price discrimination in sale of commodities); Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217
U.S. 433, 441-43 (1910) (rejecting a due process challenge to a state antitrust law); National Cotton
Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 127-30 (1905) (upholding a state antitrust law); Smiley v. Kansas,
196 U.S. 447, 453-57 (1905) (upholding a state antitrust law); Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194,
203-05 (1904) (allowing a statute forbidding combinations for the purpose of willfully or
maliciously injuring another in his occupation or business). But cf. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley
Tobacco Growers' Coop. Mktg. Ass'n, 276 U.S. 71, 89-97 (1928) (upholding a state cooperative
marketing act with what perhaps are some anticompetitive features).
220. 274 U.S. 1 (1927).
221. Fairmont Creamery Co., 274 U.S. at 3.
222. Id. at 8-9.
223. 244 U.S. 590 (1917). The law struck down in Adams was a state initiative making it
unlawful for employment agencies to receive fees from people seeking employment, in return for
furnishing those people with employment or with information leading thereto. Id. at 592-97.
224. Baccus v. Louisiana, 232 U.S. 334, 337-38 (1914) (addressing a state law forbidding the
sale of drugs by itinerant vendors).
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phenomenon of occupational licensing.2" The Lochner Court sustained a
wide variety of licensing laws and their functional equivalents against
several different constitutional attacks during the 1902-1932 period. 6
Only four of these cases look like clear applications of substantive due
process. '7 Several more, however, may be best characterized in that
fashion.22
But while the old Court almost invariably upheld occupational li-
censing laws that prevented individuals from pursuing some trade or
profession, it was much tougher on other kinds of entry restrictions. New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann2" and Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge2' are
the two best known examples." The old Court also struck down three
state trucking laws converting private carriers into public carriers and
thereby subjecting them to much more extensive requirements for doing
business, "2 while upholding one such law.233 It also struck down two other
225. The old Court upheld a related restriction on occupational freedom, a license tax, in three
substantive due process cases decided in 1916. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 363-
67 (1916); Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369, 381-86 (1916) (following Rast); Pitney v. Washington,
240 U.S. 387, 390-91 (1917) (following Rast and Tanner).
226. See Michael J. Phillips, Entry Restrictions in the Lochner Court, 4 GEo. MASON L. REv.
405,431-34 (1996).
227. Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 426-29 (1926) (upholding dentistry licensing); La
Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1919) (involving insurance brokerage); Payne v.
Kansas ex rel. Brewster, 248 U.S. 112, 112-13 (1918) (upholding restriction on the sale of farm
produce on commission); McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1917) (involving
optometry).
228. See Weller v. New York, 268 U.S. 319,324-25 (1925) (conducting a substantive review of
law requiring license to resell theater tickets, but not clearly due process review); Merchants' Exch.
v. Missouri ex rel. Barker, 248 U.S. 365, 367-68 (1919) (conducting a substantive review of law
forbidding weighing of grain at public warehouses by anyone except authorized and bonded state
weigher, but making no clear reference to due process); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S.
568, 590 (1917) (following Hall); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 564-68
(1917) (following Hal); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550-52 (1917) (substantively
reviewing a law requiring license for securities brokers, but making no clear reference to due
process); Lehon v. City of Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53, 54-55 (1916) (applying substantive review in a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge to an ordinance limiting entry to the position of private detective);
Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340, 343-44 (1916) (applying substantive review in a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to a licensing scheme for employment agencies); Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S.
288, 295-97 (1912) (applying substantive review in a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a law
limiting entry to the practice of osteopathy); Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1911)
(applying substantive review in a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a licensing law for private
banking, with a separate equal protection discussion).
229, 285 U.S. 262, 273-80 (1932) (striking down a state law limiting access to the ice
business).
230. 278 U.S. 105, 111-14 (1928) (invalidating a state law essentially requiring that every
pharmacy or drug store going into business after the law's passage be wholly owned by a licensed
pharmacist or pharmacists).
231. For more on these two cases, see Phillips, supra note 226, at 438-41, 443-47 and infra
notes 297-304 and accompanying text.
232. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 563 (1931); Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583,
592-99 (1926); Michigan Pub. Utils. Comn'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1925). For more on
these cases, the other constitutional issues they presented, and some other cases presenting those
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measures that impeded freedom of occupation. In Smith v. Texas,"' the
Court invalidated a state statute making it a misdemeanor to serve as a
freight train conductor without having previously served for two years as
a brakeman on freight trains.23 In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,' it sustained
a due process attack by Chinese businesspeople on a Philippine statute
making it illegal to keep business accounts in any language other than
English, Spanish, or a local dialect. "7
7. Employment
Among the cases commonly cited as representative of Lochner era
substantive due process,238 those involving regulation of the employment
relationship loom large. These decisions include Lochner itself,239 Muller
v. Oregon," Bunting v. Oregon,"4 ' Adair v. United States,""2 Coppage v.
Kansas,"3 and Adkins v. Children's Hospital.'"
These cases are supplemented by several related 1902-1932 deci-
sions-some fairly well known and some less so. In addition to Muller,
the old Court rejected due process attacks on at least four other state laws
setting maximum hours for women.2 ' As for wages, the Court followed
issues, see Phillips, supra note 226, at 435-38. Common carriers undertake to carry all persons or
their goods, while private carriers undertake to carry particular people or particular goods on
particular occasions.
233. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 265-69 (1932).
234. 233 U.S. 630 (1914).
235. Smith, 233 U.S. at 636-39. This case found the law unconstitutional on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds without specifying a specific provision, but indicating that life, liberty,
property, and equal protection are closely related. Id. at 636.
236. 271 U.S. 500 (1926).
237. Yu Cong Eng, 271 U.S. at 524-27.
238. See supra notes 12-41 and accompanying text.
239. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-64 (1905) (striking down a maximum-hours law
for bakery employees).
240. 208 U.S. 412, 417-23 (1908) (upholding a state maximum hours law for women).
241. 243 U.S. 426, 434-39 (1917) (upholding a state maximum hours law for factory workers).
Bunting often is read as overruling Lochner sub silentio. E.g., CuRRIE, supra note 9, at 103.
242. 208 U.S. 161, 172-76 (1908) (striking down a federal law that forbade the firing of
railroad workers due to their union affiliation).
243. 236 U.S. 1, 8-20 (1915) (rejecting a state statute banning yellow dog contracts). Yellow
dog contracts make membership in a union a condition of a worker's employment.
244. 261 U.S. 525, 545-62 (1923) (overturning a District of Columbia minimum wage law for
women and children).-Six years before Adkins was decided, a per curiam decision by an equally
divided Court had affirmed lower court decisions upholding minimum wage laws. Stettler v. O'Hara,
243 U.S. 629 (1917).
245. Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 392-94 (1915) (reviewing an eight hour daily
maximum for women, as applied to graduate nurses in hospitals); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373,
379-82 (1915) (evaluating statutory limitations of an eight hour day for women in a wide range of
occupations); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671, 679-81 (1914) (reviewing a ten hour daily limit
for women working in manufacturing or mechanical establishments). See also Hawley v. Walker,
232 U.S. 718 (1914) (upholding a maximum hours law for women on the authority of Muller v.
Oregon).
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Adkins in two cases decided before 1933 and one thereafter.2" In the
same year that it decided Adkins, furthermore, the Court overturned por-
tions of a state industrial relations act empowering a state body to set pay
rates and other terms of employment in businesses the state deemed af-
fected with a public interest. 7 Roughly complementing the Court's less
than fervid embrace of organized labor in Adair and Coppage, finally, is
a 1921 decision striking down one application of a state statute limiting
the use of injunctions and restraining orders in labor disputes.2"
The three main themes that emerge from the preceding discussion
are the old Court's occasional willingness to invalidate legislation bene-
fitting unions, its general tendency to uphold maximum-hours laws (es-
pecially for women), and its hard line against regulation of wages. In
part, at least, the last of these themes reflected the old Court's view that
the price paid for goods or services is central to any contract.2 9 Thus, as
Justice Sutherland observed in Adkins,' the Court was willing to sustain
laws prescribing the character, methods, and time for the payment of
wages, because such laws were aimed at abuses such as fraud rather than
at the substance of the deal." As Sutherland also observed, the Court had
upheld statutes regulating wages and other matters in public works con-
tracts, basing those rulings on "the right of the government to prescribe
the conditions upon which it will permit work of a public character to be
done for it."'"
246. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 603-18 (1936); Donham v. West-
Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927); Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925).
247. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 534-44(1923); see
also Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 289-91 (1924) (accepting Charles Wolff Packing Co. while
declining to decide whether a provision of the act at issue there was separable from it, and returning
the case to the state for a decision on this issue); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus.
Relations, 267 U.S. 552, 566-69 (1925) (striking down a maximum-hours provision contained in a
writ of mandamus issued by a state supreme court following the first Charles Wolff Packing Co.
case's return to that court).
248. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). In this case, the state law was applied to permit
union picketing and handbilling that libelled a restaurant owner and threatened injury to his
customers. Id. at 327-30.
249. E.g., Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553-54 (stating that the amount of wages to be paid and received
is "at the heart" of a labor contract).
250. Id. at 547.
251. See Rail & River Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U.S. 338, 349-55 (1915) (upholding a state law
requiring that coal miners' pay be based, generally speaking, on car loads of coal they produced);
Erie R.R. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685, 699-704 (1914) (rejecting a challenge to a state law requiring
that railroads pay their employees semi-monthly in cash); McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 545-
51 (1909) (upholding a state law requiring that, for payment purposes, coal produced by miners be
weighed as it comes from the mine, and before it is passed over a screen).
252. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 547; see Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1915) (allowing a
state law giving citizens a preference over aliens in employment on public works); Crane v. New
York, 239 U.S. 195, 198 (1915) (a companion case to Heim); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 219-24
(1903) (upholding a state law regulating wages and hours of workers employed by municipal paving
contractors); cf. Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 254-56 (1907) (upholding a federal statute
LOCHNER COURT PROGRESSIVENESS
Of course, the Lochner Court also was willing to sustain employ-
ment regulations with some reasonable link to worker health and safety.
The asserted absence of such a link doomed the maximum-hours law at
issue in Lochner," and beliefs about women's special susceptibility to
the trials of industrial labor helped justify maximum-hours laws for their
protection.' The Court also upheld state laws on health, safety, and gen-
eral welfare grounds, forbidding the employment of children below six-
teen in certain hazardous occupations," prohibiting the night time em-
ployment of women in restaurants located in large cities, " regulating the
width of entries to coal mines," and requiring coal mines to maintain
wash houses for their employees at the request of twenty or more work-
ers."o Fitting roughly within this category, finally, are two decisions up-
holding state laws that required employers to grant requests by departing
employees for a letter stating the particulars of their employment and the
reasons for their leaving the job."9
The most important Lochner Court substantive due process cases
regarding workers' health, safety, and welfare--cases rarely noted in
standard treatments of the subject-are its many decisions upholding
workers' compensation laws and other measures regulating employee
recovery for on the job injuries. In two 1911 decisions, the Court upheld
federal and state laws that prevented employer and employee from con-
tracting out of the former's statutorily created liability for on-the-job
injuries.2" Six years later, in New York Central Railroad v. White 6' and
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,2"2 it rejected substantive due proc-
ess challenges to workers' compensation laws for hazardous employ-
limiting the hours worked by federal workers or employees of federal contractors to eight per day;
decided on authority of Atkin without mentioning due process).
253. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58-61 (1905).
254. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908).
255. Sturges & Bum Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320,325-26 (1913).
256. Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 293-95 (1924).
257. Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1913); cf. Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton,
205 U.S. 60, 70-74 (1907) (upholding as consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment a state law
requiring licensure of mine managers and examiners and making mine liable for their willful failure
to furnish a reasonably safe place for workers).
258. Booth v. Indiana, 237 U.S. 391, 395-97 (1915).
259. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 534-36 (1922); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac.
Ry. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 548, 555-56 (1922).
260. Second Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1911) (upholding provision of federal
law covering railroads' liability for their employees' on-the-job injuries that voids any contract by
which employer tries to eliminate its liability under the act); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 563-73 (1911) (upholding provision of state law governing railroads'
liability for their employees' workplace injuries that prevented any contract of insurance relief,
benefit, or indemnity between employer and employee from operating as a defense to the statutory
liability); see also Bowersock v. Smith, 243 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1917) (holding that a state statute
making employer liable for failure to properly guard manufacturing equipment does not violate due
process as applied to employee who had contracted with the employer to provide the safeguards
whose absence caused his death).
261. 243 U.S. 188, 196-208 (1917).
262. 243 U.S. 219, 235-46 (1917).
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ments that contained many of the features found in contemporary laws of
this kind-for example, strict liability; the elimination of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant rule as employer
defenses; and a statutory scheme of damage recoveries.263 The old Court's
subsequent decisions sustaining workers' compensation provisions con-
cerned matters such as employee recoveries, ' other parties eligible for
recovery, '5 the industries covered by the act, " scope-of-employment
questions,' the operation of elective systems," and the fees attorneys
could charge clients.269
B. Summarizing the Results
As Warren observed in his 1913 article, successful due process at-
tacks on government action were much more likely to involve "private
rights of property" than "social justice legislation."" Included within
Warren's first category are utility rate decisions and other deprivations of
utility property."' If we omit these two classes from the Court's 1902-
1932 substantive due process decisions, the ratio of unsuccessful to suc-
cessful challenges is somewhat below four to one. If in addition we
eliminate the cases involving civil liability, remedies, presumptions, and
taxation," the ratio is about four and a half to one. And if we limit our-
263. The Court also upheld a similar measure in 1919. See Arizona Employers' Liability Cases,
250 U.S. 400, 420-31 (1919). Later, on grounds resembling those it used to sustain similar state
laws, the Court upheld the substantive and remedial provisions of the federal Longshoreman's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act against a due process attack. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
41-42 (1932).
264. New York Cent. R.R. v. Bianc, 250 U.S. 596, 600-03 (1919) (rejecting employer's claim
that employee recovery for disfigurement deprives employer of property without due process).
265. New York State Rys. v. Shuler, 265 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1924) (upholding law requiring
that, when employee dies without beneficiaries, employer must make contribution to state workers'
compensation fund); R.E. Sheehan Co. v. Shuler, 265 U.S. 371, 376-78 (1924) (involving same facts
and resulting in indentical holding as Shuler); Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499, 500-04 (1923) (finding no violation of due process for otherwise-valid
workers' compensation law requiring that compensation for accidental death be paid to employee's
nonresident alien dependents). See also Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 281
U.S. 98, 106-08 (1930) (upholding a portion of the law at issue in New York State Rys. and Sheehan
Co. which required that the employer be indemnified by a third party against whom the employee
had recovered outside workers' compensation).
266. Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503, 510-16 (1922) (upholding the extension of the law
at issue in White to most occupations in which four or more workers are employed).
267. Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158-59 (1928); Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 422-26 (1923). Both cases upheld workers' compensation recoveries
where the employees were killed while going to work.
268. Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 155, 162-63 (1919) (finding that an
employee was not deprived of liberty and property without due process when state law required him
to accept workers' compensation at his employer's election).
269. Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540, 541 (1925) (upholding a state law restricting the fees
attorneys could charge clients in workers' compensation cases).
270. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 4; see also supra notes 77-100 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 101 -31 and accompanying text.
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selves to the decisions contemporary critics of Lochner era substantive
due process emphasize-general police matters, regulation of business
and trade, and employment law 73-the ratio exceeds five to one. For the
employment cases alone, finally, the ratio was between three and four to
one."" Going some way toward explaining these figures is the Court's
decided tendency to uphold two overlapping categories of laws: health
and safety regulations and consumer protection measures."'
Within the entire collection of 1902-1932 substantive due process
cases just discussed, on the other hand, the ratio of unsuccessful to suc-
cessful challenges is just below two and a half to one. As the preceding
discussion suggests, this lower ratio mainly reflects the Court's greater
propensity to accept substantive due process challenges in "property
rights" cases than in "social justice" cases. For example, decisions over-
turning utility rate orders, where the old Court probably struck down
more rulings than it upheld,' comprised over one-third of the successful
substantive due process challenges during the years 1902-1932. Also
contributing to the lower overall ratio are the decisions involving regu-
latory orders directed at utilities, remedial provisions, tax laws, and entry
restrictions, where the Court. struck down significant percentages of the
laws it considered. 7 Still other contributors to the overall figure fall
within the categories where the ratio of unsuccessful to successful chal-
lenges was four or five to one. These include the cases involving mini-
mum wage laws, laws benefitting organized labor, price regulations, and
land use regulations. 8 Each of these subcategories, that is, bucked the
trend for its general category. If we cut the pie a different way, finally,
another interesting point emerges. Of the laws struck down on substan-
tive due process grounds between 1902 and 1932, nearly half were rate
orders for regulated industries, minimum wage laws, or laws fixing the
cost of consumer goods to consumers." In other words, nearly half of
these laws involved the regulation of prices."
Although my two-and-a-half-to-one overall ratio does not comport
with Warren's figures," it conveys a similar overall message: that the
Lochner Court rejected considerably more substantive due process
claims than it granted. More importantly, the four-to-one and five-to-one
ratios that prevail outside the "property rights" cases make clear that the
old Court upheld a great deal of progressive social legislation against
273. See supra notes 132-222, 238-69 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 239-69 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 146-65, 179-222, 253-69 and accompanying text. One conspicuous
exception to this generalization, however, concerns the cases involving price regulation. See supra
notes 191-95, 244-47 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 97-107, 122-31, 223-36 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 166-78, 191-95, 244, 246-48 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 89, 191-93,244, 246-47 and accompanying text.
280. This tendency receives more attention infra at notes 330-39 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 3-4,9 and accompanying text.
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substantive due process attacks. One obvious reason for the disparity
between my numbers and Warren's is the different time periods from
which they are drawn. But the main reason is his much broader base of
decisions, which include equal protection cases, procedural due process
decisions, and the "incorporation" cases I explicitly did not consider.2"
Even within the universe of decisions considered here, furthermore, I
usually rejected cases that did not clearly involve either due process or
substantive review. Since almost all of these decisions refused the due
process challenge, this means that my figures probably overstate sub-
stantive due process's impact.
IM. THE CRITICISMS RECONSIDERED
In addition to corroborating Warren's general point, the preceding
figures belie Justice Souter's assertion that the old Court's substantive
due process cases applied their standard of constitutional arbitrariness in
an "absolutist" fashion. 3 Or at least those figures show that the Court's
review cannot have been absolutist across the board.' But if Warren
largely was correct and Souter largely is wrong, what does this say about
the three familiar criticisms of Lochner era substantive due process
sketched in this article's first section? The first of these attacks, which
applies to substantive due process in all its forms, asserts that the doc-
trine licenses illegitimate exercises of judicial power. The second says
that the old Court's substantive due process decisions unjustifiably aided
business in its struggles with workers and other relatively powerless in-
dividuals and groups. The third adds that those decisions were con-
sciously intended to have that effect.
This section considers the preceding section's implications for these
three criticisms. In other words, it limits itself to conclusions, that flow
from the patterns of substantive due process decision making just dis-
cussed. Due to that limitation, I do not fully discuss certain questions
(e.g., the. prevalence of unequal bargaining power) that have to be ad-
dressed in any definitive evaluation of Lochner era substantive due proc-
ess. Nonetheless, the following discussion at least weakens the first two
attacks, while seriously crippling the third. I open with that third tradi-
tional assault on the old Court.
282. See supra notes 72-75, 116-18 and accompanying text (depicting particular
"incorporation" cases).
283. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2279 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); see
supra text accompanying note 65.
284. However, maybe one could argue that the rule the Court applied in its 1920s price
regulation cases, which made their constitutionality depend on the relevant industry's being affected
with a public interest, qualifies as an "absolutist" standard. See supra notes 191-93, 200 and
accompanying text. The better word, though, might be "mechanical."
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A. The Question of Motive
Most critics of Lochner era substantive due process agree that the
doctrine assisted business while disadvantaging workers and other rela-
tively powerless groups because it enabled the Court to strike down pro-
gressive social legislation intended to assist and protect them. But as we
have seen, ' critics disagree about the degree to which the Court's con-
servative justices recognized, intended, and/or desired this result. Here, I
begin by considering the claim that those justices were witting and will-
ing servants of business in its assaults on the disadvantaged. Then I con-
sider two other interpretations of the old Court that put it in a much more
favorable light. Throughout, my concern is with the motives that inspired
the Court's substantive due process cases. As will become evident, it is
most unlikely that the desire to assist business ranked high among those
motives.
1. The Agent-of-Business Explanation
Critics of the Lochner Court who assert that it was a knowing and
willing tool of business hardly lack ammunition for their attack. The old
Court's minimum-wage and anti-labor cases, they can say, directly aided
business and hurt workers, just as its price regulation decisions helped
business and hurt consumers. Furthermore, the critics can continue, the
Court's decisions knocking down rate and regulatory orders for railroads
and other regulated industries obviously helped those frmns, their share-
holders, and their bondholders prosper at the public's expense. Finally,
businesses of all kinds profited to some degree from the Court's deci-
sions on damage recoveries and its tax decisions. So tangible and obvi-
ous are these effects, our critic might conclude, that they must have been
the reasons the old Court decided as it did. What else could explain such
cases?
If one wants to criticize a legal doctrine for the motives that inspired
it, one's case is weakened if those motives fail to exhibit themselves in
all or most of the doctrine's applications. Thus, the critics' case is par-
tially blunted by the large number of occasions on which the old Court
upheld laws challenged on substantive due process grounds. Except for
the minimum-wage cases and the union cases, the Court sustained many
of the protective regulations it confronted within each category of deci-
sions listed in the previous paragraph. This pattern continues when we
consider the Lochner Court's decisions concerning matters such as
health, safety, and aesthetic regulations in general and worker safety in
particular; consumer protection; antitrust; maximum hours laws; and the
regulation of insurance and banking. Like the measures noted above,
most of these laws probably tended to disadvantage business and to assist
285. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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the public or segments of it. Yet the Lochner Court rejected substantive
due process challenges in a very high percentage of these cases.
To all this, a critic might reply that what counts are the Court's
cases striking down social legislation on substantive due process
grounds, not the inevitable cases upholding such legislation. Some of
these cases, however, have policy arguments in their favor. This suggests
that the justices deciding them may have had motives other than the de-
sire to benefit business. The old Court's rate decisions, for example, were
inspired at least in part by the fear that state legislatures and regulators
would curry favor with the public by setting rates too low,2" thus inhib-
iting private investment in these vitally important industries." ' These
fears hardly seem chimerical: some of the rate orders the old Court struck
down look questionable," and the problem of legislative and regulatory
bias against (and for) regulated industries persists to this day."' This last
point also holds in the area of civil remedies, where the modem Court
has been forced to reinvoke substantive due process to handle problems
similar to those the Lochner Court faced early in the century.' Turning
to price regulations in businesses not affected with a public interest,
economists routinely attack such measures for their tendency to create
artificial shortages of the regulated commodity or service."' Similarly,
the minimum wage comes under constant fire for reducing employment,
especially among marginal workers such as blacks, young people, and
middle aged women.'
Obviously, these and other arguments that might be made for the
old Court's decisions go only so far in justifying them. But the question
here is the motive for such decisions-specifically, the contention that
nothing other than pro-business bias could possibly have inspired them.
A critic might reply that such bias remains a possibility because it is un-
clear whether these arguments really motivated the Court, and because it
is certain that the decisions in question helped business overcome pro-
gressive social legislation. The same, he might continue, holds for sub-
stantive due process as a whole. At least one category of Lochner era
286. See, e.g., ELY, CHIEF JUsTIc-sHIP OF MELVILLE FULLER, supra note 82, at 88; see also
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary Attempt to Police the
Political Institutions?, 77 GEO. LJ. 2031, 2044-45 (1989).
287. ELY, CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE FULLER, supra note 82, at 88; Porter, supra note
62, at 143.
288. See, e.g., Detroit United Ry. v. City of Detroit, 248 U.S. 429, 434-36 (1919) (striking
down a municipal ordinance regulating street railway fares because its enforcement would result in a
deficit for the company).
289. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 286, at 2048-53 (describing state regulators' alternate patterns
of excessively favoring and disfavoring electric utilities during the 1950s through the 1980s).
290. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND
EXTENSIONs 432-34 (4th ed. 1989).
292. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 308-10 (3d ed. 1986).
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substantive due process cases striking down government action, how-
ever, cannot plausibly be regarded as favoring business interests and
disadvantaging the powerless. The category in question consists of the
old Court's entry restriction cases. As Herbert Hovenkamp once re-
marked about such cases:
These decisions simply cannot be characterized as a judicial choice to
side with business against labor, immigrants, and the poor. On the
contrary, they permitted such groups increased entry into established
markets in the face of protectionist legislation designed either to ex-
clude newcomers directly or to give established firms a cost advan-
tage over prospective entrants. 93
By striking down laws that favored established economic interests, in
other words, the old Court's entry restriction decisions confound one of
the most enduring stereotypes about the Lochner era. This further di-
minishes the likelihood that the doctrine had its genesis in a desire to
protect big business.
Although restrictions on entry to a trade, profession, or business
have their justifications,' too many of them exist primarily to benefit
existing practitioners by reducing competition. This is especially true of
occupational licensing. As one opponent of that practice puts the matter,
by lessening competition "[o]ccupational regulation has served to limit
consumer choice, raise consumer costs, increase practitioner income,
limit practitioner mobility, deprive the poor of adequate services, and
restrict job opportunities for minorities."295 Sometimes, of course, the law
must risk such abuses in order to protect the public against unethical or
incompetent practitioners. Perhaps for this reason, the old Court almost
invariably upheld occupational licensing measures against constitutional
challenges.' The story was different, however, for some of the other
entry restrictions it confronted.
Two examples may suffice to illustrate how the Lochner Court's
handling of entry restrictions undermines the stereotypes that still sur-
round it.' Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,8 which the modem Court
293. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 379, 390 (1988); see id. at 388-90.
294. The most common justifications for entry restrictions are: (1) to allocate inherently scarce
physical resources such as broadcasting frequencies; (2) to get the benefits and prevent the costs of
real or alleged natural monopolies such as electrical power generation and some other businesses
affected with a public interest; and (3) to protect the public against unethical or incompetent
practitioners. Phillips, supra note 226, at 411; see id. at 408-12 and the sources cited therein.
295. S. DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN AMERICA !
(1987).
296. See Phillips, supra note 41, at 431-34. For the substantive due process cases involving
occupational licensing, see supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
297. For a more complete listing and discussion of the old Court's non-occupational licensing
entry restriction cases, see Phillips, supra note 41, at 434-47.
298. 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
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overruled as "a derelict in the stream of the law" in 19 7 3,"' struck down
a Pennsylvania statute which basically required that every pharmacy or
drug store entering the business after the statute's passage be wholly
owned by a licensed pharmacist or pharmacists." Justice Sutherland's
majority opinion emphasized the extent to which Pennsylvania already
regulated drug stores and the tenuous connection between ownership of
such stores' shares and the public health and safety. °' After that, he sug-
gested that the law's real aim was to suppress competition from publicly
traded chain store druggists,3 2 a suggestion Justice Holmes's dissent did
nothing to deny? 3
Today, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann' is best known for the pas-
sages in Justice Brandeis's dissent depicting state legislatures as labora-
tories of democracy with the freedom to try "novel social and economic
experiments."' But it would be difficult to discover less. experimental a
law than the measure at issue in that case. Liebmann involved an Okla-
homa statute requiring a license before one could engage in the manu-
facture, sale, or distribution of ice; and permitting state regulators to
deny new applicants a license if the area to be served already received
adequate service from a licensed ice company. After expending several
pages to determine that the ice business was not affected with a public
interest,' Sutherland got around to characterizing the measure before
him:
[T]he control here asserted does not protect against monopoly but
tends to foster it. The aim is not to encourage competition, but to pre-
vent it; not to regulate the business, but to preclude persons from en-
gaging in it. There is no difference in principle between this case and
the attempt of the dairyman under state authority to prevent another
from keeping cows and selling milk on the ground that there are
enough dairymen in the business.... '07
299. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156, 167 (1973).
300. Liggett, 278 U.S. at 113-14.
301. See id.
302. Id. at 113-14.
303. See id. at 114-15 (Holmes, J., dissenting). In his dissent, which was joined by Justice
Brandeis, Holmes argued that the challenged law need only have a "manifest tendency" to lessen the
evil it attacks, and that a firm's ownership probably has some impact on the safety of its operations.
Id. at 114-15. Justice Douglas made a similar argument while writing to uphold a very similar law in
North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 414 U.S. at 166-67.
304. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
305. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
306. See id. at 273-78 (Sutherland, J., for the Court). Actually, Sutherland used the term
"charged with a public use." Id. at 273. But he most likely was extending the rule that price
regulation is unconstitutional for businesses not affected with a public interest, see supra notes 191-
93, 200 and accompanying text, to the entry restriction arena; Phillips, supra note 41, at 440-41 &
n.198.
307. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 279.
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Brandeis's much praised dissent did little to counter these arguments.'
In fact, it essentially confirmed them. For example, Brandeis's main ar-
gument in support of the statute was that without it, the Oklahoma ice
industry faced "ruinous competition" in the form of severe price
cutting.'
2. The "Class Legislation" Hypothesis
According to Morton Horwitz, one manifestation of the "Progres-
sive historiography" that still dominates the constitutional history of the
Lochner era "has been to buttress historical interpretations that ... con-
tinue to treat the late-nineteenth-century judiciary as having capitulated
to big business. In fact, it is quite clear ... that the Lochner Court was
strongly representative of the old conservative view that big business was
unnatural and illegitimate." 0 As the previous section should make clear,
the claim that the old Court consciously capitulated to business faces
several telling objections. But what possible sense can it make to suggest
that its conservative justices were (in some sense or another) antibusi-
ness? The entry restriction cases provide a hint.
Limitations on entry typically result from private efforts to suppress
competition, and succeed because those who suffer from the restriction
(potential entrants and the general public) are too few, too scattered,
and/or too uninformed to mount an effective opposition."' Thus, the
Court's decisions striking down such laws can be seen as promoting
government neutrality and equal competition by thwarting private inter-
ests intent on using the state for their own purposes. Prominent among
such interests, of course, are businesses of all kinds. And the political
influence of such firms is apt to increase with their size.
This interpretation of the Lochner Court's substantive due process
decisions found expression in a provocative 1993 book by Howard Gill-
man. According to Gillman, the old Court was:
[Oin guard against not all regulations of the economy but only a par-
ticular kind of government interference in market relations-what the
justices considered 'class' or 'partial' legislation; that is, laws that
308. For an extended critique of Brandeis's dissent, see Phillips, supra note 226, at 443-47. See
also ARKES, supra note 49, at 54-58; POSNER, supra note 292, at 590-93; and BERNARD SIEGAN,
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTrTION 132-38 (paperback ed. 1980). My account borrows
heavily from these sources.
309. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 292 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The industry's hostility to this state
of affairs, he continued, led it to engage in various anticompetitive practices. Id. at 292-93. And once
the Oklahoma law was passed, the industry readily accepted it. Id. at 294.
310. MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960. THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 7 (1992).
311. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 226, at 412.
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(from their point of view) promoted only the narrow interests of par-
ticular groups or classes rather than the general welfare."'
Therefore, "[plolice powers jurisprudence during the Lochner era had its
origins in the founders' desire to delegitimize 'factional politics,' at-
tempts by competing classes to use public power to gain unfair or un-
natural advantages over their market adversaries."33 The aim, Gillman
thought, was not to minimize state power or to maximize economic free-
dom, but rather "to prohibit the government from passing laws designed
merely to promote the interests of certain classes at the expense of their
competitors, to impose special burdens and benefits on particular groups
without linking these burdens and benefits to the welfare of the commu-
nity as a whole."3 Thus, he emphatically rejected the view that the old
Court was a knowing and willing tool of business.3"5
Gillman's argument suffers from two interrelated flaws: his appar-
ent ignorance of the full scope of Lochner era substantive due process
and the relatively small number of cases he adduces to support his thesis.
Despite their obvious congruence with that thesis, for example, he barely
mentions the entry restriction cases.3 " (Another absence in Gillman's
account, one this article does nothing to rectify, is his failure to consider
the old Court's equal protection decisions, which may be more relevant
to his argument than its better publicized substantive due process cases.)
Rather than examining the cases Gillman does discuss, " this section
briefly considers whether his argument finds support in the areas where
substantive due process was most effective as a check on government
action.
3 18
As suggested earlier, the old Court's decisions striking down entry
restrictions are obvious examples of class legislation. Partiality to private
interests may also have influenced some of the statutes, ordinances, and
commission orders successfully challenged by railroads and other regu-
lated industries."9 The law at issue in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v.
Nebraska,3" for instance, basically made railroads build, pay for, and
maintain side tracks to grain elevators at an elevator's request.32' The old
Court's decisions striking down certain remedial provisions might be
characterized as blocking unjustified wealth transfers to undeserving
312. GILLMAN, supra note 53, at 7. For additional statements of Gillman's position see id. at 7-
11,61-62, 199.
313. Id. at 61.
314. Id.
315. E.g., id. at 199. As we will see, however, this does not make Gillman a defender of the old
Court's jurisprudence. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
316. See GILLMAN, supra note 53, at 181, 261 n.37.
317. See, e.g., id. at 49-60, 64-75, 86-99, 120-31, 137-46, 167-93.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 276-79.
319. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
320. 217 U.S. 196 (1910); see supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
321. Missouri Pac. Ry., 217 U.S. at 204.
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plaintiffs (and their attorneys).3" Perhaps, as Gillman seems to
maintain, " the laws at issue in Adair v. United States32" and Coppage v.
Kansas,3" might be described as pro-union class legislation. While strik-
ing down a state ban on yellow dog contracts in Coppage, for example,
the Court argued that the strengthening of labor unions-or indeed the
strengthening of any particular voluntary association-simply is not a
valid object of the police power. 6 Finally, minimum wage laws for
women may have reflected the interests of male-dominated unions inter-
ested in reducing competition for their members' services.2
Other examples might be adduced, but hopefully enough has been
said to illustrate that Gillman's thesis has some plausibility. Because
most law making has distributional consequences, however, carrying that
thesis to its extreme would render most regulations class legislation and
potential targets for judicial invalidation. As the size of the favored class
increases, moreover, it begins to approximate the general public, at
which point the law favoring the class begins to look like legislation for
the general welfare. Perhaps one could defend, for example, utility rate
regulations and other price regulations on these grounds. A final problem
with Gillman's thesis is that the Lochner Court's substantive due process
cases generally do not speak the language of class legislation.328 Instead
they talk incessantly of property and liberty. Gillman's discussion of
Lochner illustrates the point quite well; as he is forced to admit, that
case's majority opinion simply does not say anything about class, partial,
or unequal legislation."
322. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
323. GILtMAN, supra note 53, at 139-40. Gillman, I presume, would add that these laws were
justified class legislation.
324. 208 U.S. 161 (1908); see supra note 240 and accompanying text.
325. 236 U.S. I (1915); see supra note 243 and accompanying text.
326. Coppage, 236 U.S. at 16-17. Later, the Court argued that because unions presumably had a
right to exclude members who are willing to work in non-union shops and workers could refuse the
employ of firms that employ nonunion labor, symmetry of treatment demands that employers have
the right to exclude employees for their union affiliation. Id. at 20.
327. SIEGAN, supra note 308, at 148-49.
328. I have been able to find only a few 1902-1932 substantive due process cases using the
terms "class legislation," "class law," "partial legislation," or "partial law." Southern Ry. Co. v.
Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 320 (1922); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 333 (1921); Payne v. Kansas ex
rel. Brewster, 248 U.S. 112, 113 (1918); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 239
(1917); Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260, 267 (1912); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 418
(1908). In none of these cases was the Court's use of the term vital to its decision. A few equal
protection cases used these terms as well.
329. GILLMAN, supra note 53, at 128; see id. at 125-31 for his complete discussion of Lochner.
Interestingly, Gillman does not consider what may be the best argument for the idea that Lochner's
maximum-hours law was class legislation-Bernard Siegan's contention that it gave large,
mechanized bakeries (whose employees tended to work fewer hours) an edge over their smaller, less
sophisticated counterparts (whose employees tended to work much longer). See SIEGAN, supra note
308, at 115-18. Siegan's argument also is not discussed in Paul Kens's recent history of the Lochner
case. See PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLmCS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW
YORK (1990).
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3. The Traditional Explanation
Sooner or later, anyone who ponders the Lochner Court's decisions
striking down government action is bound to discover at least one sig-
nificant pattern: over forty percent of them involved price regulations.'"
The vast bulk of these decisions were railroad and utility rate cases; the
others struck down minimum wage laws and laws regulating the prices
of consumer goods and services. As suggested earlier,3 ' one obvious
explanation for this phenomenon is the old Court's belief that the price
paid for goods and services is central to any bargain. This explanation
tends to vindicate the widespread belief that freedom of contract was
central to Lochner era substantive due process. This is true even though,
as was also emphasized earlier,332 relatively few of the old Court's deci-
sions striking down government action formally proceeded on that basis.
For example, both rate rulings for businesses affected with a public inter-
est and consumer price regulations usually were struck down on the the-
ory that they impermissibly deprived the claimant of property.
333
This emphasis on liberty of contract and on its most important exer-
cises may suggest that the old Court had an implicit "preferred free-
doms" or "fundamental rights" theory of the sort that has become explicit
by now'.3' But while this may be true, the old Court never stated any such
theory.3 Its closest approximation to such a theory, perhaps, was Justice
McReynolds's general definition of due process liberty in Meyer v. Ne-
braska.3' Different Lochner Court decisions using due process to strike
down substantive government action emphasize different liberties within
McReynolds's collection. For example, freedom of contract naturally
appears on McReynolds's list. Some explicit or implicit freedom of con-
tract cases have already been mentioned; other examples include union
cases such as Adair and Coppage.33 Meyer and Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, by contrast, generally are read as protecting parents' right to control
330. See supra notes 279-80.and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
333. See the decisions cited supra in notes 89, 191-93.
334. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267-68 (1997) (listing the
fundamental liberty interests that now get strict substantive due process scrutiny). Included among
these interests are three listed by Justice McReynolds in Meyer, see supra text accompanying note
136. These are the rights to marry, to have children, and to direct the education and upbringing of
one's children.
335. Also militating against the idea that liberty of contract was a preferred freedom during the
Lochner era is the considerable number of cases rejecting substantive due process challenges to laws
that allegedly restricted contractual freedom. I have not attempted a headcount of these cases, but
they outnumber the decisions invalidating laws on this basis, see Phillips, supra note 41, at 1086
n.197, by a huge margin.
336. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see supra text accompanying note 136.
337. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915) (concluding that freedom of contract included
in liberty and property); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908) (stating that liberty and
property embrace freedom of contract).
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the upbringing and education of their children. 38 Although they do not
always say so, furthermore, the entry restriction cases effectively pro-
mote the right to pursue the trade, business, or occupation of one's
choice. In addition, some of the old Court's land use cases effectively
defended a person's right to live where he or she wishes, even though
they formally involved property.339 The same might be true of the cases
striking down orders to regulated industries, which essentially increased
the regulatee's freedom of action. The tax and civil remedies cases, on
the other hand, probably are best regarded as protecting one's ability to
keep one's money and possessions.
Taken together, these examples suggest that the simplest explana-
tion for the old Court's substantive due process decisions striking down
government regulation is the traditional one: that the justices voting to do
so were friends of liberty (especially economic liberty) and property.
This explanation has the additional advantage of consonance with what
those justices usually said when justifying their decisions. Of course, the
numerous Lochner era cases upholding progressive legislation cannot be
accounted for on this basis. But this reflects little more than the com-
monplace that in many contexts, some values are more important than
personal liberty. And those cases bear equally hard on our other two ex-
planations for the old Court's behavior.
B. Unintentional Support for Business
The preceding section considered a traditional criticism of the
Lochner Court: that it was a knowing and willing servant of business
interests. It did so both by evaluating that claim and by considering two
more favorable motives for the old Court's substantive due process deci-
sions. These were that the Court really was intent upon eliminating class
legislation, and the traditional idea that it aimed to advance liberty, espe-
cially economic liberty. As we have seen, the conscious-agent-of-
business theory not only has intrinsic difficulties, but also has two formi-
dable competitors. Although I have not fully evaluated Gillman's argu-
ment, initially it seems to have less explanatory power than the view that
Lochner era substantive due process was essentially about freedom. But
the two interpretations are not mutually exclusive; few values are more
deeply rooted in American life than the idea of free and equal economic
competition on a neutral playing field.
Even if either or both of our latter two theories best explains
Lochner era substantive due process, however, foes of the doctrine still
can attack it as pro-business in its practical impact. Often, this view as-
serts that the old Court's conservative justices naively stuck to the values
of simpler times in an age when corporate power over workers and other
338. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
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powerless individuals had made those values largely irrelevant."' The
result, of course, was that too often the Court struck down social legisla-
tion designed to correct the imbalance. Gillman, who evidently concedes
that some social legislation is class legislation but sees it as a necessary
response to conditions of "dependency" characterizing industrial life, is
largely of this view." By dependency, he presumably means something
like the traditional view that workers and other individuals lack the
power to bargain effectively when they deal with large corporations. This
article's findings do not speak directly to the validity of this very widely
accepted view. But even if it is completely valid, 2 those findings still go
some way toward absolving the old Court of the charge that in its sub-
stantive due process cases it naively helped business trample the lower
orders.
The first and most important reason why this charge fails to fully
persuade is that the old Court rejected most substantive due process
challenges to social and economic regulation. As we have seen, in many
relevant areas the ratio of rejected challenges to successful ones ap-
proaches or exceeds five to one.3 Included here are laws aimed at pro-
tecting weak and "dependent" parties in areas such as working hours,
compensation for on-the-job injuries, and consumer protection. The sec-
ond reason why the Court's substantive due process cases partly evade
340. See, e.g., supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 53, at 11, 13-14, 21-22, 76-86,114-18.
342. Although they do not begin to exhaust a subject that probably demands a book, two
interrelated remarks on this subject may be in order. The first is that people too often seem to believe
that if A is a large business firm and B is a natural person, and if B accepts A's offered terms without
any bargaining, then A has superior bargaining power. For example, Roscoe Pound implicitly
adopted this view when he criticized a court for ignoring "actual industrial conditions" by treating
the relation between railroads and their employees "as if the parties were individuals--as if they
were farmers haggling over the sale of a horse." Pound, supra note 39, at 454. But if this is the
model for equal bargaining power, it rarely exists (which probably was Pound's point). And in that
event, government has the right and perhaps the duty to regulate private contracts extensively (which
may not have displeased Pound either). Why, however, are human parties, relatively equal size,
and/or genuine bargaining the criteria for determining whether government intervention is
appropriate? Their imposition would justify regulation of, for example, the simplest terms of
consumer contracts in the most competitive industries.
This leads to my second point, which is that better criteria for determining the
appropriateness of govemment regulation are whether the supposedly weaker parties had genuine
choices, the capacity to identify those choices and appreciate their significance, and the means to
exercise them. Regarding the first criterion, it is worth noting that some economists who study labor
markets and who think along these lines doubt whether monopsony conditions-conditions in which
one firm is a monopoly or oligopoly seller of labor-are common in the United States today. See
Michael J. Phillips, Toward a Middle Way in the Polarized Debate over Employment at Will, 30 Am.
Bus. L.J. 441, 464-65 (1992) and sources cited and discussed therein. Of course, this is not to say
that things were the same during the Lochner era. The second criterion, capacity to identify available
choices, probably varies with the contractual term in question. For example, most people can readily
evaluate a job's wage, but relatively few can handle the details of an employer's health insurance
policy. One example of the third criterion, whether the other party has the means to exercise her
options, would be the availability and cost of transportation to alternative jobs.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 271-75.
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the charge is that many of them either had significant policy justifica-
tions, or simply did not involve the standard oppressor-and-victim sce-
narios. Examples of the former include the utility rate decisions, the
other price regulation cases, and the cases involving remedies.' Exam-
ples of the latter include the entry restriction cases, the land use deci-
sions, and the tax cases. Because they attack the abuse of private eco-
nomic power, in fact, the entry restriction decisions utterly confound the
usual stereotypes applied to the Lochner Court. Perhaps that is why they
receive so little attention.
C. Illegitimate Judicial Behavior
The last, and in some ways the most formidable, objection to
Lochner-era substantive due process applies to all of the doctrine's appli-
cations. This is the familiar argument that, because the traditional mean-
ing of due process is procedural and because that meaning was adopted
by the Framers, substantive due process allows the courts to exercise
power that is not legitimately theirs.' Because my main findings hardly
touch the host of issues this interpretivist or originalist argument raises, I
do not address it at any length. Even assuming that the argument is valid,
however, those findings have definite implications concerning the degree
of the old Court's culpability. Because it rejected considerably more sub-
stantive due process attacks than it granted, at worst the Court sinned
only some of the time. Unless judicial activism is an offense whose
blameworthiness admits of no degrees, that is, the Lochner Court cannot
be judged completely reprehensible under interpretivist criteria.
My findings also suggest two points that concern originalism's justi-
fications. Because the Constitution's text and its Framers' supposed in-
tent do not automatically create an obligation to follow them, this posi-
tion needs a moral or policy justification. Earlier, majoritarianism was
suggested as one possibility.'4 The "class legislation" argument, how-
ever, goes some way toward undermining majority rule as a basis for
attacking the Lochner Court. To the extent that this explanation of the
old Court's behavior is accurate, it was correcting the democratic proc-
ess's malfunctions more than it was overriding majority will. It did so by
insisting that laws bear some reasonable relation to general interests and
thus checking "partial" legislation. If most laws are class legislation,
moreover, judges who practice judicial restraint are not so much follow-
ing the people's will as ratifying whatever mandates a pluralist political
process generates.
Another, far less principled and context-specific, justification for
judicial restraint is the Court's incompetence to handle some kinds of
344. See supra notes 289-92 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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issues, especially economic questions." This has been a common argu-
ment against the old Court's utility rate decisions,"4 over half of which
overturned the challenged rate order. 9 Because the Lochner Court usu-
ally deferred to the legislature in other areas, however, it may not be es-
pecially vulnerable to this charge outside the regulated industries context.
Furthermore, some of the Court's decisions striking down government
action invoked moral criteria more than social science argumentation.
For example, Justice Sutherland's majority opinion in Adkins proceeded
almost entirely on the levels of precedent and legal-moral principle, and
did not consider the tangle of empirical and policy issues surrounding the
minimum wage." Whatever else might be said about such arguments,
they seem relatively invulnerable to claims that their makers lack the
necessary expertise. Finally, some of the economic claims made by the
old Court do not much depend on such expertise. One does not need a
Ph.D. in economics to see what is wrong with the entry restrictions at
issue in Liggett v. Baldridge and New State Ice Company v. Liebmann.
IV. CRITIQUING THE OLD COURT'S CRITICS
According to Melvin Urofsky, the turn-of-the-century progressive
agenda involved
minimum standards to reduce the incidence of child labor; maximum
hours for women and children and for men employed in dangerous
occupations; payment of wages in cash, to eliminate the abuse of the
scrip system and company store; establishment of a minimum wage,
first for women and children, and then for men; elimination of em-
ployers' common law defenses against liability for job-related acci-
dents; creation of workmen's compensation plans to insure against
death and disability in the factory; and laws supporting labor's right
to organize and bargain collectively. " '
Except for the minimum wage and a few pro-union measures, the
Lochner Court upheld this agenda when it was challenged on substantive
due process grounds."2 From this, one might expect that the old Court
would get at least a "C" on the Progressive report card. Instead it has
been attacked as, either by ignorance or by design, a consistent opponent
of government regulation, champion of business, and foe of the disad-
vantaged. What can account for the mischaracterization?
347. E.g., Antonin Scalia, On the Merits of the Frying Pan, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at
10, 13.
348. Cf Pierce, supra note 286, at 2045-46 (discussing the various institutional limitations that
led the Court to abandon serious review of rate decisions during the 1940s).
349. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
350. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525,545-61 (1923).
351. UROFSKY, supra note 54, at 543.
352. See generally supra notes 238-69 and accompanying text.
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Different reasons have been suggested to explain the special hostil-
ity the Lochner Court has attracted. For example, Robert McCloskey
once opined that it resulted from the old Court's own extremism,"3 and
more recently Horwitz has related it to the Progressives' need to legiti-
mize the New Deal by delegitimizing its opponents." The obvious ob-
jection to McCloskey's argument is that the old Court was not all that
extreme. As for Horwitz's explanation, the progressives' task of legiti-
mization might have been accomplished without demonizing the Lochner
Court. For example, progressives could have argued the compelling need
for government regulation by observing that even the reactionaries on the
Supreme Court had signed on to most of it. Both my objections, how-
ever, lose some force when we look beyond the old Court's substantive
due process cases to consider the battles between the Court and the New
Deal during the 1930s, which mainly involved the scope of federal
power.
On the assumption that there need be no one cause for a social phe-
nomenon, I conclude with some speculation about another explanation
for the special obloquy into which the Lochner Court has fallen. In 1924,
Benjamin Cardozo described the divisions on the Court in the following
terms:
On the one hand, the right of property... was posited as permanent
and absolute. Impairment was not to be suffered except within narrow
limits of history and precedent. No experiment was to be made along
new lines of social betterment. The image was a perfect sphere. The
least dent or abrasion was a subtraction from its essence. Given such
premises, the conclusion is inevitable. The statute becomes an ille-
gitimate assault upon rights assured to the individual against the en-
croachments of society. The method of logic or philosophy is at work
in all its plenitude. The opposing view, if it is to be accepted, must be
reached through other avenues of approach. The right which the as-
sailants of the statute posit as absolute or permanent is conceived of
by the supporters of the statute as conditioned by varying circum-
stances of time and space and environment and degree. The limita-
tions appropriate to one stage of development may be inadequate for
another.3"
353. McCloskey, supra note 38, at 42-43 (arguing that the old Court's extremism bred
extremism in subsequent thinking about it).
354. See Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional
Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57, 57-63 (1987) (explaining how progressives helped legitimize
New Deal programs and delegitimize the old Court by falsely picturing the latter as a break with
tradition and by touting the Court's supposed return to a noninterventionist stance). Horwitz's
overall position, I might add, seems like Gillman's general view. Although Horwitz rejects the idea
that the Court consciously set out to assist business by killing social legislation and instead pictures
its motives much as Gillman does, he regards its policy of state neutrality as inappropriate to the
industrial age. Id.
355. BENiAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw 72-73 (1924).
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If this passage accurately described the old Court's conservatives, little
social legislation would have survived substantive due process attack
during the Lochner era. Actually, of course, the Court upheld most of the
reform measures it encountered in many areas of concern to progres-
sives. Cardozo had to know this. So why did he describe the Court's con-
servatives as uncompromising ideologues?
With all the usual qualifications, I suggest the following answer:
that Cardozo's description better fits himself and the old Court's progres-
sive critics than it does the Lochner Court's conservative justices. In
other words, it is the progressives who possessed the "perfect sphere"
whose "least dent or abrasion was a subtraction from its essence." That
essence, I further suggest, was an almost religious faith in government's
ability to improve society through regulations applying social science
knowledge.3" Embrace this faith to the fullest, and almost any exercise of
government power seems a good thing. For example, how else can one
explain Brandeis's characterization of the entry restriction in New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann as an experiment whose main aim was to rectify
ruinous competition, and his refusal even to consider Sutherland's argu-
ment that the law was special-interest legislation of the most obvious
kind?... To one who thinks in this way, furthermore, degrees of opposi-
tion to the faith cease to matter. The old Court's qualified progressivism,
therefore, really was no progressivism at all.
CONCLUSION
Articles like this one often seem to argue at cross-purposes. On the
one hand, there is the urge to counter the overdrawn portraits of the
Lochner Court that have been so common throughout this century. By
showing that the old Court was more progressive than is commonly
imagined, this corrective approach seems to adopt progressive criteria of
evaluation-to implicitly concede that constitutional limitations on gov-
ernment regulation are a bad thing. But there also is the urge to show that
some of the old Court's most criticized decisions either were not as awful
as advertised or even were justified. This line of attack, however, sug-
gests that constitutional restrictions on government regulation have
something to recommend them after all.
The obvious way to escape this apparent conflict is to assert that
some exercises of government power (those the old Court struck down?)
deserve constitutional limitation, while for others (those it upheld?) the
state should be allowed to work its will. The conflict, in other words,
exists primarily for those who think that one must adopt an all-or-nothing
356. See supra note 8 and accompanying text
357. See supra notes 304-05 and accompanying text. I do not read Brandeis's long dissent as
ever really confronting Sutherland's argument that the Oklahoma entry restriction thwarted
competition for private ends.
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attitude toward government regulation of the economy and constitutional
limitations on such regulation. As this article has made abundantly clear,
the Lochner Court eschewed extremes on this question. Of course, one
might rightly ask whether the old Court picked the proper occasions on
which to intervene. To the progressive tradition that has shaped the mod-
em Court's noninterventionist stance on economic matters, it is illegiti-
mate even to entertain this question. But just why should that tradition
invariably bind us?

A SKUNK AT A GARDEN PARTY: REMEDIES FOR
PARTICIPANTS IN STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS
RIDGELEY A. ScoTt"
I. INTRODUCTON
Legislators who want to spend more money than is available prefer
to obtain the difference by a method other than raising taxes.' Pension
trusts for public employees are especially inviting because they fre-
quently have substantial assets.2 When legislators remove funds from
pension trusts,3 they leave the trusts in a weakened condition, forcing
fund administrators to make suspect loans.'
The current trend is to make indirect removals.! Approaches include
terminating all6 or part7 of the plan; reducing benefits;8 and, suspending,9
postponing' or reducing" contributions by the employer. Legislators may
also increase contributions by participants.'2 While some of the activities
are accompanied by an explanation, other legislative bodies do not at-
tempt to justify the action.'3
* Copyright @ 1998 Ridgeley A. Scott. Associate Professor, Widener University School of
Law. J.D., Memphis State School of Law, 1967; LL.M. in Taxation, New York University, 1978.
1. Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 828-29 (W. Va. 1988).
2. Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered,
93 COLUM. L. REv. 795,799 (1993).
3. Sklodowski v. Illinois, 642 N.E.2d 1180, 1181-83 (Ill. 1994); Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at
826; I.R.S. and NJ., Agreement as to Final Determination of Tax Liability and Specific Matters
(Mar. 22, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter I.R.S. and N.J.]; A Wobbly California Giant,
ECONOMIST, May 30, 1992, at 75.
4. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd
without op., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979); Philadelphia Lodge No. 5, Fraternal Order of Police v.
Philadelphia Bd. of Pensions and Retirement, No. 5224 slip op. at 9 (Dec. Term, 1990), appeal
denied, 606 A.2d 603 (Pa. Commw. CL 1992).
5. Romano, supra note 2, at 802-03.
6. Pennie v. Reis., 132 U.S. 464, 471 (1889); A Wobbly California Giant, supra note 3.
7. Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Neb. 1995).
8. Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 75 (1937); Alston v. City of Camden, 471 S.E.2d
174, 176 (S.C. 1996); A Wobbly California Giant, supra note 3.
9. Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 822-23 (W. Va. 1988).
10. Board of Admin. of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207,
213-16 (Cal. CL App. 1997).
11. McDermott v. Regan, 624 N.E.2d 985, 986-88 (N.Y. 1993); Kleinfeldt v. New York City
Employees' Retirement Sys., 324 N.E.2d 865, 868-69 (N.Y. 1975); A Wobbly California Giant,
supra note 3.
12. Pennsylvania Fed'n of Teachers v. School Dist., 484 A.2d 751, 752-53 (Pa. 1984).
13. See Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 822-23.
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The availability of remedies for participants is uncertain. Where
contributions have been reduced or eliminated, the question is whether
the government has an enforceable obligation to make contributions in an
ascertainable amount. In states which provide express constitutional
protection for pensions,' some courts will enforce the obligation."
State and local governments generally are liable for their agree-
ments under the obligations of the Contracts Clause.'6 Some courts find
there is an enforceable agreement.'" Others have focused on the idea of
permitting legislators to do whatever they would prefer, and go out of
their way to avoid finding a contract.'8
The government cannot take property without due process.'9 Where
there is no contract, the courts usually conclude that participants have a
property interest in the plan. This approach does not provide much com-
fort to participants since most courts conclude that the only requirements
for modifying an interest in a plan is notice and an opportunity to be
heard on a proposed change.'0
Money damages is the usual remedy for a breach of contract or a
taking of property without due process.' Equitable remedies are available
if money damages are an inadequate remedy.22 Executive and legislative
authorities have been ordered to make the contributions necessary to
satisfy actuarial standards.'
The remaining question is the relationship of the participant to trust
funds. Governments frequently argue that they own trust assets because
they contributed the money. 4 This position is nonsense unless the trust
agreement contains an express reservation which permits the government
to recover the funds.'
14. See N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7.
15. Kleinfeldt, 324 N.E.2d at 868-69; McDermott, 624 N.E.2d at 986-90.
16. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1977).
17. Board of Admin. of the Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207,
226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
18. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 516-17 (Me. 1993); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 304-05
(N.M. 1995).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1.
20. Pierce, 910 P.2d at 304.
21. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcrs § 12.4,850 (2d ed. 1990).
22. Id.
23. Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 828-29 (W. Va. 1988); see also Board of Admin. of
the Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997);
Kleinfeldt v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 324 N.E.2d 865, 868-69 (N.Y. 1975).
24. See, e.g., I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
25. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 42, at
431-33 (2d ed. 1984). See, e.g., Dadisman 384 S.E.2d at 825-26.
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The right to use trust assets is a related problem. Governments may
seek to borrow trust funds because they are unable to borrow elsewhere 6
An alternative is making loans available to others. Governments may
establish programs to develop the local economy 7 and for other socially
conscious reasons.' However, if the funds do not belong to the govern-
ment, the government is not entitled to a preferred status for obtaining
loans, or for making loans available to others.
Government plans that desire the benefits of qualification for tax
purposes must satisfy the pre-Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) qualification requirements. If the government has the right to
modify fund components such as benefits and contributions, the plan
does not qualify since it fails the definiteness requirement. 9 Hence, the
plan is subject to tax on its income,' and holders of vested interests re-
ceive income each time the government makes a contribution to the
plan.
3'
Qualified plans are subject to prohibited transaction rules. The plan
loses its tax exemption32 if loans to the government do not satisfy the
rules. The loan must be based on a bona fide debtor-creditor relationship,
bear a reasonable rate of interest, and be backed by adequate security.
3
The utility of the qualification rules is uncertain because the IRS
usually avoids enforcement actions against government plans' 4 Partici-
pants can sue for a declaration that the plan is not qualified. If the IRS
does not enforce a declaration, participants might be able to force it to
perform its duty?' The greatest prospect of success may be political pres-
26. See, e.g., Withers v. Teacher's Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1255-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), affd without op., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979); Philadelphia Lodge No. 5, Fraternal Order of
Police v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pensions and Retirement, No. 5224 slip op. at 9 (Dec. Term, 1990),
appeal denied, 606 A.2d 603 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
27. James A. White, Picking Losers, Back-Yard Investing Yields Big Losses, Roils Kansas
Pension System-But Idea of Using Such Funds to Help Local Industries Still Intrigues Politicians-
Now a Steel Mill is Sitting, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1991, at Al. The idea appealed to the S.B.A.,
which commissioned a report. M&R Assoc., Pension Funds and Small Finn Financing (1995) (on
file with author).
28. Romano, supra note 2, at 810-12; Cindy Skrzycki, The Regulators: Targeting a Pension
Policy To GOP, 'Targeted Investments' Are Just Retiree Robbery, WASH. POST, June 2, 1995, at Fl;
Jim Saxton, A Raid on America's Pension Funds, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1994, at A12.
29. South Texas Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 764, 767 (1946), affd, 162
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1947).
30. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-1(a)(]) (1978).
32. I.R.C. § 503(a)(1)(B) (1994).
33. I.R.C. § 503(b)(1) (1994).
34. Public Employee Pension Benefit Plans: Joint Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means and the Subcomm. on Labor-Management
Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 98th Cong. 165 (1983) (statement of S. Allen
Winborne, Ass't Commissioner of Internal Revenue) [hereinafter Joint Hearing].
35. I.R.C. § 7476 (1994).
36. See, e.g., Vishnevsky v. United States, 581 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1978).
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sure generated by the possibility that participants will pay taxes on con-
tributions.
The probability that financially troubled governments will continue
to try to solve their problems by reducing or eliminating financial sup-
port for pension programs combined with the uncertainty of enforcement
of those programs underline the need for legislation. Proposals designed
to subject plans to a modest set of definite rules37 have been defeated by
intense lobbying of state and local governments.38
The principal theme has been that the requirements would unneces-
sarily increase the cost of providing pensions. 9 That argument is difficult
to accept since many state and local governments have not taken the
trouble to determine what the cost of their programs might be.' A much
more likely explanation is that legislators do not like the idea of being
forced to make unexpectedly large payments to deliver benefits which
have been promised. Legislators also want to retain the ability to reduce
benefits in order to deal with financial problems.
This article covers the possibilities for enforcement of pension
promises against state and local governments. The discussion begins with
state law actions, continues with tax rules, and ends with the possibility
for legislation analogous to ERISA. The conclusion argues that legisla-




Employees of state and local governments expect pensions because
of their common use as one of the inducements used to attract and retain
employees." Enforcement of the expectation is another matter. State law
frequently is silent about the nature of the interest held by participants, '2
and many courts are reluctant to find enforceable rights.'3
37. See, e.g., H.R. 14138, 95th Cong. (1978).
38. Ridgeley A. Scott, Misuse of Public Pension Assets: White Collar Crimes and Other
Offenses, 26 IND. L. REV. 589, 590 (1993).
39. Id.
40. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESs., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM 63-64, 180-81 (Comm. Print 1978).
41. Hammon v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (Alaska 1981); Calabro v. City of Omaha,
531 N.W.2d 541, 548-49 (Neb. 1995); Jaennont v. New Hampshire Personnel Comm'n, 392 A.2d
1193,1196 (N.H. 1978).
42. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 80 (Comm. Print 1978).
43. See Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513 (Me. 1993); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288 (N.M. 1995).
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The classification of pension rights generally is a matter of state
law." Some courts find that pension legislation creates contracts, 5 while
others conclude that interests in receiving benefits are property rights."
Enforcement of property rights may be more uncertain than enforcement
of contract rights.'
Politics is the reason for the lack of agreement over the nature and
extent of the interest of a participant.' Judges who conclude that there is
an agreement which cannot be unilaterally altered '9 are not be sympa-
thetic to legislative problems. Those who find there is no enforceable
right' are not be concerned with the needs of participants. Intermediate
positions reflect attempts to reconcile the competing interests.
The availability of remedies usually is governed by the nature of the
right. The enforcement of contract and property rights generally is lim-
ited to money damages, although circumstances may justify extraordi-
nary remedies such as an injunction.5 The availability of remedies also
may be affected by the fact that the defendant is a government."
B. Plans
There are three general categories of pension rights. One is the terms
and conditions of the plan prior to retirement, which includes the amount of
contributions by the employer and the participant, requirements for receipt
of benefits, and the amount of benefits. 3 Another is the terms and
conditions of the plan after retirement, which includes the amount of
44. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-47 (1976); see also Alston v. City of Camden,
471 S.E.2d 174, 177-78 (S.C. 1996).
45. Calabro, 531 N.W.2d at 551-52.
46. Pierce, 910 P.2d at 299.
47. Id. at 299-304; Spiller, 627 A.2d at 515-17; Peter Rehon, The Pension Expectation as
Constitutional Property, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153, 163-67 (1980); Note, Public Employee
Pensions in Times of Fiscal Distress, 90 HARv. L. REV. 992, 1002-03 (1977) [hereinafter Note,
Public Employee Pensions].
48. Kosa v. Treasurer of the State, 292 N.W.2d 452, 454-55 (Mich. 1980); see also Dadisman
v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 828 (W. Va. 1989).
49. Yeazell v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541, 546 (Ariz. 1965); see also Pennsylvania Fed'n of
Teachers v. School Dist., 484 A.2d 751, 753-54 (Pa. 1984).
50. See Board of Trustees of Firemen's Pension v. Behnnan, 203 P.2d 490, 492-93 (Colo.
1949), overruled in part, Police Pension and Relief Bd. v. McPhail, 338 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1959).
51. See Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 829, 832.
52. Musselman v. Governor, 533 N.W.2d 237, 245-46 (Mich. 1995), reh'g granted, 535
N.W.2d 346 (1995), on reh'g, 545 N.W.2d 346 (1996).
53. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBuC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 43-46 (Comm. Print 1978); 3 EUGENE
McQunLuN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 12.141-12.172 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing
pensions, benefits, and insurance); Rubin G. Cohn, Public Employee Retirement Plans-The Nature
of the Employees' Rights, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 32 (1968) (criticizing courts' willingness to apply labels
in analyzing pension fund situations); Deborah Kemp, Public Pension Plans: The Need for Federal
Regulation, 10 HAMUNE L. REv. 27, 47-52 (1987) (outlining the characteristics of Public Employee
Retirement Systems).
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contributions by the employer, the amount of benefits, and limitations on
the right to continue receiving benefits.
The third category is rights in plan assets." Participants own a property
right in the assets held in trust.' While this right may achieve protection of
trust assets, 7 it usually is not a ground to force the government to make
adequate contributions." Sometimes the circumstances obligate the trustees
to take legal action to obtain adequate contributions. 9
C. Expectations of the Parties
When state and local governments seek to attract prospective
employees, one of the inducements offered is pension benefits.'
Recruitment materials often describe pensions in terms of the monthly
amount which participants can expect after a certain number of years on
the job.' This leads participants to think that the benefit is part of the
compensation for work performed. 2
Employment contracts confirm the impression that pension benefits
are compensation. 3 Many contracts go further by requiring employee
contributions as one source of funding retirement benefits.' Materials
furnished by the employer to supplement the contracts frequently outline
the terms of the plan including a description of the monthly amount which
participants can expect after a certain number of years on the job.'
Legislators have a different viewpoint. There is little or no advance
planning devoted to the establishment or modification of most retirement
programs.' The atmosphere is political, and problems such as how to pay
the costs or who will pay the costs are not carefully considered.
54. See Lea E. Selleck, Post-Retirement Employment Restrictions on Public Employees in
Kansas, 5 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 199 (1996).
55. New Jersey claimed it was the owner of the corpus of pension trusts and had the right to
remove assets. I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3; Scott, supra note 38, at 589.
56. Scott, supra note 38, at 597.
57. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 25, § 42.
58. See Rehon, supra note 47.
59. Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 825-26 (W. Va. 1988).
60. Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 803 (Cal. 1947).
61. See Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (Alaska 1981); Jaennont v. New
Hampshire Personnel Comm'n, 392 A.2d 1193, 1195-96 (N.H. 1978).
62. Nash v. Boise City Fire Dept., 663 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Idaho 1983); Duella v. Massachusetts
Bay Transp. Auth., 421 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 n.9 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
63. Police Pension and Relief Bd. v. McPhail, 338 P.2d 694, 698-99 (Colo. 1959); Hammond,
627 P.2d at 1056-57; Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 829.
64. Pennsylvania Fed'n of Teachers v. School Dist., 484 A.2d 751, 753 (Pa. 1984); McPhail,
338 P.2d at 698-99.
65. Information of this sort frequently is repeated and embellished by benefits officials. See
Alston v. City of Camden, 471 S.E.2d 174, 179 (S.C. 1996).
66. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95T CONG. PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT
ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 80 (Comm. Print 1978).
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Legislators even seem to be unaware of the fact that if one program is made
more generous, participants in other programs will seek similar terms."
Legislative programs generally can be modified at any time.6 Legis-
lators usually avoid expressly committing their successors to continue a
definite program, 69 and they feel free to change their spending priorities
at any time. There may be no legal remedy available to those who lose
all or some of what they were entitled to receive under an existing pro-
gram.70 Faced with budget shortfalls, many legislative bodies have re-
duced contributions' or removed assets from plans to balance their
budgets.2
D. Gifts
Early decisions relied on the feudal doctrine that a pension was a gift
from the king 3 which could be modified or terminated at any time.7'4 After
the Supreme Court suggested that participants acquired a vested interest
when payments became due, 5 many courts concluded there was a mere
expectancy prior to retirement.
Gift classification may make the plan illegal where gifts of public
money are prohibited.' One court avoided the problem by concluding that
pension contributions were payments for services even though the
legislature could modify or terminate the plan at any time.7 '8 Another found
67. Id. at 63-64.
68. Spina v. Consolidated Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 197 A.2d 169, 172-73
(NJ. 1964); Alston, 471 S.E.2d at 177-78.
69. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95Th CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 80 (Comm. Print 1978).
70. City of Dallas v. Trammell, 101 S.W.2d 1009, 1013 (Tex. 1937). See STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 80 (Comm. Print 1978).
71. Governor Whitman's plan to balance the New Jersey budget and reduce state income taxes
included substantial reductions in state contributions. Bob Herbert, Whitman Steals the Future, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at A19.
72. Governor Florio removed assets from the New Jersey plan to balance the budget. I.R.S.
and N.J., supra note 3.
73. Hickey v. Pension Bd., 106 A.2d 233, 235 (Pa. 1954). See also Nash v. Boise City Fire
Dep't, 663 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Idaho 1983); see Note, Public Employee Pensions, supra note 47, at
992. The idea is so fantastic that one court observed that the "label 'gratuity' could never have been
taken with sober literalness." Opinion of the Justices, 303 N.E.2d 320, 327 (Mass. 1973).
74. Pecoy v. City of Chicago, 106 N.E. 435,436 (111. 1914).
75. Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 80-81 (1937); Pennie v. Reis., 132 U.S. 464, 471
(1889); see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
76. Haverstock v. Public Employees' Retirement Fund, 490 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986); Cook v. Employees' Retirement Sys., 514 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
77. See APiz. CONST. art. IX, § 7; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3,913.
78. Spina v. Consolidated Police and Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 197 A.2d 169, 175
(N.J. 1964).
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that contributions were not donations because they induced state employees
to remain on the job.'
E. State Constitutions
Five states provide express protection for public pension obligations.'
After the New York courts concluded they could be modified or terminated
at any time,' the state constitution was amended to protect pension rights.'
Since an employee received an enforceable right at the moment he became
a participant,. the constitution provided that the legislature could not re-
duce benefits" and contributions,' remove funds from the trust, or order
the trust to make loans to the government.' On the other hand, a federal
court approved a trustee's decision to make suspect loans because failure to
make the loans might cause termination of the plan." This approval may
have been a political decision."
Interpretation of the other constitutions is not uniform. The Illinois
provision was modeled after the New York rule, 9 and the courts found that
the legislature cannot reduce benefits." However, the amount of protection
79. The payments were not classified as payments for services. Fraternal Order of Firemen v.
Shaw, 196 A.2d 734, 736 (Del. 1963).
80. See Darryl B. Simko, Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law of Public Pensions,
State Constitutional Contract Protection, and Fiscal Constraint, 69 TEMPLE L. REv. 1059 (1996).
81. Roddy v. Valentine, 197 N.E. 260,262 (N.Y. 1935).
82. N.Y. CoNsr. art. V, § 7; see McDermott v. McDermott, 507 N.Y.S.2d 390, 396 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986).
83. Birnbaum v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 152 N.E.2d 241, 245 (N.Y.
1958).
84. McDermott, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 398-99; Kleinfeldt v. New York City Employees' Retirement
Sys., 324 N.E.2d 865, 868-69 (N.Y. 1975).
85. McDermott v. Regan, 624 N.E.2d 985, 987 (N.Y. 1993).
86. Sgaglione v. Levitt, 337 N.E.2d 592,594 (N.Y. 1975).
87. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd
without op., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979). The Pennsylvania courts reached the same decision when
Philadelphia was on the edge of bankruptcy. See generally Scott, supra note 38, at 603 (discussing
Philadelphia's fiscal crisis during Mayor Wilson Goode's administration).
88. Marc Gertner, Fiduciary Responsibility of Public Employee and Employer
Representatives, 6 J. OF PENSION PLANNING & COMPLIANcE 83, 94 (1980).
89. Compare ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5 (stating that membership in a pension or retirement
system of "the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or
instrumentality thereof' shall be an "enforceable contract"), with N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7 (stating
that membership in a pension or retirement system of "the state or of a civil division thereof" shall
be a "contractual relationship"), People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 642 N.E.2d 1180, 1193 (Il.
1994) (recognizing that New York courts consistently interpreted the protections to "shield the
source of funds for benefits not yet realized"), Kraus v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension
Fund, 390 N.E.2d 1281, 1288 (111. App. Ct. 1979) (recognizing that the illinois legislature was aware
of New York's comparable constitutional provision, but that even then, some legislators were unsure
of the provision's implications). See Loren Oury, Comment, Public Employee Pension Rights and
the 1970 Illinois Constitution: Does Article XIII, Section 5 Guarantee Increased Protection?, 9 J.
MARSHALL J. OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 440 (1976).
90. See, e.g., Felt v. Board of Trustees of the Judges Retirement Sys., 481 N.E.2d 698, 699-700
(1l. 1985).
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is smaller because the funding needed to provide actuarial soundness is not
required,9' and funds can be removed from a pension trust to balance the
budget.92 Hence, the Illinois courts are willing to let political expediency
override the constitution."'
While the Alaska, Hawaii and Michigan constitutions" protect ac-
crued benefits, their courts sometimes permit modifications of conditions
for future benefits." Although Michigan cities must provide adequate
funding,' the requirement is not enforceable against the state because the
courts would not order the legislature to appropriate money.' On the other
hand, Michigan could not transfer funds from a trust to balance the budget."
There are no reported Alaska or Hawaii decisions on the funding issue.
The decisions give the distinct impression that the courts are hostile
to the rules. Most courts are unwilling to force politicians to honor their
commitments even where state constitutions establish substantive rights. '
F. Statute or Ordinance
Rights may be contained in various sorts of legislation. °° Funding
provisions have been upheld where a statute required the governor to keep a
plan financially sound,"' and a home rule charter required a city to keep a
plan actuarially sound.'"
Courts also may enforce funding requirements appearing in the
legislation creating the plan. One statute contractually obligated the
legislature to make monthly payments to the plan,' 3 and another called for
contributions needed to maintain actuarial soundness.'
91. See People exrel. Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749 (111. 1975).
92. See generally Sklodowski, 642 N.E.2d at 1180 (allowing state officials to transfer money
from pension funds to the state's general revenue fund by refusing to grant beneficiaries' motions
and denying appeal).
93. Id. at 1194.
94. ALASKA CONST. art XII, § 7; HAW. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24.
95. See Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Alaska 1981); Chun v. Employees'
Retirement Sys., 607 P.2d 415, 421 (Haw. 1980); In re Enrolled Senate Bill 1269, 209 N.W.2d 200,
202-03 (Mich. 1973).
96. See Shelby Township Police and Fire Retirement Bd. v. Charter Township of Shelby, 475
N.W.2d 249,250 (Mich. 1991).
97. Musselman v. Governor, 553 N.W.2d 237, 246 (Mich. 1995). See generally Allison
Weathersby, Government Law, 42 WAYNE L. REv. 955, 977-85 (1996) (discussing Musselman).
98. Musselman, 533 N.W.2d at 246.
99. Id.; Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd
without op., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979); Gertner, supra note 88, at 94.
100. See generally Kemp, supra note 53 (discussing differences in pension plan benefits).
101. Weaver v. Evans, 495 P.2d 639,649-50 (Wash. 1972).
102. Dombrowski v. City of Philadelphia, 245 A.2d 238 (Pa. 1968).
103. Board of Admin. of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Valdes v. Cory, 189 Cal. Rptr. 212, 223 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
104. Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816 (W. Va. 1989).
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Either type of right may be illusory since elected officials may
change legislation without any obligation to continue a former program, or
to continue it on the same terms. Hence, enforcement of a plan may be de-
nied if the legislature modified or repealed the legislation.
Legislation may create an obligation that cannot be unilaterally
altered. The legislation creates this obligation if there is either an express
contract requiring maintenance of the plan, °" or the circumstances are
sufficient to constitute a contract.'" For example, where an employee has
the choice to enter the system, most courts find that this consent creates a
contract right which vests at the time of entry.'" Where the plan requires
participation, many courts conclude there is a mere expectancy prior to
retirement.1
5
The rights under a contract may be less than one might expect. One
court found that the term "contract" was a label meaning that the material
expectations of the employees should in substance be respected." The court
suggested that retirement plans for public employees do not readily submit
themselves to analysis under accepted principles of contract law, which
typically require mutually assenting individuals to form a specific
bargain."0 One of the accepted principles of contract law involves
continuing unilateral offers. An enforceable contract arises between the
person who made the offer and everyone who satisfies the conditions and
accepts the offer."'
The distinction between voluntary and mandatory participation is
difficult to justify. Prospective employers typically offer employment on
specified terms and conditions. If participation in a mandatory pension plan
is part of the arrangement, acceptance of employment constitutes
105. The contract might be an individual employment agreement or a collectively bargained
arrangement for a group of people.
106. Weaver v. Evans, 495 P.2d 639, 648 (Wash. 1972). See generally David Kopilak, Recent
Development, Hughes v. State: Breaching Statutory Contracts Without Violating Oregon's Contract
Clause, 72 OR. L. REv. 487 (1993) (discussing Hughes, where the Oregon Supreme Court held that
PERS was a binding contract between the state and its employees and that such contract included a
statutory state tax exemption).
107. Barden v. Board of Trustees of Judges Retirement Sys., 174 N.E.2d 168, 170 (111. 1961).
But see Haverstock v. State Pub. Employees Retirement Fund, 490 N.E.2d 357, 360-61 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986).
108. Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 297 (N.M. 1995). The fact that the employee was required to
contribute to the plan did not change the result. Haverstock, 490 N.E.2d at 360-61.
109. Opinion of the Justices, 303 N.E.2d 320, 327-28 (Mass. 1973).
110. Id.; see Spina v. Consolidated Police and Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 197 A.2d 169,
176 (N.J. 1963) (finding the concept of contract was inadequate and concluding that a pension plan
was merely legislative policy).
111. Oregon State Police Officers' Ass'n v. State, 918 P.2d 765, 773-74 (Or. 1996); 1 ARTHUR
LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3.9 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993); SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6:31 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1991).
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agreement to the burdens and benefits of the plan. Hence, the transaction
certainly has the appearance of assent to a specific pension bargain.' 2
Requiring employee contributions"' is an additional ground for
concluding that there is a contract. Where the employee's consent to join
the plan includes an agreement to place part of his pay in the plan, he has
good reason to expect a pension in return for his investment in the plan."'
Suggesting that employee contributions are not contributions because
money is merely transferred from one public account to another"' does not
withstand analysis. Since the transaction would not occur but for the em-
ployee's services, the employee earned the money. The fact that the plan
requires contributions and the money never comes into the possession of
the employee does not change the fact that the employee contributed part
of the compensation to his plan."6
Pension plans usually give a participant credit for his contributions."'
It would be especially difficult to argue that the employee did not make a
contribution if the plan confirms the existence of a benefit to the employee
from his mandatory contributions."8
The general nature of the transaction leads to the same conclusion.
Federal"9 and state'2° tax laws agree that mandatory contributions constitute
compensation, which is taxable to the employee. Several cases involve
federal employees whose wages were reduced by contributions. The fact
the contributions were mandatory and the money was merely transferred
from one public account to another did not alter the government's conclu-
sion that employees received the contributions for state income tax
purposes. '
112. Dryden v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 59 P.2d 104, 106 (Cal. 1936); Calaboro v. City of
Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541, 548-49 (Neb. 1995); Oregon State Police Officer's Ass'n., 918 P.2d at
773.
113. Eighty-five percent of employees are required to make contributions. STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 138 (Comm. Print 1978).
114. Hogan v. United States, 513 F.2d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1975); Police Pension and Relief
Board v. McPhail, 338 P.2d 694, 699-701 (Colo. 1959); Witte v. Director of Revenue, 829 S.W.2d
436, 441 (Mo. 1992).
115. Pennie v. Reis., 132 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1889).
116. McPhail, 338 P.2d at698-701; Hogan, 513 F.2d at 174; Witte, 829 S.W.2d at441.
117. An interest in an ERISA plan must always be 100% vested for accrued benefits from
employee contributions, while benefits from employer contributions may be less than 100% vested.
I.R.C. § 41 l(a)(l)-(2) (1994).
118. Zwiener v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 273, 275-76 (5th Cir. 1984); Feistmen v.
Commissioner, 63 T.C. 129, 133-34 (1974), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 587 F.2d 941
(9th Cir. 1978).
119. Zwiener, 743 F.2d at 274-75; Cohen v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1976).
120. Borthwick v. Veatch, 38 Haw. 188 (1948).
121. Bemknopf v. Commonwealth, 425 A.2d 880, 882 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981); Kjer v.
Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation, 24 N.W.2d 604,606 (Wis. 1946).
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Economic benefit is the justification for the income tax rule.'2 Even if
the employee can never acquire possession of the money,' 3 receipt of a
benefit such as an increase in pension rights'24 is a sufficient receipt to
justify a tax.
The effect of tax motivated arrangements is unclear. Under a salary
reduction agreement, the participant agrees to a salary reduction in
exchange for the employer's payment of a contribution in order to avoid
income tax withholding." A pick up arrangement reaches the same result
because there is no withholding when the employer pays the employee's
contribution."
The argument that the employee does not make a contribution is not
convincing. While the agreements are effective to avoid current
withholding2' and income'" taxes under special statutes, the receipt is
taxable under the general rules.' 9 Since it is clear that the employer agreed
to make the contribution for the employee, the payment should be treated as
received by the employee.
G. Contract
Where a plan creates contract rights, the question is the extent to
which enforcement is available.' 3 States which find that plans constitute
contracts but deny enforcement'3 ' probably do so to avoid the prohibition on
gifts of state money while also avoiding enforcement.
Other states go to the opposite extreme by prohibiting any change. A
typical situation involves an increase in mandatory employee
contributions and a decrease in benefits after an employee commences
participation. In one case, the court concluded that the terms of the pension
122. Canron Corp. v. City of New York, 674 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (N.Y. 1996); Humble Oil &
Refining Co. v. Calvert, 478 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1972).
123. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
124. Zwiener, 743 F.2d at 275-76; Feistmen v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 129, 133-34 (1974),
appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 587 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1978); Witte v. Director of
Revenue, 829 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Mo. 1992); Kjer, 24 N.W.2d at 606; Bernknopf, 425 A.2d at 882.
125. I.R.C. § 3401(a)(12)(A) (1994); University of N.D. v. United States, 603 F.2d 702, 703
(8th Cir. 1979).
126. I.R.C. § 414(h)(2), § 3401(a)(12)(A) (1994); Rev. Rul. 77-462, 1977-2 C.B. 358.
127. I.R.C. § 414(h)(2), § 3401(a)(12)(A) (1994); University of N.D., 603 F.2d at 703-06; Rev.
Rul. 77-462, 1977-2 C.B. 358.
128. I.R.C. § 402(a) (1994); Rev. Rul. 77-462, 1977-2 C.B. 358.
129. A contribution to a vested account in a nonexempt pension trust is taxable. I.R.C. §
402(b)(1) (1994); Zwiener, 743 F.2d at 275-76; Feistmen, 63 T.C. at 133; Wine, 829 S.W.2d at 441;
Bernknopf, 425 A.2d at 882; Kjer, 24 N.W.2d at 606.
130. See generally Note, Public Employee Pensions, supra note 47, at 998-1003 (arguing that
contract doctrine offers limited guidance to courts in accommodating the interests of pensioners and
the government).
131. City of Dallas v. Trammell, 101 S.W.2d 1009, 1013-14 (Tex. 1937). Refusing to provide a
remedy probably is an improper impairment of the obligation of contract. United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.17 (1977).
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were established when participation began and they could not be
unilaterally modified. ,32 This interpretation entitles the employee to
receive pension payments based on the benefit formula in force when the
employee commenced participation.'33
There are intermediate positions which attempt to compromise
between the contractual rights of employees and the desire for flexibility.
The California version grants limited contractual rights at the moment a
participant enters the system.'34 The right prevents repeal, and modifications
are permitted'35 if they are reasonable.'" A modification is reasonable if it
has a material relationship to the operation of the pension system. and any




Cases construing the Contract Clause' 39 generally permit legislation to
be changed. The Supreme Court concluded that legislative programs
usually can be repealed or modified'" because state and local governments
typically have the sovereign right to change their spending priorities at any
time. The right to change financial arrangements is limited if a statute is
considered a contract between the government and private interests.'
Impairments are upheld if they are reasonable and serve an important
public purpose. However, the mere fact that a government would prefer to
spend the money for the public good does not justify an impairment of its
financial obligations. The impairment must be compared with other means
132. The court concluded that pension rights "vest" at the moment a participant receives a
legally protected interest. Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541, 550 (Neb. 1995).
133. Yeazell v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541, 546 (Ariz. 1965); Pennsylvania Fed'n of Teachers v.
School Dist., 484 A.2d 751, 752-53 (Pa. 1984).
134. Board of Admin. of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207,
230 (Cal. 1997); Dryden v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 59 P.2d 104, 105-06 (Cal. 1936).
135. One opinion suggested that the pension statute included an implied right to make
reasonable modifications. Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 802-03 (Cal. 1947). Another
concluded that the employee contracted for a substantial pension, and he was presumed to have
acquiesced to reasonable modifications. Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 296 P.2d 536, 540 (Wash.
1956).
136. Wallace v. City of Fresno, 265 P.2d 884, 886 (Cal. 1954).
137. Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955).
138. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 326 P.2d 484, 488-89 (Cal. 1958).
139. "No State shall ... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .. " U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L.
REv. 433 (1993); Barton H. Thompson, The History of the Judicial Impairment "Doctrine" and Its
Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1373 (1992).
140. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Pennie v. Reis., 132 U.S. 464 (1889).
141. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451,
465-66 (1985); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,21-25 (1977).
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of serving the public purpose, and any benefits received by the other party
to the contract.1
2
One court applied the impairment criterion to a pension plan where a
state changed the timing of contributions from monthly to annually 12
months in arrears. 3 The court determined that the state financial problems
did not justify the arrears approach to contributions.'" In another case, a
city repealed part of a plan because of financial problems." The repeal was
rejected because the city failed to provide any evidence that a less drastic
measure would not deal with the financial problem, and the disadvantage
was not offset by another benefit.'"
I. Detrimental Reliance
A contract sometimes will be implied from the circumstances. The
party to be charged must have made a promise that a reasonable person
would expect to induce action or forbearance. A contract arises if it does
induce the action or forbearance and enforcement is necessary to avoid
injustice.'" Reasonable people can differ about whether particular
circumstances are adequate to justify application of the doctrine.
One case involved an employee who elected to join a municipal
pension plan, and retired with 23 years of service.'" Payments were
suspended after the state enacted a minimum age requirement.'" The court
observed that a pension was promised without mention of a minimum age
requirement, and that the employee relied on the promise when he elected
to join the plan." Once he elected to become eligible for benefits, the state
was estopped to deny his right to those benefits. 5 '
142. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 28-32; Board of Admin. of the Public Employees'
Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); see Stephen F. Befort, Public
Sector Bargaining: Fiscal Crises and Unilateral Change, 69 MiNN. L. REV. 1221 (1985); Stewart E.
Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
647 (1988); Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Contract Clause-Fourth Circuit Upholds City's
Payroll Reduction Plan As a Reasonable and Necessary Impairment of Public Contract-Baltimore
Teachers Union v. Mayor, 107 HARv. L. REV. 949 (1994).
143. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2dat213.
144. Id. at 242. Similar ploys have been rejected by other states. See McDermott v. Regan, 624
N.E.2d 985 (N.Y. 1993).
145. Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541 (Neb. 1995).
146. Id. at 551-52.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
148. Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Employees' Retirement Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, 742
(Minn. 1983).
149. Id. at 742-43.
150. Id. at 749.
151. Id.; see also Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc. v. County of Mower, 483 N.W.2d 696,
701 (Minn. 1992). On the other hand, reliance on reemployment criterion in effect at the time of
retirement did not create an implied contract. Retired Adjunct Professors v. Almond, 690 A.2d 1342,
1345 (R.I. 1997). See generally Case Note, Public Employee Pension Benefits-A Promissory
Estoppel Approach, 10 WM. MrTCHELL L. REV. 287 (1984) (discussing Christensen v. Minneapolis
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J. Property
Since a participant has a right to benefits,' 2 his interest in a pension
plan is a property right'" which cannot be taken without due process.'4 State
courts have concluded that due process is satisfied by notice and an
opportunity to be heard on proposed changes to pension arrangements.'"
Whether due process"' requires compensation is unclear. Elimination
or reduction of a pension right certainly appears to be a taking of property
for use by the government. If the change is not an actual taking, the issue is
whether governmental action amounted to a taking.' Although regulations
which prevent all economically viable use is a deemed taking of land, the
Supreme Court suggested that a change which renders personal property
less valuable or even worthless usually does not require compensation.'"
Perhaps the distinction can be justified by the differences between real
and personal property. Because most parcels of land are capable of many
types of productive use, the fact that one or more uses are prohibited
usually does not render a parcel economically useless. If personal property
has only one use, prohibition of that use renders it economically useless.
The expense of requiring compensation for that sort of prohibition might
frustrate many otherwise appropriate regulations.
The fact that the Due Process Clause applies to private property sug-
gests that all property should be given the same treatment.'"9 Attempts to
explain the distinction have produced discussions of issues such as social
Employees' Retirement Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. 1983), where the court reconciled the gratuity
and contract theory approaches to public employee pension ights).
152. Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 301 (N.M. 1995).
153. Rehon, supra note 47, at 163-67; Note, Public Employee Pensions, supra note 47, at 1003-
05.
154. The Due Process Clause provides that "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. What constitutes property generally is a matter
of state law. D. Benjamin Barros, Defining "Property" in the Just Compensation Clause, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 1853, 1865-82 (1995).
155. Pierce, 910 P.2d at 304-05.
156. See Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. REv. 531 (1995);
Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993); Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law, 26 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 955 (1993); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 1433 (1993).
157. Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on
Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 655-56 (1996). See generally Margaret Jane Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 991-1008 (1982) (discussing takings issues by
using the "rough dichotomy between personal and fungible property").
158. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992); see Susan A.
Austin, Comment, Tradeable Emissions Programs: Implications Under the Takings Clause, 26
ENv-rL. L. 323,336, 346 (1996); McUsic, supra note 157, at 655 n.214.
159. Clegg, supra note 156, at 533-34; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Responsibility, Causation, and the
Harm-Benefit Line in Takings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 433,468 n. 178 (1995).
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contract and the expectations of owners,'" forfeitures as a means of
preventing undesirable uses,'6 ' and cases involving endangered species.'62
Several commentators concluded that there is no reasonable basis for
distinguishing real and personal property for due process purposes."
K. Trust
A trust is created whenever a person intends'" that the property will
be held for the benefit of one or more persons.'65 The existence and con-
tinuation of a trust is not affected by the lack of involvement of the bene-
ficiary in the creation and operation of the trust.'" Hence, the fact that the
beneficiary did not know of a proposed trust,'6" did not contribute to it,'"
and did not accept benefits, does not affect the trust.'" Since the identity
of the trustee is irrelevant, the trustee may be the settlor, or his officials
or employees.'"0
Rights to trust property"' are determined by the trust instrument.' 2
The settlor has no further interest in anything conveyed to the trust ex-
cept to the extent of expressly reserved rights. If nothing has been re-
served, the settlor is not entitled to remove assets from the trust, and
has no right to use trust assets. If the settlor is permitted to use trust as-
sets, it must be the result of an arm's length transaction.' 5
160. Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1411,1423-25
(1993); William W. Fisher I, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1399-1400 (1993).
161. John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLuiM.
J. ENVrL. L. 1,3-4 (1993).
162. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and
Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REv. 305,328-35 (1997).
163. MARK L. POLLOT, GRAND THEFt AND PETrT LARCENY: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AMERICA
194-95 (1993); Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and
Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REv. 91, 128, 130-31 (1995).
164. AUSTIN WAKEMAN Scor & WILLIA FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 23
(4th ed. 1987); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 25, § 46.
165. SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 164, § 2.3; BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 25, § 1.
166. See ScOrr & FRATCHER, supra note 164, § 14, at 185.
167. See id. § 36, at 385.
168. Id. § 29.
169. Id. § 36.1, at 389-92.
170. Id. § 32.5; see Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 820 n.1, 825-26 (W. Va. 1989).
171. The word property may be defined as a "bundle of rights" associated with a physical thing.
.See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
172. A statute expressly creating a trust presumably will be considered a trust instrument.
Where there is no express trust, the terms of the trust should be inferred from circumstances such as
the statute creating the plan.
173. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 25, § 42.
174. Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 827.
175. Compare 29 U.S.C.A § 1103(c) (Supp. 1997), with 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2 (1996). See
Note, Public Employee Pensions, supra note 47, at 1005-16.
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The ability of beneficiaries to obtain distributions is also determined
by the trust instrument.' 6 Most jurisdictions conclude that a participant
who has retired has an absolute right to accrued payments. However, the
right to any payment due in the future frequently can be modified at any
time before the payment becomes due.'" The trust arrangement may be
modified to the extent permitted by the contract, or due process princi-
ples.
Any beneficiary is entitled to protect his interest by preventing mis-
use of trust assets by the employer.'78 Hence, a participant can maintain
an action to prevent an employer from removing assets, require the em-
ployer to return assets, ' and block other actions such as improper bor-
rowing. "s The duty to preserve trust assets for the beneficiaries may ob-
ligate the trustees to sue to prevent misuse of trust assets. 8
The circumstances may justify relief that goes beyond protecting
assets in the plan. One plan created contractual rights in the beneficiaries,
and the state was obligated to make adequate quarterly contributions.'82
The court found the trustees had a duty to sue the state for failure to
make the contributions and ordered restoration of past contributions as
well as adequate future contributions.' 3 Inadequate protection for the
interests of participants led to suggestions of a need for federal regulation
of the trustee's conduct.' "
176. One court observed that each beneficiary held a "contractually vested property right."
Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 827.
177. See generally Selleck, supra note 54, at 205-08 (discussing matters to consider before
making changes in pension benefits).
178. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 541, at
167 (2d ed. 1993); id. § 543, at 217; see Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement Sys. v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989); PETER DRUCKER, POST-
CArrALST SOCIETY 75 (1993).
179. Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 831. Some courts do permit the employer to remove assets to
balance the budget. See, e.g., People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 642 N.E.2d 1180 (11. 1994).
180. Sgaglione v. Levitt, 337 N.E.2d 592, 596 (N.Y. 1975).
181. Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 825 n.12. See generally Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Socially
Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 Am. U. L. REv.
1 (1992) (focusing on socially responsible investing as practiced by pension funds); Marcia Gaughan
Murphy, Regulating Public Employee Retirement Systems for Portfolio Efficiency, 67 MINN. L. REV.
211 (1980) (proposing a model regulatory scheme for public employee retirement systems);
Romano, supra note 2 (underscoring investment conflicts faced by public pension fund managers).
182. Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 832-33.
183. Id. at 825 n.12, 826.
184. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95Tm CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 187-88, 197-98 (Comm. Print 1978);
Kathleen Paisley, Public Pension Funds: The Need for Federal Regulation of Trustee Investment
Decisions, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 188, 196-206 (1985). See generally DRUCKER, supra note 178,
at 75.
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L. Reappraisal
Using state law to require a government to honor an apparent pen-
sion promise may be impossible. Plans established by private employers
are unenforceable if the circumstances do not justify finding either a
contract or application of the doctrine of detrimental reliance. Govern-
ment plans are subject to the same uncertainties as well as the additional
consideration of politics.
Legislative bodies have a duty to represent all their constituents by
doing whatever is needed for the public good as determined by a major-
ity of the legislators at any particular time. The statement that "a week is
a long time in politics""'8 suggests that politicians should be free to re-
spond to the perceived needs of the community at any moment.
While it is desirable that the political system is able to adequately
respond to changes in circumstances, discretion should not be completely
unlimited. Benefits to society in general or to a group of people should
not unfairly burden particular segments of the community. One com-




Pension plans are not subject to the qualification rules unless the
plan is set up to derive tax benefits. A qualified plan is not subject to tax
on its income, ' and participants are not taxed on employer contributions
until after retirement." However, many plans and participants claim the
benefits even though the plan does not satisfy the requirements for quali-
fication.'
The pre-ERISA qualification rules apply to government plans."
Requirements include'9 ' a plan,"m funding,'93 and holding plan assets in a
185. The statement was made by Prime Minister Harold Wilson. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE
670(1992).
186. David L. Gregory, The Problematic Status of Employee Compensation and Retiree
Pension Security: Resisting the State, Reforming the Corporation, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 37, 40
(1995); Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 829.
187. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994).
188. Id. § 402(a) (1974).
189. See, e.g., I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
190. H.R. Rep. No. 93-779, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 248.
191. Additional rules address topics such as the adequacy of participation and vesting, and
prohibit discrimination in contributions or benefits. I.R.C. § 401(a)(3)-(4), (7) (1974).
192. Id. § 401(a)(1).
193. I.R.S. Publication 778, pt. 2(b) (Feb. 1972), reprinted in 3 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH)'
§ 2605.70 (1973), replacing Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 2(b), 1969-2 C.B. 59.
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trust"' which expressly prohibits diversion of assets for an improper pur-
pose.95 Certain transactions between the trust and the employer are pro-
hibited.' The IRS does not require an advance determination" that a
new plan or an amendment to an existing plan satisfies the qualification
rules.'" The consequences of failure to qualify are so drastic that most
employers want advance approval."' The fact that many officials have
little or no idea of what the rules are' suggests that most state and local
plans do not consider obtaining approval.
The principal problem with qualification rules is lack of enforce-
ment. The IRS has shown little interest in enforcing the qualification
rules." The fact that participants are permitted to obtain a judicial decla-
ration of whether the plan is qualified' may not be helpful since there is
no reasonably reliable method for enforcing a declaration. Political pres-
sure to obtain the tax benefits of qualification may produce the desired
result.
B. Government Plans
Government plans are exempt from the labor portion of ERISA,n
and are subject to the pre-ERISA tax qualification rules.' The plan must
be "established" or "maintained" 2" by a government' for its employees.'
194. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(1) (1972).
195. Id. § 1.401-2(a)(2) (1964).
196. I.R.C. § 503(b) (1974).
197. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(e)(1) (1972); Tech. Info. Rel. 1195 (Aug. 24, 1972), reprinted in 7
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) § 6902 (1973).
198. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(o) (1997). Determination letters on qualified plans are sufficiently
important to rate a separate set of instructions which are updated annually. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 97-4,
1997-1 I.R.B. 96.
199. 2 BORIS BrI-KER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES &
GIFrs § 61-11 to-12 (2d ed. 1990).
200. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 77-78 (Comm. Print 1978); I.R.S. and
N.J., supra note 3.
201. Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 165; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH
CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 33-
35 (Comm. Print 1978); see S. REP. NO. 92-634, at 97 (1972).
202. I.R.C. § 7476(a) (1994).
203. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (1994).
204. H.R. REP. NO. 93-779, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 248. A few of the original
ERISA qualification roles apply to government plans. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR,
95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
30-35 (Comm. Print 1978); see S. REP. No. 92-634 (1972). Some ERISA modifications apply to
government plans. See I.R.C. § 401 (a)(26) (1994).
205. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (1994). Although the tax definition requires that the plan be
established and maintained, the IRS apparently has concluded that the requirement is satisfied if the
plan is established or maintained. Feinstein v. Lewis, 477 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
affd, 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1980); I.R.C. § 414(d) (1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-09-037 (Nov. 28,
1978), modified, Priv. Litr. Rul. 79-35-040 (May 29, 1979); see Priv. Lt. Rul. 91-10-048 (Dec. 12,
1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-10-029 (Dec. 9, 1996).
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Administrators do not have a consistent approach to applying the
"established" or "maintained" requirement.2' The Labor Department feels it
is satisfied if the employer either contributes funds to the plan or has a
significant involvement in the administration of the plan. ' The IRS
considered several enumerated criteria and other relevant factors, and has
indicated that one of the most important factors is the degree of control the
government has over the everyday operations of the plan.2 '
If the government establishes the plan and there is no change in the
circumstances, the plan is always a government plan."' Governments
frequently hire private concerns such as insurance companies to operate
plans. If the government remains in overall control, it is still a government
plan." ' If a private plan becomes the responsibility of a government, it
becomes a government plan at the moment of the change."' Similarly, a
government plan becomes a private plan at the moment it becomes the
responsibility of a private corporation." '
C. Definiteness
1. The Plan
The plan must be in writing which expressly sets forth the terms and
conditions of the essential features such as benefits.2 ' The terms and
206. The term "government" means a state, a political subdivision of a state, or an agency or
instrumentality of a state or political subdivision. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (1994); I.R.C. § 414(d)
(1994); Rose v. Long Island R.R. Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 917-18 (2d Cir. 1987). Compare Rev.
Rul. 89-49, 1989-1 C.B. 117, with Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-41-040 (July 20, 1995).
207. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (1994); I.R.C. § 414(d) (1994). Compare DOL Advisory Op. 80-50A
(1980), with DOL Advisory Op. 86-24A (1986), and Rev. Rul. 89-49, 1989-1 C.B. 117 (stating that a
govermental plan may be defined as one established pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement).
208. Commentators have suggested a need for more definite criteria for identifying when an
organization is a government. See Ellen P. Aprill, Excluding the Income of State and Local
Governments: The Need for Congressional Action, 26 GA. L. REv. 421, 480-87 (1992); Phillip
Marchesiello, Note, Federal Tax Immunity for State-Related Organizations: Michigan v..United
States, 49 TAX LAW. 429, 437-42 (1996).
209. DOL Advisory Op. 79-83A (1979). Compare DOL Advisory Op. 80-16A (1980), with
DOL Advisory Op. 86-23A (1986). Application of the criterion to multi-employer plans is more
complicated. See DOL Advisory Op. 83-36A (1983), revoked by DOL Advisory Op. 85-03A (1985).
210. Compare Rev. Rul. 89-49, 1989-1 C.B. 117, with Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-05-027 (Nov. 5, 1996),
and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-41-040 (July 20, 1995), and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-29-038 (April 27, 1995).
211. Rose v. Long Island R.R. Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910,917-18 (2d Cir. 1987).
212. Roy v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 878 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1989). See generally
Silvera v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 884 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a group benefits policy
purchased by the city for employees was a "governmental plan," although the plan was offered and
administered by a private insurer).
213. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-09-037 (Nov. 28, 1978), modified by Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-35-040 (May 29,
1979); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-10-029 (Dec. 9, 1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-10-048 (Dec. 12, 1990).
214. Hightower v. Texas Hosp. Ass'n, 65 F.3d 443, 449-51 (5th Cir. 1995).
215. Engineered Timber Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 808, 827 (1980); Rev. Rul. 74-
466, 1974-2 C.B. 131; I.R.S. Publication 778, pt. 2(f) (Feb. 1972), reprinted in 3 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. (CCH) 2605.70 (1973), replacing Rev. R0I. 69-421, pt. 2(f), 1969-2 C.B. 59 at 63.
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conditions must be communicated to the employees"6 so that they
understand their relationship to the plan as well as to ensure that the plan is
enforceable.'
The exact extent to which the plan must be enforceable is unclear. The
possibility that a right to terminate the plan will be exercised usually does
not affect the qualification of the plan."8 However, alteration of the
essential features of the plan is another matter. Since the employer may not
retain the right to modify the essential features, "9 the employer cannot make
a change that is less favorable to participants. The IRS and participants
presumably would not object to amendments that are favorable to
participants.
Several recent decisions conclude that state and local governments
may retroactively modify the essential features of plans.20 The existence of
this power means the plan is not qualified because it fails the definiteness
requirement."'
2. Pension Benefits
A pension plan2 must provide definitely ascertainable retirement
benefits. " Benefits are not definitely ascertainable if they are subject to the
discretion of the employer." Some recent decisions conclude that legisla-
tive bodies may reduce benefits whenever they choose to do so. " If legis-
latures can reduce benefits to suit political expediency,26 they are not
definitely ascertainable.
216. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2) (1972); Rev. Rul. 72-509, 1972-2 C.B. 221; Rev. Rul. 71-90,
1971-1 C.B. 115.
217. G & W Leach Co. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 988, 990, 992 (1981); Engineered,
74 T.C. at 827.
218. The possibility of termination does affect the qualification of the plan if the circumstances
suggest that the employer did not expect the plan to be permanent. Engineered, 74 T.C. at 822;
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1972).
219. Lichter v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1111, 1118-20 (1952), acq., 1952-1 C.B. 3, aff'd per
curiam, 201 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1952); South Tex. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 7 T.C.
764, 767-68 (1946), afftd, 162 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1947).
220. See Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513 (Me. 1993).
221. Lichter, 17T.C. at 1118-20; South Texas, 7T.C. at767-68.
222. Any plan is considered a pension plan if benefits are to be paid over a period of years after
retirement, and contributions can be determined either actuarially, or are fixed without being geared
to profits. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (b)(1)(i)-(ii) (1972).
223. Id. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i); Rev. Rul. 71-24, 1971-1 C.B. 114.
224. I.R.C. § 401(a)(25) (1994); Rev. Rul. 74-385, 1974-2 C.B. 130.
225. See Spiller, 627 A.2d at 513.
226. Leslie Scism, Coming Up Short: Public Pension Plans Are So Underfunded That Trouble
is Likely: Many States and Localities May Have to Cut Benefits or Raise Taxes Sharply: Some
People Delay Retiring, WALL. ST. J., April 6, 1994, at Al.
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3. Funding
Unfunded plans have never satisfied the requirements for
qualification."" Hence, a promise that the employer will pay benefits
directly to the employee fails the funding requirement." The employer
must make regular and substantial contributions. to a fund in an amount
needed to pay current and near future benefit payments.m
A plan may be considered terminated if the employer suspends or
reduces contributions. Unless the plan satisfies objective criteria, whether
termination has occurred is to be determined by examining the facts and
circumstances." A suspension of contributions is not a discontinuance if
the amount of benefits are never affected, and a minimum funding standard
is satisfied."2 It usually is satisfied by contributions equal to the present
cost of future benefits earned during the year plus interest on the past
service cost."
Continuing problems led to several statements that funding should be
required," and the requirement was upheld." The fact that IRS
enforcement practices were inadequate was underlined by the mass loss
of benefits when the underfunded Studebaker plan was terminated. " The
227. Trebotich v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 326, 333-36 (1971), affd, 492 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir.
1974); S. REP. No. 70-960, at 21-22 (1928), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 423-24; H.R. CONFR.
REP. No. 70-1882, at 12 (1928), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 445-46.
228. Rev. Rul. 71-91, 1971-1 C.B. 116 (1971).
229. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1972).
230. Compare Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,813 (Aug. 16, 1976), with Trebotich, 57 T.C. at 334-36.
231. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(c)(1) (1963).
232. Id. § 1.401-6(c)(2)(i). The unfunded past service cost never exceeds the unfunded past
service cost as of the date the plan was established, plus any additional past service or supplemental
costs added by amendment. Id. § 1.401-6(c)(2)(ii).
233. PRESIDENr's COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS, PUBLIC POLICY & PRIVATE
PENSION PROGRAMS 49-50 (1965); Regina T. Jefferson, Defined Benefit Funding: How Much Is Too
Much?, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 8 n.35 (1993).
234. Funding was not a distinct topic in the formal IRS qualification guides issued prior to
1961. Funding was a separately stated requirement beginning in 1961. I.R.S. Publication 778, pt.
2(b) (Feb. 1972), reprinted in 3 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) J2605.70 (1973) replacing Rev. Rul.
69-421, pt. 2(b), 1969-2 C.B. 59, at 62, replacing Rev. Rul. 65-178, pt. 2(b), 1965-2 C.B. 94, at 98-
99, replacing Rev. Rul. 61-121, pt. 2(f), 1961-2 C.B. 65, at 72, replacing Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1
C.B. 128. A funding safe harbor was added to the regulations in 1963. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(c)(2)
(1963).
235. Trebotich, 57 T.C. at 332-34.
236. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS, PUBLIC POLICY & PRIVATE
PENSION PROGRAMS 51 (1965).
237. H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 13 (1973), reprinted in 1974-3 (Supp.) C.B. 248; S. REP. No.
92-634, at 71-72, 75 (1972); Leigh Allyson Wolfe, Is Your Pension Safe? A Call For Reform of the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and Protection of Pension Benefits, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 145,
145-46 (1994).
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Studebaker episode was one of the major causes for the enactment of
ERISA.28
Political pressure motivated Congress to exempt government plans
from the ERISA funding rules. 9 Although governments argued that the
taxing power was a functional substitute for the funding rules, several
congressional reports note instances where taxes probably could not be
raised enough to pay the promised benefits.2"
Congress compromised by exempting government plans and ordering a
study. Congress went even further by emphasizing that the termination safe
harbors were not to become requirements for governmental plans.24 ' Hence,
those that do not satisfy the safe harbor are to be judged under the facts and
circumstances. 2 Although the study concluded that funding rules were
needed,4 3 state and local governments successfully lobbied against them."
D. Trust
Contributions and other assets of the plan must be held in a trust.
2"
Government plans frequently do not satisfy this requirement because the
mere holding of assets in an employer's account is unsatisfactory.2" The
assets must be held by an organization which is independent of the
employer. 7 Some cases conclude that the trust requirement is satisfied if
assets are held by an organization such as an independent corporation."
The assets must be the property of the trust at least to the extent
needed to satisfy all of its liabilities.249 The trust instrument' must provide
238. George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan
Interpretation, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 955, 975 (1995).
239. H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 90, 163 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 333, 406; H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 93-1280, at 291 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 452; S. REP. No. 93-383, at 67 (1973),
reprinted in 1974-3 (Supp.) C.B. 146.
240. H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 90.
241. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 291.
242. Id.
243. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESs., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 179-81 (Comm. Print 1978).
244. See generally Public Employee Pension Benefit Plan: Hearings Before the Ways & Means
Comm., 98th Cong. 1138 (1984) (presenting the statement of Mr. Hawkins of the Committee on
Education and Labor).
245. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(1) (1972); Rev. Rul. 72-14, 1972-1 C.B. 106. See I.T. 4102,
1952-2 C.B. 173, 174 (treating civil service retirement and disability fund as a qualified trust).
246. Rev. Rul. 71-91, 1971-1 C.B. 116; see S. REP. No. 75-1567, at 24 (1938), reprinted in
1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 796.; S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 21-22 (1928), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 423-
24; H.R. CONFR. REP. No. 70-1882 at 12 (1928), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2 ) C.B. 445-46.
247. D.J. Lee, M.D. Inc., v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 291, 297-99 (1989), affd, 931 F.2d 418
(6th Cir. 1991); Gillis v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 11, 16-17 (1974); Trebotich v. Commissioner, 57
T.C. 326, 333-34 (1971).
248. See Tavannes Watch Co. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1949); South Penn Oil
Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 27 (1951), nonacq., 1952-2 C.B. 6.
249. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(b) (1964); S. REP. NO. 75-1567, at 24(1933).
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that the trust is for the exclusive benefit of the participants and their
beneficiaries,"' and expressly prohibit diversion of assets to any other
purpose." Hence, the fact that the employer has financial difficulties and
needs the money is irrelevant. For example, when New Jersey removed
assets from a trust to close a budget gap, the IRS found the action was
improper.25
E. Prohibited Transactions
The purpose for requiring plan assets to be held in trust is to protect
them from actions of the employer. The prohibited transaction rules provide
additional safeguards by proscribing certain transactions between the trust
and the employer.
The trust generally cannot make loans" to the employer unless there is
a bona fide debtor-creditor relationship,' the trust receives a reasonable
rate of interest,"7 and there is adequate security."5 The security is adequate
if it is reasonably anticipated that the security will prevent any loss of
principal and interest in the event of default on the loan.nsA loan based on
the financial resources of the borrower is not secured 2° unless it qualifies
for an exception.
The security requirement does not apply"' if the trust pays the same
price charged to independent62 purchasers' of obligations and ownership is
250. It is unclear whether the requirement of a trust instrument is satisfied where there is no
writing other than a statute. Perhaps the statute satisfies the requirement if it expressly provides that
the funds shall be held in trust, or if the administrator's express duties are equivalent to those of a
trustee. See Rev. Rul. 69-231, 1969-1 C.B. 118.
251. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(a)(1) (1964).
252. Id. § 1.401-2(a)(2)-(3).
253. I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
254. See S. REP. No. 93-383, at 94-96 (1973), reprinted in 1974-3 (Supp.) C.B. 173-75.
255. The term "loan" includes purchasing bonds, debentures, notes, or other evidence of
indebtedness. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(c)(1), § 1.503(c)-1(b) (1976).
256. The trust must be a business-like creditor by doing things such as promptly recording
mortgages and demanding payment of principal and interest when due. Rev. Rul. 73-609, 1973-2
C.B. 187, superseded by Rev. Rul. 81-145, 1981-1 C.B. 350; Rev. Rul. 68-474, 1968-2 C.B. 240;
Rev. Rul. 66-324, 1966-2 C.B. 230, superseded by Rev. Rul. 80-269, 80-2 C.B. 191.
257. The rate is adequate if it is equal to the prevailing rate in the community for similar loans.
Treas. Reg. § 1.503(b)-1(c) ex.(4) (1976).
258. I.R.C. § 503(b)(1) (1994). The security requirement applies to loans by government trusts.
Rev. Rul. 73-586, 1973-2 C.B. 186, superseded by Rev. Rul. 85-114, 1985-2 C.B. 163.
259. The criterion presumably is not satisfied unless the security also covers legal fees and other
costs of dealing with a default. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(b)-1(b)(1) (1976). A loan which is partially secured is
not adequately secured. Id. § 1.503(b)-1 (c) ex.(2).
260. Id § 1.503(b)-l(c)ex.(1).
261. Even if the security requirement does not apply, the obligation must bear a reasonable rate of
interest. Id. § 1.503(e)-1(a)(3).
262. 1& § 1.503(e)-1(b)(3).
263. The exact requirements depend on whether the trust purchased on a market, from an
underwriter, or directly from the employer. IR.C. § 503(e)(1) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1503(e)-2(b)(2-4)
(1976).
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diversified." The trust cannot purchase more than 25% of the outstanding
obligations of the same issue,"5 at least 50% of those obligations must be
held by persons independent of the employer, and no more than 25% of
trust assets can be invested in obligations of relatives of the employer.'
Security is not required if a federal law prohibits pledging over half of
the assets of the employer 7 and the other conditions are satisfied. A trustee
who is independent of the employer must approve the investment" and the
amount lent without receipt of adequate security cannot exceed 25% of the
value of the assets of the trust. 
2
Loans that satisfy the restrictions of the prohibited transaction statute
continue to be subject to the general requirements for qualification. Hence,
they will be examined carefully to determine if the loan is for the exclusive
benefit of the participants and their beneficiaries."'
Trustees of several New York City plans knew that if they purchased
city bonds they would violate the exclusive benefit' and prohibited
transaction rules due to the general unmarketability and high risk nature of
the bonds." Although a special exemption was granted,"3 Congress
emphasized that the exemption was not a precedent for using plan assets to
deal with financial crises if the transaction violated the rules."
F. Taxability of Trust Income
There are two issues to resolve in determining whether a trust is
taxable on its income. The income of qualified plans usually is exempt from
taxation."5 A government plan loses its exemption if the trust enters into a
prohibited transaction" ' or becomes disqualified.'m
Where the exemption has been lost, the question is whether the
government is subject to tax on its income. Suggestions that Congress did
264. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(e)-2(c) (1976).
265. Idt § 1.503(e)-l(b)(4),-2(e).
266. I.R.C. § 503(e)(2) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.503(e)-2(c) to -2(d) (1976).
267. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(f)-1(b)(2) (1976).
268. Id. § 1.503(f)-1(b)(3).
269. I.R.C. § 503(0 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.503(f)-1(b)(4), -1(d) (1976).
270. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(a)-l(b), (e)-l(a)(3), (f)-l(a)(2) (1976); id. § 1.401-1(b)(5)(ii).
271. Rev. Rul.73-380, 1973-2C.B. 124.
272. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE
REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RErntEMENT SYSTEM 33-34 (Comm. Print 1978).
273. Pub. L. No.94-236,90 StaL 238(1976).
274. H.R. REP. No. 94-851, at7 (1976).
275. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994).
276. Id. § 503(a)(1)(B). After the exemption is lost, the trust must apply for reinstatement, which
will be granted if the IRS is satisfied that the trust will not again knowingly engage in a prohibited
transaction. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(c)-1(a) (1976). Reinstatement is effective in the year after the application
was filed. I.R.C. § 503(c) (1994). The trust will be subject to tax for at least one full taxable year. Treas.
Reg. § 1.503(c)-1 (b) (1976).
277. The 501 exemption depends on 401 qualification. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994).
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not receive the power to tax activities of state and local governments have
been rejected" and the extent of the general exclusion for governmental
income is unclear. One authority suggests that trust income is exempt
because it would be imputed to the government." Others are less certain of
the proper application of the general exclusion.2"
The general exclusion is not available if Congress decides the
transaction is taxable. The prohibited transaction statute applies to pension
trusts of state and local governments and the consequence of a prohibited
transaction is loss of the qualified plan exemption. 8' Since loss of the
exemption is irrelevant unless it makes the income taxable, it is clear that
the income is taxable.'
Congress also decided that state and local government plans are
subject to the pre-ERISA qualification rules. 3 Congress knew that one
consequence of failure to qualify is loss of the qualified plan exemption."
Although Congress was uncertain about whether nonqualified government
trusts were taxable,m a trust would have the burden of proving that it was
entitled to the exemption. It may be impossible for an administrator of a
trust to meet this burden.
G. Enforcement by the IRS
The IRS approach to applying the qualification requirements to
government plans developed over a period of time.2 6 The first substantial
restrictions on qualification were enacted in 194228 and the policy of
applying them to government plans" was published in a 1972 ruling."9
278. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 519 n.11, 523 n.14 (1988); New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572,583-84 (1946); Michigan v. United States, 40 F.3d 817, 822-23 (6th Cir. 1994). See
generally Aprill, supra note 208, at 450-65 (arguing that principles of federalism compel Congress to
revisit tax law).
279. I.R.C. § 115(1) (1994); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss.,
PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM 31 (Comm. Print 1978).
280. H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 163 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 406; Aprill, supra note 208, at
480-87; Black, Tax Exenption Issues for Public Employee Retirement Systems, 4 ExEMPT ORG. TAX
REv. 801 (1991). See generally Marehesiello, supra note 208, at 434-42 (summarizing various
approaches); Timothy Philipps, Federal Taxation of Prepaid College Tuition Plans, 47 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 291 (1990) (examining prepaid tuition plans and discussing IRS tax treatment of such plans).
281. I.R.C. § 503(a)(1)(B) (1976). See generally HR. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 at 307 (1974),
reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 468 (discussing administration and enforcement).
282. See I.R.C. § 503(c) (1994) (government plan that has lost exemption may claim exemption for
subsequent years); Treas Reg. § 1.503(c)-1(a) to -l(b) (1976) (government plan that has lost exemption is
subject to taxation for at least one tax year).
283. H.R. REP. NO. 93-779, at 5(1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 248.
284. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1994); H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 212.
285. H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 163 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 406.
286. See HR. REP. No. 93-807, at 102-05 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 (Supp.) C.B. 337-4, S. REP.
No. 93-383, at 106-10 (1973), reprinted in 1974-3 (Supp.) C.B. 185-89.
287. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 165,56 Stat. 862-63 (1942).
288. STAFF OF HOUSE COmm. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., PENSION TASK FORCE
REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM 33-34 (Comm. Print 1978).
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Although there were occasional instances where plans' and beneficiaries'
were denied the benefits of qualified status, a Congressional Committee
concluded that enforcement was almost non-existent until an enforce-
ment program' began in the early 1970s. It caused a flurry of protests '
and revealed some of the weaknesses in the IRS approach to government
plans.
Favorable rulings and determination letters were issued without
attempting to ascertain whether the plans satisfied the rules.' One of the
inconsistencies backfired when the Chief Counsel concluded the IRS
could not litigate a case involving a discriminatory plan for state judges
because he could not distinguish it from a favorable ruling issued to a
discriminatory plan for federal judges.' 3 This resulted in an announce-
ment by the IRS that it would reconsider the application of the discrimi-
nation requirements' to state and local plans for elected and appointed
officials, and whether those plans were subject to tax on their income.
Apparently improper plans would be treated as qualified until the study
was completed.'m
The study probably was not completed,' and the IRS's claim that it
was avoiding regular enforcement because the impact would fall solely
on the participants' is suspect since private plans have grown steadily
since the enactment of ERISA. While removal of the restrictions would
make more money available to provide benefits, private employers must
either absorb the extra cost or reduce contributions to pay the costs. It is
much more likely that the IRS found that enforcement made many mem-
289. Rev. Rul. 72-14, 1972-1 C.B. 106. Some federal plans obtained rulings at earlier times. See
Rev. Rul. 61-218, 1961-1 C.B. 102 (judges). Others were considered qualified. See Rev. Rul. 56-1, 1956-
1 C.B. 444 (civil service).
290. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE
REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 34-35 (Comm. Print 1978).
291. Dooley v. United States, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-6463 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
292. Gen. Courns. Mem. 36,813 (Aug. 16, 1976) (citing the auditing guidelines).
293. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC RETREMENT SYSTEMS 33 (Comm. Print 1978).
294. See Ridgeley A. Scott, Rabbis and Other Top Hats: The Great Escape, 43 CATH. L. REV.
1,25-26 (1993).
295. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,897 (Oct 27, 1976). When considering the plan for federal judges,
the IRS adopted the position of "extreme reluctance to find prohibited discrimination in any
retirement plan of the Federal Government." Gen. Couns. Mem. 32,019 (June 26, 1961).
296. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,897 (Oct 27, 1976) (citing I.R.C. § 401(a)(3-4) (1974) and Dooley
v. United States, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-6463 (E.D. Tenn. 1975)).
297. I.R.S. News Release IR-77-1869 (Aug. 10, 1977).
298. The IRS stated that tentative written results had been compiled, but that the matter was
still being studied in 1983. Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 162, 164.
299. Id. at 165.
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bers of Congress unhappy and decided to forgo enforcement in the inter-
est of promoting better relations with Congress."
The IRS is still not willing to start applying the rules. Twelve years
after the reconsideration began, the IRS announced that discrimination
requirements would apply for 1989.30 The effective date has been post-
poned several times 2 and the current deadline is 1999.0' The ruling on
the plan for federal judges"' is still in force and it is unlikely to be
changed since the IRS does not want to incur the wrath of federal judges
or Congress.' The circumstances suggest that the discrimination rules
will never be enforced against state and local plans.
The other qualification rules are also not regularly enforced. While
state and local plans are subject to requirements such as definiteness,'
participation,' funding," anti-diversion' and financial reporting," ' there
is no evidence indicating they are regularly enforced!" A congressional
committee found that enforcement of the reporting requirement would
have a major impact on public employee retirement systems."'
H. Enforcement by Participants
Participants"3 have the right to bring a Tax Court action '" for a de-
claratory judgment on the qualifications of a plan" ' if there has been an
300. The desire to keep on the good side of Congress was an express consideration in the
decision to approve a discriminatory plan for federal judges. Gen. Couns. Mem. 32,019 (June 26,
1961).
301. Minimum Coverage Requirements, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,441 (1989) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 1).
302. See I.R.S. Notice 9236, 19922 C.B. 36
303. The deemed satisfaction approach applies to all plan years beginning before 1999. I.R.S.
Ann. 95-48, 1995-23 I.R.B. 13. Different deadlines are specified for cetain types of plans. For
example, the 401(k) date is October 1, 1997. I.R.S. Notice 96-64, 1996-2 C.B. 229.
304. Rev. Rul. 61-218, 1961-2 C.B. 102.
305. Gen. Couns. Mem. 32,019 (June 26, 1961). The Chief Counsel recommended
reconsideration of the ruling on the plan for federal judges. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,897 (Act. 27,
1976). There is no evidence that the ruling was reconsidered. Id.
306. South Texas Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 764, 767-68 (1946), affid,
162 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1947); Lichter v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1111, 1118-19 (1952), acq., 1952-1
C.B. 3, affd per curiam, 201 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1952).
307. I.R.C. § 401(a)(3) (1974).
308. Rev. Rul. 71-91, 1971-1 C.B. 116; Rev. Rul. 75-505, 1975-2 C.B. 364; Gen Couns. Mere.
36,897 (Oct. 27, 1976), reprinted in 1976 IRS GCM Lexis 420.
309. I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (1974); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(a) (as amended in 1981); I.R.S. and N.J.,
supra note 3.
.310. I.R.C. § 6058 (1994).
311. Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 165.
312. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE
REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 33 (Comm. Print 1978).
313. I.R.C. § 7476(b)(1) - l(d)(2) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.7476-1(b)(1) (1988).
314. There are 2 time limits. If the IRS has not made a decision, a petition cannot be filed less
than 270 days after the application. If the IRS makes a decision and notice was mailed to the person,
that person cannot file a petition more than 90 days after the date the notice was mailed. I.R.C. §
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application for a determination letter."' If the employer did not apply, 3 7 a
participant can seek a determination on the overall plan3 ' or his interest in
the plan. This individual interest application should be adequate since any
determination or failure to make a determination with respect to the
qualifications of a plan apparently satisfies the jurisdictional statute.3 9
A person who seeks a declaratory judgment probably should apply for
his own determination letter. Since the review usually is limited to the
matters which appear in the administrative record, 2' participants should
develop the facts during the administrative proceedings. If the applicant
feels that his position would be strengthened by material from an
application by the employer, this material becomes part of the record if it is
referenced in the participant's application."'
The action may involve review of an IRS decision or failure to make a
decision. Participants may seek a disqualification of the plan for failure to
satisfy initial or continuing qualification requirements.2 Hence, partici-
pants can argue that the plan is not qualified because the plan is not
defmite, 3 the employer has not satisfied the funding requirements," ' or the
employer has removed assets from the trust.ra
Whether a declaration that the plan is disqualified would achieve the
desired result is uncertain. Since state and local governments are not
concerned about expense deductions, that pressure is not present. On the
7476(b)(3, 5) (1976). See generally Federal Land Bank Assoc. v. Commissioner, 573 F.2d 179 (4th
Cir. 1978), on remand, 74 T.C. 1106 (1980) (finding that a notice requirement does not apply if the
plan is not subject to ERISA); Treas. Reg. § 601.201(o)(3)(xiv-xvi) (1976) (finding a requirement
for notice by applicant to interested parties); Treas. Reg. § 1.7476-3 (1976) (finding a requirement
for notice by IRS to applicant and certain interested parties).
315. The term plan includes pension, profit sharing and annuity plans. I.R.C. § 7476(c) (1976).
316. I.R.C. § 7476(a) (1994); Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,417 (Feb. 14, 1978); James J. Clark,
Recent Developments, 42 ALBANY L. REV. 153 (1977); see S. REP. No. 93-383, at 112-16 (1973);
LAURENCE CASEY ET AL., FEDERAL TAx PRACTICE § 639a (rev. ed. 1992); George G. Short, Using
the Tax Court's Declaratory Judgment Procedure to Obtain Plan Determinations, 45 J. TAx'N 90
(1976) (discussing when and how the declaratory judgment procedure may aid ERISA applicants in
securing a favorable plan determination).
317. One study found that over 75% of governmental plans did not apply for an initial
determination, and those that did frequently made changes without requesting approval. STAFF OF
HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 33 (Comm. Print 1978).
318. The I.R.S. may refuse to accept an application which is not filed by the employer, a plan
sponsor, or a plan administrator. I.R.C. § 7476(b)(1) (1994).
319. I.R.C. § 7476(a) (1994).
320. TAx CT. R. 217(a); Joseph P. Clawson, M.D., Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (RIA) 799
(1993); Tamko Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 824, 837 (1979), affd, 658 F.2d 735,
738-39 (10th Cir. 1981); H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 108 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. (Supp.)
343.
321. TAx CT. R. 211(a), (c)(5).
322. S. REP. 93-383, at 115-16 (1973), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. (Supp.) 194-95.
323. See Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513 (Me. 1993).
324. Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816 (W.V. 1989).
325. I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
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other hand, participants would lose the benefits of qualification. If the
government made a contribution to a vested account, the participant would
be required to report it as income." Taxation of contributions presumably
would cause considerable political pressure.
Another possibility involves forcing the IRS to collect tax on income
of the plan. ' Although the IRS usually is not subject to injunction," a par-
ticipant may obtain injunctive relief if the suit seeks to require the IRS to
perform a duty." Hence, the court may order the IRS to perform if it fails
to perform a ministerial duty." °
The probability of success is not great. An act is not ministerial if it
involves the IRS' discretion."' Since the courts usually try to avoid
interfering with activities of the IRS, and the IRS has express discretion to
compromise civil suits,"2 the courts probably would refuse to force the IRS
to collect the tax from a government plan.
The probability of success may be irrelevant. Suppose the action also
seeks to have the IRS collect tax from every vested participant.333 Political
pressure from the participants, especially those who hold relatively high
office such as legislators and judges, may put the government in such a
difficult position that it will favorably resolve the problem.
326. I.R.C. § 402(b)(1) (1974).
327. One decision concludes that a state-related trust is not taxable unless Congress has
expressly imposed tax. State of Michigan v. United States, 40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994);
Marchesiello, supra note 208. Results may depend on construction of the statutes. Congress may
have intended to impose tax since governmental plans are subject to the qualification requirements,
and the consequence of failure to qualify is denial of an exemption. A similar argument applies to
denial of exemption because of a prohibited transaction. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1974); I.R.C. § 501(a)
(1994); 503(a)(1)(B) (1994). See generally STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH
CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 34-
35 (Comm. Print 1978) (outlining the consequences in the few instances where the IRS enforced
qualification requirements against public plans).
328. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1994).
329. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994); Vishnevsky v. United States, 581 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1978);
Blair v. United States ex rel. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 6 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1925); see Tull v. United
States, 69 F.3d 394 (9th Cir. 1995). See generally John A. Lynch, Nontaxpayer Suits. Seeking
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Against IRS Administrative Action, 12 AKRON L. REV. 1 (1978)
(arguing that the APA properly permits review of IRS rulings in appropriate circumstances).
330. United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40 (1888); United States ex rel. Botany
Worsted Mills v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1937); see Tull, 69 F.3d at 394 (9th Cir. 1995).
331. United States ex rel. Ashley v. Ashley, 3 A.F.T.R. 3420 (D.C. 1917); Murray v. United
States, 585 F. Supp. 543 (D.N.D. 1984), affid, 751 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1985).
332. I.R.C. § 7122(a) (1994). The IRS settled a qualification controversy with New Jersey.
I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
333. If the plan is not qualified, a contribution for a vested participant is taxable in the year
when it is received by the plan. I.R.C. § 402(b)(1) (1974).
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I. Recapitulation
State and local government plans seeking the benefits of qualification
are subject to the pre-ERISA qualification rules.33 The plan will be
disqualified if the government does not contribute enough money to fully
satisfy the funding rules every year.3 The fact that the government is not
obligated by statute to make the contribution3" and would prefer to spend
the money on something else is irrelevant.
Assets of the plan must be held by a qualified trust.33 ' If the
government removes assets for any purpose at any time,3 3 the plan will be
disqualified, and trust income is taxable if the trust makes an improper loan
to the government."9 The fact that the government was not obligated by
statute to make the contributions"' and has a desperate need for use of trust
assets is irrelevant.3"'
It is unlikely that the IRS will begin actively enforcing the law. The
IRS always feels it is understaffed and it prefers to use its resources in areas
which are more likely to produce substantial revenue without becoming
involved in political controversies. Hence, the participants and other
interested persons such as unions probably will be the only ones who are
concerned about enforcement.
It is unlikely that interested persons will be able to judicially enforce
the qualification rules. The utility of a declaration that the plan is
disqualified 2 is uncertain because the IRS is reluctant to enforce the law.' 3
A suit to require the IRS to enforce the law' probably would be
unsuccessful since the IRS has discretion to settle civil controversies."
The ability to obtain judicial enforcement of the law may be irrelevant.
If enough people are upset over the consequences of disqualification, they
334. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 30-35 (Comm. Print 1978).
335. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS, PUBLIC POLICY & PRIVATE
PENSION PROGRAMS 49-50 (1965); P.S. No. 57 (Aug. 5, 1946), reprinted in 3 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. (P-H) § 76,237 (1946); IRS Publication 778, pt. 2(b) (Feb. 1972), reprinted in 3 STAND. FED.
TAX REp. (CCH) 2605.70 (1973).
336. Trebotich v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 1974).
337. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(3) (1964).
338.. The only exception is when the plan has been terminated. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(a)(1)
(1964).
339. I.R.C. § 503(a)(1)(B)-(b)(1), 4975(g)(2) (1994).
340. Trebotich, 492 F.2d at 1025.
341. I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
342. I.R.C. § 7476 (1994).
343. Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 165.
344. See United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40 (1888).
345. I.R.C. § 7122(a) (1994). The IRS settled a qualification controversy with New Jersey.
I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
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presumably will put sufficient pressure on the government to force it to
timely follow the qualification rules.3"
IV. REFORM
A. Introduction
Promises by state and local pension systems may be enforceable if
there is a contract. The contract approach may not provide adequate
protection since many jurisdictions permit modification of a promise."7
Even states which have express constitutional protection frequently find
ways to avoid requiring compliance.3"
Rights are much more uncertain where there is no contract.
Enforcement depends on a denial of due process, which means that
complaints will be upheld only where property has been taken without
compensation. 9 Most courts feel that due process is satisfied by public
notice and an opportunity to be heard on proposed changes."
The IRS can control the conduct of governments by denying tax
benefits. State and local plans are not qualified unless they satisfy the
requirements of pre-ERISA law,3 ' which means that the plan must be
definite and enforceable.352 Since the IRS has shown little interest in forcing
governments to follow the rules,353 it probably will not do anything to
provide assistance to participants.
Several proposals to regulate public pension plans have been defeated.
Horrified at the prospect of being subjected to rules, state and local
governments sent a parade of witnesses to each of the hearings involving
346. New Jersey agreed to settle with the IRS since it had already planned to return assets to the
trust, and wanted to avoid costly litigation. I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
347. See generally Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 326 P.2d 484, 493 (Cal. 1958) (stating that
substitution of a fixed pension for a fluctuating pension is not permissible unless accompanied by
commensurate benefits); Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955) (invalidating
portion of pension plan which modified pension rights without offering any commensurate
advantages).
348. See People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 642 N.E.2d 1180, 1181-82 (Ill. 1994) (involving
transfer of money from pension funds to general revenue fund); Musselman v. Governor, 533
N.W.2d 237, 239-40 (Mich. 1995) (involving an executive order reducing the appropriation to the
public school employees retirement system).
349. See Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 304 (N.M. 1995) (stating that public retirement plans
create property interests that cannot be taken without just compensation).
350. See Pierce, 910 P.2d at 304 (finding that before the legislature may alter retirement
benefits, it must provide employees and retirees with adequate notice and an opportunity to respond).
351. H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 248.
352. South Tex. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 764, 767 (1946), affid 162
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1947) (finding that a qualified pension did not exist when the provisions of the
trust agreement are vague and tenuous).
353. See Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 165; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR,
95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
34-35 (Comm. Print 1978).
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these proposals.35 The representatives of state and local governments
principally argued that there would be a substantial increase in costs which
would cause termination of some plans and reduce the benefits available
under other plans.35
Congress took no action. Although several committee reports
recommended regulation, neither house of Congress passed a bill. After
years of effort, those concerned decided that passage was improbable and
there was no effort to obtain passage after 1984."
B. Legislative Background
An early draft of ERISA did not contain an exemption for
governmental plans.35' State and local governments argued that applying the
statute to their plans was undesirable because they were substantially
different than private sponsors. Many of the problems that led to ERISA
involved employers who had become unable to contribute to their plans.35
State and local governments contended that this problem was not appli-
cable to governmental sponsors since they had the power to tax to raise the
necessary funds.3 Further, they argued that the cost of complying with
unnecessary regulations would lead to termination of some plans and a
decrease in benefits available under other plans.' °
Congress was suspicious of the explanation. Reports suggested that
some governments could not raise taxes enough to pay for the benefits
which they had promised.6 ' Since there was inadequate evidence about
whether the need for regulation would justify the cost, Congress exempted
governmental plans pending completion of a congressional study?' The
report was over 1,000 pages long and concluded that there was ample
justification for regulation of several aspects of governmental plans. 3
The report criticized every phase of pension affairs. Legislative bodies
typically create and modify pension plans with little or no information
about the effect of their actions. ' Instead of seeking data about the
354. For an illustrative sample of witnesses, see Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 367-71.
355. See id. at 369-70 (statement of the National Association of Counties).
356. See Scott, supra note 38, at 590.
357. See H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 90 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 333.
358. See H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 12 (1974). reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 255.
359. See H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 90 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 333.
360. See Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at 369-70 (statement of the National Association of
Counties).
361. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBuC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 140 (Comm. Print 1978); H.R. REP.
No. 93-779, at 90 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 333.
362. H.R. REP. NO. 93-779, at 90 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 333
363. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORE REPORT ON PuBLIC EMPLOYEE RErREMENT SYSTEMS 81-82, 101, 179, 198 (Comm. Print
1978).
364. See generally id. at 63 (stating that the specialized nature of pensions requires technical
knowledge).
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probable future cost of proposed actions, legislators made decisions based
on the politics of the moment. 5 The fact that taxes could not be raised
enough to pay promised benefits' was no problem if the fact was
unknown. Any thought that financing might become difficult or impossible
was dismissed on the grounds that it would be the problem of a future
legislative body.'
C. PERISA
The congressional study led to several proposals to regulate state and
local governmental plans. They were comparable to some aspects of
ERISA' but they were more modest apparently because committees felt
that governmental plans did not require as much regulation as private plans.
Since the evidence does not support the implication that governmental
workers are less likely to be shortchanged, it is likely that the difference is
based on friendships between federal politicians and those holding state and
local offices.
1. Discrimination
Private plans must make membership available to a fair cross section
of the employer's work force.' The plan generally satisfies this
requirement if an adequate portion of the participants are from the middle
and lower compensation ranges." For example, suppose the only people
who are eligible for a plan are judges. If they are highly compensated,"' the
plan is disqualified unless it is proper to evaluate the plan in combination
with another plan, and the combination has an adequate quantity of persons
in the middle and lower compensation ranges."
Benefits from private plans must be nondiscriminatory."' The rule is
satisfied if all members receive benefits which are an equal percentage of
their pay."" Other formulas may be satisfactory as well. 5 Thus, even if the
plan for judges has adequate membership, it will fail if benefits are
discriminatory. For example, if the benefits for employees who are not
365. Id. at 63-64.
366. See id. at 139-42.
367. See generally id. at 63-64 (stating that legislatures modify one system without regard for
fiscal consequences).
368. PERISA is an acronym for Public Employees Retirement Income Security Act. H.R.
14138,95th Cong. (1979).
369. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994); id. § 401(a)(3)(B) (1974).
370. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(3) (1972); Rev. Rul. 70-200, 1970-1 C.B. 101.
371. I.R.C. § 414(q) (1994).
372. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(f) (1997); Rev. Rul. 61-218, 1961-2 C.B. 102; Gen. Couns.
Mem. 36,897 (Oct. 27, 1976).
373. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994).
374. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(a)(2)(i) (1997).
375. Id. § 1.401-4(a)(2)(iii).
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judges are 5% of compensation and judges receive 10%, the plan for
judges fails because the benefits are discriminatory."'
The nondiscrimination requirements were imposed on private plans
because Congress felt that it should grant tax benefits only if the plan was
sufficiently available to workers. None of the proposals would have applied
a nondiscrimination rule to public plans."
2. Funding
Employers must make adequate contributions to pension plans."'
Studebaker and similar cases convinced Congress that employers should
contribute the amount necessary to cover the present value of future bene-
fits so that funds would be available when benefits were due to be paid
even if the employer went out of business." '
Legislators frequently put off funding to make money available for
other purposes." Since governments do not go out of business and they
have the power to tax, the employer will continue to be accountable to
some extent. However, participants and their beneficiaries may lose all or
some of the promised benefits if taxes cannot be raised enough to pay the
benefits or if legislative authorities are unwilling to eventually fund the
benefits."'
None of the bills would require governments to satisfy a funding
standard.32 Hence, governments would be permitted to use any arrangement
from full funding to pay as you go. Once a funding standard has been
adopted, it would be enforceable by the fiduciary since their duty is to
administer the plan according to its terms.83 However, the bills would not
expressly prohibit modification of the standard in a plan for services
rendered after the date of the change.
3. Modification of Plans
When governments are unwilling to make adequate current
contributions, they frequently decide to reduce their liability by modifying
376. See generally Loper Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 385, 392-93 (1969)
(concluding that disparity between profit-sharing plan for salaried employees and pension plan for
union employees was discriminatory with respect to both contributions and benefits); Rev. Rul. 81-5,
1981-1 C.B. 171 (1981) (finding that disparity in corporate benefits between profit-sharing plan for
salaried employees and pension plan for hourly employees was discriminatory).
377. See H.R. 14138,95th Cong. (1979).
378. I.R.C. § 412(a) (1994).
379. H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 12-13 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 256.
380. See, e.g., Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 829 (W. Va. 1988) (finding diversion of
earned pension trust fund contributions to general revenue fund unconstitutional).
381. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETiREMENT SYSTEMS 139-42 (Comm. Print 1978).
382. See H.R. 14138,95th Cong. (1979).
383. See id.
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the terms of the plan.3 4 The modifications usually include retroactive
reductions in benefits."' Attempting to change the terms of a plan after a
benefit has been earned is improper."
Definiteness is a requirement for qualification. Hence, an employer
must delete a reserved right to change the plan, and the terms of the plan
must be published to the employees. 8 7 The IRS requires publication for the
purpose of establishing detrimental reliance as a ground for enforcing the
plan, 3  and a series of decisions conclude that plans subject to change are
not qualified.3'9 ERISA continued the publication requirement' and
established substantial ownership requirements.9
Private plans must make participants the owners of their benefits not
more than seven years after the beginning of participation.' Congress felt
the benefits were earned, and should not be forfeitable after a worker
completed a substantial period of participation in the plan, even if he left
the job or committed a wrongful act. 9'
The effect of the bills on the right to modify plans depends on the
circumstances. Since they require publication of the terms of the plan to
384. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RHTIREMEtwr SYSTEMS 43-46 (Comm. Print 1978); Gregory,
supra note 186, at 40; Romano, supra note 2, at 802-03.
385. See Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 514 (Me. 1993) (reviewing statute which reduced
benefits to state employees with fewer than seven years of service).
386. See Rubin G. Cohn, Public Employee Retirement Plans-The Nature of the Employees'
Rights, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 32, 33 (1968) (discussing a split in jursidictions regarding the permanency
of contractual rights within a plan); Selleck, supra note 54, at 205-06.
387. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2) (1972); Rev. Rul. 72-509, 1972-2 C.B. 221 (determining
that a plan not communicated to employees at the time of establishment does not satisfy the elements
for a qualified plan); Rev. Rul. 71-90, 1971-1 C.B. 115 (permitting substitute methods of informing
employees about a qualified plan).
388. See generally Engineered Timber Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 808, 827-28 (1981)
(stating that the purpose of a written plan is to inform plan participants of their benefits, rights, and
obligations, and to ensure the plan's enforceability); G & W Leach Co. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M.
(CCH) 998 (1981) (finding general notice distributed to employees did not satisfy the requirements
for a written plan).
389. See generally Lichter v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1111, 1118-20 (1946), acq., 1952-1 C.B.
3, affd per curiam 201 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1952) (finding that a trust is not qualified if the trustor
reserves the right to alter, modify, or amend the trust provisions); South Tex. Commercial Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 764, 767-68 (1946), affd 162 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1947) (refusing to
allow a trust to be a qualified plan when the trustor retains power to amend the plan).
390. 29 U.S.C. § 1021(a)(1) (1974).
391. Pre-ERISA law required vesting when a participant retired, and when the plan terminated.
I.R.C. § 401(a)(7) (1994).
392. Benefits from employee contributions must always be 100% vested. Benefits from
employer contributions must occur no later than either on completion of the fifth year of service, or
on a sliding scale beginning with completion of the third year and ending with completion of the
seventh year. I.R.C. § 411 (a) (1994). See generally STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR,
95TH CONG., 2D SnSS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
87-92 (Comm. Print 1978) (describing different vesting schedules).
393. I.R.C. § 411 (1994).
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participants and provide a federal enforcement right, an attempt to
retroactively reduce vesting, benefits, or funding would be improper.9
Prospective modifications present a different set of considerations.
They would be improper to the extent that state law prohibited the change.
There would be no relief for modifications that did not contravene state law
and only the the definiteness requirement for qualification might prevent
them.
4. Trust
Private employers must deliver contributions to a trust 95 and trustees
are subject to several express duties. The overall rule is that they act solely
for the benefit of participants and their beneficiaries." Hence, any act
which does not benefit the participants is improper.
The arrangements for holding government contributions frequently are
unclear. Where assets are held in a governmental account, politicians and
bureaucrats may feel they are merely another item of state property.3 7 New
Jersey claimed it was entitled to remove assets from a trust since New
Jersey was the owner of the assets.'" However, unless there was an express
right to remove assets, the claim was frivolous.3"
The duties of the fiduciaries are equally uncertain. Statutes frequently
are silent or indefinite about their responsibilities and court decisions may
be similarly vague. ' Where duties are unclear, fiduciaries frequently are
cooperative with the employer' because they are friendly with or feel they
owe a duty to elected or appointed officials.'
The bills established standards for fiduciary conduct which are
patterned after ERISA. Hence, fiduciaries would have been required to act
solely for the benefit of participants and their beneficiaries, and would be
subject to various subsidiary rules aimed at achieving the overall goal. 3
394. See H.R. 14138, 95Th CONG. §§ 102(a), 302(a)(1)(B), 302(e) (1978).
395. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1)(A).
396. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
397. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 188-92 (Comm. Print 1978).
398. I.R.S. and N.J., supra note 3.
399. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 25, § 42.
400. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBUC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 188-89 (Comm. Print 1978).
401. Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 825-26 (W. Va. 1988).
402. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 71 (Comm. Print 1978).
403. See, e.g., H.R. 14138,95th Cong. § 204(a) (1978).
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The threat of a suit to enjoin improper fiduciary conduct ' could be enough
to force a fiduciary to sue the government for unpaid contributions. '
D. Fate of the Bills
State and local governments were horrified at the prospect of being
subject to federal standards. Even minimal requirements could be a
substantial hindrance to unbridled discretion. Moreover, it is easier to
amend an existing statute than it is to enact the first measure. Establishment
of minimal regulations would tend to focus attention on the problems and
make it easier to adopt additional requirements for the purpose of further
reducing discretion. Politicians decided to conduct a determined campaign
against each of the bills and a parade of witnesses opposed each proposal.'
The principal argument was that any sort of regulation was unjustified
because it would increase the cost of providing pensions. Some of the
arguments were clearly groundless. Suggesting that current funding would
increase costs is the reverse of the truth. The only cost is to make timely
contributions. Making timely contributions reduces the amount the
employer would eventually have to contribute since the money will earn
income while it is in the plan.
Reducing or eliminating the ability to make retroactive changes would
not increase costs. The problem is that governments frequently make
pension arrangements by determining the amount to be paid as a retirement
allowance. Unions and other representative bodies typically are concerned
only with getting large allowances, and legislative officials rarely hear
anything initially about the cost of those allowances.' When the bill
becomes due at some later time, legislative officials frequently seek to
reduce it by making retroactive modifications to the plan.' If those
changes were prohibited, the government would be forced to contribute
amounts in excess of that which is convenient.
Failure to establish the actual cost in advance is not the fault of the
participants who relied on the plan and does not sound like a reasonable
ground to permit governments to avoid their apparent promises. If politi-
cians know they will be forced to honor their commitments, they pre-
sumably will be more responsible about making promises.
Preventing the employer from removing assets from the trust and
making the trustee subject to a duty to act solely for the benefit of
404. See, e.g., id. § 302(a)(3).
405. See Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 825-26 (holding that a failure to act in the face of illegal
legislative maneuvers is a breach of fiduciary duty by the trustees of a public employee pension).
406. Scott, supra note 38, at 590.
407. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 63-64, 180-81 (Comm. Print 1978).
408. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 514 (Me. 1993).
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participants should not require any discussion.' Settlors usually cease to
have any property interest in assets contributed to a trust 0 and assets are
placed in a pension trust to increase the probability that participants will be
timely paid in full."'
Government officials frequently see things in a different light. Since
the government contributed the money, the money should be available if
the government needs it for another purpose such as balancing the budget. '
Government officials who act as trustees frequently can not obtain a
reasonably clear idea of their duties, and they usually will willingly do the
bidding of legislative and executive officials.' One court used strong
language to describe the actions of trustees who cooperated in the removal
of assets from a pension trust."" The court wondered why they did not sue
to prevent the removals instead of appearing as defendants."
Governments want to retain their ability to remove assets and
manipulate trustees. Their suggestion that strict rules surrounding retaining
assets and the conduct of trustees would increase costs is illogical. The real
explanation is that it would force governments to make hard choices. When
the funds in pension trusts are not available for other purposes, legislators
are more likely to be forced to either reduce spending or obtain money from
other sources." The fact that some projects would have to be curtailed or
taxes raised or money borrowed is not a reasonable justification for
jeopardizing the payment of benefits which have been promised to
participants.
E. Prospects for Change
Proponents eventually decided that change was unlikely. Committees
adopted several bills between 1978 and 1984, but neither house of Con-
gress passed any of them. Failure to secure favorable action on the 1984
bill was the last straw, and no member of Congress introduced a
subsequent bill.' Hence, state and local governments managed to avoid
even minimal regulation of their retirement plans.
409. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 183 (Comm. Print 1978).
410. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 25, § 42.
411. See, e.g., D.J. Lee, M.D., Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 291, 299 (1989), affd, 931 F.2d
418 (6th Cir. 1991).
412. People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 642 N.E.2d 1180, 1180-82 (Ill. 1994); Dadisman v.
Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816, 825-26 (W. Va. 1989); I.R.S. and NJ., supra note 3.
413. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETREMENTr SySTEMS 71 (Comm. Print 1978).
414. Dadisman, 384 S.E.2d at 825 n.12.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 829.
417. Scott, supra note 38, at 590.
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Records of hearings on the bills identify the lobbyists and their public
testimony."" What is unknown is the quantity of personal lobbying by state
and local government officials. The fact that the committees adopted
several of the bills but neither house of Congress passed any of them
suggests that personal lobbying was successful with many members of
Congress.
No effort to secure passage was made after 1984 because it was clear
that Congress was not willing to approve. Since lobbying by state and local
governments has always been successful, another campaign is unlikely
unless there is enough support from the public or interest groups to give it a
reasonable prospect for passage.
The problem has been lack of organization. While interest groups have
been very active in dealing with specific local or statewide issues, there has
been little or no effort to organize a campaign to obtain national legislation.
Hence, Congress concluded that the complaints were not of sufficient
magnitude to justify even minimal regulation of state and local pension
plans.
F. Recapitulation
Unions and other interest groups have merely reacted to problems.
They spent much time and money on litigation and other efforts to deal
with specific state and local situations. '19 However, they have spent little or
no effort to obtain national legislation which could be a much more
effective method of dealing with the immediate problems of their
constituents.
There may be several explanations for their actions. Some are not
interested because they have never had a problem. Others are reluctant to
spend money at times when their arrangements are satisfactory. That may
be especially true if they fear a program could be counter-productive
because it might move legislators to take unfavorable actions against
satisfactory arrangements.
Perhaps their outlook will change when there is a bigger demand for
funds. Whenever there is a depression, governments are more aggressive in
their efforts to finance their budgets without raising taxes. If a sufficiently
large group began to take unfavorable actions against pension arrangements
at the same time, interest groups may decide to promote efforts aimed at
obtaining national legislation.
418. Joint Hearing, supra note 34, at v.
419. See Board of Admin. of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d
207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); McDermott v. Regan, 624 N.E.2d 985 (N.Y. 1993); Pennsylvania Fed'n of
Teachers v. School Dist., 484 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1984).
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V1. CONCLUSION
Politics is the principal concern of legislative bodies. When pension
arrangements are being created or modified, benefits to be paid are
established by criteria such as the amount legislators think would be
attractive to prospective employees and interest groups. There is little or no
thought given to who will pay the bill or how the bill will be paid."'
Legislators usually do not consider payment problems because the
courts do not force them to honor their promises. Refusing to pay because
other demands deserve greater priority would be acceptable if no previous
commitment existed. Once the government commits itself to make future
expenditures and people act in reliance on the commitment, the government
should be required to fulfill the commitment.
While some states force legislators to literally honor their promises,
most permit some changes4 2  and some have no significant restrictions on
changes. One state found there was no contract, and due process was
satisfied since there was notice and an opportunity to be heard on proposed
changes. '
The rules for qualified plans may offer some hope. A plan is not
qualified if the essential terms are subject to modification. 4 The
consequences of a finding that a plan is not qualified could be an effective
weapon. The tax rules have not been a significant factor because the IRS
has been unwilling to undertake significant enforcement activities.' and
there is substantial doubt about the ability of participants and interest
groups to enforce the tax rules.
Results demonstrate that federal legislation is the only possibility for
forcing many legislative bodies to honor their pension promises. The statute
should expressly prohibit retroactive changes, and permit participants,
beneficiaries and representative groups to sue to enforce the plan. ' Further,
benefits should be fully funded in the year they are earned 27 and the funds
should be held in trust.428 Finally, removal of funds by the employer should
420. STAFF ON HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK
FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 63-64 (Comm. Print 1978).
421. Pennsylvania Fed'n, 484 A.2d at 752-53.
422. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 326 P.2d 484, 488-89 (Cal. 1958); Allen v. City of Long
Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955).
423. Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 299-304 (N.M. 1995).
424. South Tex. Commercial Nat'i Bank v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 764, 767-68 (1946), aff d,
162 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1947); Lichter v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1111, 1118-20, acq., 1952-1 C.B. 3,
affid per curiam, 201 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1952).
425. Joint Hearing, supra note 34; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 95TH CONG.,
2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBUC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 34-35
(Comm. Print 1978).
426. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994) (empowering certain persons to bring a civil action).
427. I.R.C. § 412 (1994).
428. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
1998]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:2
be prohibited ' 9 and other uses should be limited to arm's length
transactions' which satisfy adequate fiduciary safeguards. 3'
429. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 25, § 42.
430. See Note, Public Employee Pensions, supra note 47, at 1005-16 (commenting on options
available to government when need for funding modifications arise). Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)
(stating that assets of plan are not to inure to the benefit of employer unless within an enumerated
exception), with 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2 (1996) (providing statutory exemption for services of
office space).
431. 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
FROM O.J. TO TIM MCVEIGH AND BEYOND: THE SUPREME
COURT'S TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST AS
RINGMASTER IN THE EXPANDING MEDIA CIRCUS
JOHN A. WALTON*
Imagine what could happen if the latent local passions were aroused
through channels provided by radio and television. Then there might
be no place to which the trial could be transferred to protect the ac-
cused.'
INTRODUCTION
When Justice Douglas spoke these words nearly forty years ago, he
probably intended to make a rhetorical, rather than a prophetic, state-
ment. Nonetheless, on March 14, 1997, the attorneys for Timothy
McVeigh attempted to make prophecy of Douglas's speculation.2
McVeigh was one of two men accused of bombing the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City.3 One hundred sixty-eight
people died in the explosion, which caused an estimated $651,594,000 in
total incidental costs. 4 Emotionally intense news coverage in Oklahoma
was of such magnitude that a United States District Court held that wide-
spread prejudice among the citizens of the state prevented the defendants
from receiving a fair and impartial trial.5 As a result, the case was trans-
ferred to Denver, Colorado.6
* Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.S., 1976, Illinois State
University; M.S., 1978, Illinois State University; J.D., 1986, Northwestern University School of
Law. Many thanks to my colleagues at the College of Law and particularly to Professors Jeffrey A.
Parness and James J. Alfini for their early input and continued support during this research. Thanks
to Professor Kathleen Coles for editorial assistance. Thanks also to my research assistants, Angela
Wu and Tammy M. Westoff, for their hard work. Special thanks to my wife and family.
1. Justice Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 1, 9
(1960). This article is based on an address delivered by Justice William 0. Douglas at the University
of Colorado Law School on May 10, 1960. See id. at 1 n.*.
2. See Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Request for Abatement or Other Relief, with
Supporting Memorandum of Law at *1, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M, 1997 WL
117366 (D. Colo. Mar. 14, 1997) (Motion of Defendant Timothy McVeigh) [hereinafter Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss] (claiming that national media coverage of his alleged confession made it impos-
sible for him to receive a fair trial).
3. For a brief factual and procedural history of the early stages of the McVeigh case, see
United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (W.D. Okla. 1996). McVeigh and his codefen-
dant, Terry Lynn Nichols, were charged with using a truck bomb and completely destroying the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1469-74.
6. Id. at 1474-75.
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On February 28, 1997, just one month before the beginning of his
trial, the Dallas Morning News announced via the Internet that defendant
Timothy McVeigh had confessed to the bombing.' The news spread
quickly, and by March 1, 1997, the story was being broadcast nation-
wide.' Two weeks before his trial, McVeigh filed a motion to dismiss the
entire prosecution based on this prejudicial pretrial publicity. The federal
district court dismissed it in short order." McVeigh responded with a writ
of prohibition that he filed in the Tenth Circuit, seeking review of the
District Court's ruling." The court denied the writ with similar dispatch.
The fact that McVeigh experienced prejudicial pretrial publicity
shortly before the beginning of his trial is nothing new.'3 The fact that the
story received national coverage is similarly familiar." Also common in
high profile trials is the defendant's request for a change of venue.'5 What
7. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at * 1. For discussion of the McVeigh Mo-
tion to Dismiss, see infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
8. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at * 1.
9. Id.
10. Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative,
Request for Abatement or Other Relief, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M, 1997 WL
117369 (D. Colo. Mar. 17, 1997) [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion] (denying McVeigh's Motion
to Dismiss).
11. Petitioner-Defendant Timothy James McVeigh's Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Brief
in Support (Redacted), McVeigh v. Matsch, No. 97-1117, 1997 WL 194126 (10th Cir. Mar. 27,
1997) [hereinafter Defendant's Petition for Writ].
12. Order In re Timothy James McVeigh, Petitioner, McVeigh v. Matsch, No. 97-1117, 1997
WL 154760 (10th Cir. Mar. 28, 1997) [hereinafter Order] (denying writ of prohibition).
13. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 338-42 (1966) (beginning of prejudicial
pretrial publicity occurred when the Assistant County Attorney, who became Sheppard's chief
prosecutor, publicly criticized the refusal of the Sheppard family to permit his immediate question-
ing); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963) (holding that, considering the nature of the
media coverage, the Court could find juror bias without review of the juror voir dire testimony, and
that due process of law required a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people who had not
seen and heard Rideau's television interview); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961). In Irvin,
existing intensive pretrial publicity made it impossible for jurors to set aside opinions or impressions
and render a verdict based on evidence presented in court. id. This pretrial publicity consisted, in
part, of press releases issued by the prosecutor stating that the defendant had confessed to six mur-
ders. Id. at 719.
14. See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975);
Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 333; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau, 373 U.S. at 723; Irvin, 366
U.S. at 717; Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181
(1952); United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980); State v. Smart, 622 A.2d 1197 (N.H.
1993); People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1972); People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1976). For a discussion of cases receiving national publicity, see Robert
Hardaway & Douglas B. Tumminello, Pretrial Publicity in Criminal Cases in National Notoriety:
Constructing a Remedy for the Remediless Wrong, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 39 (1996).
15. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 346; Estes, 381 U.S. at 535; Rideau, 373 U.S. at 724; Irvin, 366
U.S. at 720; Charles H. Whitebread & Darrell W. Contreras, Free Press v. Fair Trial: Protecting the
Criminal Defendant's Rights in a Highly Publicized Trial by Applying the Sheppard-Mu'Min
Remedy, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1587, 1615-18 (1996) (noting that the McVeigh trial's change of venue
to another state, though unusual, was of little value in reducing the risk of bias resulting from pretrial
publicity).
FROM O.J. TO MCVEIGH
is uncommon, however, was McVeigh's attempt to have his indictment
dismissed because of prejudicial pretrial publicity, such that he would be
insulated from federal prosecution. This has been labeled
unprecedented.'6 Interestingly, McVeigh's motion came on the heels of
another criminal prosecution considered unprecedented-the double
murder trial of O.J. Simpson.'7 In contrast to McVeigh's procedural
move, commentators labeled the Simpson case as unprecedented because
of the media coverage it received.'8
A peculiar link exists between Simpson and McVeigh. Prior to the
O.J. Simpson trials, neither the courts, nor the country, had witnessed
pretrial coverage so pervasive that it could provide a basis for the motion
McVeigh filed, to dismiss an indictment on the basis that an entire nation
of potential jurors had been contaminated by media coverage of pretrial
events.'9 Throughout the Simpson prosecution, media coverage of events
was so extensive that an entire nation of prospective jurors were aware
of, and apparently held strong opinions about, the defendant's guilt or
innocence.'
Moreover, there is reason to believe that those who concluded
Simpson was guilty before or during the trial were not persuaded by his
acquittal.2' It is startling to consider, for example, that a prominent law
professor such as Ronald Allen would acknowledge that, while unable to
observe the evidence presented to the jury, he knew Simpson was guilty
based on what he had heard from the media.22 Allen reasoned that one
16. Brief of the United States in Opposition to McVeigh's Motion for Dismissal or "Abate-
ment" at *1, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M, 1997 WL 117368 (D. Colo. Mar, 14,
1997) (stating that McVeigh's motion to dismiss the indictment and his attempt to insulate himself
from federal prosecution was unprecedented).
17. See Nina Burleigh, Preliminary Judgments, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 55, 60 (quoting well-
known First Amendment specialist Floyd Abrams who, when discussing the Simpson case said, "It
is so extraordinary and idiosyncratic by the standards of any trial in history ... ").
18. Id. at 56 (referring to the estimated seventy million people who viewed the low-speed
highway chase that preceded Simpson's arrest, and quoting University of California law professor
Peter Arenella who noted, "we have never seen a case like [Simpson's]").
19. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *2; infra notes 195-208 and accom-
panying text; see also Eileen A. Minnefor, Looking for Fair Trials in the Information Age: The Need
for More Stringent Gag Orders Against Trial Participants, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 95, 97 (1995) (stating
that "the scope of publicity surrounding certain criminal cases has now reached unprecedented
levels").
20. See Minnefor, supra note 19, at 97-99. Minnefor suggests that trials like the Simpson trial
have received unprecedented national media coverage largely due to the expanding coverage of
cable television, which she attributes to a rise in tabloid-style programs. Id. at 107-08. She believes
that the mainstream press has begun to offer a similar style of coverage in order to compete with
these tabloid-type shows. Id. The result is "pervasive publicity both before and during the trial which
impacts the jury's view of the case." Id. at 99.
21. See Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process, and
Magic Bullets, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 989, 989 (1996) ("[A] vicious crime has gone unpunished and
the likely perpetrator now walks among us free from the risk of criminal liability, his presence a
constant reminder of the injustice that was done ... .
22. Id.
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need not go around the world to know it is "a sphere of some kind and
not flat."" Applying this in the context of Simpson, this is similar to
saying, "he is guilty of something ('a sphere of some kind'), and not in-
nocent ('flat')." Though the press provides neither the standard, nor the
appropriate source, of proof in criminal trials, media coverage was ap-
parently sufficient to support a conviction of Simpson in some courts of
public opinion."
Professor Allen observed that
the citizens of the country saw with their own eyes the acquittal of an
obviously guilty man of a vicious crime of violence, and they-we-
realize that the primary point of all the political rhetoric about rights
is the protection of innocent people from false convictions,. . .not the
protection of violent criminals from the consequences of their
actions."
This statement is indicative of precisely the type of fixed opinions the
Supreme Court has condemned when considering the effect of pretrial
publicity--publicity that would fix the venire's, or empanelled jurors',
opinions such that they would be unaffected by the evidence presented at
trial. 6 If the "citizens of the country" were not persuaded by a not guilty
verdict, could they be less resistant to its underlying evidence? Even
those who believe that Simpson's acquittal indicates a working jury sys-
tem must acknowledge widespread opinion that Simpson's verdict was
simply the result of jury nullification and racial bias.28 The critical point
for this discussion is not that perceptions of guilt or innocence in the
23. Id. at 990.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). In Irvin, the trial court excused over half of the
prospective jurors for holding biased pretrial opinions based on extensive media coverage. Id. at 727.
The Supreme Court emphasized that with preconceptions of guilt, "[tihe influence that lurks in an
opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental proc-
esses of the average man." Id. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion also addressed pretrial pub-
licity's impact on jurors' opinions, asking, "How can fallible men and women reach a disinterested
verdict based exclusively on what they heard in court when, before they entered the jury box, their
minds were saturated by press and radio for months preceding by matter designed to establish the
guilt of the accused." Id. at 729-30.
27. Allen, supra note 21, at 990.
28. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol, Through a Glass Diversely: The OJ. Simpson Trial as Racial
Rorschach Test, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 909, 913 (1996). Professor Cottrol noted that, following the
Simpson criminal verdict, the public concluded that jury nullification had occurred, and "[flew
public commentators were willing to consider whether a good case might be made in support of the
jury's verdict." Id. Professor Cottrol sees the Simpson trial putting at issue the fact that racism has
penetrated, and is tolerated, in the nation's police departments. Id. at 914; see also Richard A. Bos-
well, Crossing the Racial Divide: Challenging Stereotypes About Black Jurors, 6 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 233, 235-36 (1995) (noting the widely held stereotype that the jury's decision in the
Simpson trial was motivated by race, rather than evidence); John Leo, The Color of the Law, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 16, 1995, at 24 (citing the Wall Street Journal's report of racial nullifi-
cation among jurors "humming right along").
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Simpson case were often dismissed as racially motivated. ' It is whether
those perceptions, nationwide, were'a result of the media circus that pre-
ceded Simpson's trial.'
The arguable impact of the Simpson-type pretrial circus-nationwide
bias-was tested by McVeigh's motion to dismiss. This is odd because
the McVeigh prosecution, while forced from its forum state by early me-
dia coverage,3' has been described as a "circus-free" example of judicial
control over a high-publicity trial. 2 It is interesting, therefore, to consider
the theoretical viability of McVeigh's motion to dismiss if it had been
based on Simpson's pretrial coverage instead of McVeigh's.
The position taken in this article is that, after years of steady in-
creases, the media coverage of high profile trials went overboard in the
Simpson criminal case. This is noteworthy because Supreme Court
precedent since the 1960s holds that, at some ambiguous level, media
coverage of a criminal proceeding may be sufficient to create a pre-
sumption of bias against the defendant in all who witnessed it. Such
fixed opinions render prospective jurors unfit to serve. Thus, national
media coverage, like that exemplified by the Simpson trial, could result
in precluding an entire nation of potential jurors. The result of this pre-
clusion would be the success of a motion to dismiss, like that filed by
McVeigh. With that in mind, this article examines the test applied by the
Supreme Court to determine whether a particular venire of prospective
jurors is presumptively biased. It also evaluates the Court's voir dire re-
quirements for the trial court identifying media based bias in individual
potential jurors. The article concludes that, by applying the test as cur-
rently construed, the Court can indefinitely evade a presumption of na-
tionwide jury bias. In the case of coverage like that in the Simpson trial,
however, the Court risks jeopardizing the defendant's constitutional right
to an impartial jury by using current voir dire requirements. The sug-
gested solution to this problem requires trial courts to consider the ele-
ments of pretrial publicity that the Supreme Court has evaluated when
holding that bias could be presumed, in order to determine when exten-
sive voir dire is constitutionally mandated.
Part I recounts the historical conflict between the media's unfettered
rights in generating pretrial publicity and the protection of the venire
29. See Cottrol, supra note 28, at 915 (stating "it was ... the way the press framed the trial
and the issues surrounding the public reaction to it that helped transform the trial of O.J. Simpson...
into a presumed arena of racial confrontation").
30. See Minnefor, supra note 19, at 99 n.15 (reporting empirical evidence results showing
jurors' attitudes to be affected by "extreme exposure" to pretrial publicity) (citing Symposium, What
Empirical Research Tells Us, and What We Need to Know About Juries and the Quest for Impartial-
ity, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 547, 551 (1991)).
31. See United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
32. See Ryan Ross, McVeigh's Trial Lean and Trim, A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 24 (lauding the
"circus-free" atmosphere of the McVeigh trial, and describing U.S. District Court Judge Richard
Matsch's control over the proceedings as a "model of judicial efficiency").
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from pretrial publicity bias. Part II discusses the tests the Supreme Court
has employed to evaluate the impact of media based bias, and the Court's
attempts to diminish or prevent that impact. This part notes the apparent
change in the tenor of the Court's decisions following Sheppard v. Max-
well. Part III considers the factual elements of pretrial events to which
those tests have been applied. Part IV discusses the "totality of circum-
stances" test, as construed by Murphy v. Florida and subsequent cases,
and finds that the level of national jury bias alleged in the McVeigh mo-
tion could not sustain a dismissal under the current test. Part IV con-
cludes that, under current voir dire requirements, the Court's refusal to
presume bias may jeopardize defendants' fair trial rights in high profile
cases. Part V proposes a solution, suggesting that certain types of pretrial
publicity should trigger constitutionally mandated questions during voir
dire about what publicity prospective jurors specifically witnessed.
In conclusion, this article'fids that under the current test, there is
no amount of coverage sufficient to establish a presumption of bias for
the entire national venire. Therefore, a case like McVeigh will be ana-
lyzed in accord with the Supreme Court's holding in Mu'Min v.
Virginia,33 which upholds the trial court's reliance on individual jurors'
assurances that they can be fair and impartial. Moreover, the article sug-
gests that the magnitude of the Simpson media coverage puts at issue the
level of trial coverage required before the court can presume bias. Ap-
plying the totality of circumstances test, arguably, the Court can use the
Simpson trial coverage as a basis for holding that a new standard of pre-
trial publicity is the appropriate test for national bias; that what was suf-
ficient to prove or presume bias under the circumstances examined in, for
example, Sheppard v. Maxwell, is not enough for McVeigh and that what
might satisfy the test for McVeigh, will not satisfy the test for a subse-
quent high profile defendant like McVeigh's alleged co-conspirator,
Terry Nichols.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONFLIcT BETWEEN FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIALS
The right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial and impartial jury is
guaranteed by the United States Constitution' 4 The free press guarantee
has equally substantial underpinnings. 5 There is, however, a long history
of conflict between the two,3 rooted in the fact that the framers did not
33. 500 U.S. 415,431 (1991).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed...").
35. U.S. CONST. amend.-I (providing, in part, that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press ... ").
36. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1897) (No. 14,692G). Chief Justice
Marshall faced the acute problem of finding a jury pool that had not formed opinions concerning
Burr, whose prosecution for planning to invade Mexico had been detailed in a Virginia newspaper.
Id. That the Chief Justice conducted a searching voir dire of the jury panel to draw out bias indicates
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prioritize constitutional rights.3" Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
declined to take a position regarding conflicting free press and fair trial
rights,38 instead wavering between the two, and championing whichever
is threatened at a given time. For example, in acknowledging the histori-
cal primacy of the rights guaranteed to the press by the First Amend-
ment, the Court has stated, "[T]he unqualified prohibitions laid down by
the framers were intended to give to liberty of the press, as to the other
liberties, the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly
society."39 While the Supreme Court has recognized the need to balance
an individual's right to a fair trial with the "passions of the populace"
impact of the press in influencing potential jurors, it has at times ap-
peared willing to risk potential jury bias in the interests of preserving a
free press.'
that the dichotomy between an unbiased jury and free press is not new. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 548 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 1, at 2 (concluding that the Constitution puts no qualifica-
tion on the freedom of the press).
38. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,729 (1961). Justice Frankfurter, in his concurrence,
found the influence of the press in jeopardizing fair trials as violative of the decencies guaranteed by
the Constitution, though the press was constitutionally protected in its reporting. He acknowledged
the Court's dilemma in this constitutional conflict, stating:
This Court has not yet decided that the fair administration of criminal justice must be
subordinated to another safeguard of our constitutional system-freedom of the press,
properly conceived. The Court has not yet decided that, while convictions must be re-
versed and miscarriages of justice result because the minds of jurors or potential jurors
were poisoned, the poisoner is constitutionally protected in plying his trade.
Id.
See also Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 547-48 (finding that neither the Constitution nor contempora-
neous writings addressed the conflict between freedom of the press and the right to a fair trial);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336 (1946) (noting that courts must balance between freedom
of the press and the right to a fair trial).
39. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941). The majority opinion noted that James
Madison, the leader in the drafting of the First Amendment, recognized that England's Magna Carta,
the forerunner of all modem constitutions, did not secure the rights of freedom of the press. 1 GALES
& SEATON'S HISTORY OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS 1789-1791, at 453 (Joseph Gales & Seaton eds.,
1834), cited in Bridges, 314 U.S. at 264. Madison also wrote that "the state of the press, therefore,
under the common law, cannot... be the standard of its freedom in the United States." Letter from
James Madison to James Currie (Jan. 28, 1786), in VI WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1790-1802, at
387 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906), quoted in Bridges, 314 U.S. at 264. Thomas Jefferson wrote, "Our
liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost." 9 PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 239.
40. See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559, 570. The Court held that a prior restraint on speech
is the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights, necessitating a heavy
burden to secure that in this case had not been met. Id. The Court stated that pretrial publicity-even
pervasive, adverse publicity-does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial. Id. at 554. Furthermore, the
tone and extent of the publicity affecting an impaneled jury may be shaped by the actions of attor-
neys, police, other officials, and, most importantly, the trial judge. Id. at 555; see also Murphy v.
Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 802-03 (1975) (finding that a defendant on trial for armed robbery was not
denied a fair trial regardless of the extensive news coverage of defendant's past crimes and jurors'
knowledge of defendant's criminal record); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 194-95 (1952)
(finding that despite the district attorney's premature release of the defendant's murder confession,
and inflammatory newspaper accounts, the defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to a
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Notwithstanding the Court's broad interpretation of free press
rights, it has simultaneously endeavored to balance defendants' rights to
fair trials, expressing a need to protect fair trial rights when they are
threatened by the media's overzealous exercise of its First Amendment
privileges." In Estes v. Texas, the Court acknowledged the press as "a
mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs,
exposing corruption among public officers and employees, and generally
informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences, including court
proceedings." ' The Court, however, continued by stating that "[w]hile
maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying on this impor-
tant function in a democratic society, its exercise must necessarily be
subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process. '
The historical dichotomy between free press and fair trials predates
television as the dominant medium of trial coverage." But the Court rec-
ognized the potential hazards associated with televised trials when televi-
sion was still in its relative infancy. 5 Moreover, television commentary
outside the courthouse, and its implications, was not unanticipated.4 Yet
fair trial because of absence of affirmative showing that any community prejudice ever existed, or
even affected, the jury).
41. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 534-35 (1965). Estes's conviction for swindling
was overturned after the Court concluded that he was deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment right
to due process because of the televising and broadcasting of his pretrial hearings. Id. In Estes, the
pretrial publicity accumulated to eleven volumes of press clippings, illustrating the case's national
notoriety. Id. at 535. Furthermore, the hearings were carried live by radio and television. Id. The
Court noted that "[piretrial ... [publicity] may be more harmful than publicity during the trial for it
may well set the community opinion as to guilt or innocence." Id.; Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
466, 471-72, 474 (1965) (holding that due process guarantees the criminally accused a jury trial by a
panel of impartial, indifferent jurors, and was violated when two deputy sheriffs giving key testi-
mony that led to defendant's conviction had charge of the jury, and while discharging their duties,
fraternized with them outside the courtroom); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 724, 726 (1963)
(reversing the conviction of a defendant whose staged, highly emotional confession had been filmed
with the cooperation of local police, and subsequently broadcasted on television for three days while
awaiting trial, the Court stating "[any subsequent court proceeding in a community so pervasively
exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality"); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725-28
(1961) (holding that intensive pretrial publicity, which included a statement by the prosecutor that
defendant had confessed to six murders, made it impossible for jurors to lay aside opinions or im-
pressions and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court). But see, e.g., Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 191-93 (1952) (holding that newspaper accounts of petitioner's murder
conviction did not cause such prejudice in the community as to deprive him of that "fundamental
fairness" essential to the concept of justice and a fair trial, when the majority of the publicity was
immediately prior or subsequent to arrest and not during the trial itself).
42. Estes, 381 U.S. at 539.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692G); supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 541. The Court quoted Justice Douglas's article, which argued
against televising court proceedings because of "the insidious influences which [televising] puts to
work on the administration of justice." Id.; see Douglas, supra note 1, at 9.
46. Estes, 381 U.S. at 540. Justice Douglas's article was in response to actions by the Colo-
rado Supreme Court in 1956, which adopted the report of a referee that recommended televising or
broadcasting trials at the discretion of the trial judge, provided this would not "detract from the
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fair trial rights, though often touted as supreme in the federal courts,'
have not enjoyed a clear mandate of supremacy in cases where free press
and fair trial rights have been in conflict. ' The manifestations of this
ambiguous demarcation between free press and fair trial are evident in
several areas, and have perplexed the Supreme Court for decades.' For
example, that the freedom of the press is broadly protected by the First
Amendment is further demonstrated by the Court's historical antipathy
towards orders restraining the press.' And, while the power of the courts
to protect themselves from media related disturbances has long been rec-
ognized,' attempts to expand the contempt power have, at times, evoked
popular reaction favoring the free press. 2 One ramification of this di-
chotomy is the regular attempts by the Court to balance the media's
rights to pretrial reporting and the defendant's rights to a fair trial." At
dignity thereof, distract the witness in giving his testimony, degrade the court, or otherwise materi-
ally interfere with the achievement of a fair trial .... In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d 465, 472 (Colo. 1956).
47. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (declaring that courts must take
"strong measures" to ensure trials by impartial juries); Estes, 381 U.S. at 540 (stating that "[wle have
always held that the atmosphere essential to the preservation of a fair trial-the most fundamental of
all freedoms-must be maintained at all costs," and that the court accomplishes this good "through
rules, contempt proceedings and reversal of convictions obtained under unfair conditions"); Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 419 (1918), overruled by Nye v. United States, 313
U.S. 33 (1941) (upholding contempt convictions of two newspapers on grounds they prejudiced a
pending judicial action).
48. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Smart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (reversing order restraining the
media from publishing or broadcasting admissions and information which implicated the defendant).
49. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that,
every term, the Court reviewed claims that a trial had been distorted by inflammatory news coverage
affecting potential jurors).
50. See, e.g., Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 539 ; Alberto Bemabe-Riefkohl, Prior Restraints on
the Media and the Right to a Fair Trial: A Proposal for a New Standard, 84 Ky. L.J. 259, 288-89
(1996) (indicating that only two restraining orders have survived constitutional attack since Ne-
braska Press).
51. Compare Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1907) (dismissing petitioner's
contempt proceeding for lack of jurisdiction, while stating that "the propriety and necessity of pre-
venting interference with the course of justice by premature statement, argument, or intimidation
hardly can be denied"), with In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 257-59 (1948). In Oliver, the Court granted
petitioner's writ of habeas corpus because he was sentenced to jail in haste and secrecy by a one-
man judge/grand jury in Michigan. Id. The Court found that the defendant had been denied his Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Id. at
267. It noted, however, that "[t]he narrow exception to these due process requirements includes only
charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's busi-
ness . I... d. at 275.
52. Bridges v. Califomia, 314 U.S. 252, 266-67 (1941). The Court cited the case of Judge
Peck, who had impeachment proceedings brought against him as a result of his summary punishment
of a lawyer for publishing a comment on a case that was on appeal. This case led to legislation;
Congress enacted a statute concerning the power of federal courts to inflict summary punishment for
contempt, and specified that the contempt power "shall not be construed to extend to any cases
except the misbehaviour of. .. persons in the presence of the said courts, or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice .... Act of March 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 487, 488 (1831).
53. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 730. In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter states that
Not a Term passes without this Court being importuned to review convictions, had in
States throughout the country, in which substantial claims are made that a jury trial has
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such times, the Court applied several standards and tests, addressing is-
sues ranging from prior restraint of the press in order to preserve trial
integrity, to reversal of convictions when unrestrained press coverage
compromised a fair trial."
II. THE TESTS FOR BALANCING FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS
Reviewing the Supreme Court decisions addressing the conflict
between fair trials and free press reveals a history punctuated with vari-
ous tests for determining when the scales tip for, or against, the defen-
dant, or the media. In evaluating whether pretrial publicity has caused
bias, the Court appears to be searching for a test (or at least a way of
describing the test it selected) that would provide the appearance of a
concrete standard, with the flexibility to contend with the unpredictable
future of pretrial, and trial, media coverage.
Early standards adopted by the Court evaluated the authority of the
trial court to punish, through contempt proceedings, publicity that might
influence a trial." One such test, or standard, was whether the publication
at issue had the "reasonable tendency" to influence matters of law pend-
ing before the court.' In Patterson v. Colorado and Toledo Newspaper v.
United States, for example, the issue was the trial courts' ability to issue
contempt orders punishing these types of publications." The standard
applied by the Court was whether the publication had the "reasonable
tendency" to impact the judge's decision."
One year after its decision in Toledo Newspaper to adopt the "rea-
sonable tendency" standard, the Court decided Schenck v. United States"
and applied a "clear and present danger" test, raising the issue of the
limitations on free speech rights.' In Schenck, the defendants were con-
victed of violating the Espionage Act by distributing leaflets calculated
been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts-too often, as in this case,
with the prosecutor's collaboration-exerting pressure on potential jurors before trial ....
"Id.
54. See infra Part II.
55. See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918), overruled by Nye v.
United States, 313 U.S. 33, 52 (1941) (sustaining the trial court's contempt authority when publica-
tion had a "reasonable tendency" to impact the judge's decision); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
454, 460 (1907) (stating that publications about matters pending before a court that tended toward
interference with the court's administration of the law were punishable by contempt).
56. Toledo, 247 U.S. at 421; Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462-63.
57. Toledo, 247 U.S. at 410 ("[Tlhe situation is controlled by the reasonable tendencies of the
acts done [to influence matters pending before the court] .... "); Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462-63
(noting that a publication concerning a matter of law pending before the court is punishable if it is
"tending toward ... interference" with that matter).
58. Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462-63 (noting that the publication at issue was no less subject to
contempt because the matter was before a judge instead of a jury).
59. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
60. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
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to cause insubordination by military service recruits during war time.6'
Applying the clear and present danger test to the defendants' speech, the
Court stated: "The question in every case is whether the words used are
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Con-
gress has a right to prevent."'2 The Court noted that whether the test was
satisfied depended not only upon the words spoken, but the circum-
stances in which they were said.63 Because the defendants in Schenck
were not members of the press, the Court did not consider whether the
"clear and present danger" test was applicable to limit the First Amend-
ment freedoms guaranteed the press. Yet, the Court in Schenck articu-
lated a test which set the stage for protecting free press rights in the fu-
ture when it linked the stricter standards of the clear and present danger
test with the flexibility of considering the surrounding circumstances to
evaluate whether speech was constitutionally protected.
During the 1940s, however, the Court took strides to better protect
the First Amendment rights of the press. In Nye v. United States," for
example, the Court overturned Toledo Newspaper, holding that it had
improperly enlarged the contempt authority of the trial court6 5 That same
year, in Bridges v. California," the Court applied the "clear and present
danger" test to speech by the press, to determine whether a publication
should be deprived of constitutional protection.67 In doing so, the Court
simultaneously rejected the "reasonable tendency" standard, finding that
a reasonable tendency to interfere with the court's administration of jus-
tice was not sufficient to justify restriction of free speech." The Supreme
Court reversed the contempt order, holding that the clear and present
danger test mandates that the substantive evil must be extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be
punished.' Responding to the state's assertion that the substantive evil
61. Id. at48-49.
62. Id. at 52.
63. Id. (noting that many constitutionally protected statements made in times of peace may be
stripped of such protection in times of war).
64. 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
65. Nye, 313 U.S. at 52.
66. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
67. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 261-62. The Bridges Court used the clear and present danger test,
stating that "there must be a determination of whether or not 'the words.., used in such circum-
stances... are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils."' Id. at 261 (quoting Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52). The Bridges Court also noted that
even when there is a likelihood of substantive evil, the evil itself must be substantial. Bridges, 314
U.S. at 362 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)); see
also Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1947) (holding that the trial court had no power to
punish for contempt when reporting is inaccurate on cases pending before it and awaiting disposi-
tion, unless that reporting causes an imminent threat to the administration of justice).
68. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 272-73. Bridges involved two California newspapers adjudged guilty
of contempt for publishing comments pertaining to pending labor union litigation. Id. at 271.
69. Id. at 278.
70. Id. at 263.
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feared by publication is the disorderly and unfair administration of jus-
tice, the Court noted that "[l]egal trials are not like elections, to be won
through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspapers."7'
Nevertheless, the Court found it inappropriate to initially assume that
publications dealing with pending cases threaten fair trials.72 The Court
reasoned that, rather than grant the judiciary a contempt power to close
communications on pending matters, a study of the circumstances that
surround the particular utterance is a more appropriate way to determine
the likelihood that the feared evils will occur." Though the Court in
Bridges did not enunciate a totality of circumstances standard, it was
consistent with Schenck, focusing on the particular nature of the words
spoken and the circumstances of their publication, when evaluating the
constitutional protection afforded trial-related press coverage."4 Yet, the
Court in Schenk articulated a test which set the stage for protecting free
press rights in the future when it linked the stricter standards of the clear
and present danger test with the flexibility of considering the surrounding
circumstances to evaluate whether speech was constitutionally protected.
The Supreme Court affirmed the "clear and present danger" stan-
dard in Pennekamp v. State of Florida,7 a case against the Miami Herald,
and an individual editor, for publishing two editorials. These defendants
were charged with being contemptuous of the circuit court and its judges,
on the grounds that they were unlawfully critical of the court's admini-
stration of criminal justice in certain cases pending before it."6 The Su-
preme Court stated that public comment about pending cases may not be
as free as similar comment on cases after complete disposal.' Moreover,
the Court was not insensitive to the risks some publicized comments
pose for trials, stating that in borderline cases, "the specific freedom of
public comment should weigh heavily against a possible tendency to
influence pending cases. Freedom of discussion should be given the wid-
est range compatible with the essential requirement of the fair and or-
derly administration of justice."' The Court, in agreement with the Flor-
71. Id. at 271.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 270 (affirming the clear and present danger standard).
75. 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946).
76. Pennekanip, 328 U.S. at 333. The editorials at issue criticized the Florida circuit judges
specifically for not accepting the eight indictments for rape from the grand jury, stating, "[W]hen
judicial instance and interpretative procedure recognize and accept, even go out to find, every possi-
ble technicality of the law to protect the defendant, to block, thwart, hinder, embarrass and nullify
prosecution, then the people's rights are jeopardized and the basic reason for courts stultified." Id. at
336 n.4.
77. Id. at 346. In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter noted "that in a particular contro-
versy pending before a court," people should not be swayed from impartiality by extraneous influ-
ences. Id. at 366. A pending controversy is a proceeding that has been put at issue in the court and is
still there. Id. at 369.
78. Id. at 347.
[Vol. 75:2
FROM OJ. TO MCVEIGH
ida courts, found that the editorials in question did not report the full
truth about the pending cases, and failed to objectively state the attitude
of the judges.' Nonetheless, it held that such comment could not create a
clear and present danger to the administration of justice.'
The Supreme Court has reiterated the strong position favoring the
media's First Amendment freedoms while covering trials which it stated
in cases like Bridges v. California and Pennekamp v. Florida.' While
maintaining this position, however, the Court also began to consider the
ability of unrestricted publicity to bias prospective jurors, and the con-
comitant risk of that bias affecting the defendant's ability to obtain a fair
trial." In Stroble v. California, for example, the Court held that, despite
the District Attorney's premature release of the defendant's confession to
murder, and inflammatory newspaper accounts, the defendant had not
been deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial because he failed to
make an affirmative showing that any community prejudice existed, or
affected, the jury. 3 Justice Frankfurter dissented, stating that the decision
contravened the requirement that guilt be assessed on evidence adduced
at trial." His theory gained momentum in Marshall v. United States,
when the Court granted the defendant a new trial on the grounds of jury
exposure to evidence in newspaper articles that had been ruled inadmis-
sible at trial.' In Marshall, the Court did not reach the constitutional is-
sues regarding free press and fair trials because it granted the new trial
under its supervisory authority to establish and apply standards for
proper enforcement of criminal law in federal courts.'
The Court took a significant step toward better protecting criminal
defendants' fair trial rights in Irvin v. Dowd.' In Irvin, the defendant was
charged with having committed six murders in the vicinity of a rural In-
diana community.' Intense publicity in the county in which the defen-
dant was to be tried included reports that he had confessed to the mur-
ders."9 As a result, defendant's counsel sought, and was granted, a change
79. Id. at 344-45.
80. Id. at 348.
81. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1965) (reaffirming Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 331 (stating that "reporters of all media, including
television, are always present if they wish to be and are plainly free to report whatever occurs in
open court through their respective media").
82. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961) (finding that, despite a change of venue,
defendant failed to receive an impartial trial, since voir dire examination of the final jurors reflected
a "pattern of deep and bitter [community] prejudice" created by adverse pretrial publicity); Marshall
v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) (reversing conviction that was based on prejudicial
information jurors received through news reports); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 193 (1952).
83. Stroble, 343 U.S. at 194-95.
84. Id. at 200 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
85. Marshall, 360 U.S. at 312-13.
86. Id. at 313.
87. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
88. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 719-20.
89. Id.
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of venue, but the court moved the trial to the' adjoining rural county,
which had seen similarly inflammatory coverage. ° The defendant was
denied further changes of venue pursuant to an Indiana statute that al-
lowed only one venue change.9' During voir dire the trial court judge
individually questioned members of the jury panel whom the defendant
had challenged for cause on the basis that they had been biased by pre-
trial media coverage." When questioned, each of the challenged jurors
indicated he or she could be impartial despite any preconceived
opinions. 3
On review, the Supreme Court said that "[tlo hold that the mere ex-
istence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an ac-
cused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospec-
tive juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard.''
The Court, however, examined the trial court's voir dire transcript and
found that the defendant did not receive an impartial trial because, not-
withstanding their oaths to the contrary, the juror's voir dire testimony
reflected a pattern of deep and bitter community prejudice created by
adverse pretrial publicity." The Court applied a standard of clear and
convincing evidence to the question of whether the voir dire evidenced
prejudiceY While it did not expressly adopt a "totality of circumstances"
test to find jury bias, it did conduct a detailed review of all of the media-
related incidents occurring before defendant's trial, and concluded that,
"in the light of the circumstances here, the finding of [juror] impartiality
does not meet constitutional standards."'8
Two years after Irvin, in Rideau v. Louisiana," the Supreme Court
held that certain types of press coverage and content are so inherently
prejudicial as to create, the presumption that a fair trial is impossible.'° In
Rideau, the defendant, while in the sheriffs custody, confessed to par-
90. Id. at 720.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 724.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 723.
95. Id. at 727.
96. Id. at 725.
97. Id. at 727. The clear and convincing evidence standard is less strict than the clear and
present danger test. The Court, however, applied the lower standard not to evaluate the constitution-
ality of a contempt order against the press (akin to prior restraint), but to determine whether the
media coverage had caused provable bias.
98. Id. at 725-28.
99. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
100. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726; see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541-43 (1965) (addressing
the State's contention that televising portions of a criminal trial does not constitute a denial of due
process). In Estes, the Court acknowledged the public's right to be informed about events which
transpire in a courtroom. Id. at 541-42. In holding that bias could be presumed based on the televi-
sion coverage of a trial, however, the Court stated that a showing of actual prejudice was not a
prerequisite to a finding that the defendant was denied a fair trial. Id. at 542.
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ticipating in a robbery and homicide.'"' The confession was filmed and
broadcast several times on the local television station, before the defen-
dant's arraignment for the crimes."'° He was tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced to death for the murder charge, and ultimately appealed to the
Supreme Court for a reversal, arguing that his due process rights had
been denied.0 3 The Court, in reversing the conviction, stated "that due
process of law in this case required a trial before a jury drawn from a
community of people who had not seen and heard Rideau's televised
'interview.""' The Court did not state that it was presuming bias, but the
presumption is indicated by the fact that the Court established no nexus
between those jurors who viewed the confession, and their actual opinion
as to defendant's guilt.'5' Indeed, the Court stated that it did not need to
examine the jurors' voir dire transcripts to conclude that due process had
been denied.'"
In contrast to Irvin, in which the Court considered all of the circum-
stances of pretrial publicity, the Rideau Court focused exclusively on
defendant's broadcast confession as a basis for finding presumed or in-
herent bias." The Court identified the presumed bias of Rideau as inher-
ent prejudice in Estes v. Texas."'° In Estes, the Court overturned the de-
fendant's conviction for swindling, concluding he was deprived of his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by the televising and broad-
casting of his pretrial hearings."'° The Court applied the inherent preju-
dice rule established by Rideau, at the same time distinguishing its analy-
sis therein from the detailed examination of circumstances conducted in
Irvin and Stroble, to determine if prejudice was the actual result of the
media coverage, as opposed to a presumption of bias based on the nature
of the coverage."' Nonetheless, the Estes Court conducted a thorough
evaluation of the pretrial publicity circumstances before concluding that
101. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 723-74.
102. Id. at 724.
103. Id. at 724-26.
104. Id. at 727.
105. Id. This failure to link the broadcast interview to the bias of prospective jurors was the
basis of Justice Clark's dissent. Justice Clark stated that "[ulnless the adverse publicity is shown by
the record to have fatally infected the trial, there is simply no basis for the Court's inference that the
publicity, epitomized by the televised interview, called up some informal and illicit analogy to res
judicata, which made petitioner's trial a meaningless formality." Id. at 729 (citing Beck v. Wash-
ington, 369 U.S. 541, 558 (1962)).
106. Id. at 727. The Court also stated that
For anyone who has ever watched television the conclusion cannot be avoided that this
spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a very real sense
was Rideau's trial-at which he pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent court pro-
ceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hol-
low formality.
Id. at 726.
107. Id. at 726-27.
108. 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1959).
109. Estes, 381 U.S. at 534-35.
110. Id.at543-44.
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a presumption of prejudice was appropriate."' The Court implied that a
broad view of circumstances was necessary when confronting the impact
of televised court proceedings, stating that "one cannot put his finger on
[television's] specific mischief and prove with particularity wherein he
was prejudiced."' 2
While these cases offered some relief to defendants subjected to
extraordinary pretrial publicity, the relief was purely retrospective-re-
versing a conviction rendered defective by the prejudicial publicity-as
opposed to a prospective attempt to protect the defendant's fair trial
rights at the trial court level. In these cases the Supreme Court imposed
no limits on the press, nor suggested the ways in which the trial courts
might prevent, limit, or control the types of extreme coverage that had
resulted in reversible convictions."3 In the 1966 case of Sheppard v.
Maxwell,"" however, the Supreme Court acknowledged the inadequacy
of reversals, 11 and suggested means to contemporaneously deal with
prejudicial publicity during pretrial and trial."" The Court overturned
Sheppard's conviction on the grounds that media coverage of the events
surrounding his wife's murder, and his arrest and trial for that murder,
deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights."' In re-
111. Id. at 550-52.
112. Id.at544.
113. See Sheldon Portman, The Defense of Fair Trial from Sheppard to Nebraska Press Asso-
ciation: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. REv. 393,405 (1977) (noting
that Supreme Court decisions for the twelve years preceding Sheppard made no suggestions as to
how prejudicial pretrial publicity could be prevented); see also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 556 (1976) (noting that none of the Court's previous cases addressing prior restraint in-
volved orders restricting publicity in an effort to protect a defendant's right to an unbiased jury).
114. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
115. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362-63. The Court stated, "[WMe must remember that reversals are
but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its incep-
tion. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from
prejudicial outside interferences." Id. at 363.
116. Id. at 358-63 (suggesting limiting the number of reporters in the courtroom; insulating the
trial witnesses from the press; controlling leads, statements, and gossip by police, court personnel,
witnesses, and attorneys; warning reporters of the impropriety of publishing information not intro-
duced in the proceeding; continuations; sequestration; and reversal).
117. Id. at 362-63. On July 9, 1954, Sheppard, at the coroner's request re-enacted the crime for
the coroner, newsmen invited by him, and police officers. Id. at 338. The news media reported, in
detail, this re-enactment. Id. On July 21, in response to a news editorial entitled: "Why No Inquest?
Do It Now, Dr. Gerber," the coroner called an inquest beginning July 22. Id. at 339. The coroner, the
county prosecutor, and two detectives as bailiffs presided over the inquest, which lasted three days
and was broadcast live by television and radio personnel. Id. Sheppard's counsel was present, but
when he attempted to place documents in the record, he was forcibly ejected amidst cheers and hugs
from ladies in the audience. Id. at 340. Furthermore, the Court found that
Much of the material printed or broadcast during the trial was never heard from the wit-
ness stand, such as the charges that Sheppard had purposely impeded the .. . investiga-
tion and [that he] must be guilty [because] he had hired a prominent ... lawyer, that
Sheppard was a perjurer, that he had sexual relations with numerous women; that his
slain wife had characterized him as a 'Jekyll-Hyde'; ... ; and ... that a woman convict
claimed Sheppard to be the father of her illegitimate child.
Id. at 356-57.
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versing, the Court, quoting Estes, said that convictions could be set aside
in the "absence of any showing of prejudice.""' 8 It applied the inherent
prejudice standard of Estes, noting that application of this standard to
Sheppard was warranted by the "totality of circumstances" in his case."9
When applying the inherent prejudice standard, the Court initially
took the position that the rights of criminal defendants in highly publi-
cized cases must be protected through strong measures that would not
favor the press.'" Within ten years, however, the Court appeared to re-
treat from these precedents, possibly evidencing a concern that these
opinions provided too broad a basis for challenging criminal convictions
in an atmosphere where trials were receiving increasing media
attention.'2 ' In Murphy v. Florida,'22 the Court, enunciating the "totality of
the circumstances" test, reviewed its prior decisions in Irvin, Rideau,
Estes, and Sheppard, and said that those decisions could not "be made to
stand for the proposition that juror exposure to information about a state
defendant's prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with
which he is charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due
process.'"" This statement indicates a significant turnabout from the
Court's totality of circumstances reference in Sheppard.'24 In Sheppard,
the Court referenced its holding in Estes and stated that the "totality of
circumstances" in Sheppard warranted that it be treated like Estes even
though the circumstances in the two cases were different (the Sheppard
case being the more compelling).'" In contrast, the Court in Murphy,
interpreted the totality of circumstances test as if it excluded cases that
contained factors indicating presumed prejudice resulting from pretrial
118. Id. at 352. The Court stated, "'It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process
deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times a
procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is
deemed inherently lacking in due process."' Id. (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43
(1965)).
119. Id.
120. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362. The Court stated, "Given the pervasiveness of modem
communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the
trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the ac-
cused." Id.
121. See Alfredo Garcia, Clash of the Titans: The Difficult Reconciliation of a Fair Trial and a
Free Press in Modem American Society, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1107, 1120-21 (1992) (discuss-
ing how the presumed (inherent) prejudice standard was diluted by the Court's decisions in Murphy
v. Florida and Patton v. Yount); Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an Impartial Juror in an
Age of Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 643 (1991) (noting that, with the decision in Murphy
v. Florida, the Court had withdrawn reliance on presumed prejudice and began to insist on proof of
actual prejudice).
122. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
123. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799. These cases overturned the defendants' state court convictions
because the "trial atmosphere... had been utterly corrupted by press coverage." Id. at 798.
124. Compare Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352 (1966) (adopting the "totality of cir-
cumstances" test), with Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799-803 (applying the "totality of circumstances" test
more narrowly than the Sheppard Court).
125. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 352-54.
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publicity, but did not indicate a totality of circumstances prevented the
defendant's trial from being fundamentally fair. 6
III. RIDEAU, ESTES AND SHEPPARD AS THREE CARD MONTE: PICK ANY
PRECEDENT BUT THE DEFENDANT STILL LOSES
After Murphy, the totality of circumstances test became a sort of
shell game, in that--due to ever changing circumstances-high publicity
defendants could rarely find the appropriate totality of circumstances
needed to establish presumed bias.
A. The Recurring Factors Which Provide Proof or Presumption of Bias
to the Venire
In Irvin, Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard, the Supreme Court focused
on several elements of pretrial and trial related media coverage that ap-
peared to be the cornerstones of proving or presuming bias to the venire
or individual jurors.'27 In Murphy, the focus changed and the Court's po-
sition was that all, rather than certain critical or pivotal circumstances are
considered for determining bias.'" On the one hand, this latter position
can be criticized because, if there is to be any consistency in the totality
of circumstances test, it rests in the recurrence of certain factors essential
to the Court's determination. On the other hand, under a Rideau analysis,
a fixed set of factors might tie the Court's hands, with the result being
the success of a McVeigh-type motion.
The following discussion considers the factors that the Court con-
sidered critical in the quadrant of 1960s cases, from Irvin through Shep-
pard. Though not the only factors now considered in the totality of cir-
cumstances test, they are the ones that were initially considered threat-
ening to fair trials. This article suggests that these factors have a con-
tinuing role in protecting the high-profile defendant's rights in the con-
temporary media circus. The critical factors were identified as follows:
1) exposure of jurors or the venire to information that was not admissi-
ble, or presented as evidence, at trial; 2) the existence of a community
pattern of thought, or unified opinion, among members of the venire; 3)
widespread media coverage and replay of an alleged or actual confession
by the defendant; 4) the media circus (denial, due to media attention, of a
defendant's privilege to have judicial serenity or calmness and solemnity
in the courtroom); and 5) media saturation of the venire with prejudicial
pretrial publicity.
126. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799.
127. See infra notes 160, 170 and accompanying text.
128. See infra Part IV.A.
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1. Exposure of Jurors or the Venire to Information Which Was Not
Admissible or Presented as Evidence at Trial
A long time companion to a defendant's constitutional right to a
jury trial is the Supreme Court's position that the jury's verdict must be
the result of evidence developed and presented at trial.'29 Consistent with
this position, many courts have deemed media exposure of jurors or pro-
spective jurors to be highly prejudicial and inadmissible information as
significant in evaluating whether unfair bias exists.'" The risk of bias is
substantial because the media often reports the inadmissible information
as "evidence" of the defendant's guilt.'
Exposure to persuasive influences outside of the courtroom pro-
ceedings has also been a significant basis for the courts finding presumed
juror bias.' In Rideau, the Supreme Court set a landmark precedent in its
treatment of pretrial publicity when it held that trying the defendant in
the geographic region where prospective jurors had seen a television
broadcast of the defendant's confession was presumptively unfair.'33 The
Court stated that, having aired the confession to the venire, "[a]ny subse-
129. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692G) (requiring
jurors to be open-minded to testimony presented during trial). Likewise, in Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907), the Supreme Court stated, "[C]onclusions to be reached in a case will be
induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of
private talk or public print." This position has been reiterated in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540, 544 (1965) (stating that the "atmosphere essential to the preservation of a
fair trial . . . must be maintained at all costs" and the use of television "inject[s] ... an irrelevant
factor into court proceedings"); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (stating that the "verdict
must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial"); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S.
199, 204, 206 (1960) (reversing defendant's convictions for loitering and disorderly conduct because
there was no evidence in the record to support any of the charges, and stating that it is "a violation of
due process to convict and punish a man without evidence of his guilt"); Marshall v. United States,
360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) (stating that news accounts that the trial judge refused to admit into
evidence were prejudicial, and jurors' exposure to them entitled defendant to a new trial).
130. See, e.g., Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 356-57. During trial, the unsequestered jurors were ex-
posed to claims that the defendant was a perjurer and bare-faced liar, a womanizer, and the father of
an illegitimate child. Id. There was also publicity equating his hiring of a prominent lawyer to an
admission of guilt. Id. None of these published claims, however, were ever presented as evidence at
trial. ld. at 356; see also Estes, 381 U.S. at 535-44. In Estes, massive pretrial publicity consisted of
11 volumes of press clippings, live radio television broadcasts, and news photographs. Id. According
to the Court, this extensive publicity destroyed the atmosphere necessary in order for the accused to
receive a fair trial. Id.
131. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 359 n.13. The Court noted that the prosecution released much
"evidence" to the media that was never offered at trial or became part of the record and stated that
"[t]he exclusion of such evidence in court is rendered meaningless when news media make it avail-
able to the public." Id. at 360. The Court found that premature release and weighing of evidence by
the media could "jeopardize a defendant's right to an impartial jury." Id. at 361 n.15 (citing Report
of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, at 239).
132. See, e.g., Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (finding that extreme prejudice re-
suited from contacts between jurors and key prosecution witnesses during the trial); Rideau v. Lou-
isiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (finding that repeated televised coverage of defendant's confession made
fair trial impossible without change of venue).
133. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726-27.
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quent court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such
a spectacle could be but a hollow formality.' 34
Similarly, in Turner v. Louisiana,35 the Supreme Court overturned a
conviction on the basis of presumed juror prejudice which was caused by
influences external to the trial evidence.'" Unlike the jury in Rideau, the
Turner jury panel was sequestered.' 3 On several occasions, however, the
panel was under the care of two deputy sheriffs who were also key
prosecution witnesses at Turner's trial.' 3' Though the deputies denied
discussing the case with the jury, the Court held that their continued
contact with the jurors during meals, and at other times throughout the
trial, allowed them to establish and renew acquaintances with the jurors
that would significantly enhance the jurors' perception of the deputies'
credibility as key witnesses in a trial where the defendant received a
death sentence.'39
The Court noted that the jury verdict must be based on evidence
developed at trial, and observed that the credibility of key witnesses was
an integral part of that evidence.'" The Court stated, "Any judge who has
sat with juries knows that, in spite of forms they are extremely likely to
be impregnated by the environing atmosphere."'' The Court concluded
that, notwithstanding the deputies' assurance that they had not discussed
the case directly with the jury, "it would be blinking reality not to recog-
nize the extreme prejudice inherent in this continual association through-
out the trial between the jurors and these two key witnesses for the
prosecution."'4 " The Court reversed Turner's conviction even though no
actual prejudice had been shown, noting that his "fate depended upon
how much confidence the jury placed in these two witnesses."'4 "
In contrast to Rideau, the Turner case did not involve media influ-
ence on jurors or the venire. " Nonetheless, the Court's conclusion in
Turner, that bias could be presumed, demonstrated its sensitivity to ex-
ternal influences on jurors. Moreover, among external influences, the
Court has indicated that the media is among the most suspect and perva-
134. Id. at 726.
135. 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
136. Turner, 379 U.S. at 474.
137. Id. at 467.
138. Id. at 469.
139. Id. at 473-74.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 472 (quoting Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
The Court, citing Rideau, noted that external influence may have rendered the courtroom proceed-
ings hollow. Id. at 473.
142. Id.at:473.
143. Id. at 474.
144. Id. at 467-70.
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sive.45 Therefore, the existence of media-based influence on the jury or
the venire resulting from information, or other influences which are not
part of proper evidentiary development in court, could play a significant
role in a defendant's assertion of denial of due process."
2. The Existence of a Community Pattern of Thought or Unified
Opinion Among Members of the Venire
The existence of a widespread opinion among the members of the
community from which the jurors will be selected has, on several occa-
sions, been a significant factor in the Court's analysis of undue jury
bias.' 7 The Court has said that the impaneling of impartial, "indifferent"
jurors is essential to protecting the criminal defendant's constitutional
right to a fair trial."6 The necessity of "indifferent" jurors may be traced
to the oft quoted words of Lord Coke, who stated that the fair juror must
be as "indifferent as he stands unsworn."'' 9 Over the years, courts have
used differing terms to describe the hazards arising from a lack of indif-
ference within a community. The underlying concern, however, has con-
sistently been the need for impartial jurors." In Irvin v. Dowd, the Court,
while assessing defendant's claim of juror bias, referred to the "commu-
nity pattern of thought" existing in the area from which the jurors were
selected. "' The Court noted that this demonstrated "a pattern of deep and
bitter prejudice against the [defendant],"'5 2 and held that, under these cir-
145. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 544 (1965). The Court stated that "[tielevision in
its present state and by its very nature, reaches into a variety of areas in which it may cause prejudice
to an accused." Id. Of greatest significance was "[t]he potential impact of television on the jurors."
Id. at 545.
146. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356-57 (1966) (finding that although broadcast
material was not presented as evidence at trial, it undoubtedly reached the jury); Rideau v. Louisi-
ana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (emphasizing the prospective jurors' repeated exposure to a broadcast
film of the defendant's irregular confession).
147. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 803 (1975); Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351; Estes,
381 U.S. at 545; Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961).
148. See Turner, 379 U.S. at 471-72 (the right to a jury trial requires a trial by a panel of indif-
ferent jurors, cited in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-73 (1948)); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722 (stating that
"the right to a jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial,
'indifferent' jurors"); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (holding that the defendant has the
right to have an impartial judge, regardless of the evidence against him).
149. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799; Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505,509 (1971); Turner, 379
U.S. at 472, Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722 (quoting EDWARD COKE, 1 INSTrrUTE OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND
155a (1853)).
150. See, e.g., Murphy, 421 U.S. at 803 ("[T]o select jurors who appear to be impartial is .. . [a]
factor relevant in evaluating [the] jurors' assurances of impartiality."); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 724-25
(stating that "[i]mpartiality is not a technical conception").
151. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725; see also Rideau, 373 U.S. at 731 (Clark, J., dissenting). In his
dissent, Justice Clark compared the circumstances surrounding Rideau's trial with those in Irvin. He
characterized Irvin as a case involving media coverage causing "complete permeation, imbedding
opinions of guilt in the minds of 90% of the veniremen . I... d.
152. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 727. The Court cited newspaper reports of uniform community bias,
noting that the voir dire record revealed that 90% of the prospective jurors had indicated some opin-
ion of guilt, as did two-thirds of the impaneled jurors. Id.
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cumstances, a finding that the jurors were impartial did not meet consti-
tutional standards.' 3 Though the Irvin Court did not hold that bias could
be presumed, it easily discounted the jurors' oaths, and other indications
of impartiality.
4
In Estes v. Texas'55 and Sheppard v. Maxwell,'" the existence of a
community pattern of thought was a significant factor in the Court's
holding that juror bias, and its accompanying denial of due process,
could be presumed.'57 The Estes Court indicated the presence and poten-
tial hazards of a community pattern of thought, noting that "intense pub-
lic feeling" created by pretrial publicity is aggravated when jurors realize
they must return to a community "hostile to an accused."'5 8 In Sheppard,
the Court quoted Irvin, stating that an accused was entitled to be "tried in
an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion .... "'"
The Supreme Court has discussed the concept and impact of com-
munity opinion or patterns of thought in the context of trials being de-
cided on the basis of evidence presented in court, free of external influ-
ences."' It is also significant, however, when considering the likelihood
that prospective jurors will mirror the widespread opinions of the com-
munity.
161
3. Widespread Media Coverage and Replay of an Alleged or Ac-
tual Confession by the Defend'ant
Rideau v. Louisiana 16 is a landmark opinion. It is the first time the
Supreme Court ruled that media coverage of pretrial events could so bias
the venire that a jury selected from that venire would deny the defendant
a fair trial, without demonstrating actual bias among the empanelled ju-
rors.'63 Critical to the Court's finding of a due process violation was the
153. Id. at 728.
154. Id. The Court dismissed jurors' statements that, notwithstanding their opinions, they would
be fair and impartial in their deliberations, stating, "Where so many, so many times, admitted preju-
dice, such a statement of impartiality can be given little weight."Id.
155. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
156. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
157. See supra notes 15, 108 and accompanying text.
158. Estes, 381 U.S. at 545.
159. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351 (quoting Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728).
160. See, e.g., Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351 (requiring that "the jury's verdict be based on evi-
dence received in open court, not from outside sources"); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725 (noting the existence
of a community bias or pattern of thought as proof of prejudice).
161. See, e.g., Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351; Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725.
162. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
163. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726-27. The Court stated:
[We do not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the
voir dire examination of the members of the jury, that due process of law in this case re-
quired a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people who had not seen and
heard Rideau's televised 'interview.'
Id. at 727. In his dissent, Justice Clark condemned the majority opinion for failing to establish "any
substantial nexus between the televised 'interview' and petitioner's trial . I... "d  at 729.
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fact that the venire "had been exposed repeatedly and in depth to the
spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in detail to the crimes with
which he was later to be charged."''
The broadcast of a confession has been a significant issue in other
cases'65 when the Supreme Court has held media coverage of trial events
resulted in a denial of due process." With the exception of its significant
weight in Rideau, however, this factor alone has not been enough to
carry the charge of juror bias and has sometimes existed in cases where
convictions were upheld.'
6'
4. The Media Circus: Denial, Due to Media Attention, of a Defen-
dant's Privilege to Have Judicial Serenity, or Calmness and So-
lemnity, in the Courtroom
The Supreme Court has frequently expressed its position that, to be
proper and fair, a trial must be conducted in an atmosphere of calmness
and solemnity.'" Consistent with that position, the Court has expressed
concern that the presence of the media in or around the courtroom might
disrupt or destroy the solemn air needed for a fair trial.'" The Court has
taken a strong position that due process is in jeopardy when the media's
presence causes the solemnity of the courtroom to deteriorate to a media
circus or "Roman holiday."'"7 Indeed, in the three pivotal cases where the
Supreme Court ruled that juror bias could be presumed without proof of
actual bias, the Court noted that media coverage had somehow infringed
on the proper air of the trial proceeding."'
The Supreme Court's bristly reaction to the media in these 1960s
era cases was apparently not attributable to the relative newness of tele-
164. Id. at 726. The Court stated that, following the spectacle, the trial would be no more than a
"hollow formality." Id.
165. See, e.g., Rideau, 373 U.S. at 727.
166. See, e.g., Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725-28 (describing the effect of broadcasting defendant's
irregular confession).
167. See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 194, 198 (1952) (affirming defendant's convic-
tion, notwithstanding his aired confession).
168. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965) (entitling the defendant to "judicial
serenity and calm"); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 583 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that
"calmness and solemnity of the courtroom" is necessary for proper adjudication); Sinclair v. United
States, 279 U.S. 749, 765 (1878) (finding that the "exercise of calm and informed judgment [by the
jury] is essential to proper enforcement of the law").
169. Cox, 379 U.S. at 583 (stating that freedom of discussion should not be allowed to hamper
the solemnity of the courtroom); see also Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965) (emphasiz-
ing the importance of calmness to the proper enforcement of the law).
170. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 355-58 (1966). In discussing the trial atmosphere, the
Court in Sheppard characterized it with terms like "bedlam reigned," "Roman holiday," and "carmi-
val atmosphere." Id. The Court recounted nine examples of what it called "flagrant episodes of
pretrial and trial publicity." Id. at 345-49; see also Estes, 381 U.S. at 549 (stating that the defendant
is "entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena"); Rideau, 373 U.S. at
726 (referring to pretrial media coverage as a "spectacle").
171. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 355-58; Estes, 381 U.S. at 549; Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
vision coverage of trials.' 2 It is not surprising, therefore, that after many
years, the media circus still seems to raise the ire of the courts.' Perhaps
this is where judges can more clearly see a need, and exercise the power,
to restrict the media without impinging on its First Amendment rights.'
74
Historically, the courts have distinguished between the press's right to
report versus its right to influence trial proceedings, and have no reluc-
tance prohibiting the latter, stating that interference is not a protected
right.'75 The lesson is that a media circus, which likely contains attributes
of other critical factors discussed above, may be the factor that triggers-
at minimum-the acknowledgment that prejudice to the venire may oc-
cur.
5. Media Saturation of the Venire with Prejudicial Pretrial
Publicity
In addition to focusing on the nature and content of the publicity
and the behavior of the press in reporting trial events, courts have con-
sidered the sheer amount of pretrial coverage to be a significant factor in
finding presumed bias.' 6 The Supreme Court has described saturation
press coverage in terms that indicate the frequency and number of the
reports.'" The Court has also described saturation in terms of the percent-
age of households in the venire which received the prejudicial
coverage.' The courts have considered saturation in conjunction with
other factors to conclude that prejudice to the venire could be
presumed.
172. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 541 (indicating that the Court's reservations about broadcasting
trials were not attributable to the newness of television, but rather its potential to impact the admini-
stration of justice); Douglas, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that the photographing or broadcasting of
trials "is not dangerous because it is new" but "dangerous because of the insidious influences which
it puts to work in the administration of justice").
173. See, e.g., Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1491-1537 (1lth Cir. 1985).
174. See, e.g., Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 357-59 (disagreeing with the trial judge's perceived lack
of power to control trial publicity, and giving several measures the judge should have taken to limit
the press's presence). The Court found that the judge should have warned reporters against publish-
ing materials not introduced at the proceedings. Id. at 362. This would have given added protection
to the defendant's fight to a fair trial without further restricting the news media. Id.
175. See, e.g., Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 349-51; Estes, 381 U.S. at 538-39.
176. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 357; Estes, 381 U.S. at 538; Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726; Irvin, 366
U.S. at 725; Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1490.
177. See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 538 (describing the coverage as a "bombardment of the com-
munity"); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725 (describing a "barrage of newspaper headlines, articles..
178. See, e.g., Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725.
179. Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1490 (considering whether pretrial publicity is sufficiently prejudi-
cial and inflammatory).
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B. Why the Sum of Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard Equals a Criminal De-
fendant Without a Jury
Though Justice Douglas may have seemed like an alarmist in
1960,'" following the Supreme Court's reasoning in Rideau, we might
envision circumstances in which a criminal defendant could claim a due
process violation based on jury bias, before voir dire, that could not be
corrected.'8 ' Under Rideau and its progeny, the Court has considered and
evaluated the nature, content, and extent of saturation of the media cov-
erage of the defendant's case.'82 Once the coverage reached a certain
level, juror bias against the defendant was presumed.'83 Thus, no proof of
actual bias was necessary in order for the defendant's conviction to be
overturned. '" Indeed, in some cases, no nexus between the coverage and
bias was even evaluated.' Therefore, there existed what can be inter-
preted as a dual presumption." First, at a certain level of media cover-
age, it was presumed that all members of the particular venire had been
exposed to the prejudicial publicity.'" Second, presumed bias was the
result of presumed exposure.' The conclusion stemming from these pre-
sumptions was that due process had been denied.'89 The sum of these
180. Douglas, supra note 1; see also infra note 310 and accompanying text.
181. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *16. This was precisely the claim
made by Timothy McVeigh's attorneys during a review of questionnaires received from members of
the venire, prior to their live voir dire. Id. at *9-12.
182. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963); see also supra note 163 and accompa-
nying text.
183. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 353-55 (1966) (coverage consisted of extensive
newspaper, radio and television broadcasts of the trial, in addition to a live inquest of Sheppard
televised at a high school gymnasium, which seated hundreds of people); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 536, 554 (1965) (coverage consisted of live radio and television broadcasts, news photographs,
cameramen taking live and still pictures during the proceedings, and microphones on the judge's
bench); Rideau, 373 U.S. at 725, 727 (coverage included a local televised broadcast of the jailed
defendant, who admitted details of the commission of robbery, kidnaping and murder in the presence
of the sheriff and two state troopers).
184. See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 542 (showing of actual prejudice is not necessary for the court
to reverse); id. at 613 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that "there is no indication anywhere in the
record of any disturbance whatever of the judicial proceeding").
185. See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 542 (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), and
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 729 (1963) (Clark, J.,
dissenting). But see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725-27 (1961) (explaining the community pattern
of thought that resulted from the extensive media coverage).
186. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 442 n.3 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recog-
nizing the apparent or potential existence of a dual existence of a dual presumption in Irvin, though
the Irvin decision ultimately rests on the existence of actual, not presumed, bias). See Irvin, 366 U.S.
at 723-24,727-28.
187. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 719-20.
188. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 442 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (interpreting Irvin as standing
for the proposition that a community exposed to unrelenting publicity is presumed prejudiced,
thereby entitling the defendant to a new trial); Rideau, 373 U.S. at 727 (holding that the process
required selecting a jury from a community that had not been exposed to certain pretrial publicity).
189. Estes, 381 U.S. at 543 (1965) (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), and Turney v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), for the proposition that, at times, a state may engage in procedures that
result in prejudice, which are inherently lacking in due process).
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presumptions in a case attracting the requisite amount of national pretrial
publicity would arguably equal a presumption that the entire nation had
witnessed the coverage and was thereby prejudiced.
Though the Supreme Court has paid little more than lip service to
the presumed bias standard since Murphy v. Florida, there is some re-
search that supports the presumed bias standard. For example, significant
research confirms that negative media coverage taints a juror's percep-
tion against the defendant."w Moreover, the authors of one study found
that only by delaying the trial could they obtain any statistically signifi-
cant reduction in the impact of some types of negative coverage."' This
research conflicts with court holdings that bias can be overcome by juror
voir dire or jury instruction.'" However, the courts' focus on assessing
the amount of bias affecting individual jurors may be the answer to
claims of nationwide juror bias, because finding impartial jurors through
individual voir dire would be the best response to allegations of pre-
sumed, rather than actual, bias. Moreover, focusing on the individual
jurors better addresses the problem of prejudicial media coverage, which
frequently occurs before the trial begins, or, indeed, as the crime itself is
reported.'93 Conversely, limiting pretrial and trial coverage in an effort to
190. Amy L. Otto et al., The Biasing Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Judgments, 18 LAw
& HuM. BEHAV. 453 (1994). These authors conducted a survey of 262 psychology students to test
the differential impact of several types of pretrial publicity on decision making in a trial simulation,
both before and after the subjects viewed the trial, and to determine whether the evidence presented
at trial would have the effect of either accenting or diminishing the negative impact of pretrial pub-
licity. Id. at 464. The study found that negative character publicity about the defendant had the
greatest effect on initial judgment. Id. The authors concluded that trial evidence generally reduces
the effects of pretrial publicity manipulations on the final verdict. Id. at 465; see John S. Carroll et
al., Free Press and Fair Trial: The Role of Behavioral Research, 10 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 187
(1986). The authors cited studies, including one by Constantini and King, which indicated that
respondents with greater knowledge about a case were more likely to be pro-prosecution. Id. at 191.
The more media sources a respondent accessed, the greater his or her knowledge of the case. Id.
Pretrial knowledge was the best predictor of prejudgment, and was relatively independent of other
attitudinal and demographic predictors of case bias. Id. The authors further noted that attempts to
relate publicity to actual verdicts are more difficult than attempts to show prejudice in the public.Id.
191. Geoffrey P. Kramer et al., Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 LAW &
HuM. BE-AV. 409 (1990). The authors suggest that a continuance of several days between exposure
to publicity and viewing the trial effectively remedies factual publicity (containing incriminating
information about the defendant), but not emotional publicity (containing information arousing
negative emotions, but not incriminating information). Id. The authors found that judicial instruc-
tions not to base verdicts on the news were minimally effective, especially in highly emotional or
heinous cases. Id. at 413. But see Carroll et al., supra note 190, at 192 (finding judges, prosecutors,
and reporters generally of the opinion that existing remedies work, including jury instruction, se-
questration, continuation, additional preemptory challenges, and gag orders). Judges believe voir
dire to be an effective remedy for news coverage, and the authors seem to agree. Id. at 192, 197.
192. For examples of cases where the Court found that voir dire or jury instructions could
overcome bias, see Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431-32 (1991), Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S.
1025, 1038-39 (1984), and Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1290-91 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
193. See Minow & Cate, supra note 121, at 633 (noting that an impediment to judicial control
over media reporting of information related to a case is the fact that "increasingly, the most dramatic
revelations occur at the time of the crime itself, long before there is a trial, much less a judge se-
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address the prejudicial impact of prior media coverage of the crime in
progress is akin to slamming the barn door behind the escaping horse.
Courts applying the presumed prejudice standard have held that a
trial before a jury selected from the adversely affected venire is void.'94
The arguable consequences of a defendant establishing that the affected
venire is the entire nation of potential jurors would be dismissal of the
criminal prosecution'9 or extended delay of the trial to abate the impact
of adverse media coverage.'" Most recently, the attorneys for convicted
Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, took this position in seeking
to dismiss charges against him following the publication of his alleged
confession.'97 The main argument presented in McVeigh's motion was
that pretrial publicity was so devastating, prejudicial, and widespread
that there was no reasonable possibility that the defendant could receive
a fair trial. His indictment, therefore, should be dismissed.'98 The motion
lected to oversee the trial"). In Estes, Sheppard, Rideau, and other cases, the damaging prejudicial
reporting occurred before jury selection. In Sheppard, the defendant was convicted for the second-
degree murder of his wife. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966). Pretrial publicity con-
sisted of newspaper articles emphasizing the defendant's guilt, capitalizing on the defendant's affair
with another woman, and delving into the defendant's personal life. Id. at 340-42. The newspaper
clippings alone filled five volumes, and there were radio and television broadcasts. Id. at 342. In
Estes, the defendant was convicted for swindling. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 534 (1965). Pretrial
publicity included radio and television broadcasts, and live news photographs. Id. at 533-36. At the
defendant's pretrial hearing, all the seats in the courtroom were filled, with at least twelve camera-
men present at all times to take motion and still pictures. Id. Pretrial publicity totaled eleven volumes
of press clippings. Id. at 535. In Rideau, the defendant was convicted for the murder of a bank em-
ployee. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 725 (1963). The pretrial publicity consisted of three
television broadcasts of the defendant's "interview" with the sheriff. Id. at 724. In these "inter-
views," the defendant admitted in detail to committing robbery, kidnaping, and murder. Id. at 725.
194. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726; Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1490 (11 th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that prejudice could be presumed, since the small community was so overwhelmed and saturated
with pervasive pretrial publicity).
195. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *5. The motion argues that the defense
seems like a lie "at worst," when jurors hear negative opinions and commentary in the press, and
then hear a different story from the defense at trial. The "real trial" has already occurred with poten-
tial juror exposure to purported confessions; the defense can do nothing more than "score debater's
points." Id. Because the entire nation had been exposed to the negative publicity, arguably due
process could not be obtained, thus counsel argued that the case should be dismissed. Id. at *10-11;
see also United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1485 (10th Cir. 1995) (presuming prejudice when the
court determines that jurors had watched news reports of a trial).
196. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *13 (arguing that a substantial continu-
ance will make the details of the publicity less memorable). According to defense counsel, "[a]
continuance is [the] favored remedy when the prejudicial publicity complained of will abate within a
foreseeable period." Id. at *14 (citing United States v. Morales, 815 F.2d 725, 737 (1st Cir. 1987));
see Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 114 (1st Cir. 1952) (holding that a new trial was the
remedy for failure to grant a continuance because a change in venue would not have provided relief
for national publicity).
197. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *1. According to the newspaper, it had
lawfully obtained internal defense documents in which Timothy McVeigh confessed to his defense
team that he alone bombed the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and that he did so
during the day because he needed a "body count" in order to make his point to the government. Id. at
*3.
198. Id. at *9-12.
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began by describing the prejudicial publicity, which started with a Dallas
Morning News story.
On February 28, 1997, thirty-one days before trial was scheduled to
begin, the Dallas Morning News published an article on its Internet home
page which stated that the defendant, Timothy McVeigh, had confessed
to a defense team member that he had driven the truck containing explo-
sives to the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, and detonated
the explosives.'" This article immediately sparked additional stories
about the McVeigh "confession."2' The defendant contended that publi-
cation of his "confession" harmed him because it "violat[ed] the sanctu-
ary of the attorney-client privilege""2 ' and eviscerated "[his] right to plead
not guilty."' Furthermore, the defendant emphasized that because of the
extensive publicity given to this "confession," any doubt about his guilt
based on the evidence at trial would "invariably be resolved against
[him] .... 203
Next, the defendant presented his main argument, namely that the
indictment should be dismissed because the prejudicial, inflammatory,
pretrial publicity destroyed any reasonable possibility that he could re-
ceive a fair trial anywhere in the nation. ' As support for this argument,
he relied on the cornerstones of our criminal justice system-the pre-
sumption of innocence, and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a fair
trial.' Citing case law,"6 the defendant concluded that prejudice to him
199. Id. at *3. The trial was scheduled to begin on March 31, 1997. Id. The article also cited
"confidential defense documents" which were "obtained legally." Id.
200. Following the Dallas Morning News story, publicity included televised stories about the
alleged "confession," newspaper articles, and radio broadcasts relaying the "confession." Id. at *4.
Moreover, the Dallas Morning News story triggered a similar story on Playboy magazine's Internet
home page, and, in turn, interviews of its author, Mr. Ben Fenwick, on all three major television
networks. Id.
201. Id. at *5. The defendant stressed that the attorney-client relationship "is the central place
where counsel's assistance can be had--where there is a right to communicate without fear of the
consequences ..... Id. As a result of the numerous publications of McVeigh's "confession," the
defendant contended that Dallas Morning News and Playboy had intruded into the sacred attorney-
client relationship because they were not "invited" in by the accused; thus, they were trespassers. Id.
at *2.
202. Id. at *5. Although the defendant acknowledged that he could still plead not guilty, he
emphasized that jurors cannot simply be uninfluenced by the content of the publicized stories, re-
gardless of whether they honestly believe they can listen and evaluate the evidence at trial without
considering the pretrial disclosures. Id.
203. See id. at *6.
204. See id. at *9-12.
205. Id. McVeigh bases his argument on the idea that to presume innocence, jurors must lay
aside all suspicion and the conclusions they have formed in order to reach their final conclusion
solely on legal evidence. See id. The Sixth Amendment provides in part that "[in all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
206. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963) (presuming prejudice when defendant's
confession was televised prior to trial); United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1485 (10th Cir. 1995)
(presuming prejudice when jurors had watched television reports prior to trial).
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was presumed.' Finally, in the alternative, he moved that the court abate
his trial for at least one year to allow the lethal effects of prejudicial and
inflammatory publicity to subside, in order to assure him of his constitu-
tional rights.'
The court denied McVeigh's motion on the basis that it did not "ac-
cept the assumptions necessary to support the defense position .... "
The court concluded, noting past experience with jurors and general
awareness of public attitudes but without referring to specific content or
amount of media coverage, that the stories about McVeigh's alleged con-
fession lacked the impact necessary to create the alleged type and mag-
nitude of bias to the venire." ° The court acknowledged that the pretrial
proceedings had been extensively reported and furthermore, that the fu-
ture coverage could be expected to increasingly slant toward the sensa-
tional aspects of the trial as the media competed for public attention. "' In
so concluding, the court did not address the impact and implications of
an alleged confession on the venire that, according to McVeigh's
motion,"' the Court considered to be a critical issue in Irvin"3 and Ri-
deau."
While the court addressed the issue of foundational and fundamental
fairness with respect to the defendant's trial, it concluded that such fair-
ness could be protected by the skill of the defense attorneys, pretrial
measures by the court, and the voir dire process for the jury panel.25 The
court found that "there is no reason to believe that fair-minded persons
would be so influenced by anything contained in this recent publicity that
they would not be ready, willing, and able to perform the duty to follow
the law and decide according to the evidence presented in a vigorously
contested trial. 2 6 Apparently the court attributed this ability to jurors,
notwithstanding the coverage of McVeigh's alleged confession, because
of a presumed "healthy skepticism about what they are told."2 7
207. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *10.
208. Id. at *12-15. The motion stated that "fo]nly with a substantial, meaningful continuance
will recall fade to the point where a fair trial may become possible." Id. at *14. The motion esti-
mated that one year would probably be sufficient for memories about the reports to become less
specific, and would allow jurors the ability to listen without thoughts clouded by improper, inflam-
matory information. Id.
209. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 10, at *1.
210. Id. Chief Judge Matsch of the U.S. District Court of Colorado stated that "(plast experi-
ence with jurors and a general awareness about pretrial publicity in criminal cases suggest that these
stories have had neither the wide exposure nor general acceptance that the defendant's lawyers
presume." Id.
211. Id.
212. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *11.
213. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,725-26 (1961).
214. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963).
215. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 10, at *2.
216. Id. at *3.
217. Id. at *2-3.
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Following the trial court's decision, McVeigh's attorneys filed a
petition for writ of prohibition with the Tenth Circuit, in essence appeal-
ing the court's ruling.28 The court of appeals denied the petition as pre-
mature,"9 and McVeigh proceeded to trial. At trial, he was convicted and
sentenced to death.2"
The actual and potential impact of media coverage on the judicial
system is notable in this case; a case which had already been transferred
to a different state to address the issue of statewide bias to potential ju-
rors."' Noteworthy is the fact that the bias existed prior to any trial pro-
ceedings, notwithstanding the fact that, because the trial was in federal
court, no cameras were permitted in any of the pretrial proceedings.' In
transferring the case from Oklahoma to Colorado, the federal court ac-
knowledged that McVeigh could not receive a fair trial anywhere in the
original forum state.' Yet, when national juror bias became the issue, the
district court and the court of appeals made quick work of disposing of
McVeigh's claims. For its part, the court of appeals held that McVeigh
must await the outcome of voir dire." ' This essentially eliminated the
presumed bias analysis of Rideau and led to the court's review of
McVeigh's arguments under an Irvin or Mu'Min type of analysis, where
proof of bias to the actual jurors is at issue.2" If the "totality of circum-
stances" test was confined to applying specific critical elements, like the
classic factors cited in Irvin, Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard, and if proving
the existence of those factors was sufficient to presume bias, the court
218. Defendant's Petition for Writ of Prohibition, supra note 11, at *1.
219. See Order, supra note 12, at *1. The court stated that, though delay and an unnecessary
trial might result, the relief sought could be obtained through direct appeal following final judgment.
Id. It also deferred to the trial judge and voir dire for a determination of whether the alleged unfair
pretrial publicity was merely speculation or "demonstrable reality," citing United States v. Halde-
man, 559 F.2d 31, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Id.
220. Defendant McVeigh's Motion for New Trial, Request for Evidentiary Hearing, and
Memorandum in Support at *1, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M, 1997 WL 403417 (D.
Colo. July 7, 1997) [hereinafter Defendant's Motion for New Trial].
221. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 10, at *1. According to Judge Matsch, the court
changed venue from Oklahoma to Colorado because the entire state of Oklahoma had become a
unified community that shared the emotional trauma of those who had been victimized. ld.
222. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states, "Mhe taking of photographs in
the court room during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial pro-
ceedings from the court room shall not be permitted by the court." FED. R. ClaM. P. 53; see also
United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (finding that existing bias
was sufficient to warrant a change of venue nearly six weeks before the beginning of the trial). The
court ordered the transfer of trial on February 19, 1996. Id. at 1475. It was scheduled to proceed on
March 31, 1996. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 10, at *3.
223. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. at 1473-74 (stating that the extensive publicity which evoked
strong emotional responses from those living in the united community of Oklahoma City presented
so great a prejudice to the defendant that a change of venue to Denver, Colorado was appropriate).
224. Order, supra note 12, at * i.
225. McVeigh's argument used a Rideau-type analysis, claiming that, due to media coverage of
his confession, bias could be presumed without reference to voir dire. The court of appeals ruled
against that position, stating that voir dire testimony would be used to prove individual juror bias. Id.
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could have been painted into a comer by the McVeigh motion and forced
to choose between setting him free, or denying him his constitutional
right to an unbiased jury. The court, however, was spared this dilemma,
because the "totality of circumstances" test under Murphy is flexible
enough to defeat virtually any claim of presumed national bias.
IV. THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST HAS BECOME A GELATIN-
LIKE STANDARD GIVING WAY TO THE DON'T ASK-DON'T TELL
STANDARD OF MU'MIN
In adopting the "totality of the circumstances" test, courts have re-
jected the use of specific limited elements-the classic factors-of pre-
trial publicity when wrestling with conflicting First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights."2 This is consistent with the Supreme Court's posi-
tion that measuring the attitudes which underlie strong opinions is not
subject to any particular test.2" The Supreme Court has also noted that
generalizations with respect to attitudes of bias are not profitable because
each case must turn on special facts which are unique to each case." As
a result, the "totality of circumstances" test has only the appearance of a
firm standard.
A. The Gelatin-Like Standard
After Murphy, the "totality of the circumstances" test can be
viewed as the Court's Jell-O" remedy for the unknown future of pretrial
publicity. Like Jell-O, it appears solid in that it requires a court, in evalu-
ating the impact of pretrial publicity on a defendant's due process rights,
to look "to any indications in the totality of the circumstances that peti-
tioners' trial was not fundamentally fair."" Yet because the test grants
the Court discretion to rule based on individual factors in each case, like
Jell-O, it wiggles or changes when a defendant attempts to grab hold of
an opinion as precedent.' Each new case presents, in "totality," a new
226. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,724-25 (1961).
227. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936) ("Impartiality is not a technical
conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indiffer-
ence, the Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and
artificial formula.").
228. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959); see also, e.g., McVeigh, 918 F. Supp.
at 1473 ("The possible prejudicial impact of this type of publicity is not something measurable by
any objective standards."). The court noted that determination of juror prejudice was not subject to
"scientific methodology" or "laboratory experiments," and indeed part of the genius of the American
jury system was the presence of so many variables, such that no two trials could be compared, re-
gardless of their apparent similarities. Id.
229. See WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 648 (9th ed. 1986) (defining "Jell-
0" as a trademark for a gelatin dessert usually having the flavor and color of fruit).
230. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975).
231. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177
(1989). In discussing the totality of the circumstances test, Justice Scalia referred to it as a "discre-
tion-conferring approach," rather than one establishing a general rule of law. Id. To Scalia, this type
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set of circumstances. " Since the totality of circumstances, as opposed to
a predetermined set of factors, are determinative, any one factor from
prior cases and precedents may be discounted or offset by another."3
Justice Antonin Scalia, while providing an illustration of how the
test works, said, "Today we decide that these nine factors sustain recov-
ery. Whether only eight of them will do so-or whether the addition of a
tenth will change the outcome-are questions for another day.""' Criti-
cizing the test in certain applications, he stated, "When one is dealing, as
my Court often is, with issues so heartfelt that they are believed by one
side or the other to be resolved by the Constitution itself, it does not
greatly appeal to one's sense of justice to say: 'Well, that earlier case had
nine factors, this one has nine plus one."925
Scalia's criticism of the approach can be summarized as discomfort
with the lack of uniformity that a "totality of circumstances" test pro-
vides for legal decisions. This allows for inconsistent verdicts and a con-
clusion that there is "no single 'right' answer."' In the context of pretrial
publicity and especially in a McVeigh-type motion, however, it allows
the courts the luxury of continually moving the bar that a defendant must
hurdle to prove or establish a presumption of bias according to current
societal standards. " ' Under such a "totality of circumstances" test, the
level of media coverage needed to presume bias in 1966, when Sheppard
was decided, would never be sufficient in 1997, when McVeigh was de-
cided. So, while the McVeigh coverage exceeded that in Sheppard, other
factors that can be weighed in the totality of the circumstances might be
counted to offset the impact of publicity." Moreover, under the "totality
of circumstances" test, new circumstances can be added to the mix. 9 For
example, the magnitude of the coverage in the Simpson trial, combined
with the widespread dissatisfaction with the Simpson criminal verdict,
may be found to have conditioned the venire such that after Simpson,
prospective jurors would be skeptical about the media coverage of trials
of approach had the advantage in that "all generalizations (including, I know, the present one) are to




235. Id. at 1178.
236. Id. at 181.
237. See id. at 1188 (suggesting that even the rule of law may change over time). Justice Scalia
quotes Justice Cardozo, who stated that "[s]tandards of prudent conduct are declared at times by
courts, but they are taken over from the facts of life." Id.
238. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031-32 (1984). The court of appeals, in focusing on
the factors in Irvin substantiating a finding of bias, failed to give adequate weight to factors pre-
sented in the case at bar that undercut, or diminished, the impact of the prejudicial publicity. ld.
239. Scaia, supra note 231, at 1178; see also infra notes 249-71 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991), in which the Court, while comparing defendant's
circumstances to those in Irvin, considered that factors not address by Irvin mitigated the impact of
pretrial publicity in Mu'Min).
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and, therefore, more receptive to actual trial evidence. This is confirmed,
at least in part, by poll results following the media coverage of the Simp-
son criminal pretrial events indicating that 86% of those surveyed said
they were more aware that media intrusion could affect a defendant's
ability to get a fair trial and 56% said they have less respect for the me-
dia.2"
B. The Demise of Presumed Bias? Alas Poor Rideau- Knew It Well
"Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were combined in
this case in such a manner as to intrigue and captivate the public fancy..
This quote, from Sheppard, sounds like it might have been a de-
scription of the O.J. Simpson case. Indeed, when comparing the Simpson
trial coverage with the coverage in Irvin, Rideau, Sheppard, and Estes,
every element of prejudicial pretrial publicity in those cases, except an
alleged confession, can be found in the Simpson coverage. 2 Then again,
none of these earlier cases contained footage so dramatic as the famous
"slow-speed car chase," which was seen by an estimated seventy million
television viewers.2'3 The McVeigh trial coverage, when compared to its
early predecessors, includes most of the classic elements, including the
coup de grace last-minute release of an alleged confession." When con-
240. See Don J. DeBenedictis, The National Verdict, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1980, 52, 54-55 (1994)
(listing Gallup Organization poll results).
241. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356 (1966) (citing State v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d
340, 342 (Ohio 1956)).
242. For discussion of the elements present in Irvin v. Dowd, Rideau v. Louisiana, Estes v.
Texas, and Sheppard v. Maxwell, see supra Part lII.A.
243. See Christopher B. Mueller, Introduction: OJ. Simpson and the Criminal Justice System
on Trial, 67 U. CoLO. L. REv. 727, 730 (1996); Burleigh, supra note 17, at 56 (estimating the num-
ber of people who watched the Los Angeles police pursuing Simpson at low speed on the freeway
just prior to his arrest).
244. McVeigh contended that extensive pretrial publicity essentially destroyed his right to a fair
trial. Specifically, he asserted that his Fifth Amendment rights to due process and against self-
incrimination were violated because the devastating "confessions" he made to his defense counsel
were so widely publicized. Defendant's Motion for New Trial, supra note 220, at * 1; see also U.S.
CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."). Pretrial publicity
consisted of extensive newspaper and electronic media coverage. Defendant's Motion for New Trial,
supra note 220, at *3. Newspaper coverage of the McVeigh "confession" began with the Dallas
Morning News' Intemet home page publication on February 28, 1997. Id. On March 1, the "confes-
sion" appeared in print media, after which the publicity continued relentlessly for eleven days. Id.
Following Playboy's home page reiteration of McVeigh's "confession," several newspapers carried
articles with headlines such as "McVeigh Wanted a Body Count," "Timothy McVeigh's Purported
Admission That He Committed the Oklahoma City Bombing May Be Inadmissible at His Trial ... "
and "Paper Suspect Timed Blast to Boost Deaths." Id. Television news coverage consisted of several
reports of McVeigh's "confession" carried by major networks such as ABC, CBS, and CNN. Id. at
*4. These were broadcast in the weeks before McVeigh's trial, from Febnrary 28 to March 12, 1997.
Id. Furthermore, the trial had the element of a consistent community pattern of thought, which re-
sulted in removal of the trial from Oklahoma City to Denver. United States v. McVeigh, 918 F.
Supp. 1467, 1471 (W.D. Okla. 1996). As the court noted, "Oklahomans are united as a family with a
spirit unique to the state." Id. at 1471.
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sidering the elements of media coverage in these cases, and comparing
them to Supreme Court precedent, one could draw the conclusion that,
following the lead of Sheppard, Irvin, Estes, or Rideau, a court could
easily sustain a finding that prejudicial pretrial publicity might deny
McVeigh or Simpson 5 .a fair trial." Moreover, because of the expansive
coverage of these two cases, as compared to other cases in recent
history," it is not a long stretch to argue that the prejudicial impact
would be nationwide.2" The natural result of combining these two factors
is the success of a motion like that made by McVeigh, which contended
that his entire prosecution should be dismissed for lack of a venue that
could supply an impartial jury.'4 9 It appears, however, in reviewing recent
precedents, that the Supreme Court has positioned itself to always be the
ringmaster at the media circus rather than the clown painted into a cor-
ner. It has done this by adopting the "totality of circumstances" test and
then applying the test in such a way that new factors and circumstances
continually change the mix necessary to prove or presume bias.'
For example, in Mu'Min, the Court considered not only the size of
the population, the saturation of the media coverage, the extent and con-
tent of the coverage, and the airing of the defendant's alleged confession,
but it also tossed in the number of murders in the area, and the fact that
the defendant's crime was only one of nine murders occurring that
245. Though Simpson was acquitted, his trial is relevant in terms of the publicity that it re-
ceived.
246. Compare Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 340, and Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), with
Defendant's Motion for New Trial, supra note 220, and Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). The
newspaper coverage in Sheppard tended to emphasize the defendant's guilt, and pointed out discrep-
ancies in his statements to authorities. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 340. The Court granted defendant's
motion for a new trial, because of the massive pretrial publicity that had saturated the community,
the "carnival atmosphere of the courtroom," the failure to insulate the witnesses, and the lack of
effort by the court to control the flow of information to the press. Id. at 357-63. In Rideau, the de-
fendant's request for change of venue was granted because three televised interviews of the defen-
dant's "confession" had been broadcast within the community. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 727-28. After
acknowledging the probability that tens of thousands of people watched the televised "confession,"
the Court stated that "subsequent court proceedings ... could be but a hollow formality." ld. at 726.
Pretrial publicity of McVeigh's "confession" received national coverage via television and even
world-wide coverage, due to publication on Internet home pages. Defendant's Motion for New Trial,
supra note 220, at *1-3. Finally, in Irvin, the defendant's conviction for murder was reversed be-
cause the Court found that despite a change of venue, the current community pattern of thought
revealed a deep and bitter prejudice. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725; see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 545-50
(1965) (noting that the use of television does not contribute materially to ascertaining truth, but
rather impacts the opinions of jurors, impairs the quality of testimonies, places additional responsi-
bilities on the trial judge, and tends to harass the criminal defendant).
247. See Burleigh, supra note 17 (indicating that the coverage of the Simpson trial was unlike
any in history).
248. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at * 11.
249. Seeid.at*12.
250. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1991) (distinguishing the factors in
Mu'Min from those in Irvin).
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year."' Putting aside the life-cheapening implications of this analysis, it
suggests that with more murders, there is less sensitivity to a single mur-
der, and therefore less impact on the venire as a result of pretrial public-
ity directed at a single murder suspect."2 That same logic can be applied
to the media coverage itself. As the media creates bigger, more nation-
ally-saturating coverage (a bigger circus), the nation as part of the venire
is desensitized. Thus, after Simpson, the courts could arguably move the
bar for McVeigh, claiming that the Simpson coverage desensitized the
nation's media consumers to a point where they expect that level of cir-
cus atmosphere in trial coverage. This lack of sensitivity would undercut
a defendant's claim that the prospective jurors who received that cover-
age would be impacted by, or biased as a result of, having seen or heard
it.
Arguably, then, the presumed or inherent prejudice standard articu-
lated in Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard could never be met again, or at least
could always be refuted by simply shifting the factors to be considered in
the totality of media coverage circumstances. For the courts, the beauty
of this is that there will never be national jury bias, and there will always
be a place to send the defendant for a fair trial with an "impartial" jury.2
3
With the presumed prejudice test out of the way, a court can focus on the
standards established in Mu'Min, which allow the judge to determine that
individual jurors are sufficiently impartial to be impaneled without a
specific inquiry into the types of pretrial publicity they encountered.'
This is also good for the media, which is less likely to be restrained if the
courts perceive that the defendant will receive a fair trial regardless of
the press coverage. While the effective elimination of presumed preju-
dice permits the courts and the media to evade the trap of national jury
bias, it leaves the nationally notorious, and even the locally notorious,
defendant at substantial risk of being denied a fair trial.
C. The Mu'Min Alternative--Don't Ask Don't Tell
In Mu'Min v. Virginia," the Court held that in criminal cases having
prejudicial pretrial publicity, the defendant does not have a constitutional
right to question the prospective jurors about the specific content of the
251. Id. at 429. The Court expanded this discussion to include the number of murders in the
surrounding area even though there was no indication that residents of that area were part of the
venire. Id.
252. Id.
253. This situation does not apply to state criminal defendants, who unlike McVeigh, cannot be
tried anywhere in the country under federal jurisdiction. This issue is unfortunately, but intention-
ally, omitted from this discussion.
254. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 427 (acknowledging that prior cases have recognized the wide dis-
cretion granted to trial judges in conducting voir dire). The Court determined that despite the trial
judge's failure to question individual jurors about the content of the publicity they were exposed to,
the voir dire examination was sufficient to allow the court to select an impartial jury. Id. at 431-32.
255. 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
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pretrial publicity they observed."6 The defendant in Mu'Min was a con-
victed murderer who was alleged to have robbed and killed a shop owner
after escaping from a prison work detail. 7 The case received substantial
news coverage due, in part, to the controversy surrounding allegations of
lax security on the work detail at the time of the murder." At trial, the
defendant asked the court to include several questions in voir dire about
the specific content of pretrial reports that the jurors had heard. 9 The
court denied the request, and conducted a voir dire of the general jury
panel, and jurors, in groups of four, but did not ask the jurors the content
questions the defendant had submitted.2" The jury convicted the defen-
dant and sentenced him to death.26' He then sought relief from the Su-
preme Court, claiming that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
had been denied."
The Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, stating that there
was no constitutional requirement that the trial court ask the specific
content voir dire questions submitted. 3 The Court noted that trial judges
have been given broad discretion in deciding how to conduct voir dire.2'
Reviewing its earlier decisions, it compared the judge's function during
voir dire to that of the jury during trial, stating "[b]oth must reach con-
clusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evalua-
tions of demeanor evidence and of responses to questions.""
The Court acknowledged that content questions during voir dire
might be helpful to the trial court's assessment of juror impartiality.2" It
concluded, however, that to be constitutionally compelled, the failure to
ask the questions had to "render defendant's trial fundamentally
unfair.""' The Court quoted its opinion in Irvin v. Dowd, noting that in
that case, it had acknowledged that pretrial publicity can create such a
presumption of bias that jurors' claims of impartiality should not be be-
lieved.2' It even conceded that content questions might be constitution-
ally required if the media coverage of Mu'Min's trial had been equiva-
lent to that in Irvin.' The Court then distinguished the two cases, noting
differences in the magnitude of media coverage, and the sizes of the
256. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 424-25.
257. Id. at 418.
258. Id. at 434-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at419.
260. Id. at 420.
261. Id. at 421.
262. Id. at 417.
263. Id. at 425.
264. Id. at 423.
265. Id. at 424 (quoting Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981)).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 425-26 (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794,799 (1975)).
268. Id. at 429 (citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984)).
269. Id.
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communities in which the cases occurred.'m Though the Court concluded
that the Irvin coverage was more substantial, it considered factors never
discussed therein to support its conclusion that Mu'Min did not face the
"'wave of public passion"' that occurred in Irvin.27' For example, the
Court considered the fact that the murder in Mu'Min occurred in a large
metropolitan area where the defendant's case was only one of nine mur-
ders in the particular county, and one of hundreds in the metropolitan
area that year.27
One problem with the Court's analysis in Mu'Min is that a court has
the difficult task of determining a juror's individual sensitivity to pretrial
publicity. The impact on impartiality cannot be generalized."' In the
Court's estimation, there was insufficient media coverage in Mu'Min to
presume bias to the whole venire. That conclusion does not, however,
warrant the additional presumption of the absence of bias in any of the
individual jurors. In his dissent in Mu'Min, Justice Marshall put his fin-
ger on another problem when he stated that "an individual juror may
have an interest in concealing his own bias. .. [or] may be unaware of
it." ' Moreover, inquiry into the content of the media coverage an indi-
vidual juror was exposed to certainly ought to be required so the trial
court can check the believability and credibility of the juror's statement
of impartiality. The judge's task in evaluating juror bias is analogous to
what jurors do with respect to witness testimony during trial." 5 The
anomaly in the Supreme Court's subsequent conclusion that content
questions are not required is thus apparent when one considers a jury
panel having to evaluate a witness's credibility based on nothing more
than the witness's promise to tell the truth. Finally, jurors may honestly
believe they can be impartial 'because they do not fully understand the
implications of what impartiality entails."6 Only the trial judge would be
in a position, through questioning a juror, to recognize the juror's erro-
neous conclusion.
270. Id. at 429-30.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 429.
273. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 724-25 (1961) (citing United States v. Wood, 299 U.S.
123, 145-46 (1936)). The Court stated: "Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of
mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays
down no particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula." Id.
274. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 440 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S.
209, 221-22 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
275. Id. at 424.
276. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728 (recognizing that although jurors say they will be fair and impartial,
they cannot forget what they see and hear); see also Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 443 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that a prospective juror may be "confused" as to what constitutes impartiality). Justice
Marshall refers to the example of a juror who insisted she was impartial despite exposure to news
articles but who, upon further questioning, stated, "Well, we all know what she has done.., we all
know the girl went in and held up the bank and the policeman was shot there." Id. at 443 n.4.
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Notwithstanding the anomalies in the Court's reasoning, there are
several issues in the Mu'Min opinion that are particularly relevant in the
context of massive pretrial publicity creating national jury bias. First, the
Court never referred to the "totality of circumstances" test. Yet, it refer-
enced Murphy for the proposition that to be constitutionally deficient, the
failure to ask content questions must render the defendant's trial funda-
mentally unfair.' The Mu'Min Court failed to point out that, in Murphy,
the Court held that fundamental unfairness must be determined through
examining the totality of circumstances." The Court, however, in Mur-
phy applied the "totality of circumstances" test to determine that the de-
fendant's case was not one in which bias to all the veniremen could be
presumed without reference to voir dire." In contrast to Mu'Min, the
Court in Murphy then examined a detailed voir dire while acknowledging
that, if the circumstances warranted, the jurors' assurances of impartiality
would not be dispositive.2 "
Second, the Court distinguished Mu'Min from Irvin, noting that the
coverage in Irvin might have necessitated content questions before the
jury could pass constitutional standards of impartiality."' It introduced,
however, new factors not considered in Irvin.2 Moreover, the Court used
the magnitude of coverage in Irvin as a sort of litmus test for Mu'Min,
concluding that, because Mu'Min's coverage did not meet or exceed the
coverage in Irvin, no content questions were required.' This comparison
is a bit misplaced since in Irvin, the Court held that the magnitude of
coverage supported its conclusion that it should not trust the jurors'
statements regarding their ability to be impartial at the conclusion of voir
dire. ' The Court did not hold that, absent that magnitude of coverage,
only a general voir dire was needed.
Third, as previously noted, this freedom to move the bar in a totality
of circumstances analysis, as evidenced in Mu'Min, is the Supreme
Court's escape hatch from the comer of national jury bias. No case will
ever be identical to any of those in which bias was presumed without
reference to voir dire. If a case comes to the Court that looks similar,
such as the McVeigh case, the Court can simply introduce new factors,
such as more people, or number of murders per year, to undercut a pre-
sumed bias argument. If that fails, the Court can look to prior media cov-
erage and conclude that the current case did not have sufficient coverage
277. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 425-26 (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794,799 (1975)).
278. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799.
279. Id. at 800.
280. Id. at 800-01.
281. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 429.
282. Id. (including the number of murders in the area, and the fact that the defendant's crime
was one of only nine murders occurred in the jurisdiction that year).
283. Id.
284. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,728 (1961).
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to impact the venire. This presents the prospect that the Court could use
the Simpson criminal trial coverage as a future litmus test for bias-
producing coverage, given that the unprecedented (unsurpassable?) cov-
erage in that case did not prevent his acquittal.
Under the foregoing analysis, it may be concluded that presumed
bias as it was established in Rideau is dead. But the lessons learned in
Irvin should not be. There are times when media coverage may be insuf-
ficient to presume bias, but substantial enough to presume exposure to
media coverage and content that is inherently prejudicial. At that point,
content questions, if requested, should be obligatory because only
through that inquiry can the court determine whether the totality of cir-
cumstances to which an individual juror was exposed renders that juror
biased and, thereby, makes that juror's jury service a violation of the
defendant's constitutional fair trial rights.20
V. THE NEW RING MASTER AT THE MEDIA CIRCUS
In the current media atmosphere, high profile and otherwise curious
or unique trials are likely to attract a media "circus" or at least a "carni-
val. ' 2M Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, however, courts
should not sit by and juggle the constitutional rights of defendants whose
cases attract excessive attention. Some precedents, while still good law,
have the appearance of clowns when thrust into the spotlight of the con-
temporary media circus. Rideau supports the proposition that, under ex-
treme circumstances of media coverage, bias can be presumed to all who
witness the coverage.' Applying Rideau, if the entire nation witnessed
sufficiently damaging coverage, the defendant could paint a court into a
corner, allowing a McVeigh-type scenario to result in the dismissal of a
defendant's prosecution before voir dire of a single juror. Murphy, as
currently interpreted, converts the totality of circumstances test into a
juggling act-tossing in new circumstances and eliminating old ones,
like trading balls for bowling pins.' Mu'Min is the classic clown with a
bucket of confetti that everyone believes is water. With the standard of
285. This is also consistent with the interpretations some courts have adopted in applying
Mu'Min v. Virginia. See, for example, People v. Jendrzejewski, 197 WL 422515, at *2 (Mich. 1997)
(citing Mu'Min v. Virginia. 500 U.S. 415,442 n.3 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting), where the Court
concluded that Irvin presents a dual presumption: first, that a certain level of media coverage creates
a presumption of exposure and, second, that the exposure creates a presumption of bias. Id. Even
though the Court may now be able to undercut the second presumption through introduction of new
factors in the totatlity of circumstances, it is safe to presume that, at a certain level, media coverage
would reach every individual in the nation.
286. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975) (referring to the trial in Estes as being
conducted in a "circus atmosphere"); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (referring to
the "carnival atmosphere at trial" created by the presence of the press); Rideau v. Lousiana, 373 U.S.
723, 726 (1963) (referring to the proceedings in the case as "kangaroo court proceedings").
287. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963). The Rideau Court held that due proc-
ess required the defendant to be tried by a jury who had not witnessed his televised confession. Id.
288. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 425-26.
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presumed prejudice virtually eliminated, a trial court's reliance on the
jurors' statements that they can be impartial is sustainable even without
the detailed voir dire called for by other Supreme Court precedent. ' In
the circumstance of a media circus large enough to actually impact a
venire, Mu'Min tosses confetti, not water, on the flame of injustice by
allowing a court to seat jurors who could take their prejudices to the jury
room undetected by the filter of extended voir dire designed to identify
bias. '
The media circus that appears at so many trials these days needs a
ringmaster to balance the rights of the media and the accused. It does not
need more clowns. Some suggest that the court should take control of the
spectacle."' Indeed, the court in McVeigh was quite aggressive and suc-
cessful in its efforts to control the circus.' Notwithstanding the precau-
tions the court took in pretrial, however, a single media event spiraled
into a spectacle that threatened or, according to McVeigh, destroyed the
defendant's chance for a fair trial. 3 Moreover, the Simpson trial demon-
strated that a big enough circus can turn even a competent, respected
judge into a performer in center ring. Judge Ito was not the first judge to
beoverwhelmed by the media onslaught, as other judges have appeared,
or felt, powerless to restrain the press."4
The release of the alleged confession in the McVeigh trial demon-
strated the explosive potential of pretrial coverage, even under controlled
circumstances." Indeed, McVeigh's defense counsel complimented the
manner in which the court had managed the pretrial and minimized the
impact of the publicity prior to the confession incident.' Unfortunately,
such media incidents in high visibility trials cannot be anticipated or
289. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984) (resolving any questions of juror impar-
tiality through an extensive voir dire); cf Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 431 (holding that due process does
not require jurors to be asked specifically about their exposure to pretrial publicity).
290. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 445 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for failing
to fault the trial judge's decision to seat jurors without first inquiring into their exposure to public-
ity).
291. See Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 14, at 78-84 (proposing that courts actively
restrain the press and lawyers, and close voir dire/trial proceedings); Whitebread & Contreras, supra
note 15, at 1619-25 (proposing that courts impose a gag order on all trial participants, and utilize a
voir dire patterned after the considerations discussed in Mu'Min).
292. See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 931 F. Supp. 756 (D. Colo. 1996) (prohibiting extra-
judicial statements to the press by attorneys, support personnel, persons associated with attorneys,
and court personnel).
293. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *9.
294. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358-59 (1966) (noting that the trial court's fun-
damental error was compounded by the judge, who held that he could not control or restrict the
prejudicial pretrial coverage).
295. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at *3-5 (describing the extensive media
coverage of the alleged confession that the Dallas Morning News published a month before the
scheduled commencement of trial).
296. Id. at *3 (noting that the court had gone to great lengths to balance free press and fair trial
rights).
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controlled. Therefore, the ultimate ringmaster would be a precedent that
provides the trial court with solid guidance and allows the court to bal-
ance the competing interests of the press and the accused, even after an
uncontrollable media outburst appears to make a fair trial impossible.
This article suggests that the Court already has the necessary precedent
in the form of Irvin, as it was interpreted by the Court in Patton v.
Yount,' with a little help from Rideau, Estes, Sheppard, Murphy, and
Justice Marshall's dissent in Mu'Min. The net result would be a "totality
of circumstances" test that considers and evaluates the impact of media
coverage, and other circumstances, on each individual juror. The ration-
ale for applying the test in this manner, and the method for application,
can be found in the above mentioned precedents.
Starting with the Court's interpretation of Irvin is unconventional
because, in Patton, the Court appeared to put it out to pasture.' The
Court's reference to the Irvin decision as "a leading one at the time" in-
dicates its perception that the decision was past its prime.m The Court
read the holding in Irvin to say "that adverse pretrial publicity can create
such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims
that they can be impartial should not be believed." The Court also
noted that, in Irvin, a number of factors had been reviewed to determine
whether the totality of circumstances raised such a presumption. °' This
reading of Irvin indicates that the Court in Patton believed that the for-
mer case had reviewed the totality of circumstances to evaluate presumed
bias to the community, which was sufficient to undercut an individual
juror's statement of impartiality. This reading requires that, when a case
is accompanied by a certain level of pretrial publicity, the court cannot
believe the juror's statements of impartiality. Rather, it must make the
determination of juror ,bias based on the totality of circumstances en-
countered by the juror.'
Here is where Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard enter the analysis. The
court's initial inquiry should be guided by the critical factors identified
by the Supreme Court in those cases. 3 If the pretrial publicity contains
297. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031-35 (1984) (stating that the court of appeals, in
relying on Irvin, failed to consider other significant factors).




302. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). The Court imposed on the defendant the
burden of proving bias, and stating that
Unless [defendant] shows the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror
as will raise the presumption of partiality, the juror need not necessarily be set aside... If
a positive and decided opinion had been formed, [the juror] would have been incompetent
even though it had not been expressed.
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878)).
303. See supra Part II.A.
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these factors,' as Justice Marshall suggested, the court should be re-
quired to engage in detailed individual voir dire of the prospective jurors,
which would include questions about the content of publicity
witnessed.' At that point, nonclassic elements can be considered in the
totality of circumstances, such as whether the case arises in a community
that is more or less likely to be sensitive to, and thereby biased against, a
particular kind of crime or defendant.' This two-step inquiry serves two
purposes. First, it sorts out the source and strength of attitudes that assist
in determining whether a juror can put aside impressions and render a
fair verdict.' This determination is for the judge, not the juror, to
make.' Second, in the event that the judge cannot find impartial jurors,
the information received may assist the decision to transfer or delay the
trial.
Applying this process has several benefits. It prevents the court
from getting painted into a comer because the presumption of bias to the
entire venire is, in effect, left to rest in peace. Simultaneously, it creates a
fixed set of standards for initial inquiry into bias, but allows the flexibil-
ity to deal with societal changes that impact the community composing
the venire. Finally, this two-step process requires content questions when
a certain level of pretrial coverage occurs, but not for every case that
makes the evening news. Thus, courts are not burdened in the way the
majority feared in Mu'Min,' but a defendant in a high publicity case is
not left to trust his fate to the superficial and unexamined promise of
impartiality by a potentially biased juror.
CONCLUSION
Courts have wrestled with the impact of pretrial publicity on local
prospective and empanelled jurors for nearly two hundred years."' In
retrospect, Justice Douglas sounded almost prophetic when he said,
Think, too, of the times when a community is thoroughly
aroused about some heinous crime-so aroused as to generate an at-
mosphere in which a fair trial cannot be had. Imagine what could
happen if the latent local passions were aroused through channels
304. The defendant would still have the burden of raising the issue of bias, and establishing the
presence of certain factors. Consistent with precedent, however, not all factors would be required.
Rather, the defendant would argue those which appear in his case.
305. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 441-47 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). A number of
courts use content voir dire. See id. at 446. Under Mu'Min, however, content questioning in voir dire
is not required to preserve defendant's due process rights. Id. at 431-32.
306. See id. at 429.
307. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723 (1961).
308. See id. at 724; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878).
309. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 446 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's
claim that content questions would unduly burden trial courts).
310. See generally supra note 37.
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provided by radio and television. Then there might be no place to
which the trial could be transferred to protect the accused."'
Now, nearly forty years later, Douglas's words are timely when consid-
ering the McVeigh trial, which was moved to a different state on the basis
that the entire state of Oklahoma was considered a unified community in
terms of its bias against the bombing suspect."2
The McVeigh court's treatment of the Oklahoma City bombing's
media coverage demonstrates a shifting focus from local and regional
bias to a more expansive presumed statewide bias. 3 Is nationwide bias
far behind? Worse yet, what if nationwide bias already exists and is sim-
ply undetected? Consider again the Simpson criminal trial coverage.
What if, as Professor Allen suggested, the "citizens of the country" be-
lieved, as he did, what they saw in the media coverage of Simpson's trial,
and subscribe to the notion that procedural protection of the criminally
accused is just "political rhetoric" when the citizens believe the media
instead of the evidence?" If Professor Allen's view, that the citizens of
this nation believe Simpson is guilty, actually reflects national sentiment,
we may have already witnessed the arrival of media-based national jury
bias, but simply failed to recognize it behind the veil of Simpson's
criminal acquittal."'
It is difficult to imagine this diverse nation of prospective jurors
both unified and galvanized in their opinions about a defendant's guilt or
innocence. Yet the challenge to the nation's ability to remain impartial
while engulfed in the media circus has now been issued-and initially
answered with a conviction-in the McVeigh trial. Regardless of the
ultimate resolution in that case, we have not likely seen the last of the
criminal trial media circus. Thus, we have not likely seen the last allega-
tion of national jury bias, which, for the purpose of this research, raises
two questions. First, is a motion to dismiss a prosecution because pretrial
publicity tainted the national jury pool viable after the Simpson trial cov-
erage exceeded every prior trial spectacle? Second, has the Court antici-
pated a Simpson-like media circus and raised the bar so high that all me-
dia coverage will fall below the standards required by the Court's post-
311. Id.
312. United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (finding, without
proof of actual juror bias, that media coverage of the Oklahoma City explosion was so comprehen-
sive and profound that- the defendants could not receive a fair and impartial trial anywhere in the
state).
313. See id. (focusing on statewide media-based bias).
314. Allen, supra note 21, at 990 (stating that the "citizens of the country" saw an obviously
guilty Simpson acquitted, and that these "citizens" believe constitutional protection is intended for
the falsely accused innocent, not the [media-convicted] guilty).
315. This conclusion would, according to one poll, necessarily exclude approximately 70% of
black and 30% of white people from Professor Allen's definition of "citizen." Burleigh, supra note
17, at 61 (noting poll results).
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Murphy "totality of circumstances" test for presuming bias without ex-
amining voir dire testimony?36
An affirmative answer to either of these questions is troubling. As to
the first, it would mean that a Timothy McVeigh or O.J. Simpson-type
suspect, given sufficient prejudicial publicity, could escape prosecution
on the federal constitutional ground that no venue in the country could
supply an impartial jury."' Even those who accept the Simpson verdict
should reject the prospect of not being able to put a suspect on trial. An-
swering yes to the second question is equally distressing. It suggests that
even when the media coverage has interfered with a trial and thereby
compromised a defendant's constitutional rights, the court can juggle the
standard and hold a trial with a biased jury.
This article concludes that the first question is answered in the
negative. A motion to dismiss a prosecution because of pretrial publicity,
as made by McVeigh, is not viable. But the Simpson trial coverage as a
new litmus test may be part of the reason such a motion is doomed. Thus,
the second question gets an affirmative answer. Under the totality of cir-
cumstances test, as applied in Murphy, the Court could arguably use the
magnitude of coverage in Simpson-as well as any number of other fac-
tors-to evaluate the potential for bias caused by media coverage in a
later case, like McVeigh. Under the test, as applied to evaluate the bias-
ing impact of media coverage on the national venire, national coverage
of one case-and its impact-could become a factor for evaluating na-
tional coverage of another case, no matter where it occurs.
This raises the final issue-the prospect that, with the flexibility to
consider an infinite number of factors in the totality of circumstances, a
court could conclude that no level of pretrial publicity is sufficient to
create a presumption of bias. The court could then affirm the conviction
rendered by a biased jury. Some argue that such a step was taken by the
Supreme Court when it decided Mu'Min.38 Mu'Min, however, did not
reject the Court's earlier precedents in which convictions were vacated
on the basis of widespread bias to the venire resulting from extraordinary
pretrial publicity. 9 This article suggests that the critical elements of
316. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794,795 (1975).
317. As a state court criminal case that cannot be revisited due to Simpson's acquittal, the
Simpson trial is discussed here because the coverage of the case was extraordinary. Burleigh, supra
note 17. Its impact on the nation is illustrative. The Simpson case also presents issues not addressed
in this article, specifically the implications for state criminal defendants facing bias in the only state
with original jurisdiction to prosecute them.
318. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991) (holding that a defendant was not deprived
of his Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment rights when the trial judge refused to question prospective
jurors about the contents of the pretrial publicity they encountered).
319. See id. at 439 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (recognizing that precedent indicates that exposure
to pretrial publicity may deprive a defendant of his constitutional rights, but stating that this case was
one of first impression because it dealt with the actual procedures necessary to protect the defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury after its exposure to pretrial publicity). The Su-
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prejudicial pretrial publicity, which were the basis for the Court finding
presumed bias in the 1960s, should become a standard for determining
when contemporary trial publicity presents a sufficient probability of
juror bias so as to support constitutionally mandated content questioning
during voir dire.
Clearly, we do not want to face the prospect of a guilty, or even
potentially guilty, suspect going free without any trial on a procedural
technicality. If a motion like McVeigh's could succeed, due process
would be denied to all by the failure to hold a trial. Simultaneously, the
inverse is no more attractive-an innocent person convicted by jurors
tainted by biased media coverage. The Irvin and Murphy era cases must,
therefore, be read together to stand for the proposition that while no to-
tality of circumstances could bias the entire national venire, the national
media circus raises a presumption of exposure to bias such that a juror's
mere statement of impartiality-in the midst of the circus-is not suffi-
cient to overcome the prospect of bias.
preme Court had reversed the defendant's conviction, because of extensive prejudicial publicity. See
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (finding that the trial judge did not adequately
protect defendant from pretrial publicity that was "inherently prejudicial" and "saturated" the com-
munity); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550-52 (1965) (holding that extensive television coverage of
defendant's criminal trial violated due process considerations); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)
(holding that the community in which defendant was tried had a definitive media-based bias that




CIVIL COMMITMENT AND THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PREDATOR
Stability without tyranny and liberty without anarchy.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Kansas last convicted Leroy Hendricks for child molestation in
1984,2 ten years before the creation of Kansas's Sexually Violent Preda-
tor Act (SVP Act).3 When Hendricks reached the end of his ten-year
prison sentence, Kansas sought to confine him to a mental hospital under
the SVP Act as a sexually violent predator." Hendricks challenged the
Act on substantive due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto
grounds.5 On June 23, 1997, the United States Supreme Court, in a five
to four decision, rejected all of Hendricks's arguments and held that the
SVP Act applied to Hendricks.6 Neither the SVP Act nor the fact that
Hendricks molested children made the decision controversial. Rather, the
fact that a slim majority of justices upheld retroactive application of the
SVP Act to Hendricks sparked debate." Although the retroactive applica-
tion became the primary focus of the Court's analysis, Hendricks's
greater significance should be the Court's eight to one holding that civil
commitment legislation for sexually violent predators does not violate an
individual's substantive due process rights.! The Hendricks decision cre-
ates both a significant historical marker in the legal treatment of sexual
predators9 and an immediate catalyst for more effective legislation to
handle individuals who commit sex crimes against children.
1. Joseph Hamburger, Utilitarianism and the Constitution, in CONFRONTING THE
CONsTrrTToN 235, 257 (Alan Bloom ed., 1990).
2. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. CL 2072, 2078 (1997).
3. Kansas enacted the Sexually Violent Predator Act in 1994. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01
to -29a15 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
4. Hendricks, 117 S. CL at 2076. The term "sexually violent predator" includes more crimi-
nals than just those who prey on children. Id. at 2077. However, for purposes of this Note the term
"sexually violent predator" refers to offenders who commit crimes against children. Discussion of
sexually violent offenses against adults lies outside of the scope of this Note.
5. Id. at 2076.
6. Id. at 2076, 2086.
7. Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 2079. Justice Kennedy concurred with the majority's finding that the SVP Act satis-
fied substantive due process requirements. Id. at 2087. Justice Ginsberg did not join in Part I of the
dissent in which the three remaining justices agreed that the SVP Act satisfied substantive due proc-
ess requirements. Id. at 2087-90.
9. Hendricks stands as the first case heard by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the issue of
validating civil commitment for sexually violent predators after an offender completes criminal
incarceration. See Mark Hansen, Danger vs. Due Process, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1997, at 43, 43.
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The complicated issues in Hendricks present an excellent example
of the difficulty in maintaining a balance between opposite forces inher-
ent in a democratic society: tyranny and anarchy.'" Our Constitution
guarantees individuals the freedoms of life and liberty." With these free-
doms, however, lies the grim reality that not all people respect or even
consider others' rights. Because no society functions devoid of criminal
acts, survival necessitates the formation of a legal structure that will
maintain the safety of the community." Although not always popular,
state and federal governments must construct certain mechanisms to as-
sure that all citizens can enjoy their constitutional freedoms.'3 This juxta-
position of protecting individual rights while securing community safety
renders the Hendricks case and others like it difficult to satisfactorily
resolve. The paradox becomes especially prominent when the targets of
the criminal acts are children.
When society must cope with a person who violates the sanctity of
youth by committing sexual offenses against children, the community's
interest in punishing the offender and deterring future acts competes with
the offender's long-term liberty interests. A relatively short period of
criminal incarceration does not usually prompt tyrannical concerns.
However, after an offender completes a criminal sentence, society strug-
gles with the anarchical problem presented by trying to control a freed
offender and preventing that offender from molesting again. This Note
discusses the ever present struggle between tyranny and anarchy in-
grained in our constitutional law, from the inception of our legal system
to the present controversy of courts and legislatures striving to address
and control sex crimes against children without denying the individual
rights of sexually violent predators. While focusing on the tragedies of
child sexual abuse, this Note demonstrates why civil commitment pro-
vides society and the offender with the most humane response to the se-
rious dilemma created by sexually violent predators.
11. HISTORY
A. Constitutional Balancing of Individual Rights Against Community
Rights
In 1787, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention gathered in
Philadelphia." Their experiences, first as British colonials and then as
10. See Hamburger, supra note 1, at 257; see also DAVID W. MtNAR, IDEAS AND POLITICS:
THE AMERICAN EXPERmNCE 101-02 (1964) (describing how the Constitution institutionalized the
tension between liberty and authority).
I. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. MINAR, supra note 10, at 101 (asserting that one of the major aims of the Constitutional
Convention was to establish authority).
13. Id.
14. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 3 (1966).
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rebels, and aspiring republican thoughts led them to some astounding
conclusions." The delegates understood the genuine tension between the
threat of tyranny on one hand and the equally dangerous possibility of
anarchy on the other." They also perceived the delicate state of equilib-
rium necessary to ensure that the document they created to govern their
new world would fairly serve individual rights while securing societal
stability." The framers recognized that the solution lay in a document
that could embody and negotiate discordant principles.'8
The authors of the Constitution melded protection for individual
rights and protection for society into this unique governing document to
avoid the extremes of totalitarianism and chaos.'9 These pioneers relied
on a practical approach to draft a governing document that both obscured
philosophical origins and opened the possibility of future consideration
of unrealized ideas. ° The amazing prescience of these delegates pro-
pelled the Constitution through over two hundred years into the present
as a largely unchanged and living framework for a "well-constructed
Union."2'
In The Federalist Number 44," James Madison's discussion of pow-
ers conferred by the Constitution noted the impossibility of enumerating
"a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the Constitution
relates. .. ."' Madison argued that the creators could not possibly ac-
commodate all the changes which "futurity may produce."'2 The release
15. See id. at 3-15. The 55 delegates who arrived in Philadelphia in 1787 came from a variety
of backgrounds and participated in what was called "a Grand Convention at Philadelphia" or the
"Federal Convention." The delegates closed their meetings to the public, and at the time neither the
country, nor the delegates themselves, referred to these sessions as a "constitutional" convention. Id.
16. Hamburger, supra note 1, at 257.
17. MiNAR, supra note 10, at 100-01 (describing the Constitution as an expression of the
American social consensus and stating that the framers "institutionalized a set of preferences firmly
rooted in the American society of the time").
18. Hamburger, supra note 1, at 257. American constitutional thought emphasizes balancing,
described as "a perpetual system of compromise, a perpetual trimming." Id. (quoting James Mill,
Periodical Literature, Edinburgh Review, WESTMINSTER REv., Jan. 1824, at 203, 218).
19. Id. at 256-57.
20. Id. at 257.
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 122 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
23. Id. at 289. Written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in order to
persuade Americans to support ratification of the Constitution, the Federalist Papers present a series
of essays widely accepted as the standard authority on Constitutional principles behind the Constitu-
tion. ALAN PENDLETON GRiMEs, AMERICAN PoLITCAL THOUGHT 119 (1960). The authors of The
Federalist, by unveiling the intentions of the convention delegates, clarify the framers' dilemma
over establishing national unity without abusing the rights of individual states and citizens. Id. at
199-221.
24. HE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 22, at 289. In the same essay, Madison described
some restrictions on the power of the states, including the prohibition against ex post facto laws,
which he defined as "contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to every principle of
sound legislation." Id. at 287. Madison clearly desired to protect citizens from the improper use of
power by the government, yet he also felt that without the power afforded by the "necessary and
proper" clause, the Constitution would be a "dead letter." Id. at 288-89. The Madison argument often
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of sexually violent predators into society after completion of their crimi-
nal sentences, despite high rates of recidivism, presents a problem not
anticipated by the writers of the Constitution.' Madison and Hamilton
concurred that "[i]t is of great importance in a republic not only to guard
the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of
the society against the injustice of the other part."'6 Although Madison
and Hamilton were not speaking specifically of child sex offenders when
they wrote this essay, their words reverberate with ironic implications:
Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society 27.... In
a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily
unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as
in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against
the violence of the stronger.... Y
The framers' ingenious decision to instill underlying flexibility in
the Constitution allows courts and state legislatures to apply constitu-
tional principles to modem problems-problems unfathomable over two
centuries ago. Sadly, in today's complex society, child sex abusers like
Leroy Hendricks victimize growing numbers of children. State legisla-
tures must put an end to this "anarchy" by protecting the "weaker" mem-
bers of our society.
used to defend a "loose construction" of the Constitution states: "No axiom is more clearly estab-
lished in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wher-
ever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is in-
cluded." Id. at 290.
It should be noted that another Federalist author, Alexander Hamilton, proposed the estab-
lishment of a national bank in 1790 while serving as Washington's Secretary of the Treasury.
GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, AMERICA: A NARRATivE HISTORY 300-01 (2d ed. 1988). The opponents
of this proposal, including Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, claimed that the bank would
represent an unconstitutional presumption of power on the part of the national government. Id.
Resorting to a literal interpretation of the Constitution, Jefferson argued that because the Constitu-
tion did not provide for a bank and because a national bank was not "necessary" for the execution of
delegated powers, the Hamilton proposal was unconstitutional. Id. Hamilton, using the concept of
"implied powers," responded in defense of the bank that if the Constitution were limited to a literal
interpretation, it would "arrest the motions of government." GRIMES, supra note 23, at 138. Hamil-
ton's "loose construction" defense of the bank echoed Madison's sentiments:
That every power vested in a government is in its nature sovereign and includes, by force
of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite and fairly applicable to the attain-
ment of the ends of such power, and which are not precluded by restrictions and excep-
tions specified in the Constitution, or not immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of
political society.
Id. at 137 (quoting 3 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 181 (Henry
Cabot Lodge ed., 1885-86)).
25. In The Federalist No. 44, Madison describes some of the powers that the Constitution
confers on the federal government for the greater good of the nation, but also supports the rights of
the individual, stating that ex post facto laws run "contrary to the first principles of the social com-
pact, and to every principle of sound legislation." THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 22, at 287.
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).




B. The Hendricks Example: Leroy Hendricks's History as a Sexually
Violent Predator
Leroy Hendricks inflicted many known acts of sexual abuse upon
children.' In 1955, Hendricks pled guilty to indecent exposure when he
exposed his genitals to two young girls.2' In 1957, after a conviction for
lewdness with a young girl, Hendricks served a brief jail sentence." Hen-
dricks returned to jail in 1960 for two years after molesting two boys
while he worked at a carnival." In 1962, Hendricks was paroled but im-
mediately rearrested for molesting a seven-year-old girl." Following the
arrest, Hendricks received treatment at a state psychiatric hospital but
was discharged in 1965, considered "safe to be at large. '
Rearrested just two years later in 1967, Hendricks served prison
time for sexually assaulting an eight-year-old girl and an eleven-year-old
boy. While incarcerated, Hendricks refused to participate in a sex of-
fender treatment program.' Hendricks gained parole in 1972." After be-
ing diagnosed as a pedophile, he entered, but subsequently abandoned, a
treatment program. 8 At the time of his parole, Hendricks admitted that he
still harbored sexual desires for children." Shortly after his 1972 parole,
Hendricks began to molest his own stepdaughter and stepson.' He forced
these children to participate in sexual activity with him for over four
years.4 ' Finally, in 1984 Leroy Hendricks pled guilty and was incarcer-
ated for taking "indecent liberties" with two thirteen year-old boys who
entered the electronics store where he worked. '2
Just before Hendricks's imminent release to a halfway house in
1994, Kansas petitioned to further confine him "civilly" as a sexually
violent predator under the state's newly ratified "Sexually Violent
Predator Act.4 3 Hendricks challenged the SVP Act as violating the Ex
29. Hansen, supra note 9, at 43. Given the small fraction of sexual abuse incidents actually
reported, however, Hendricks's total acts of abuse likely approach two to three times the number of
his known acts. See infra note 49 and accompanying text; see also Stephen R. McAllister, The Con-
stitutionality of Kansas Laws Targeting Sex Offenders, 36 WAsHtultRN LJ. 419, 443-44 (1997)
(citing testimony of psychologist Dr. Befort that Hendricks told a clinician that he acted sexually
based on his urges to molest children at least "once per month, twice a month").
30. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072,2078 (1997).
31. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing Respondent's Brief Joint App. at 143-44, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649 & 95-
9075)).







42. See id.; Brief for Leroy Hendricks, Cross-Petitioner at 3, Hendricks (No. 95-1649).
43. Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 1-2, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649 & 95-9075).
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Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses and his substantive due process
rights." The Kansas trial court held that probable cause existed to find
Hendricks a sexually violent predator, but did not rule on the constitu-
tionality of the SVP Act.' The trial court ordered Hendricks to submit to
an evaluation at the Lamed State Security Hospital." Hendricks re-
quested a jury trial to determine whether he was a sexually violent
predator.'
At his trial, Hendricks testified about his extensive history of mo-
lestation and sexual abuse of children. ' Admitting that he repeatedly
molests children when not confined, Hendricks said when he "'gets
stressed out,' he 'can't control the urge' to molest children."' While ac-
knowledging that his behavior harms children and stating that he hoped
he would not molest any more children, Hendricks said that the only way
to make sure that he would not molest another child was for him "to
die." Hendricks concurred in the diagnosis of a testifying state physi-
cian that he continues to suffer from pedophilia.' The state physician
also testified that Hendricks remarked that "treatment is bullshit.
5 2
The jury unanimously affirmed beyond a reasonable doubt that
Hendricks met the definition of a sexually violent predator 3.5 The Kansas
trial court then determined that pedophilia qualified as a "mental abnor-
mality" under the SVP Act and ordered Hendricks to civil commitment.'
When Hendricks appealed the trial court's finding, the Kansas Supreme
Court held that the SVP Act violated Hendricks's substantive due proc-
ess rights because the Act's definition of "mental abnormality" did not
satisfy the United States Supreme Court's "mental illness" requirement
in an action for civil commitment.5 ' At the time of the Hendricks deci-
sion, seventeen states had enacted legislation designed to segregate sexu-
ally violent predators from the public through mandatory treatment pro-
44. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076.




49. Id. (quoting Respondent's Brief Joint App. at 172, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649 & 95-9075)).
50. Id. (quoting Respondent's Brief Joint App. at 190, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649 & 95-9075)).
51. Id. at 2078-79 (citing Respondent's Brief Joint App. at 153, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649 &
95-9075)).
52. Respondent's Brief Joint App. at 190, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649 & 95-9075); see also
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078-79.
53. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079.
54. Id.
55. Id.; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,78 (1992) (stating that civil commitment is
improper unless civil commitment proceedings result in determination that the individual currently
suffers from a mental illness and is dangerous). The U.S. Supreme Court granted both the petition
for certiorari filed by Kansas (based on the adverse due process ruling) and Hendricks's cross-
petition for certiorari (based on the rejection of his ex post facto and double jeopardy arguments).
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076.
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grams or civil confimement.' The Kansas SVP Act provides a good ex-
ample of the general structure and content of these statutes.
C. Kansas's 1994 Sexually Violent Predator Act
The Kansas SVP Act filled a loophole created by Kansas's general
civil commitment statute. 8 These loopholes also exist in many other
states' civil commitment statutes. 9 Most general civil commitment stat-
utes apply only to the mentally ill.' The SVP Act addresses a small, but
extremely dangerous, group of sexual predators who do not fit within the
criteria for traditional involuntary civil commitment." The SVP Act rea-
sons that sexually violent predators require different treatment because
generally they: (1) have anti-social personalities; (2) are incompatible
with mental illness treatment modalities; (3) are likely to engage in sexu-
ally violent behavior; and (4) are characterized by a high likelihood of
repetitive acts of predatory sexual violence. 2
Kansas recognized that its general civil commitment statute inade-
quately addressed the risks sexually violent predators pose to its society.63
For example, the prognosis for rehabilitation of a sexually violent
predator in a prison setting remains poor." Further, the treatment of
sexually violent predators requires more of a long-term approach and
differs from the traditional treatment modalities used with people com-
mitted under the general civil commitment statute for reasons other than
sexual violence.65
Kansas provides procedural safeguards to reasonably protect an
individual's liberty interests from the powerful reach and impact of the
SVP Act. Kansas places the burden on the state to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that an individual satisfies the statutory criteria for the
label of "sexually violent predator." Indigents receive appointed counsel
and a choice of qualified mental health experts for examination. The
56. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2095 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 to -29a15 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
58. Id. § 59-29a01.
59. To fill the gap created when sexual predators fail to qualify for confinement under general
civil commitment statutes, many states have enacted forms of sexually violent predator statutes. See
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-4601 to -4613 (West Supp. 1996); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600 to
6609.3 (West 1984 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-11.7-101 to -107 (1997); ILL. COMP.
STAT. §§ 205/0.01 to 205/0.12 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. § 253B.185 (1996); NEB.
REv. STAT. §§ 29-2922 to 2926, 29-2928 to 2930, 29-2934 to 2936 (1995 & Supp. 1996); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 33-6-301 to -306 (1984 & Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.010 to
71.09.902 (1996); Wls. STAT. §§ 980.01 to .13 (West Supp. 1996).
60. Brief of Petitioner at 28, Hendricks (No. 95-1649).
61. Id. at 4,Hendricks (No. 95-1649).




66. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (Supp. 1996).
67. Id. § 59-29a05 to -29a06 (Supp. 1996).
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respondent may present witnesses, cross-examine witnesses offered by
the state, and review state documents.' Once it confines an individual
involuntarily, the state must conform to all constitutional requirements
for treatment. ' A person civilly committed may file a petition for release
at any time, ' and the state may find that an individual's improvement
merits authorizing a petition for release." The state also must participate
in an annual court review, which determines if continued detention re-
mains justifiable."2 A court may free an individual after reviewing a peti-
tion for release if it finds that the state can no longer satisfy its burden
under the initial commitment standard.73
The liberty protections afforded by the SVP Act help satisfy con-
cers that such legislation could lead to unbridled tyranny. Safeguarding
individual rights merits attention and enforcement. However, in the hos-
tile world of child sex offenses lies the shocking danger of anarchy and
both the emotional and detached arguments for civil commitment as a
desired control.
D. The Harmful Effects of Child Sexual Abuse and the Social Response
Pedophilia exists as the most common of the paraphiliac' acts.'
Pedophilia involves sexual touching or activity with a prepubescent
child,'6 a person defined as one who cannot give consent.' Conservative
estimates acknowledge that 20% of all female children and 10% of all
male children suffer at the hands of sexual molesters before reaching the
68. Id. § 59-29a05.
69. Id. § 59-29a09 (1994); see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986) (discussing a
state's obligation to treat and care for sexually violent predators with a focus toward recovery). Cf.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979) (concluding that the standard of proof in a civil
commitment proceeding must be greater than a preponderance of evidence but that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is not constitutionally required).
70. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29al 1 (1994).
71. Id. § 59-29a10 (Supp. 1996).
72. Id. § 59-29a08 (Supp. 1996).
73. Id.
74. Essential features of paraphiia include recurrent, intense sexual fantasies, urges or be-
haviors over a six month period involving: (1) nonhuman objects; (2) suffering or humiliation of
one's partner or oneself; or (3) children or other nonconsenting persons. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, DSM IV 522-23 (4th ed.
1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
75. 2 GLEN 0. GABBARD, TREATMENTS OF PSYCMIATRIc DISORDERS 1960 (2d ed. 1995).
Ironically, pedophilia literally means "love of children." 1 AMERiCAN PsYCHATRIC ASSOCIATION,
TREATMENT OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 617 (1989).
76. DSM-IV, supra note 74, at 527 (stating that a prepubescent child generally refers to a 13
year-old or younger child and that an individual with pedophilia must be at least 16 years old and at
least five years older than victim). But see GABBARD, supra note 75, at 1960 (urging caution in
defining pedophilia due to inconsistent views).
77. GABBARD, supra note 75, at 1960. The criminal justice system always has defined pedo-
philic offenses as sex crimes while the American Psychiatric Association continues to define pedo-
philia as a psychiatric disorder. Id.
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still tender age of eighteen."8 Unfortunately for those studying cases in
order to postulate improved treatment, the data as to whether family
members or other persons known to the child or strangers commit most
acts of molestation languish in statistical contradiction." Society no
longer ignores or dismisses the many thousands of children who become
victims every day.' Experts opine that the number of child sex abuse
cases reported actually represents only a fraction of the actual number of
offenses committed because of a significant number of clandestine in-
cestuous incidents, and the varied, sometimes nonexistent, symptoms of
the victims.8' Others believe the inability of families to deal with the re-
ality of child sex abuse in their own families will increase the current rate
of child sex abuse incidents. 2 A perpetual risk for child sex abuse con-
tinues because humans exist as inherently sexual beings.
It is impossible to determine why every person who sexually abuses
children does so. History shows that pedophilia may perpetuate itself
from the environmental conditioning of child victims who then become
adult offenders. 3 Many pedophilic urges develop during adolescence and
adulthood and recur throughout an individual's lifetime." Resisting the
78. Id.
79. See Robin L. Deems, California's Sex Offender Notification Statute: A Constitutional
Analysis, 33 SAN DtNGo L. REV. 1195, 1231 (1996) (claiming that family members perpetrate the
majority of child sexual abuse); Robert E. Freeman-Longo, Reducing Sexual Abuse in America:
Legislating Tougher Laws or Public Education and Prevention, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFNMENT 303, 313 (1997) (indicating that 75% of child sexual abuse cases are perpetrated by
someone the child knows). But see GABBARD, supra note 75 at 1960 (stating that child molesters say
they do not know most of their victims despite data from victims' treatment programs reporting
numbers to the contrary). The tendency of the media to generate horrifying statistics concerning the
prevalence and character of sexual abuse contributes to inaccuracies in public understanding of the
problem. Freeman-Longo, supra, at 79.
80. See, e.g., Sasha Seiden, Report Says 30,000 Children Physically or Sexually Abused,
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 25, 1993, at 3 (noting statistics in Israel and that the Israeli Association for
Child Protection hopes to reach out to a greater number of abused children in the country); see also
GABBARD, supra note 75, at 1960 (stating that a 1992 nationwide study approximated 21 million
adult women had suffered sexual abuse and that 60% of that number were assaulted before age 18);
Arthur J. Lurigio et al., Child Sexual Abuse: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Probation
Practice, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1995, at 1, 69 (tracing increase of 2100% in reported cases of child
abuse from 1976 to 1986 and an additional increase of 227% by 1991).
81. See Brief on Behalf of the Public Defender, Amicus Curiae, Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367
(N.J. 1995) [hereinafter Brief: Doe v. Poritz]; Roger J.R. Levesque, Prosecuting Sex Crimes Against
Children: Time for "Outrageous" Proposals?, 19 LAW & PSYcHOLOGy. REV. 59, 64-68 (1995);
Symposium on Megan's Law, 6 B.U. PUB. Ir. LJ. 75, 78 (1996) (reprinting Brief: Doe v. Poritz,
supra).
82. Jenny A. Montana, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New
Jersey's Megan's Law, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 569, 594 & n.1 15 (1995); see also Freeman-Longo, supra
note 79, at 313-14 (noting denial in intrafamilial sexual abuse cases).
83. Lurigio et al., supra note 80, at 70; see also Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 309-10
(discussing violence and sexual assault as a public health problem).
84. DSM-IV, supra note 74, at 524-25; Ron Langevin & RJ. Watson, Major Factors in the
Assessment of Paraphilics and Sex Offenders, in SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT 39, 56 (Eli Coleman et
al. eds., 1996) (finding that around 5% to 10% suffer from mental illness and that clinicians must
carefully evaluate whether the mental illness explains or is coincidental to the sexual offense). Per-
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urge to molest children becomes exceedingly difficult for pedophiles
during periods of psychological stress.85 For the pedophile' who sexually
abuses male children, the drive to molest is usually more chronic.87 Gen-
erally, recidivism rates for individuals preferring male children approach
double the rates of those molesting female children.88
Child sex offenders differ from other criminal offenders because a
child sex offender generally victimizes multiple children," and the urge
to reoffend continues over time.' Also, the rate of recidivism for most
criminal acts pales in comparison to the rate of recidivism of a sex of-
fender.' Treatment for child sex offenders usually involves more difficult
sonality evaluations are also very important, as they may evidence an anti-social personality disor-
der. Id. at 57. Diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder shows a high level of risk for acting out.
Id. Some individuals define this type of personality as "psychopathic." Id. at 57-58. Review of past
behavior for episodes of aggression is important because past violence remains the best predictor of
future violence. Id. at 58. Recent research shows the substantial occurrence of brain damage and
dysfunction among the paraphilic population. Id. at 60. "Pedophiles, particularly, show language-
based cognitive impairment that presents problems of comprehension, information retention, re-
trieval, and application in therapy and their lives in general." Id.
85. DSM-IV, supra note 74, at 528.
86. Typically, males dominate the class of pedophiles. JOHN C. GONSIOREK ET AL., MALE
SExuAL ABUSE 49 (1994); Gail Elizabeth Wyatt & M. Ray Mickey, The Support by Parents and
Others as it Mediates the Effects of Child Sexual Abuse: An Exploratory Study, in LASTING EFFECTS
OF CHLD SEXUAL ABUSE 211, 211 (Gail Elizabeth Wyatt & Gloria Johnson Powell eds., 1988).
However, female pedophiles exist. L.C. Miccio-Fonseca, Comparative Differences in the Psycho-
logical Histories of Sex Offenders, Victims, and Their Families, in SEx OFFENDER TREATMENr 71,
72 (Eli Coleman et al. eds., 1996) (stating that men commit approximately 95% of reported sex
crimes).
87. DSM-IV, supra note 74, at 528 (referring to male on male contact). Although male on
male pedophiles offend in a more habitual manner, male on female pedophiles comprise the majority
of child sex offenders. See, e.g., CHILDREN'S DMSION, AMERICAN HUMANE ASS'N, PROTECTING
THE CHILD VICTIM OF SEX CRIMES COMMr-rED BY ADULTS 216-17 (Vincent De Francis ed., 1969)
(stating that while the majority of child sex offenses are committed by men, 90% of their victims are
women).
88. DSM-IV, supra note 74, at 528.
89. Brief: Doe v. Poritz, supra note 81, at 80 (citing a study that estimated that extrafamilial
child molesters who assault girls average 19.8 victims, and that those who assault boys average 150
victims); Margit C. Henderson & Seth C. Kalichman, Sexually Deviant Behavior and Schizotypy: A
Theoretical Perspective with Supportive Data, 61 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 273, 273 (1990) (citing study in
which self-reported child molesters averaged 72 victims); Jessica R. Ball, Comment, Public Disclo-
sure of "America's Secret Shame:" Child Sex Offender Community Notification in Illinois, 27 LOY.
U. Cm. L.J. 401,407-08 (1996) (stating that'sex offenders generally attack more than one victim).
90. Brief: Doe v. Poritz, supra note 81, at 80 (stating that, in contrast to other offenders, as sex
offenders age their urge to reoffend does not seem to decline); DSM-IV, supra note 74, at 524 (clari-
fying that the urges and fantasies of paraphilics are by definition recurrent and may endure for a
lifetime); see also Jonathan J. Hegre, Minnesota "Nice"? Minnesota Mean: The Minnesota Supreme
Court's Refusal to Protect Sexually Abused Children in H.B. ex rel. Clarke v. Whittnore, 15 LAW &
INEQ. J. 435, 435-37 (1997) (discussing a Minnesota case involving the conviction of seventy-four
year-old Willard Wittemore on five counts of second degree criminal sexual conduct with four girls
ages four to seven).
91. Brief: Doe v. Poritz, supra note 81, at 80 n.20 (citing a 1994 study that found a recidivism
rate as high as 75% for untreated child sex offenders, regardless of the victim's gender). This study
also indicated that sex offenders who molest young girls recidivate at rates up to 29%, and up to
40% of those who molest young boys repeat sex offenses. Id. at 80.
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measures because of the offenders' reluctance to acknowledge their sex-
ual activity as a crime and their consequential lack of motivation to par-
ticipate voluntarily in therapy."2 Many offenders believe they cannot be
cured.93 Some studies prove that assessment and treatment of some pedo-
philes reduces sex assaults on children." One thing remains certain, how-
ever pedophilia presents a major problem for society as well as a serious
health concern for American children."
Meanwhile, the effects of child sexual abuse on victims endure for a
lifetime, often leading to a continuing legacy of intrafamily child sex
abuse.' Common manifestations of child sex abuse include chronic de-
pression, anxiety, poor social adjustment, substance abuse, suicidal be-
havior, and involvement in abusive relationships.' Sexually abused chil-
dren stand a 55% greater chance of being arrested later in life, a 500%
greater chance of being arrested for sex crimes, and a 3,000% greater
chance of being arrested for adult prostitution. 8 Victims of child sexual
abuse often evolve into adult child molesters themselves, avoid adult
intimacy or sexual relationships altogether, develop eating disorders, and
experience severe marital distress."
Public acknowledgment of the existence of child sexual abuse as a
serious social problem began in the late 1970s." Unheard victims of
sexual abuse no doubt exist as far back as the beginning of human his-
92. See MICHAEL A. O'CONNELL ET AL., WORKING WrrH SEX OFFENDERS 13 (1990) (assert-
ing that it is rare for sex offenders to voluntarily enter treatment programs and that those who do
usually refuse to make the commitment that is essential to changing their behavior to the extent
necessary to prevent reoffense); Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 316-17 (stating that many profes-
sionals question whether successful treatment for sexually violent predators such as Leroy Hendricks
exists and that the law should provide treatment for those sexual offenders that will respond to
treatment and protection for society from those sexual predators refusing treatment or who exhibit
behaviors considered untreatable); Ron Langevin et al., Why Therapy Fails with Some Sex Offend-
ers: Learning Difficulties Examined Empirically, in SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT 143, 144 (Eli
Coleman et al. eds., 1996) (discussing study of 87 sex offenders and their attitudes toward treatment,
finding that only 49% even wanted treatment); McAllister, supra note 29, at 443-44 (restating the
testimony of psychologist Dr. Befort who believed that Hendricks would offend again if released
because Hendricks did not display any desire to control his behavior, failed to comprehend the
seriousness of his behavior and demonstrated disinterest in treatment).
93. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct 2072, 2078-79 (1997) (reciting Hendricks's testimony
that the only sure way to stop him from abusing children in the future was for him to "die" and that
"treatment is bull[shit]"). Many sex offenders simply refuse to acknowledge that they have a prob-
lem. See O'CONNELL Er AL., supra note 92, at 13-15; Langevin et a., supra note 92, at 144 (1996).
94. See GABBARD, supra note 75, at 1975 (stating that treatment of pedophiles stops sex
crimes against children); Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 323 (citing a study that found the com-
prehensive treatment of pedophilia had at least a 90% success rate); Lurigio et al., supra note 80, at
72 (citing various studies that have concluded sex offender treatment works, and discussing various
types of treatment).
95. GABBARD, supra note 75, at 1975.
96. Brief: Doe v. Poritz, supra note 81, at 79.
97. Id. at 78-79.
98. Hegre, supra note 90, at 440-41.
99. Lurigio et al., supra note 80, at 70-71.
100. Levesque, supra note 81, at 63.
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tory.'0 ' Until recently, the mental health community reacted with am-
bivalence toward pedophilia treatment because effective treatments were
unknown and clinicians often were seen as supporting pedophiles rather
than as preventing the abuse through treatment.' ° Should the mental
health profession or the criminal justice system primarily be responsible
for pedophiles?"'3 Rarely does an individual suffering from pedophilia
enter the observation of the psychological community without involve-
ment from the legal system.'" Society only recently began attempting to
provide educational and preventive measures directed toward ending the
problem of child sex abuse."°
E. The State of the Law Before Hendricks
Prior to the decision in Hendricks, states instituted a number of
other methods in attempting to deal with the growing problem of sexu-
ally violent predators.'" Michigan enacted the first statutes aimed at seg-
regating convicted sex offenders in 1937.'" Twenty-five states eventually
adopted these "mentally disordered sex offender" statutes.' 08 When first
instituted, mentally disordered sex offender statutes authorized indefinite
confinement." However, the statutes generally confine the sex offender
for only a period of time equivalent to the maximum criminal incarcera-
tion allowed by law.'" Most states have repealed their mentally disor-
dered sex offender statutes."'
States utilize a number of methods to counteract the threat of sex
offenders. Some states handle the problem of habitual child sex abusers
by instituting longer and harsher prison sentences."' New Jersey made
national headlines in 1994 by enacting state legislation called "Megan's
101. See id.
102. GABBARD, supra note 75, at 1960.
103. Id.
104. Langevin & Watson, supra note 84, at 40.
105. See GABBARD, supra note 75, at 1960; Ball, supra note 89, at 444-47.
106. Six states, including Kansas, passed some form of legislation involving civil commitment
for sexually violent predators at the time of the Hendricks decision. McAllister, supra note 29, at
421. At that time, nearly three dozen other states expressed interest in similar statutes if the U.S.
Supreme Court found the Kansas SVP Act constitutional. 1d.; see also RALPH REISNER &
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM CIVtL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS
586-587 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the history of sexually violent offender legislation and civil com-
mitment in the United States).




111. In 1990, only around 15 states still subscribed to mentally disordered sex offender statutes.
Id.
112. McAllister, supra note 29, at 420; see also Laura J. Fowler & Johnnie Beer, Crimes:
Aggravated Sexual Assault on Children, 26 PAC. L.J. 219, 219-21 (1995) (discussing a California
law that requires a crime of aggravated sexual assault of a child to be punished by a prison sentence
of 15 years to life).
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Law," which required registration and community notification of the
presence of sexual predators."3 Megan's Law generated the impetus for
the first federal sex offender registration law.""
Around the time New Jersey passed Megan's Law, Congress en-
acted a federal form of Megan's Law under the name "Jacob Wetterling
Act."" ' This statute required all states to implement a registration system
for sex offenders or face a 10% loss of funding for state criminal justice
operations."6 Even without the Jacob Wetterling Act, some states felt
compelled to institute these laws or risk becoming havens for sexual
predators."' Megan's Law, for example, enabled New Jersey to require
mandatory registration for sexual predators in the community."8 As a
result, sex offenders deterred from living in New Jersey would choose to
reside in neighboring states instead. The procedures for community noti-
fication outlined by the registration and notification statues in New Jer-
sey, Louisiana, Washington, and Oregon remain among the most formal
and active. '
Critics of notification and registration laws like Megan's Law argue
that these measures provide ineffective protection because of easy cir-
the 121cumvention," the creation of anger and vigilantism in communities,
and the lack of overall physical protection of the community's children.'"
Once notified of a registered sex offender living in their neighborhood,
residents stage protests and picket the offender's home,"n develop classes
to alert children to sexual predators, 2 4 and ensure that police distribute
flyers." Enforceability presents a real problem because the registration
system only works with the cooperation of the sex offenders, who may
not register or who may give phony addresses and frequently relocate.'26
The offenders usually gravitate to areas where they disappear into the
surroundings, such as bigger cities and poorer urban areas.'2 1 In some
113. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to :7-11 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); Montana, supra note 82,
at 569-71. Megan's Law created a three-tiered approach based on the perceived risk of recidivism to
determine the degree to which a sex offender's personal information will be disseminated. Ball,
supra note 89, at 413. Only law enforcement agencies received notification of a low-risk offender's
whereabouts. Id. at 414. Schools, religious and youth organizations received a moderate risk of-
fender's personal information. Id. Individuals living in a community where a high risk sex offender
relocates received personal notification of the sex offender's presence in their community. Id.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994 & Supp 1997); McAllister, supra note 29, at 420.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 14071.
116. See Deems, supra note 79, at 1197; Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 312.
117. Ball, supra note 89, at 444.
118. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (Supp. 1997).
119. Ball, supra note 89, at 412-13.
120. Montana, supra note 82, at 590-93.
121. Id. at 577-79.
122. Id. at 603-04.
123. Id. at 579.
124. Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 319.
125. Deems, supra note 79, at 1226 n. 194.
126. Montana, supra note 82, at 590-93.
127. Id. at 582-83.
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instances, inadequacies in the legislation itself leads to problems. For
example, New Jersey enacted its mandatory registration/notification laws
without providing the requisite funds for implementation, and New Jer-
sey's law enforcement departments now struggle without adequate re-
sources to inform the public of the presence of a sexual offender. 8
Faced with the ever increasing incidents of sexual abuse of children,
in 1990 the state of Washington became the first to institute a statute
allowing involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent predators.'"
Civil commitment differs from increased prison sentences by focusing on
treatment and deterrence rather than punishment. Civil commitment pro-
vides the additional advantage of physical segregation that registration
laws do not accomplish.
F. Civil Commitment
The United States has a lengthy history of involuntarily, civilly
committing citizens found to be "furiously mad."'" Of course, the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment lurks nearby whenever a gov-
ernment attempts to physically confine an individual for any length of
time.' While the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects an
individual's liberty interest from arbitrary governmental infringement,
that liberty interest does not exist as an absolute.'32 The United States
Supreme Court recognizes numerous instances where an individual's
constitutionally protected right to avoid physical restraint must succumb
to other concerns, even in the civil context. "3
The law relating to involuntary civil confinement now requires that,
before being civilly committed, an individual pose a threat to the health
and safety of the public due to an inability to control his or her
behavior.' 4 An involuntary civil commitment statute also must consider
collateral factors, such as a mental disorder, to withstand constitutional
scrutiny. In 1940, the United States Supreme Court in Pearson v. Ramsey
County upheld the civil commitment of a dangerous and "psychopathic"
individual under a Minnesota statute.'33 In 1986, the Court in Allen v.
Illinois'" upheld the involuntary civil commitment of an individual found
to be dangerous and mentally ill.'" Then, in 1993, the Court in Heller v.
128. Id. at 583.
129. McAllister, supra note 29, at 420 n.2.
130. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2089 (1997). The phrase refers to citizens possess-
ing sexual abnormalities similar to insanity. Id.
131. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrTlONAL LAW § 13.9, at 571 (5th ed.
1995).
132. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079.
.133. Id.
134. Id. at 2079-80.
135. 309 U.S. 270, 276-77 (1940).
136. 478 U.S. 364(1986).
137. Allen, 478 U.S. at 371.
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Doe'" noted the necessity of both a "mental illness" and a
"dangerousness" finding to establish the constitutionality of a statute
requiring involuntary civil commitment.'39 The Court recently held that a
finding of general dangerousness alone would not permit the involuntary
and indefinite civil confinement of an individual.'"
As far back as the early nineteenth century, states implemented
measures to force confinement when necessary to protect society.'' For
example, in 1845 the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected Josiah
Oakes's request for release from forced commitment because he suffered
from a hallucinatory mental state." The court, in refusing to grant
Oakes's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, proclaimed:
The right to restrain an insane person of his liberty is found in that
great law of humanity, which makes it necessary to confine those
whose going at large would be dangerous to themselves or oth-
ers .... And the necessity which creates the law, creates the limita-
tion of the law. The question must then arise in each particular case,
whether a patient's own safety, or that of others, requires that he
should be restrained for a certain time, and whether restraint is neces-
sary for his restoration, or will be conducive thereto. The restraint can
continue as long as the necessity continues. '
While the facts in the Oakes case apparently did not involve acts of
violence, the Massachusetts Supreme Court clearly projected acceptance
of a concept of civil confinement for individuals who were not only po-
tentially dangerous to others but who also posed a threat to themselves.'"
States in the early twentieth century developed, through legislation,
indeterminate sentencing programs to target and separate offenders in the
regular prison system who were difficult to treat.'" These statutes still
exist in some states but are seldom, if ever, applied.'" In contrast, statutes
138. 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
139. Heller, 509 U.S. at 328.
140. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1997) (finding dangerousness alone
insufficient to justify involuntary commitment); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 85-86 (1992)
(holding that when a person is no longer classified as insane, dangerousness alone does not provide
enough support to continue civil confinement). The Supreme Court imposes other requirements on
states seeking civil confinement of an individual. The Supreme Court consistently requires proper
procedures and evidentiary standards as a prerequisite to the constitutionality of involuntary com-
mitment statutes. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080. In addition, in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
431-32 (1979), the Court determined that, in a proceeding to involuntarily commit an adult consid-
ered dangerous to himself or others, the burden of proof must be more than a mere preponderance of
evidence. However, because the determination of an individual's placement in a psychiatric institu-
tion depends on issues with little factual certainty, the Court did not require a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard of proof. Addington, 441 U.S. at 432.




145. Id. at 586-87.
146. Id. at 587.
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aimed specifically at diverting individuals charged with sex offenses into
treatment programs were much more popular.' 7 As noted above, twenty-
five states adopted statutes of this nature: Michigan was the first to enact
such a statute in 1937.'" Over time, these statutes became known as
"mentally disordered sex offender statutes" and were considered success-
ful because of a sex offender's uniquely high likelihood to recidivate."'
Originally, many statutes targeting the mentally disordered sex offender
authorized indefinite confinement; now, they usually limit commitment
to the maximum term of incarceration existing under the applicable
criminal statutes.'" Many of these mentally disordered sex offender stat-
utes disappeared with the advent and popularity of forced sentencing
requirements.''
Civil commitment law, as opposed to criminal law, seeks not to
punish for past bad acts but attempts to control, by confinement and
treatment, future conduct which could harm the individual or others.' 2
For example, individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity and some
individuals confined for substance abuse remain institutionalized even
though they have not been convicted of a crime.' Some states maintain
statutes that confine people who have no mental illness but who are
deemed dangerous to society for other reasons.'"" In light of the various
forms of civil confinement used and legally upheld throughout history,
"confinement of a limited subclass of [mentally disabled and] dangerous
persons,'"" like sexually violent predators, does not offend "our under-





151. Id. Only about 15 states still subscribe to mentally disordered sex offender statutes. Id.
152. Id. at 611.
153. See id. at 756; Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363-64 (1983) (upholding automatic
commitment of persons acquitted of crime by reason of insanity); see also United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (supporting preventive pre-trial detention of certain dangerous indictees).
154. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 14 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997) (mentally
retarded); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.01, subd. 2 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997) (chemically depend-
ant); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.4172, subd. 8 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997) (a health threat to others).
These types of statutes remain constitutionally untested via consideration by the U.S. Supreme
Court. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910,914 (Minn. 1994).





A. The Hendricks Decision Resolved Important Constitutional Issues
Surrounding the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators
1. Ex Post Facto' 7
United States Supreme Court opinions frequently illustrate the dis-
agreement among the Justices about the correct theoretical basis for in-
terpreting the Constitution.' 8 As with many other governmental affairs,
the competing views usually align into partisan groups.' 9 The Court con-
servatives generally stand firm for judicial restraint and strict construc-
tion of the Constitution." ° The liberals advocate judicial activism, argu-
ing that the Constitution exists as a living document subject to continual
re-interpretation as the world continues to advance and change.'6 ' Ironi-
cally, in Hendricks, the Court breaks with form.
Justices generally viewed as strict constructionists found that a state
statute, such as the Kansas SVP Act, did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution even when applied retroactively.'62 This find-
ing runs contrary to a literal interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause
which states that "[no] ex post facto Law shall be passed."'63 Instead of
holding to the literal language of the Constitution, the normally conser-
vative majority employed a flexible interpretation of the clause, arguing
that no violation of the clause exists when the law sought to be applied
retroactively is of a civil, rather than a criminal, nature.'" The Ex Post
Facto Clause does not distinguish between the criminal or civil nature of
a prohibited retroactive law. 5 The majority relied on some previous
157. This Note avoids analysis of the Double Jeopardy Clause because the Hendricks dissent
failed to focus on, and the majority only cursorily discusses, the double jeopardy issue. Hendricks,
117 S. Ct. at 2086.
158. See generally Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative Activism in
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 629 (1990) (discussing numerous decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court and how political forces create viewpoints on the Court that result in opinions re-
flecting liberalism on one hand and conservative constitutional theory on the other).
159. Id. at 629-31. Maltz's article takes the approach that there are associations between liberal
theory and judicial activism as well as between conservative reasoning and institutional and ideo-
logical forces. Id. at 630-31. Maltz predicts that these ideological forces will influence future Courts
towards a pattern of reviewing cases with a more aggressive conservative activism. Id. at 631.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 630-31; Arlin M. Adams, Justice Brennan and the Religion Clauses: The Con-
ceptofa "Living Constitution," 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1319, 1319 (1991).
162. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081-85.
163. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
164. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085.
165. U.S. CONST. art I; § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Supreme Court, however,
interprets the Ex Post Facto Clause to apply only to criminal punishments. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
386, 390 (1798); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S.
24, 29-30 (1981); see also NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 131, § 11.9, at 428 (discussing the
Supreme Court's determination that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal or penal
measures).
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caselaw that permitted application of civil actions retroactively to indi-
viduals convicted of certain crimes in order to promote public safety."
Perhaps cognizant of the prevailing attitudes regarding child sex
offenders, the majority discarded a strict application of the Ex Post Facto
Clause, and instead appeared influenced by the immediate concern that
Hendricks could not live in a community among children without pre-
senting a real danger. 7 By characterizing Hendricks as a person who
currently suffers from a mental disorder and who likely poses a future
danger, the majority held that retroactive application of the SVP Act was
not improper.'" Interpreting the consequences of the SVP Act as some-
thing other than punishment allowed the majority to draw the conclusion
that applying the SVP Act to Hendricks did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause."s
The dissent, dominated by those generally considered the more lib-
eral Justices, agreed with the majority's view that Hendricks's substan-
tive due process rights were not unduly infringed upon by commitment
to a mental institution.'" Justice Breyer, however, stated that the SVP
Act's application to Hendricks-regardless of the statute's label, its pro-
cedural protections, or any extenuating circumstances--clearly repre-
sented retroactive punishment by statute for a prior criminal act and, as
such, proved unconstitutional."' Because the SVP Act's application to
Hendricks focused more on punishment than treatment,'" the dissent's
opinion that the case exemplified a classic Ex Post Facto Clause viola-
tion established a more sound resolution to the case from a strict con-
structionist standpoint. Viewing the decision in this light makes it more
apparent that the majority's manipulation of the Ex Post Facto Clause
may in fact represent a veiled method of confining Leroy Hendricks at all
costs.
166. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086 (citing California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S.
499, 505 (1995) (quoting Lindsay v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937)). In California Dep't of
Corrections, the Supreme Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause, which forbids the application of
any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, pertains exclusively to penal statutes.
California Dep't of Corrections, 514 U.S. at 505; see also DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160
(1960) (holding that refusal to employ convicted felons as officers of waterfront union does not
violate Ex Post Facto Clause); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955) (finding that requiring
deportation based on a person's past bad conduct does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Hawker
v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 200 (1898) (finding that law barring doctor from practicing medicine
because of a prior felony conviction does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause). See generally
NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 131, § 11.9, at 429 (noting that convicted felons may not own
firearms).
167. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2087-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 2088, 2098.
172. Id. at 2093-98 (concluding that the failure to treat Hendricks or other offenders while
civilly committed reveals the punitive nature of the Kansas statute).
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Nevertheless, the Ex Post Facto Clause's application to the Kansas
SVP Act' 3 pales in legal significance to the Hendricks Court's resound-
ing eight to one approval of civil commitment as a method of dealing
with the sexually violent predator-the paramount consequence of this
decision." With Hendricks, the Court renders a uniquely strong pro-
nouncement that state statutes such as the one at issue in Hendricks-the
civil commitment of a sexually violent predator after the individual has
completed a criminal penal sentence--do not offend the Due Process
Clause.'" The fact that a majority of conservative Justices steadfastly
refused to rigidly apply the Ex Post Facto Clause in Hendricks represents
the country's current disposition toward the breadth of legally permissi-
ble treatment of sexually violent predators.
2. Due Process
Eight Justices agreed that the SVP Act's definition of a "mental
abnormality" satisfied substantive due process requirements.' 6 Appar-
ently, only Justice Ginsberg found a violation of due process; however,
'to the extent she did, she did so without written opinion.'" The Court
failed to specifically state whether it applied the rational basis constitu-
tional standard propounded by Kansas or the strict scrutiny test argued
for by Hendricks. The majority opinion simply concluded that applica-
tion of the SVP Act to Hendricks was consistent with the Due Process
Clause because the Act requires evidence of past sexually violent be-
havior linked to a finding of mental abnormality."' Dissenting, Justice
Breyer conceded that Kansas may classify Hendricks as mentally ill and
dangerous'" because: (1) a consensus of mental health professionals con-
sider pedophilia a serious mental disorder; (2) Hendricks's pedophilia
predominates his psyche so strongly that he cannot resist the urge to
molest children; and (3) as such, Hendricks presents a serious and con-
tinuing danger to children."
The SVP Act should pass muster under the constitutional tests
commonly referred to as "rational basis" and "strict scrutiny." The less
stringent rational basis test requires only that the SVP Act rationally re-
late to a legitimate state objective."' No one can dispute that protecting
children from sexually violent predators such as Leroy Hendricks satis-
fies a legitimate state objective and that treating repeat offenders like
173. An in depth discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause and the constitutional analysis thereof
lies beyond the scope of this Note.
174. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076, 2086-88.
175. Id. at 2086-88.
176. Id. at 2076, 2086-88.
177. Id. at 2087.
178. Id. at 2080-81.
179. Id. at 2089 (noting that the Court used the terms "mentally ill" and "dangerous" in the
same sense in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
180. Id.
181. Pearson v. Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270,274(1940).
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Hendricks, even after incarceration, soundly relates to that goal. The
SVP Act's terms similarly satisfy the strict scrutiny test, which requires
that the Act be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.' 2
The SVP Act imposes a lesser punishment than the more onerous, yet
constitutionally permissible, life sentence without parole, and provides
specialized treatment for offenders suffering from pedophilic disorders-
all while protecting the state's children from further harm at the hands of
these criminals. The Court's overwhelming rejection of Hendricks's due
process challenge provides strong support for civil commitment laws as
applied to future sexual predators.
B. Balancing the Community's Interest in Protecting Its Children
Against the Liberty Interest of Sexually Violent Predators
Protecting society and its children from sex abuse while granting the
sexually violent predator the full extent of his or her constitutional liberty
interests presents at best a complex proposition. An individual's right to
be free from arbitrary constraints on his or her physical liberty stands as
one of our nation's most fundamental maxims.' 3 However, equally as
basic lies society's right to protect its citizens.'" A strong case for di-
minishing a defendant's constitutional interests exists when children rep-
resent the subject of protection because of children's diminished capacity
to defend themselves.' 5 The United States Supreme Court has held that
society may demand that an individual's physical freedom surrender to
criminal incarceration'" or civil confinement. 7 In a case such as Hen-
dricks, society's right to prevent the continued victimization of its chil-
dren should constitutionally outweigh the sexually violent predator's
right not to be involuntarily confined, especially if the issue involves
civil treatment, not criminal punishment.
Freedom from physical restraint, often referred to as the "core of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause,"'" does not exist as an ab-
solute. 9 Clearly, the Constitution allows the restriction of individual
liberty interests when those who commit crimes threaten society.'" How-
ever, the criminal justice system does not seek to forever incarcerate
someone based on his or her status. 9 ' The penal system does not punish
182. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,237 (1995).
183. NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 131, § 13.4, at518-20.
184. MINAR, supra note 10, at 367-69.
185. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that no violation of the Confrontation Clause
exists when necessity requires a child to testify via closed-circuit television. Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836, 857 (1990).
186. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 131, § 13.4, at 518-19.
187. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2079 (1997).
188. Id. at 2079 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
189. Id.
190. NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 131, § 13.4, at 519-20.
191. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoT'r, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2d ed. 1986).
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prospectively; rather, it responds to a particular criminal act.'" Our
criminal system's design and purpose remains the protection of society
from individuals who commit crimes, rationalizing that the criminal jus-
tice system will minimize crime by effecting deterrence, retribution, and
punishment.'93 But what becomes of an individual who cannot, because
of a mental disorder, resist the impulse to harm others? What becomes of
an individual who cannot be deterred by any possible prison sentence or
fine? Must the community form groups of vigilantes because of the un-
yielding rigidity of our criminal justice system and our Constitution, both
of which are incapable of handling these unique situations? Civil com-
mitment helps resolve these questions. As noted above, the Court recog-
nizes numerous instances where an individual's constitutionally pro-
tected right to avoid physical restraint may be overridden in the civil
context."'
Organized society could not exist safely without subjecting all per-
sons to some manifold restraints for the common good.'" Thus, forced
civil confinement of a group of mentally ill and dangerous persons, such
as sexually violent predators, does not violate the constitutional guaran-
tee of individual liberty." Unlike the criminal justice system's goals of
punishment for crimes through incarceration, retribution, and deterrence,
the civil commitment system involves the confinement and control of
possible future conduct that could harm the individual or others.'97 The
civil commitment system labels an individual dangerous when that per-
son remains powerless to restrain himself from exerting behavior that
might cause harm to himself or the public.'98 Where states follow proper
procedures and evidentiary standards, the United States Supreme Court
consistently upholds involuntary commitment statutes.'"
In order for society to function effectively, each community must
institute measures to maintain order and safety.' This action necessarily
results in a corresponding decrease in individual rights."' The commu-
nity's interest in protecting its children, the most vulnerable members of
society, should constitutionally outweigh the individual rights of a con-
victed sexual predator when preserving public safety demands these
measures.' When the situation involves crimes against children, the case
for preserving the full dimension of an individual's constitutional inter-
192. PETER W. Low ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CAsEs AND MATERIALS 33-34 (2d ed. 1986).
193. LAFAvE & ScoT, supra note 191, at 23-25.
194. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079.
195. MINAR, supra note 10, at 367-69.
196. Cf Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079-80 (holding that Hendricks's civil confinement satisfies
substantive due process requirements).
197. REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 106, at 611.
198. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079.
199. Id. at 2080.
200. MINAR, supra note 10, at 367-69.
201. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079.
202. Id. (citing Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905)).
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ests weakens considerably. 3 No crime against children, short of murder,
stands out as more invasive and damaging than sexual assault.'0 Child
sex offenses are markedly different from other criminal acts such as
theft. Unlike theft, parents and their children cannot buy back the prop-
erty lost from sexual assault-the child's innocence.
Civil libertarians feel that child sexual offenders, even Hendricks
and others like him who abuse children over many years and face multi-
ple arrests and convictions for these offenses, should enjoy release once
they serve their prison time for their last known act.' When the data
shows, and the pedophile himself" admits, that without confinement he
will molest again, the system must react differently. The justice system
unfortunately must continue to segregate individuals who suffer from an
"irresistible impulse" to engage in sexual contact with children and/or
who refuse treatment once convicted, even if that confinement endures
indefinitely. The future safety of children outweighs the liberty interests
of the convicted, untreated (or untreatable) sexually violent predator.
Hendricks establishes that confining an individual who poses a danger to
himself or others, especially when that individual remains mentally dis-
ordered, does not offend the Constitution.'
The last violation committed by an offender similar to Leroy Hen-
dricks usually does not present the greatest concern; rather, people abhor
the inability of the offender to function in society without posing a seri-
ous threat to children. Civil commitment exists as common practice at
much lower thresholds of mental abnormality or dangerousness. The
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of civilly confining
someone who has never committed a crime but, as mentally ill and in-
curable, might be a danger to himself or others." States support civilly
confining people who simply cannot care for themselves." Thus, when
an individual admittedly cannot stop raping, fondling, and sodomizing
children, states should categorically reject the notion that the individual
should experience only criminal incarceration, with little if any treat-
203. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
204. See Hegre, supra note 90, at 440-41; Rachel I. Wolliter, Note, Sixth Araendment-Defen-
dant's Right to Confront Witnesses: Constitutionality of Protective Measures in Child Sexual Assault
Cases, 79 J. CriM. L. & CRiMINOLOGY 759,780 n.186 (1988).
205. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at
8, Hendricks (No. 95-1649) (arguing on behalf of Leroy Hendricks that he "has fully served his
criminal sentence and should have been released into society").
206. This Note uses the male pronoun for clarity and because males make up 95% of sex of-
fenders. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
207. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079.
208. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979) (holding that a state must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the individual poses a threat to society in order to commit him).
The Court also permits states to confine defendants indefinitely for lesser so-called "victim-less"
crimes. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) (upholding life sentence for
person convicted of drug possession, even without prior felony convictions).
209. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
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ment, and then be thrust back into a now notified and hostile community
to offend again.20 Civil confinement offers a more effective solution.2'
An individual's specific liberty interests and the more comprehen-
sive interests of society exist in tension. Placing the two interests in op-
position leads to difficult choices. Confining sexually violent individuals
like Leroy Hendricks, whose abuse of children spanned four decades,
numerous arrests and failed attempts at treatment, 2  remains the only
choice available to protect the safety of a community's children. This
choice is reasonable and it is just. Carefully enacting sexually violent
predator statutes, specifically tailored to define those subject to civil
commitment and including proper procedural and evidentiary.
standards,"3 defies any sort of "slippery slope" counter argument to civil
commitment for sexually violent predators.2"
C. Hendricks Signifies a Change in the Legal Response to Sexually
Violent Predators
Hendricks should be viewed as the test case for a more modem,
progressive view that supports providing a weapon to states in order to
directly confront the problem presented by the sexually violent predator.
These new sexually violent predator laws shift the burden of remedial
action from the community to the convict-and rightfully so."5 By im-
plementing a common theme that forces sexually violent predators to
control their own destiny, these statutes benefit society as a whole. 6
To gain any hope of release, the sexually violent predator must ac-
tively begin his own recovery by accepting responsibility for the harm
suffered by the victim of his sexual molestation and participating in ther-
apy to redirect his sexual urges towards adults, not children. 7 The of-
fender himself can then petition for release upon a showing of fitness to
210. See Montana, supra note 82, at 569-76.
211. Cf 1 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, TREATMENT OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 617
(1989) (stating that "[tihere is probably no group of criminal offenders with which the court can get
more help in arriving at proper disposition through a complete psychiatric evaluation than the pedo-
philics").
212. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
213. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a0l to -29al (1994 & Supp. 1996).
214. See Hansen, supra note 9, at 43 (stating that the Hendricks ruling opens a Pandora's box
on the question of what constitutes mental abnormality).
215. Because the predator must show that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous, he may
help to make his release possible by participating in treatment. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
29al 1.
216. While the sexually violent predator is confined, children are safe from molestation and the
individual is receiving treatment to better understand his behavior and prepare for a possible return
to society with the ability to control pedophilic urges. See supra text accompanying note 94.
217. A variety of treatment methods exist to help the sexual predator accept responsibility for
the harm directly caused by his behavior, which is fundamental to the individual's recovery. See
supra text accompanying note 92-94. The better the offender does in therapy, the more likely he is to
gain release. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29al 1.
1998]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
return to society.2 ' The state must review the sex offender's progress
every year to determine whether the individual continues to suffer from
pedophilia and still exhibits a danger to himself or others."9 The treatable
offender controls his own future by motivating himself towards success-
ful treatment.' ° For the untreatable, we should devote resources to further
study of violent sex offender behavior, which may lead to prevention of
future offenses. Until a solution develops to prevent child sexual abuse,
the offender must remain separated from the society he threatens. The
supreme benefit of this approach lies in its simultaneous protection of
children, who will not fear the release of an untreated or untreatable
sexually violent predator.
1. Defects in Current Corrective Measures
In the past, states relied on longer periods of incarceration to ad-
dress offenders who sexually molested children."' Incarceration does not
address a pedophile's inability to associate with children in a non-sexual
manner. While sexually violent predators must remain incarcerated for
criminal punishment purposes, a prison sentence will not deter a sexually
violent predator with an irresistible impulse.m A typical child molester
behaves as a model prisoner because the source of his or her temptation
does not exist within the physical confines of an adult prison facility! 3
The question of whether the sex offender experiences successful reha-
bilitation remains a mystery upon the offender's release. During a child
sex offender's time in prison, he or she usually receives little, if any,
therapy." ' A number of experts believe that sex offenders who do not
receive treatment contribute greatly to the high recidivism rates.2" Fur-
ther, victims and their families must worry about early release due to
218. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29al 1.
219. Id. § 59-29aO8.
220. Id.
221. See Fowler & Beer, supra note 112, at 219-21; McAllister, supra note 29, at 420.
222. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2078-79 (1996) (describing Hendricks's many
convictions for sexual offenses against children).
223. See, e.g., Brief for Leroy Hendricks Cross-Petitioner at 4, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct.
2072 (1996) (Nos. 95-1649 & 95-9075) (confirming that Hendricks earned all possible good time
towards release for his 1984 conviction and served his sentence without incident); Raquel Blacher,
Comment, Historical Perspective of the "Sex Psychopath" Statute: From the Revolutionary Era to
the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERcER L. REv. 889, 915 (1995) (discussing the fact that con-
victed child molester Joeseph Gallardo served as a "model prisoner" during his incarceration for
raping a ten-year-old girl).
224. Brief of Petitioner at 4-5, Hendricks (No. 95-1649) (stating that prison provides a poor
setting for a strong showing of rehabilitation among sex offenders because typically the offenders
require long term treatment and a variety of treatment modalities).
225. See Brief of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 11, Hendricks (No. 95-1649) (affirming that while there currently exists no
"cure" for sex offenders, evidence shows that over the last ten years, treatments for sex offenders
have considerably reduced recidivism); Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 323; Lurigio et al., supra
note 80, at 72 (citing studies that find no link between treatment and recidivism, as well as studies
that find treatment reduces recidivism).
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parole, must continue to testify at parole hearings, and must relive the
experiences again and again. Upon the offender's release, society at large
must deal with a sexual predator now hardened by prison life."'
States should reallocate the funding and resources currently appor-
tioned to imprisoning child sex offenders into civil commitment facilities
that educate, study, and treat sexually violent predators. In order to stop
the cycle of abuse, state authorities need a better understanding of sexu-
ally violent predators and an appropriate treatment system, not additional
jail space. As evidenced by the continuing rise in incidents of child sex-
ual abuse and the lack of decline in the recidivism rate, incarceration
alone offers little overall, and certainly no deterrent, effect to someone
with an "irresistible impulse" to offend again.
New Jersey's Megan's Law enables its state courts to require man-
datory registration in the community and lifetime community supervi-
sion," setting the example for registration and/or notification legislation
in other states.2 Forty-seven states have enacted registration laws that
allow law enforcement officials access to information revealing where
sex offenders reside in their community.' Thirty states have gone further
226. Kenneth Shuster, Halacha as a Model for American Penal Practice: A Comparison of
Halachic and American Punishment Methods, 19 NOVA L. REV. 965, 968 (stating that the American
prison system does not rehabilitate or deter offenders but rather "does more both to teach inmates
more efficient means of committing crime and to transform inmates into more hardened criminals").
227. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6.4 (West 1995).
228. Tara L. Wayt, Megan's Law: A Violation of the Right to Privacy, 6 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTs. L. REV. 139, 156 (1997).
229. Alison Virag Greissman, The Fate of Megan's Law in New York, 18 CARDOzO L. REV.
181, 189 (1996); see ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-20 to -24 (1995 & Supp. 1997); ALASKA STAT. §§
12.63.010 o .100 (Michie 1962 & Supp. 1996); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821 to -3824 (West
1989 & Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-901 to -909 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995); CAL
PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-412.5 (1997); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102r (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (1974 &
Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.21 to .255 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-
9-44.1 (1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 846E-3 (1993 & Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8301 to -8311
(1997); ILL. COMp. STAT ANN. 150/1 to 150/10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-
12 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE §§ 692A.1 to .15 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-
4901 to -4910 (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.500 to .540 (Michie 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15:540 to :549 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11001 to 11004 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792 (1996 & Supp. 1997); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
28.721 to .732 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (West 1992 & Supp.
1997); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-1 to -15 (1972 & Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.600 to
.625 (West 1979 & Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to -507 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 207.151 to .157 (Michie 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:11 to -A:19 (1996); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-11 A-I to -8 (Michie 1978
& Supp. 1997); N.Y. CORRECr. LAW § 168 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
14-208.5 to .13 (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (1985 & Supp. 1997); Omio REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2950.01 to .99 (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581 to 587 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1998); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.517 to .519 (1991 & Supp. 1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT ANN. §§
9791 to 9799.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37.1-16 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-3-400 to -490 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-31 to -39
(1988 & Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to -108 (1997); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN.
arts. 62.01 to .12 (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (1995 & Supp. 1997); VA.
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by passing legislation that gives a central authority the ability to contact
local law enforcement officials about a sexually violent predator in the
community.'e A number of states even sanction notification to school
systems, employers, community members, and the general public."' Al-
though states no doubt drafted such legislation with the best intentions,
these laws afford only a passive remedy to the problem2. and, in fact, put
a great strain on the community. "3 Megan's Laws and similar registration
laws do not provide an effective response to the problem of sexual
predators because many such laws developed from "spur of the moment"
emotional reactions to a problem deserving much more reasoned
thought."4 Critics argue that the registration laws do not work to protect
children.2" Rather, the laws tend to enrage communities, create vigilan-
tism and simply harass the sex offender by driving the sex offender from
one community to the next."6 As a result, the stressed offender is more
CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-298.1 to .3 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.130 to
.140 (1996 & Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8F-l to -8 (1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.45 (West
1991 & Supp. 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19-301 to -306 (Michie 1997).
230. Greissman, supra note 229, at 189-90; see ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010 (Michie 1962 &
Supp. 1996); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3825 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE §
290.4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-412.5 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-102r (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (1974 & Supp. 1996); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 775.21 to .23 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1 (1997);
IDAHO CODE § 18-8311 (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-11 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1997); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 692A.13 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4909 (1995); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15:546 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 11004 (West 1988 & Supp.
1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792 (1996 & Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-17 (1972 &
Stipp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-5-301 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.155 (Michie
1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632 A:17 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 (West 1996 & Supp.
1997); N.Y. CORREcT. LAW § 168 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.10
(1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (1985 & Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.586 (1991 &
Supp. 1996); PA. CONS. STAT ANN. §§ 9797 to 9798 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-22-31 (1988 & Supp. 1997); TENN.CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to -108 (1997); TEX. CODE
CRIM. P. ANN. arts. 62.01 to .12 (West Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.1 (Michie 1995 &
Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.550 (1996 & Supp. 1997).
. 231. Greissman, supra note 229, at 189-90; see GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1(e) (1997); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:546 (West 1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.550 (1996 & Supp. 1997). New
Jersey authorizes notification of members of the community "likely to encounter the registrant." NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
232. Ball, supra note 89, at 444 (stating that notification laws regarding where sex offenders
live in communities exemplify a "quick-fix, band-aid reaction to the serious threats imposed by sex
offenders"); see also Wayt, supra note 228, at 141 (suggesting that the best way to protect society
from the harms of a sexual offender is to treat the offender's disorder).
233. Montana, supra note 82, at 569-76 (detailing acts of vigilantism and heightened commu-
nity fear and anger resulting from notification of a sex offender's presence in the community).
234. See id. at 576-77 (arguing that Megan's Law represents a "short-term solution" and will
not deter sexual predators from reoffending); Deems, supra note 79, at 1233 (explaining that respon-
sible legislators attacking the serious problem of child sexual abuse should find actual, functional
remedies for this dilemma, not "empty gestures").
235. Montana, supra note 82, at 576-77 (proclaiming that notification does not address the
causes of child sexual abuse or control the sexual predator's harmful sexual behaviors).
236. Id. at 577-83 (describing how registration laws provide the community with a powerful
weapon against convicted sexual predators).
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likely to reoffend or to simply refuse to register.237 Deciding how to best
prevent a crime that will affect one in every five children"8 certainly de-
serves more serious attention and thorough research.
Our nation has ignored the reality of the magnitude of child sexual
abuse until only recently, "9 and now states have begun to panic and draft
emotionally charged legislation without considering what will actually
remedy the problem in the long run. The current "quick fixes" enacted in
many states to deal with sexual offenders prove defective.2" Registration
systems create a false sense of security. ' Because the registration infor-
mation goes only to one specified area and not to the surrounding com-
munities, the sex offender easily may avoid registration or recognition in
the community in which he registers by simply relocating to or reof-
fending in the next town."2
The required registration of all sexual predators creates multiple
problems, especially for economically disadvantaged areas.4 3 More af-
fluent communities can afford personnel to keep registration records
current, picket the offenders' houses, and post flyers of the sex offenders
around the neighborhood.2" Sex offenders find this diligence a disincen-
tive to register in these communities and consequently head to the poorer
sections of larger cities where they can disappear more easily."5 Resi-
dents of wealthier neighborhoods who learn of the presence of a sexual
offender through local notification systems" become motivated to drive
the sexual predators out of their "nice communities" with little consid-
237. See id. at 584-85 (explaining that communities that fail to allow offenders to reassimilate
create feelings of anger, frustration and sadness in the ostracized offender that may have the coun-
terproductive result of compelling the sex offender to recidivate); id. at 590-93 (noting that in
Washington approximately 20% of offenders have not registered, and in California close to 75% of
sex offenders neglect to register, while some offenders who register give false information).
238. Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 308.
239. See GABBARD, supra note 75, at 1960 (stating that, until recently, the mental health pro-
fession remained ambivalent about treating pedophiles). But see Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at
304 (confirming that child sex abuse remains a serious health problem).
240. Montana, supra note 82, at 576-77 (discussing how registration/notification laws do not
remove the threat of child sexual abuse regardless of whether members of the neighborhood are
aware of the sex offender's presence in the community).
241. Id. at 594-95 (arguing that children have a 200% greater chance of being molested by a
family member or friend than by a sex offender who is a stranger, and that Megan's Law thus falls
short of protecting children from their most frequent sexual abusers).
242. See Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 314 (revealing that a registered sex offender can
easily venture into adjacent communities, where he is unknown, to reoffend); Montana, supra note
82, at 590-93 (noting that many offenders do not even register).
243. Cf Montana, supra note 82, at 582-83 (stating that inner cities are havens for sexual
offenders seeking to avoid New Jersey's Megan's Law).
244. Cf id. at 578-83 (describing how wealthier New Jersey communities have resources and
political clout to object to convicted sex offenders' presence in their neighborhoods).
245. Cf id. (stating that large inner-city areas are attractive to sex offenders because the en-
forcement agencies are understaffed and under funded in these areas, and therefore Megan's Law is
not strictly enforced).
246. Ball, supra note 89, at 432-33 (asserting that community notification laws raise public
awareness but also heighten neighborhood anger).
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eration for the consequences of their actions. 7 Further, if a more visible
community successfully uses such combative tactics and forces a sexual
predator to leave the community, the offender likely will experience
heightened stress, greatly increasing the chances of another child in an-
other community becoming a victim."'
Compelling communities to shoulder the responsibility of policing
neighborhoods against sexually violent predators imposes an undue bur-
den on society. Community protests damage and detract from community
prosperity, resources, and morale.4 9
Sexual predator registration and notification, community uproar,
flyer distribution, and conducting classes to alert children to an of-
fender's identity will not resolve the problem of child sexual abuse.' °
These actions allow people in communities to feel more secure in the
present, but have devastating long term effects. For example, classes
designed to teach children to identify a sexual predator in their neighbor-
hood may create fear in children of going to school or even of walking
outside."' These tactics often breed local vigilante movements, which in
some cases have mistakenly brutalized innocent, wrongly identified
community members. " Some neighborhoods have resorted to criminal
acts against a known offender, under the guise of protecting their chil-
dren, as they try to run the offender out of town or into the, next commu-
247. Poorer communities remain the "islands" for the sexual offenders. See id. at 433-34 (dis-
cussing how acts of vigilantism force sex offenders from financially sound communities into low-
income areas that have a greater incidence of crime); Montana, supra note 82, at 580-83 (describing
how the notification laws enable the wealthier communities to drive convicted sex offenders out of
their neighborhoods into low-income and inner city areas where enforcement is lax due to lack of
funding, thus allowing the middle and upper class to essentially "pick and choose" their neighbors).
248. See DSM-IV, supra note 74, at 528 (stating that the frequency of the pedophilic urges
usually fluctuates in relation to psychological stress); Deems, supra note 79, at 1233 (noting that
stress resulting from notification may increase the likelihood that the pedophile will reoffend, and
may prevent his rehabilitation by obstructing his efforts to find stable employment, housing, and
normal relationships).
249. See Ball, supra note 89, at 434 (arguing that communities are incapable of responsibly
handling notification that a convicted sex offender is in their neighborhood).
250. See Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 319-20 (noting that child sexual abuse prevention
classes have engendered mixed results); Montana, supra note 82, at 579 (highlighting incidents of
community vigilantism and lawlessness).
251. See Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 314 (stating that children receiving sexual abuse
education may feel more traumatized than safe; children may be afraid to play outside for fear that
"a sex offender may get me").
252. See Montana, supra note 82, at 579 (arguing that community notification laws regarding
sex offenders provoke extreme public outrage directed not only at the sex offender but also at the
offender's family and friends); James 0. Hacking, 111, Comment, Won't You Be My Neighbor?: Do
Community Notification Statutes Violate Sexual Offenders' Rights Under the Constitution's Ban on
the Passage of Post Ex Post Facto Laws?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 761, 804 (1997) (citing an incident
in Phillipsburg, New Jersey, where two individuals broke into a registered sex offender's house and
beat a man who happened to be visiting the offender's residence).
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nity."3 Escalating the problem of sexually violent predators should not be
the preferred response.
Certainly no one wants Leroy Hendricks or any pedophile living in
his or her neighborhood. However, moving to a "safer" or "nicer" neigh-
borhood does not remove the threat of a sexually violent predator coming
in contact with a child. Sexually violent predators know no racial or so-
cioeconomic boundaries." ' Sexually violent predators exist whether cre-
ated by genetics or environmental conditioning. 5 Statistics show a rise in
the number of arrests for sex crimes.' The effects of child sex abuse
touch everyone's lives. 7 If states do not seriously address the problem of
child sex abuse and the prevention of sexually violent offenses against
all of our children, then the Hendricks decision will achieve nothing.
2. Recognizing a State's Autonomy to Legislate Against Child Sex
Offenses
The Constitution grants the states power and autonomy to decide
what statutes to enact and how to interpret them."s The United States
Supreme Court accords considerable deference to states' choices of
criminal laws."s In the Hendricks case, the Court received amicus briefs
253. See Ball, supra note 89, at 433-34 (describing how communities take it upon themselves to
punish sex offenders and their families); Hacking, supra note 252, at 804 (noting various incidents
of vigilantism directed toward sex offenders). For example, in Snohomish County, Washington,
community members, informed of convicted sex offender Joesph Gallardo's return, burned down his
house, and in Megan Kanka's New Jersey neighborhood, residents threw rocks at the offender's
roommates. Ball, supra note 89, at 433-34; see also Montana, supra note 82, at 580-83 (discussing
how community notification laws cause the migration of sex offenders into other neighborhoods
because of the offenders' inability to deal with harassment).
254. Lurigio et al., supra note 80, at 69 (stating that child sexual abuse appears in 10 to 25% of
American families and affects both male and female children).
255. See Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 327-28 (discussing the cycle of child abuse and the
fact that some sexually abused children react by sexually abusing other children, and stressing the
need to continue to develop methods to help teachers, professionals and others identify children who
show signs of a predisposition to act out sexually).
256. Id. at 304-05 (stating that the continued increase in the number of sexual abuse crimes
shows that the nation has not yet begun to reverse the problem). Before reaching their eighteenth
birthday, one out of five children will be abused. Id. at 308. The American Medical Association, in a
statement published on November 6, 1995, identified sexual assault as a health problem and stated
that sexual assault is a "silent-violent epidemic in the United States today." Id. at 309-10. Certain
paraphilic behavior begins in childhood and many individuals describe these sexual urges and fanta-
sies as constantly present. DSM-IV, supra note 74, at 524. For some people, acting on their urges
results only because of other mental disorders, such as dementia, substance intoxication, manic
episodes, or schizophrenia, and does not represent the individual's preferred behavior. Id. at 525.
257. See Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 304-12 (explaining that the problem of sexual abuse
profoundly impacts society at a variety of levels and that society must address this problem with the
attention it deserves). Every time one child suffers sexual abuse, it costs taxpayers between $138,000
and $152,000. Id. at 317.
258. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
259. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2024-25 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(stating that states have wide latitude in defining criminal offenses); see also Poulson v. Turner, 359
F.2d 588, 591 (10th Cir. 1966) (stating that the administration of criminal justice reserved to the
states includes the comprehensive right to fashion their own rules for the enforcement of criminal
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representing over forty states, all asking the Court to uphold civil com-
mitment for sexually violent predators."w
While described as "a government of laws, and not of men,"26' our
nation exists as a democracy. As a country founded on the individual's
right to speak and be heard, 2 changes in our laws occur as the result of
such citizen pressure.' While the popularity of a particular law should
not necessarily persuade the Court, advocacy for the better protection of
our children should. Citizens continually must evaluate and, if necessary,
redefine ways to coexist with one another as freely as possible but with
clear and certain consequences resulting from harming one another.
States may utilize their police power and their role as parens patriae
to impose civil commitment on sexually violent predators." The fact that
the majority of states feel an overwhelming urgency to enact legislation
similar to Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act to protect their com-
munities, even with retroactive application, should not be ignored. The
Court, in upholding the Kansas SVP Act as constitutional, both retroac-
tively and more importantly prospectively, correctly upheld a state's
autonomy to enact legislation focused on a grave and serious issue. This
aspect of the Hendricks decision should lend comfort to parents, and
ultimately to their children.
laws); see, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228,
232 (1987).
260. See McAllister, supra note 29, at 449.
261. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
262. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
263. Examples of citizen groups bringing pressure to bear on state legislatures or on the U.S.
Congress for the purposes of initiating, changing or adapting laws blanket American political his-
tory. The Progressive movement of the early twentieth century, which demanded social action to
reform American society, produced a multitude of laws intended to bring the United States more in
line with the promises contained in the documents of the Revolutionary period (The Declaration of
Independence and the U.S. Constitution). See GRIMES, supra note 23, at 381. Progressives lobbied
for such laws as the direct election of the Senate, corrupt-practices legislation, child labor laws,
minimum wage and maximum hour laws. Id. at 387. Women's temperance groups sought to combat
the liquor industry's "corrupt manipulations" of American politics by advocating both suffrage and
prohibition. Carolyn De Swart Gifford, Frances Willard and the Woman's Christian Temperance
Union's Conversion to Woman Suffrage, in ONE WOMAN, ONE VOTE: REDISCOVERING THE
WoMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 117, 118 (Marjorie Spruill Wheeler ed., 1995). American women,
reviving the suffrage movement whose roots stretched back to 1848, used this popular reform at-
mosphere to once again demand and in 1920 successfully win the right to vote. WILLIAM H. CHAFE,
THE PARADOX OF CHANGE 4 (1991). In the 1950s and 1960s, Americans joined in a crusade to end
racial discrimination, culminating in the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 198. Clearly,
pressure by citizen members of the women's rights and civil rights movements "exerted a substantial
influence on the content of legislation, executive action, and judicial decisions in the 1960s and
1970s." Id. at 234.
264. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (discussing parens patriae and police
powers). Civil commitment may be "the most dramatic example of state paternalism." REISNER &
SLOBOGIN, supra note 106, at 646.
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D. Why Civil Commitment is More Humane for the Offender and for.
Society
As applied to sexually violent predators, civil commitment and
treatment should be imposed for first-time offenders convicted of an of-
fense involving physical sexual contact with a child, no matter how mi-
nor the offense. ' Admittedly, the heinous acts committed by Leroy
Hendricks for over three decades present an extreme example. This Note
advocates mandatory civil confinement and treatment based on a much
lower threshold than over thirty years of child sexual abuse. Studies
show that child sex offenders differ from other criminal offenders be-
cause: (a) they generally prey on multiple victims;' (b) the urge to reof-
fend increases with time;. 7 and (c) they present a higher rate of recidi-
vism.' Some studies also show that some child sex abusers tend to in-
crease the severity of their crimes with time-what starts out as sexual
gratification from fondling can, without treatment, turn into more explicit
acts of penetration, rape, torture, and even murder."' Many sexual
predators never experienced any sexual adult-to-adult activity or any
education as to adult sexual relations.27" Pedophilia is considered a mental
abnormality,"' which in many instances the individual cannot control. 72
Imprisoning and then casting these offenders back into an antagonistic
community produces no effect on the offender, who probably will recidi-
vate, 3 or the community, which may respond with paranoia and vigilan-
tism." Every sex offender convicted of a crime involving physical con-
tact of a sexual nature with a child should be required to submit to at
least one year of civil commitment during which the offender may peti-
tion for early release. 5
265. This would apply equally to juvenile offenders. However, a physical location separate
from adult sex offenders would house civilly confined juveniles. As further protection, juveniles
with over three years age difference among themselves would live separately within the juvenile
facility.
266. See Brief: Doe v. Poritz, supra note 81, at 80 (estimating that extrafamilial child molesters
average 19.8 female victims and for those targeting males, 150 victims); Ball, supra note 89, at 407-
08.
267. See Brief: Doe v. Poritz, supra note 81, at 79-80.
268. Id.
269. Lurigio et al., supra note 80, at 72 (quoting L. K. Scott, Sex Offenders: Prevalence,
Trends, Model Programs, and Costs, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CRIME AND JUSTICE 52 (A. Roberts ed.,
1994)).
270. See GABBARD, supra note 75, at 1966-68.
271. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2088 (1997); DSM-IV, supra note 74, at 527-
28.
272. See, e.g., Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2088-89.
273. Montana, supra note 82, at 584-86.
274. Id. at 577-80.
275. Only if an offender proves that he or she no longer suffers from a mentally abnormality
and does not pose a danger to himself or to others, would release occur.
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Professionals believe that only a small minority of sexual predators
cannot be helped by therapy.276 Therefore, the problem presented by sex-
ual predators should be approached from a preventive point of view.
Some experts feel that the most beneficial point of intervention for sex
offenders exists during adolescence.' Many sex offenders begin mo-
lesting children as little more than children themselves, and experts be-
lieve concentrated treatment at the adolescent stage helps stop young
offenders from using sexual molestation as an acceptable means of sex-
ual gratification."' Early intervention also allows mental health profes-
sionals the chance to educate young adolescents as to the seriousness of
their offenses.
Professionals can provide counseling to the adolescent offenders,
some of whom experienced abuse as younger children, and others cur-
rently suffering abuse, and can begin to help young offenders redirect
their sexual urges to age-appropriate partners.2" Concentrating on adoles-
cent sexual offenders also helps identify those individuals who present
especially dangerous risks and suffer from mental disorders before they
further abuse children.'
Contrary to the traditional responses to child sex offenders, re-
sources and efforts should be spent creating programs that reintroduce
the sexual offender to society in a healthy way, monitored and con-
trolled, rather than in a way that wreaks havoc in communities." A sex
offender confined, treated, and then carefully released back into society
faces a better chance of not reoffending and harming the community.
276. See Brief of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 11-12, Hendricks (No. 95-1649); Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 323.
277. See GONSIOREK Er AL.., supra note 86, at 113 (describing the high percentage of adoles-
cent sex offenders); see also id. at 114 (defining juvenile sex offender); id. at 119 (describing the
increase in programs for adolescent sex offenders); id. at 117 (describing how a lack of sex educa-
tion, parents' unwillingness to teach acceptable sexual behavior and America's erotophobia in gen-
eral exacerbates the problem of sexual abuse); Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 317 (stating that
25% of all sex crimes are committed by juveniles, including 50% of child sexual abuse crimes); id.
at 320-21 (discussing how sex education for adolescent abusers and would-be abusers may deter
future child sexual abuse).
278. See Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 327-28.
279. See GONSIOREK ET AL.., supra note 86, at 116-17 (discussing the advantages of early
intervention).
280. See Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 327-28.
281. See DSM-IV, supra note 74, at 619 (stating that pedophilic urges peak in adolescence);
Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 327-28.
282. The treatment needs for sex offenders vary from those confined under general civil com-
mitment statutes. While many generally committed persons respond well to medication, pedophilic
treatment includes techniques such as behavioral reconditioning, relapse prevention, social skills
enhancement, family systems approaches and the addictive model. W.L. MARSHALL EF AL.,
TREATMENT OF THE OFFENDER, HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT: ISSUES, THEORIES AND
TREATMENT OF THE OFFENDER 279-385 (1990); see also Barbara K. Schwartz, Effective Treatment
Techniques for Sex Offenders, PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS, June 1992, at 315, 316 (arguing that treatment




This system would serve the dual purpose of protecting children while
helping the offender learn to control and adapt his or her behavior. State
programs focused on civil confinement with treatment and a subsequent
reintroduction system at least give the individual an opportunity to one
day lead a somewhat dignified, normal life. For sex offenders more se-
verely mentally disordered and dangerous, confinement may need to be
indefinite to protect society. Others that pose less of a risk may only need
the structure of civil confinement for a shorter period of time to learn the
skills necessary to resist the impulse to molest and abuse children and to
cultivate an appropriate adult sexual response.
Mental health programs must specifically treat the problems forced
upon society by the sexually violent predator by shifting the burden to
the perpetrator through concepts such as restricted halfway houses, as-
signment of specific supervisors, mandatory curfews, employment re-
quirements, no contact with children, and group homes located away
from areas where children play or live. These facilities would not resem-
ble a typical state mental hospital, state prison, or state halfway house.
The facility would not focus on punishment or the simulation of criminal
incarceration because commitment would occur after the sexually violent
predator had already completed a criminal sentence. Concurrent with
receiving intense treatment for violent sexual behavior, offenders would
wear their own clothes, receive more liberal visitations, correspond with
loved ones, and participate in controlled working environments. Offend-
ers evaluated as less of a risk might be allowed more freedom and bene-
fits, such as supervised and chaperoned day passes. Those posing higher
risks would be subjected to greater security controls, although they
would experience treatment modalities similar to the other, lesser risk
offenders. The degree of dangerousness and of the mental disorder the
sexually violent predator exhibits would dictate the differing levels of
security. In sum, the core objective would be to create an atmosphere as
close as possible to the rest of society without unnecessarily subjecting
children to the risk of being sexually molested.
Child sex offenders present a problem incapable of resolution by an
easy answer. As a result, this problem calls for the implementation on a
broader scale of certain measures society has been reluctant to adminis-
ter. Introducing legislation that confines and treats sexual predators based
on a system of classification28 to evaluate more closely what, if any,
ability a particular individual has to adapt to normal non-sexual contact
with children provides the first step. Individuals fitting the profile of of-
fenders with the highest recidivism rates would submit to a more restric-
tive treatment and routine. Instead of spending scarce resources and hu-
man effort to register sex offenders in a system easy to thwart, difficult to
maintain and largely ineffective, ' or simply extending prison sentences
283. See Lurigio et al., supra note 80, at 71-72.
284. See Montana, supra note 82, at 577-96.
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with very little hope of deterrence, community resources should be real-
located. States should fund the hiring and training of more mental health
care professionals to study, evaluate, treat and hopefully cure these sexu-
ally violent predators.
Some states such as Louisiana and Georgia have enacted legislation
that applies the death penalty for sexual predators who rape children un-
der twelve. ' Montana is seeking to pass laws that impose the death pen-
alty for repeated convictions of rape, and groups in Pennsylvania are
striving for a similar statute for repeated sexual assaults on children.'
Civil commitment offers a much more humane approach to protecting
children and gives the offender the opportunity to learn to change his
behavior and possibly return to society." These recent death penalty
laws do not protect children.' Instead, they create difficulties for chil-
dren, as some offenders may be family members and the trauma of a
child victim knowing that reporting a sexual abuse may end a loved
one's or trusted friend's life may plunge the victim even further into si-
lence.' Segregation is necessary; ending a life is not.
The aim of the states in managing this problem should focus on
careful consideration of workable, preventive action, responding to a
complex situation. Assuming that the dilemma of sexually violent
predators can be removed by one piece of legislation, whether death pen-
alty or notification/registration laws, underestimates the problem and
performs a disservice to victim, society, and the offenders. Law en-
forcement officials claim they can catch the perpetrators. Prosecutors
affirm that they can incarcerate the offenders. Psychologists assert that
they can treat the pedophile. The only way to ensure that a child sex of-
fender cannot create another victim is segregation. States must take the
initiative and create better systems to control the problems of the sexu-
ally violent predator. As with any system, miscalculations and mistakes
exist, but implementing a new means of handling sexually violent
predators through intensive treatment and controlled confinement must
begin now. In order to perfect a system, a system must be created. The
many methods states have tried have not resulted in a great degree of
success. Some individuals in our society are incarcerated for life because
of their offense, and society accepts this as appropriate. Instead of sen-
tencing sexually violent predators to life in prison, states should institute
mental health programs to attempt to treat, educate and prevent these
crimes in the future. Some sexually violent predators require indefinite








segregation, but at least with civil commitment programs, the offender
retains the opportunity and possibility of rehabilitation and release.
IV. CONCLUSION
A problem society shoved underground for so long'm now emerges
as a dilemma impossible to avoid any longer. States now confront the
conundrum of what to do with sexually violent predators like Leroy
Hendricks. How do legislatures keep individuals, who suffer from and
even admit an irresistible impulse to molest children and who inflict over
thirty years of sexual abuse, segregated from children? How do states
repent for the leniency and the lack of serious attention devoted to child
sexual abuse when it comes time for the release of a sexual predator like
Hendricks?
Education and prevention remain the best solution for the offender
and for the potential victim, but for some it arrives too late. At present,
offenders with multiple convictions over decades " co-exist in neighbor-
hoods with victims living with the result of society's inability to protect
its future.' For some offenders, emergency information hotlines" or out
patient treatment programs signal a step in the right direction and even
satisfy our concerns. Other offenders with a long history of recidivism
presently in jail or living in society must submit to more intensive action,
such as civil confinement. Teaching child sex offenders how to relate to
children in a non-sexual manner while still protecting children in com-
munities should be the aim. Because the nature of child sexual abuse
290. As late as 1975, child victims were described as seductive or provocative, and as late a
1981 people believed that the offender's word should be taken over official records when the two
were contradictory on the point of "victim participation." O'CoNNE.LL ET AL., supra note 92, at 3
(citing M. Virkkunen, Victim-Precipitated Pedophilia Offenses, BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 175, 175-80
(1976)); M. Virkkunen, The Child as Participating Victim, in ADULT SEXUAL INTEREST IN
CHILDREN, 121-34 (M. Cook & K. Howells eds., 1981)). Observers in 1964 noted, "We rarely had
the opportunity of examining the victims of peodphiles; however, we have the clinical impression
that quite often the child is aggressive and seductive and often induces the offender to commit the
offense." Id. (quoting E. Revitch & R. G. Weiss, The Pedophilac Offender, in DISEASES OF THE
NERVOUS SYSTEM, 33, 73-79 (1962)).
291. See Hacking, supra note 252, at 761-62 (discussing the offenses of several repeat sexual
predators in New Jersey); Claudine M. Leone, Legislative Survey, New Jersey Assembly Bill 155-A
Bill Allowing the Civil Commitment of Violent Sex Offenders After the Completion of a Criminal
Sentence, 18 SETON HALL LEGis. J. 890, 892 n.7 (1994) (discussing repeat offender Earl Shriner
whose criminal record stretches back to 1966).
292. See GABBARD, supra note 75, at 1960 (noting in a 1992 nationwide survey of 21 million
adult women who suffered sexual abuse that 60% of this group were assaulted before age 18); Lu-
rigio et al., supra note 80, at 69 (reporting a 2,100% increase in cases of child abuse from 1976 to
1986 and an additional 227% increase by 1991).
293. See Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 328 (describing "STOP IT NOW," a telephone
hotline piloted in Vermont as a public medical and outreach program providing information about
resources for abusers who want quit abusing, the legal system as it regards sex offenders, treatment
for offenders, attorney and therapist referrals and opportunities to converse with recovering sex
offenders).
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offenses is so dangerous and vile,2"' the damage so intense and long last-
ing, and the treatment and understanding of sexual predators so perplex-
ing, the right of the community to protect its children must outweigh the
right of these types of offenders to remain at liberty after only criminal
incarceration without any treatment or supervision.
The epidemic of child sexual abuse was not created in one day; it
follows that a solution will be a long and difficult struggle indeed. But if
communities lack the desire to commit to this effort for our children,
then for whom else could such an imposing and daunting struggle be
justified? Putting programs in place to severely limit, if not end, the risk
that one out of every five children will suffer an act of sexual abuse
should be the goal of all state legislatures" Innocent vulnerable victims,
who depend on adults for protection and guidance, now suffer at the
hands of the system adults created.' Not all children can grow up privi-
leged with tangible and intangible wealth and advantages. But every
child should have the right to grow up without being raped, sodomized,
or fondled. Child sex abuse should not be thought of as something that
"just happens," that all children should "go through" or as "some other
family's problem." If it affects one child, it affects us all.
Melissa R. Saad*
294. See Margret A. Healy, Note, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists at Home: Do Laws in Sweden
and the United States Safeguard the Rights of Children as Mandated by International Law?, 18
FORDAM INT'L L.J. 1852, 1852-53 (1995) (discussing the death of a 12 year-old street child living in
the Philippines, Rosario Baluyot, who died in 1987 after seven months of excruciating pain from a
night of sex with an Austrian medical doctor who forced an electric vibrator so deeply into her
vagina that it broke and lodged inside her-he remains a free man today).
295. See Freeman-Longo, supra note 79, at 308.
296. An expert of sex offender laws says the reason child sex abuse creates so much attention
relates to the nature of the victim. David E. Rovella, Sex-Crime Laws Given Free Rein: Circuits Use
High Court Decision on Commitment to Bless Megan's Laws, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 27, 1997, at A21.
"Mhe real reason this is such a hot button is because you are taking advantage of vulnerable [chil-
dren] who can't protect themselves." Id. (quoting former assistant U.S. Attorney Rebekah J. Poston,
chair of the White Collar Criminal Group at Miami's Steel Hector & Dais L.L.P.).
* The author would like to thank Kent Kostka for his insight and encouragement in helping
to bring this paper to publication. The author would also like to thank her grandfather, the Honorable
Robert H. Williams, and her parents, Anne W. Rye and Alton C. Rye, for their wisdom and guid-
ance, and especially her husband, Tarek F.M. Saad, for his patience and understanding during the
writing of this paper.
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COMMENT
AN INDETERMINATE MIX OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION: THE UNDERTOW OF IN FoRMA PAUPERiS
INTRODUCTION
In 1994 a Mississippi trial court took away Melissa L. Brooks's
right to be the legal mother of her own children; her name was removed
from their birth certificates.' When Ms. Brooks attempted to appeal the
termination of her parental rights, Mississippi law required her to pay for
the necessary transcripts to obtain such an appeal.' Unable to pay the
transcript expense, Ms. Brooks requested that the state supreme court
waive this requirement and allow her to proceed in forma pauperis The
Mississippi Supreme Court denied her request.' Simply put, Ms. Brooks
could not legally question the termination of her parental rights because
she was poor.
Believing she had a constitutional right to proceed in forma pau-
peris, Ms. Brooks appealed her case to the United States Supreme Court.
In M.L.B. v. S.LJ., Ms. Brooks struggled through the Court's complex in
forma pauperis jurisprudence in order to gain an appeal of her parental
rights termination. Ms. Brooks ultimately won her Supreme Court case
because the private interest involved, her parental right, was too impor-
tant to ignore.' In M.L.B., the private interest overcame the doctrinal dif-
ficulties. Not every indigent, however, will be as lucky as Ms. Brooks.
While past in forma pauperis decisions have generally expanded
protections for the poor, and at least on the surface appear consistent,
there are potentially devastating problems with this doctrine. In forma
pauperis lies within the confusing overlap of fundamental rights juris-
prudence of equal protection and due process. As a result, Supreme
Court in forma pauperis decisions have consistently cited varying con-
stitutional grounds. The doctrine in this area thus lies indeterminate.
With indeterminacy comes uncertainty and the potential for abuse by
judges. As such, danger lurks in the undertow below the apparently calm
and consistent surface of in forma pauperis protection. This Comment
analyzes this dangerous doctrinal undertow and attempts to provide a
definitive current of analysis.
1. David G. Savage, Ruling for a Mother's Rights Puts Human Face on Supreme Court's
Work, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1997, at 40.
2. M.L.B.v.S.LJ., 117 S. Ct. 555,560(1996).
3. In forma pauperis "[diescribes permission given to a poor person (i.e., indigent) to pro-
ceed without liability for court fees or costs." BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990).
4. M.L.B., 117S.Ctat560.
5. See id. at 563-69.
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Part I of this Comment analyzes the similar historical and doctrinal
roots of due process and equal protection jurisprudence. Part I also places
this analysis within the court access setting. Part II presents the M.L.B.
case, focusing on each method of Fourteenth Amendment analysis upon
which the majority, concurrence, and dissent are founded. Part Inl illus-
trates the confusion in the doctrine and the resulting problems. It then
proposes a solution. Part IV underscores the need to choose a definitive
doctrinal direction so that appropriate in forma pauperis analysis is en-
sured.
I. BACKGROUND
The Fourteenth Amendment represents one device in a long pro-
gression that is designed to protect individuals from the potentially awe-
some power of the state. While much of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine
is seen as a lineage, parts of that lineage overlap in concept and scope.
These overlapping sections of doctrine are fundamental to understanding
the right to court access predicament.
A. Historical Roots of Overlap
In the broadest sense, in forma pauperis protection for indigents is
merely the latest expansion of protection that has grown since the Magna
Carta.6 In 1225, the Magna Carta declared that no "freeman" could be
denied his freedom or land without fair hearing before some sort of
body.' One hundred twenty years later this concept was enforced by an-
other English legal provision that reiterated similar protections, this time
specifying the familiar words, "by due process of law." These provisions
6. Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The Original Understanding, 4 CONST.
COMMENT 339, 340 (1987). At the heart of Eberle's commentary is the fact that these particular
laws, and their underlying original impulse of due process, was to protect the process itself, namely
notice and the right to answer legal allegations before a court of law. Id.
7. Eberle notes the applicable text:
No Freeman shall be taken, or otherwise imprisoned, or be disseized of his Freehold, or
Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or destroyed; nor we will not pass
upon him, nor.condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the
Land.
Id. (citing the original Latin text, 9 Hen. 3, ch. 29 (1225)).
The Supreme Court itself has recognized the implications of the Magna Carta in the informa
pauperis situation that this Comment addresses. The Court stated:
Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old problem.
People have never ceased to hope and strive to move closer to that goal. This hope, at
least in part, brought about in 1215 the royal concessions of Magna Carta .... These
pledges were unquestionably steps toward a fairer and more nearly equal application of
criminal justice. In this tradition, our own constitutional guaranties of due process and
equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious dis-
criminations between persons and different groups of persons.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1956).
8. Eberle notes the full text of the 1354 English statute: "That no Man of what Estate or
Condition that he be, shall be put out of Land or Tenement, nor taken nor imprisoned, nor disinher-
[Vol. 75:2
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
grew in importance, eventually becoming the rallying cry of the English
constitutionalists of the 1600s." These pioneers were the philosophical
forefathers of the American legislators and judges who in the 1800s
opened the door for the establishment of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Incorporated in American government in sources ranging from state con-
stitutions to the United States Supreme Court, political ideas from six
hundred years ago emerged again and again, and were finally adopted by
Congress in 1868."
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Setting: Overlapping Tests and Goals
Ensuring court access for indigents is an example of the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of individual rights from unwarranted govern-
mental interference. These individual rights derive, in great part, from
the weight of the words, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'2 Out of these
words grew two distinct lines of constitutional protection, due process
and equal protection.
The Court identifies two types of due process: substantive and pro-
cedural. Procedural due process encompasses that process which is due
before the government can take away an individual's life, liberty, or
property.'3 In determining whether a procedural due process violation
occurred the Court will weigh the individual and governmental inter-
ests."
The Court begins substantive due process analysis with a determi-
nation of the right's fundamental/non-fundamental nature. Such analysis
ited, nor be put to death, without being brought in Answer by due Process of the Law." Eberle, supra
note 6, at 340 (citing 28 Edw. 3 ch. 3 (1354)).
9. Id. at 341.
10. Id. at 341-42.
11. Id.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); see also David Crump, How Do
the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judi-
cialAlchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 795, 810-11 (1996).
14. For the assessment of challenged state procedures, the Court has adopted the Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), procedural due process test. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-
600 (1979). The Court in Mathews stated the test as a balance and consideration of three factors: (1)
the private interest involved; (2) the risk that the procedures in question will erroneously usurp that
ight; and (3) the justification or interest that the Government has in using such procedures.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27-31
(1981) (determining that the Mathews test applies to parental termination proceedings).
15. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993). Initially, substantive due process was seen as
only providing protection from economic regulation that impinged upon liberty and, as such, only
"economic" fundamental rights. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Rosalie Berger
Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out
of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REv. 313, 318 (1991). The notion of substantive due
process, however, gradually changed and expanded. See Anthony C. Cicia, A Wolf in Sheep's
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is often subjective and is a point of contention among the Justices.'6 After
such a determination, the Court subjects the infringement on the right to
the appropriate level of scrutiny under which the governmental interest is
placed,'" through a device called a "means-end scrutiny test.""8 Under this
framework, the Court examines the end goal of the infringing statute and
the means by which the state attempts to achieve these results.'9
Clothing?: A Critical Analysis of Justice Harlan's Substantive Due Process Formulation, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2241 (1996). Substantive due process rights came to be recognized under
the Fourteenth Amendment's zone of privacy protection. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (right to freedom of marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to con-
traception). Yet, the judicial conservatism present in the 1980s stemmed this expansion and threat-
ened the existence of the doctrine itself, as exemplified in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
In Bowers, the Court determined that no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy existed. Bowers,
478 U.S. at 190-91. The Court went further, stating:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new fun-
damental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little
or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.
Id. at 194.
16. The fundamental rights debate is often a clash between originalists and non-originalists.
See David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between
Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 895, 897 (1993). Originalists argue that the Constitution should be read strictly and thus only
the specific rights described therein should be recognized. Id. at 897-98. At the heart of the origi-
nalist position is the notion that the Court should engage in legal analysis, not political policy mak-
ing. Id. The solution for originalists, then, is an ethic of restraint and neutrality couched in the guises
of striving for the Framers' original intention of the text. Id. at 898-99. In this manner, the independ-
ent political views of a particular judge will hopefully be weeded out of the analysis mix. Id. at 899.
Non-originalists, sometimes called fundamental rights theorists, argue that the Constitution
was never intended to be an all inclusive laundry list of fundamental rights. Id. at 900. Rather, they
argue that the Constitution presents a set of "general moral concepts." Id. In this manner they posit
that non-originalism does not ignore the precepts of the Constitution at all, rather, non-originalism is
just a different interpretation of the Constitution's meaning. Id. From these "general moral con-
cepts," rights are distilled and applied to particular situations. Id. This debate between originalists
and non-originalists, while highly intriguing, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
From either of theese two positions, the Court has been clear that expanding the scope of
substantive due process is no cavalier endeavor. The Court clearly stated:
As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of sub-
stantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted
area are scarce and open-ended. The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exer-
cise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
17. If the Court determines that the right violated was fundamental, then the state must first
prove that the state interest in violating that fundamental right is "narrowly tailored to serve some
compelling state interest" Reno, 507 U.S. at 301-02. In order for a law to be considered narrowly
tailored it must be "the least onerous alternative available for achieving the purpose [compelling
state interest]." Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L.
REv. 625, 638 (1992).
If the right violated is deemed not to be fundamental, then through a "means-end scrutiny"
test the burden is on the individual, id. at 643-44, to prove that the law infringing the right is not
rationally related to some legitimate state interest. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2271
(1997). This is known as the rational basis test. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271.
18. Galloway, supra note 17, at 627.
19. Id.
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The Equal Protection Clause"0 protects rights that are either "explic-
itly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." '  Additionally, the
Equal Protection Clause "embodies a general rule that States must treat
like cases alike but may treat unlike cases [dissimilarly],"' as long as that
dissimilarity is not based upon a suspect classification or a fundamental
right.' At the highest level of scrutiny there are two possible analytical
approaches. Under one, if a law has an "invidious discriminatory pur-
pose," ' disproportionately harming a group of people similarly situated
to others and the statute classifies individuals in a suspect manner, the
respondent State must prove a compelling state interest for such dis-
crimination.' Under the other, if the law unequally burdens a fundamen-
tal right in its classification (regardless of whether that classification is
suspect), a compelling interest must also exist. '
As the Court duly notes, most state laws classify individuals in
some manner." However, the Court recognizes few classifications as
suspect. Only race,28 national origin," and ethnicity ° currently qualify.
Wealth is the classification at issue in court access situations, as statutes
that set fees for court access inherently classify individuals into those
20. "No state shall ... deny any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
22. Vao v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293,2297 (1997).
23. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966). The Court underscored its focus on
such particularized equal protection when it noted that
To be sure, the constitutional demand is not a demand that a statute necessarily apply
equally to all persons. "he Constitution does not require things which are different in
fact... to be treated in law as though they are the same.".. . Hence, legislation may im-
pose special burdens upon defined classes in order to achieve permissible ends. But the
Equal Protection Clause does require that, in defining a class subject to legislation, the
distinctions that are drawn have "some relevance to the purpose for which the classifica-
tion is made."
Id. at 309 (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)).
24. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976). Under this test, the Court ruled that
mere statistical demonstration of discrimination is inadequate to prove violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Id. at 240.
25. Id. If no fundamental right is violated, yet the statute burdens a suspect class, the state
must still show the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. Russell W. Gallo-
way, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 121, 130 (1989). There can
also be a lower level of scrutiny yet still above rationality review called intermediate scrutiny. This
scrutiny is implicated when a law burdens a quasi-suspect class. Id. If a law does not burden a fun-
damental right or suspect or quasi-suspect class, the Court affords the law in question "a strong
presumption of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). Consequently, the individual will
then have to prove that the law does not rationally relate to some legitimate state interest. See gener-
ally Christopher E. Austin, Due Process, Court Access Fees, and the Right to Litigate, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 768, 776-77 (1982) (discussing equal protection analysis in the context of court access fees).
26. Galloway, supra note 25, at 130.
27. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,271-72(1979).
28. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding unconstitutional a law
segregating public schools on the basis of race).
29. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
30. See, e.g., id. at 214.
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who can and cannot pay.3' However, the Court does not recognize wealth
as a suspect classification.32 Furthermore, in the in forma pauperis sce-
nario, the Court considers this inevitable classification as rationally re-
lated to the efficient administration of state courts.
While the lines of constitutional protection emanating from the
Fourteenth Amendment have separate tests, the lines blur and overlap.
Right to court access situations underscore this overlap. The Court, un-
der rational relation analysis, has consistently upheld state court fee re-
quirements. As such, an indigent must argue for a heightened level of
scrutiny under either due process or equal protection.36 Under due process
the indigent must argue that some fundamental right was taken away
without due process. Under an equal protection analysis the indigent
must argue that the statute classified based upon wealth or unequally
burdened a fundamental right in its classification.
The most significant factor in creating the overlap between due proc-
ess and equal protection analyses in right to court access cases is that the
Court does not find wealth a suspect classification. Once the Court re-
moves the ability of the indigent to argue a suspect classification, the
only remaining method of recovery is to implicate a fundamental right.
This reality exposes the indigent to rather subjective and indeterminate
judicial analyses. A closer look at the right to court access cases eluci-
dates this, overlap.
C. The Right to Court Access: Due Process and Equal Protection
Overlap in Action
Access to the courts encompasses ideas about a process that is due,
equal access to that process, liberties and freedoms that are unfairly con-
strained, and judicial relief.38 As a result, in forma pauperis analysis in-
volves many issues. At a surface level the denial of court access appears
a pure denial of fundamental process, and therefore, a denial of proce-
31. See Austin, supra note 25, at 768.
32. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
33. The Court explained that "[ijn the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imper-
fect." Id. at 485.
34. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 566 (1996) ("We observe first that the Court's decisions
concerning access to judicial processes ... reflect both equal protection and due process concerns.").
At their respective cores, due process and equal protection really deal with the same concern, as has
been noted. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confuisions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 310 (1993) ("In its commonest form, substantive
due process doctrine reflects the simple but far-reaching principle-also embodied in the Equal
Protection Clause-that government cannot be arbitrary." (citation omitted)).
35. See Austin, supra note 25, at 777-78.
36. Id.
37. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
38. See generally Austin, supra note 25 (discussing various methods of constitutional analysis
posited by commentators as the correct framework in which to view court access situations).
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dural due process. Such a denial also triggers equal protection concerns,
as a distinct group of individuals (the poor) are denied equal treatment
under the law. At a deeper level, if the denial of process or the discrimi-
nation itself implicates a fundamental right, substantive due process may
be triggered. All of these issues influence the form of the in forma pau-
peris piecemealed together by the Court.
The following cases illustrate the extent to which the Justices dis-
agree on what constitutional test to apply: whether to use equal protec-
tion, due process, or both. The evolution of the right to court access and
its blurred due process, equal protection, and fundamental rights impli-
cations began in 1956 with the case of Griffin v. Illinois.39
In Griffin, two individuals were convicted of armed robbery and
subsequently appealed their convictions to the Illinois Appellate Court. '
Illinois state law granted them this right to appeal. However, Illinois law
also dictated that the appellant present particular documents to the ap-
pellate court. These documents were almost impossible to prepare with-
out obtaining full trial transcripts."' Because these defendants were poor
and could not afford to pay for these transcripts they requested a fee
waiver. '2 The Illinois Supreme Court denied this request. 3 On appeal the
U.S. Supreme Court declared the Illinois law unconstitutional, violating
the Fourteenth Amendment on both due process and equal protection
grounds."
The Court invoked both due process and equal protection, stating
that "our own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protec-
tion both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious
discrimination between persons and different groups of persons."' Un-
derscoring the equal protection nature of informa pauperis scenarios the
Court noted that "[tihere can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a
man gets depends on the amount of money he has." The Court made it
clear that states were not required to grant such appeals. Once a state
afforded individuals that right, however, it could not create an arbitrary
monetary bar to exercising that right."
Griffin spawned many cases that further defined the right of court
access for indigent appellants. The following are the essential highlights
in that series of cases. These cases further demonstrate the overlap be-
39. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
40. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13-14.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 15.
43. Id. at 15-16.
44. Id. at 17-19.
45. Id. at 17.
46. Id. at 19.
47. Id. at 18-19.
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tween due process and equal protection that currently exists in this area
of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
In 1971, the Court decided two key cases which expanded the in
forma pauperis doctrine established in Griffin. In Mayer v. City of Chi-
cago,' the Griffin holding was extended on due process grounds to cover
appeals of non-felony criminal cases, essentially including all criminal
appeals under the Griffin umbrella.'9 The Mayer Court, however, never
specifically implicated due process or equal protection alone as the basis
for its decision. Rather, the Court based its ruling on the "unreasoned
distinction" between felony and non-felony convictions.' The Court's
analysis, however, possessed a distinct equal protection flavor. The "un-
reasoned distinction" discussion focused on the rule's unreasonable and
differential treatment of similarly situated individuals.'
The Court, in 1971, also decided Boddie v. Connecticut.2 In Boddie,
the Court held that the private interest in dissolving a marriage was of
such importance that the state fiscal interest in demanding a fee for such
a court transaction violated the Due Process Clause 3 Focusing on the
basic importance of the right of marriage, the Court tied its analysis to
the due process historical framework of protection for fundamental
rights. ' In his concurrence, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority, yet
believed that the case also presented a classic equal protection problem.55
He believed that while the majority focused only on due process, the
very fact that the case dealt with a denial of a hearing additionally impli-
cated analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.' While disagreeing
with the majority and Justice Brennan, dissenting Justice Black based his
reasoning on both equal protection and due process. 7
The expansion of the exemption of court access fees for indigents
did find its limits. In United States v. Kras,58 the Court held that fees re-
quired to file a bankruptcy petition did not violate the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 The Court
stated that bankruptcy is different than marriage in that "[tihe Boddie
appellants' inability to dissolve their marriages seriously impaired their
48. 404U.S. 189 (1971).
49. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 193-99.
50. Id. at 195.
51. Id. at 195-98.
52. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
53. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374.
54. Id. at 376 ("Recognition of this (due process] theoretical framework illuminates the pre-
cise issue presented in this case. As this Court on more than one occasion has recognized, marriage
involves interests of basic importance to our society.").
55. Id. at 387-88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 388.
57. Id. at 390-94 (Black, J., dissenting).
58. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
59. Kras, 409 U.S. at 446.
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freedom to pursue other protected associational activities." Although
Kras's desire to start anew financially was important, it did "not rise to
the same constitutional level."'
The Kras Court noted that the appellant could dissolve his debt in
other manners. The legal remedy of bankruptcy, while an option, was not
the only option available to the appellant. '2 Also, the "state monopoly" on
marriage was an important factor in Boddie, and this factor distinguished
the two scenarios. 3 The Court based much of its analysis on the absence
of a fundamental right and utilized a due process approach."
The Kras Court went further yet, implicating equal protection as
grounds for ruling in favor of the government. In the process, the Court
underscored the overlap between due process and equal protection in
such situations.' The Court noted that since bankruptcy does not rise to
the level of a fundamental right, as it falls into the area of economics and
social welfare, strict scrutiny cannot be applied to the government regu-
lation.' In the absence of strict scrutiny the Court applied the rational-
relation test, finding the filing fees constitutional. 7
In Ortwein v. Schwab,' the Court held that a filing fee for welfare
appeals did not violate the Due Process Clause because no fundamental
right was at stake. ' The Court reiterated that the poor are not a suspect
class and the government's financial interest in supporting its court sys-
tem was rational." The Court, as it did in Kras, noted the non-
fundamental nature of the private interest in welfare.' To bolster its ar-
gument the Court delineated that welfare payments are "in the area of
economics and social welfare," '72 and as such bring the analysis down to
the rational-relation level."
In addition, the Ortwein Court implicated procedural due process,
stating that "procedural due process requires that a welfare recipient be
given a pretermination evidentiary hearing. . . .These appellants have
60. Id. at 444-45.
61. Id.
62. Id. In 1994 Congress created a pilot program providing for in forma pauperis bankruptcy
filing in six federal districts. Karen Gross, In Forma Pauperis in Bankruptcy: Reflecting on and
Beyond United States v. Kras, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 57, 65 (1994) (discussing Kras, the law
after Kras, and the pilot program itself). However, despite the pilot programs, as the M.L.B. case
attests, Kras still appears to be good law.
63. Kras, 409 U.S. at 445.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 446.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 446-50.
68. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
69. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660-61 (additionally finding no equal protection violation).
70. Id. at 659-60.
71. Id. at 659.
72. Id. at 660 (quoting Kras, 409 U.S. at 446).
73. Id.
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had hearings. "" While the Court clearly performed a fundamental/non-
fundamental rights analysis on the asserted right, it is unclear why the
Court did not directly discuss its ruling on substantive due process
grounds.
Through Kras and Ortwein, the Court attempted to further clarify
the types of interests that would rise to the level of fundamental and de-
serve protection in court access inquiries.'5 What was clear by the time
these cases were decided, however, was that extending Griffin to civil
court fee waivers was the exception, not the rule. 6
II. M.L.B. v. S.LJ.
M.L.B. v. S.LJ. is the most recent case in the Griffin line. It demon-
strates the indeterminate undertow of Fourteenth Amendment in forma
pauperis doctrine. M.L.B. is particularly useful because the Court itself
acknowledges the confusion and unclear doctrine in this area.
A. Facts and Procedural History
Melissa L. Brooks (M.L.B.) and Sammy Lee James (S.L.J.)" had
two children, were married for approximately eight years, and were di-
vorced in 1992."8 Upon their divorce, Mr. James retained custody of the
children and Ms. Brooks provided child support payments and retained
visitation rights." Three months after the divorce' Mr. James married
J.P.L., and together they filed suit to terminate Ms. Brooks's parental
rights so that J.P.L. could legally adopt the children." At the center of the
dispute was whether Ms. Brooks had fulfilled her child support and visi-
tation obligations. 2
On December 14, 1994, the chancery court terminated the parental
rights of Ms. Brooks, stating that there had been a "'substantial erosion
of the relationship between the natural mother, [M.L.B.], and the minor
74. Id.
75. It has been noted that, "[allthough it is not clear how significant the 'fundamental' nature
of the marriage relationship was for the Boddie Court, the Kras and Ortwein opinions confirmed the
view that access challenges would be unsuccessful unless a fundamental right was involved." Aus-
tin, supra note 25, at 770-71. This view may be confirmed by the M.L.B. case itself where the ma-
jority, noting what appears to be a fundamental rights standard in the area of court access fees in-
quiries, stated, "[wle place this case within the framework established by our past decisions in this
area.... [W]e inspect the character and intensity of the interest at stake, on the one hand, and the
State's justification for its exaction, on the other." M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 566 (1996).
76. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 563-64. ("In sum, as Ortwein underscored, this Court has not ex-
tended Griffin to the broad array of civil cases.").
77. See Savage, supra note 1, at 40.
78. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 559.
79. Id.
80. Savage, supra note 1, at 40.




children."' 3 This erosion had been caused "'at least in part by [M.L.B.'s]
serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence or unreason-
able failure to visit or communicate with her minor children."' The
chancery court determined that Mr. James and J.P.L. "met their burden
of proof by 'clear and convincing evidence.""
Approximately one year later, Ms. Brooks appealed the ruling. '
While she was granted the right to appeal by Mississippi law, she had to
prepay transcript costs amounting to $2,352.36 to fully avail herself of
that right. As she was too poor to afford these costs, Ms. Brooks applied
for an appeal informa pauperis.' The Supreme Court of Mississippi de-
nied her application on the basis that a fee waiver in civil court was only
available at the trial level. Unable to pay the fees, Ms. Brooks was effec-
tively denied an appeal." Subsequently, Ms. Brooks filed a writ of certio-
rari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which the Court granted.'
B. Opinion for the Majority
The Court framed the issue presented by Ms. Brooks's appeal as
whether "a State, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment [may] condition appeals from trial
court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent's ability
to pay record preparation fees."' In response, the majority placed Griffin
and its progeny at the heart of its opinion. Justice Ginsburg utilized the
Griffin line of cases as the analytical starting point for the majority
opinion.'
Carefully dissecting the line of in forma pauperis decisions, the
Court underscored the importance of availing to the poor the right to
court access in situations where a fundamental interest is at stake.93 In
contrast, the Court juxtaposed the line of cases dealing with the non-
fundamental right of an indigent to counsel in certain proceedings.9 ' The
Court pointed out that while its decision in Gideon v. Wainwright " man-
83. Id. (quoting the chancery court's opinion in terminating the parental rights of M.L.B.).
84. Id. (quoting the chancery court's opinion).
85. Id. (quoting the chancery court's opinion).




90. Savage, supra note 1, at 40.
91. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct at 559.
92. Id. at 560-61.
93. Id. at 560-62. Justice Ginsburg illustrated this point with the juxtaposition of Mayer v. City
of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1989), pointing out that even at lesser levels of criminal liability culpabil-
ity the liberty interest at stake is equally as important as the interest involved at at higher level of
criminal culpability in court access cases. Id. at 561-62.
94. Id. at 562.
95. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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dates that an indigent be granted counsel if charged with a felony, Scott
v. Illinois97 indicates that this is not the case where conviction would not
result in imprisonment." With respect to appeals, the Court noted that
under Douglas v. California' the state must provide counsel if the indi-
gent will have to serve prison time and is appealing as a matter of right,'"
yet under Ross v. Mofitt °' no such obligation exists in a discretionary
appeal. 2
Justice Ginsburg then made the jump to the civil court extensions of
the Griffin doctrine, subsequently detailing Boddie."'3 Ginsburg quickly
noted Kras and Ortwein, and declared the extension of Griffin to civil
cases as the exception, not the rule.'" Despite this cautionary approach,
Justice Ginsburg set the stage for the analysis that was to follow, stating
that the Court treats "state controls or intrusions on family relation-
ships"" at a different level, implying that Ms. Brooks's case may be on
the level of Boddie.'" Ginsburg noted the importance the Court placed on
"[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children.""In
The majority highlighted the importance of the parent-child relationship
by detailing the parental rights termination cases of Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Services' and Santosky v. Kramer.'"
The Court then used a hybrid standard of due process and equal
protection analysis in its analysis of Ms. Brooks's predicament."' The
Court explained that
In the Court's Griffin-line cases, "[dlue process and equal protection
principles converge." The equal protection concern relates to the le-
gitimacy of fencing out would-be appellants based solely on their in-
ability to pay core costs .... The due process concern homes [sic] in
96. M.L.B., 117 S. CL at 562 (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339).
97. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
98. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 562 (citing Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74).
99. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
100. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct at 562 (citing Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357).
101. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
102. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 562 (citing Ross, 417 U.S. at 610,612,616-18).
103. Id. at 562.
104. Id. at 563-64.
105. Id. at 564.
106. Id. at 563-64.
107. Id. at 564.
108. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). In Lassiter, the Court essentially underscored the fundamental nature
of the parental right by noting that a parent has a right to "'companionship, care, custody and man-
agement of his or her children."' Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1972)).
109. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In Santosky, the Court again highlighted the primary importance of
such rights. The Court determined that due to the importance of the parental right and the severity of
its termination, a high degree of proof, under whatever allegations, would have to be proven before a





on the essential fairness of the state-orders proceedings anterior to
adverse state action."'
Justice Ginsburg still noted that while no clear combination test had been
devised, the Griffin cases "res[t] on an equal protection framework.""'2
The Court would weigh the "character and intensity of the individual
interest at stake"' 3 against the "[sitate's justification for its exaction.'""4
In its analysis, the Court determined that Ms. Brooks's parental in-
terest was quite important considering the impact of Mississippi's intru-
sion upon that right: the termination of her parental rights."' In contrast,
Mississippi's interest in requiring the payment of fees was financial,
which the Court felt was not nearly as great as Ms. Brooks's interest,
comparing the situation to that in Mayer."6
Continuing to separate this situation out of the bundle of civil cases,
the Court framed the equal protection argument. "[Slanctions... like the
Mississippi prescription here... are not merely disproportionate in im-
pact. Rather, they are wholly contingent on one's ability to pay, .. . they
apply to all indigents and do not reach anyone outside that class.""' 7 The
majority overruled the Mississippi Supreme Court after characterizing
(1) the state intrusion into the private interest as severe, (2) Ms. Brooks's
parental interest as fundamental to liberty, and (3) the state financial in-
terest as minor in comparison."8
C. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy stated that due process alone, not the Griffin-
inspired due process/equal protection analysis upon which the majority
relied, was a "sufficient basis" for the decision.' 9 He justified his posi-
tion by relying on Boddie, Lassiter, and Santosky. Kennedy stated that
these cases dealt with state intrusion into family rights and relations, and
were all decided on due process grounds.'"
D. Justice Thomas's Dissent'2'
Justice Thomas, while recognizing the importance of the interest
involved in Ms. Brooks's case, feared that the majority's rationale would
result in the unnecessary expansion of the fee waiver doctrine, further





116. Id. at 566-67.
117. Id. at 569.
118. Id. at 569-70.
119. Id. at 570 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120. Id.
121. Justice Scalia joined in full and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Part I only.
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burdening the states.'22 He also stated that "[tihe cases on which the ma-
jority relies were questionable when decided, and have, in my view been
undermined since. Even accepting those cases, however, I am of the view
that the majority takes them too far."'" Justice Thomas criticized the
majority's hybrid due process/equal protection analysis for being mis-
guided and confused. Thomas stated that this confused approach war-




Thomas determined that due process was afforded to Ms. Brooks
through her original hearing and that the due process requirement did not
require an appeal of such a hearing.' In regard to the equal protection
issue, he determined that Ms. Brooks, while disproportionally affected by
the Mississippi law, was afforded equal protection. This was because the
law treated all individuals equally and her inability to pay only prevented
her from availing herself of process that was "above and beyond" what
the Constitution demanded.
26
In Part II of his dissent, Justice Thomas declared that he would go
as far as overruling the Griffin line of cases, including Griffin itself."
Justice Thomas drew a sharp distinction between criminal and civil ac-
tions, arguing that the line of cases succeeding Griffin extended the fee
waiver principle to interests never contemplated by the Griffin Court. It
appears that Justice Thomas felt that a clear line could never be drawn
limiting the Griffin holding, as the lines between the criminal and civil
arenas are often unclear.' 28 As he stated, "I fear that the growth of Griffin
in the criminal area may be mirrored in the civil area."'"
111. ANALYSIS
Beginning with a theoretical exposition into reasons for the inherent
problems in the in forma pauperis doctrine, this analysis sets out three
premises. First, a heightened degree of doctrinal confusion exists in the
Court's in forma pauperis decisions. Second, this doctrinal indetermi-
nacy facilitates a judge's ability to justify any desired outcome. Third, as
such, current in forma pauperis doctrine, arguably designed to protect
indigents, could be used to deny that protection. Working from the un-
derstanding of this three-tiered problem, this analysis ultimately arrives
at a solution, a new equal protection test specifically designed for in
forma pauperis situations.
122. M.L.B., 117. Ct. at570.
123. Id. at 571.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 572.
126. Id. at 574-75.
127. Id. at 575.
128. Id. at 576-77.
129. id. at 577.
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A. Ms. Brooks's Court Access: What Doctrine?
In his M.L.B. dissent, Justice Thomas presented a valid and striking
point. The state of analysis in the majority's opinion is, to put it bluntly,
confused.'3° Justice Ginsburg herself drew attention to this jumbled
analysis, noting that while decisions in the informa pauperis area rest on
an equal protection framework, they also address due process concerns.'3'
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg admitted that "[a] 'precise rationale' has not
been composed . . . because cases of this order 'cannot be resolved by
resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis.""32 This rationalization
seems to be the best explanation the Court can present to explain the
unkempt doctrinal mess that is informa pauperis.
One can see from the doctrinal history the vivid inconsistency of the
Griffin line. Sometimes cases were decided on due process grounds (both
substantive and procedural), sometimes equal protection, and sometimes
both.'33 The test that the Court uses to analyze in forma pauperis is jum-
bled and unclear. One only has to look to Justice Kennedy's M.L.B. con-
currence to confirm the Court's confusion in this area. He treats due pro-
cess alone as the correct justification for the holding in the case, rather
than the majority's hybrid analysis.'34
While the M.L.B. majority certainly felt that it ruled justly by pro-
tecting a fundamentally important interest,'33 one cannot precisely deter-
mine how the majority reached that result. Such decisions only serve to
further confuse the concept of fundamental rights and the question of
130. See id. at 570-71 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued:
[C]arrying forward the ambiguity in the cases on which it relies, the majority does not
specify the source of relief it grants .... And while we are told that cases of this order
"cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis," the majority
nonetheless acknowledges that "most decisions in this area ... res[t] on an equal protec-
tion framework." It then purports to "place this case within the framework established by
our past decisions in this area." It is not clear to me whether the majority disavows any
due process support for its holding. (Despite the murky disclaimer, the majority discusses
numerous cases which squarely relied on due process considerations.)
Id. at 571 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666, 665 (1983)).
131. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
132. M.L.B., 117S. Ct. at 566 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) and Bearden,
461 U.S. at 666, respectively).
133. See supra notes 38-76 and accompanying text.
134. M.L.B., 117S. Ct.at570.
135. The majority stated:
[W]e have repeatedly noticed what sets parental status termination decrees apart from mine
run civil actions .... To recapitulate, termination decrees "wor[k] a unique kind of depriva-
tion." In contrast to matters modifiable at the parties' will or based on changed circumstances,
termination adjudications involve the awesome authority of the State "to destroy permanently
all legal recognition of the parental relationship."
Id. at 569-70 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981), and Rivera v.
Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 580 (1987), respectively).
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how those rights interplay with due process, equal protection, and the
Fourteenth Amendment in right to court access situations.'36
B. Problems in the Current State of In Forma Pauperis Analysis
In M.L.B., the right to proceed informa pauperis flows into the fun-
damental right of parenthood. This confluence brings the Court's analy-
sis into the area of overlap between substantive due process and equal
protection at the fundamental rights level. '37 As the Court duly notes,
"'[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge"""8 in Griffin-
line cases.'39
M.L.B. follows the typical in forma pauperis pattern. The unequal
treatment resulting from the court fee statute immediately implicates
equal protection concerns.' The denial of process brings into question
procedural due process.' The parental rights well up substantive due
process concerns yet at the same time permeate the heightened scrutiny
level of equal protection. True to form, due to this overlap the Court is
indecisive about which method of analysis to pursue.
What initially seems to be a quite innocuous confluence of two pre-
viously declared rights becomes something greater. M.L.B. stands as a
red flag. Informa pauperis doctrine, in conjunction with the protection it
affords indigents, is dangerously close to being pulled into the chaotic
undertow of politically motivated judicial decision making spawned by
indeterminate doctrine.
In informa pauperis analysis the doctrinal confusion itself is not the
entire problem. This confusion expands the avenues judges can follow in
their analyses. The right to proceed informa pauperis is sometimes a due
process issue, sometimes equal protection, and sometimes both. 2 In re-
ality, any combination or choice of these doctrinal analysis strands ef-
fectively leads to a justifiable solution, any justifiable solution. A dem-
onstration with the M.L.B. situation elucidates these possibilities.
136. See Austin, supra note 25. The article by Austin is a good analysis of this state of confu-
sion. As a solution to such confusion, Austin proposes a procedural due process method of analysis
based upon Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 371 (1971). Austin, supra note 25, at 779-80. See gener-
ally Fallon, supra note 34 (underscoring the state of confusion that exists in the totality of due proc-
ess doctrine and the problems that this confusion presents). Two of the problems that Fallon dis-
cusses go straight to the heart of the problems that crop up in M.L.B.: confusion in what substantive
due process doctrine tests to use and their application and what interests are protected by the Due
Process Clause. Id. at 312-13, 314-37.
137. See supra notes 12-37 and accompanying text.
138. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983)).
139. Id. at 565.
140. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
141. See Austin, supra note 25, at 773. Austin's article presents the argument that the proce-
dural due process model, while not the predominant model in analyzing court access fee cases, is a
better method than substantive due process at solving the access fee problem. See id. at 779-803.
142. See supra notes 38-76 and accompanying text.
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1. Holding for Ms. Brooks
A Justice could argue that Ms. Brooks's procedural due process
rights were denied; that she should have had an appeal hearing.' 3 As the
Court pointed out in Lassiter, Santosky, and M.L.B., fundamental human
nature encompasses the parent-child bond. This fundamentally human
relationship is congruent with the factors defining the liberty interests
previously protected by the Court through procedural due process.'"
Thus, the parent-child bond should be accorded a high level of proce-
dural protection. The state's fee requirement, as demonstrated by Ms.
Brooks's situation, carried an undue amount of risk that such rights
would erroneously be taken away. The result of the fee law in effect was
the final, point-of-no-return removal of Ms. Brooks's parental right. Fi-
nally, the state's interest in efficiency is quite minor and unimportant in
the face of the results, the termination of Ms. Brooks's parental rights.
A Justice could additionally argue that Ms. Brooks's substantive
due process rights were denied.'"" The primacy of the parent-child rela-
tionship again underscores the fundamental importance of such a familial
bond. Contrasting this fundamental importance with the similar under-
lying human importance of other rights of association already deemed
fundamental, a clear fundamental right to parenthood arises. Next, com-
pelling state interest analysis ensues. The fundamental parental right in-
volved trumps the state efficiency right.'"
Finally, a Justice can find for Ms. Brooks under equal protection
theory.' 7 Once the Justice establishes the fundamental right of parent-
hood, circumventing the need for suspect class status, the last step is the
same state interest inquiry made under substantive due process.
2. Holding for the State
Under procedural due process analysis, a Justice could validly hold
in favor of the State.'" The Justice could reason the parental interest at
the appeal stage as less important than it is at the stage of the initial
hearing. At the initial hearing, where the termination of parental rights
occurred, the specific private interest itself clashed with government pro-
cess. At the appeal stage, however, the private interest is the right to ap-
peal. The justification for the state is efficiency and fiscal health. The law
143. See supra note 14 for the Mathews procedural due process test applied in this scenario.
144, The Court has noted that "[liberty) denotes.. . the right of the individual to... establish a
home and bring up children." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
145. See supra notes 15-19 for the substantive due process test applied in this scenario.
146. The argument presented here is much like that of Justice Kennedy in his M.L.B. concur-
rence. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text; see also M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 570 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
147. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text for the equal protection test applied in this
scenario.
148. See supra note 14 for the Mathews procedural due process test applied in this scenario.
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facilitating this interest does exactly that, regulating entry into the courts,
and thus contributes to a more efficient court docket. Given the non-
fundamental nature of the right to appeal, the state's efficiency and eco-
nomic interests take precedence.
Under substantive due process, 1 9 a Justice could argue that parental
rights, while highly important, are not the rights at issue in this in forma
pauperis situation. The right in question is, rather, a free appeal in a civil
case. No fundamental right to appeal exists in civil cases. If no such right
exists, no fundamental right to a free appeal exists. This determination
brings the analysis under the rational relation test. Regulation of court
access falls under how a state regulates its own welfare. ° Thus, the
state's right to regulate its own courts trumps the individual's right to
court access. The statute attempts to place a limit on access to the appel-
late process through a monetary requirement. The results of such a re-
striction naturally further the legitimate constitutional power to regulate
state welfare.''
Finally, a Justice could validly advocate resolution for the state un-
der equal protection. "2 The Justice would essentially reiterate the sub-
stantive due process argument that no fundamental right is at issue. The
right implicated is, rather, the non-fundamental right to proceed in forma
pauperis in a civil appeal. The absence of a fundamental right reduces
the analysis to looking for a suspect classification by the statute. The
Court does not find classification based on wealth to be suspect. Again,
the court fee statute rationally relates to the state's efficiency and fiscal
policy interests.'
3. The Problem Stated
The method a Justice uses to resolve a particular in forma pauperis
case develops somewhat independently from the constitutional test she
chooses to apply. The doctrine as it stands does not sufficiently constrain
judicial discretion. The doctrine itself is not the determinative factor. The
determining factor in the end emanates from what right the Justice seeks
149. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text for the substantive due process test applied
in this scenario.
150. State court fees logically fit within the large police power of the state. The broad deference
to the state at this rational relation level is rooted within the infamous footnote four in United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
151. This argument is similar to that of Justice Thomas in the substantive due process part of
his M.L.B. dissent. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text; see also M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at
570-72 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text for the equal protection test applied in this
scenario.
153. This argument is similar to that of Justice Thomas in the equal protection part of his




to protect-the individual's or the state's. The differing opinions in
M.L.B. underscore this indeterminate reality. As Justice Ginsburg stated:
Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children
are among associational rights this Court has ranked as "of basic im-
portance in our society," rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disre-
spect ... M.L.B.'s case, involving the State's authority to sever per-
manently a parent-child bond, demands the close consideration the
Court has long required to when a family association so undeniably
important is at stake.1
54
Justice Thomas, however, used the same constitutional tests as the
majority to establish a right on behalf of the state, which he deemed more
important than any individual right to civil appeal. "The inevitable con-
sequence will be greater demands on the States to provide free assistance
to would-be appellants in all manner of civil cases involving interests
that cannot, based on the test established by the majority, be distin-
guished from the admittedly important interest at issue here.""'
In the final assessment, the constitutional "test" used in in forma
pauperis situations becomes a subjective means to an end, merely a tool.
The fungability of in forma pauperis doctrine poses the true problem.
Identifying doctrinal problems is, however, relatively easy. The follow-
ing pages address the more difficult endeavor of effectively solving these
problems.
Logic dictates that a more determinate doctrine would guarantee
more consistent results. Thus, a viable solution to the in forma pauperis
problem is the construction of an objective analytical structure around
the applicable clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A purely objective
superstructure of analysis will curtail the ability of a Justice to substitute
her own beliefs for constitutional analysis. While focussing on objectiv-
ity, a new and effective informa pauperis test must also capture the spirit
of the Fourteenth Amendment, protection from undue state regulation."6
Such is the paradoxical challenge that the next section of this Comment
confronts.
154. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 564 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971)).
155. Id. at570-71.
156. Drawing on this Comment's background, it is evident that the Fourteenth Amendment,
from its Magna Carta roots forward, protects the individual from the unjustified oppressive intrusion
of the state. Protecting the poor from some arbitrary court affordability cut-off flows with the famil-
iar goals of justice. Thus, in this manner it seems that the Court's current conception of in forma
pauperis flows with the driving spirit at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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C. Doctrine and Indeterminacy
Critical and Feminist Legal scholars argue that doctrine is extremely
subject to manipulation."' The critique that these scholars present, dem-
onstrated by the inexactness of in forma pauperis doctrine,' is often
described as the indeterminacy of law and doctrine.'59 The argument fol-
lows that a judge will unconsciously manipulate a doctrine in order to
arrive at the outcome she wishes. Consequently, any doctrine or law can
be manipulated by a judge to justify her determination in a case." In
addition, many of these theorists argue that, under what is commonly
called the critique of rights, any particular stance by a judge can be justi-
fied by a rights-based argument.'6'
The pure law and indeterminacy critique seems to suggest that one
doctrine is just as bad as multiple doctrines because any singular doctrine
suffers from indeterminacy. From a more pragmatic view, limiting a par-
ticular area of the law to just one doctrine does control some of the inde-
terminacy problem. The more varied the strands of doctrine in a particu-
lar area of the law, the more room and opportunity a judge has to be
subjective and make more rights-based arguments for an individual or
the state.
Thus, a judge faced with such a muddled area of the law as in forma
pauperis will have multiple avenues to make a rights-based argument for
157. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978) (demonstrating how a
rather radical law, one that was seen originally as championing the rights of powerless workers, was
indeterminate in a "doctrinal sense," and eventually was used by courts as a device to constrain the
limits of workers' bargaining power); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Fam-
ily, 18 MicH. J.L. REFoRM 835 (1985) (demonstrating the Critique of Rights in showing how a
perfectly valid rights-based argument could be made for any sort of state action or non-action in
domestic relations cases, either for or against state intervention, and that the idea of intervention
itself is indeterminate).
158. See supra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
159. J. Paul Oetken, Form and Substance in Critical Legal Studies, 100 YALE L.J. 2209, 2211
(1991). The indeterminacy of law and doctrine was first discussed and presented formally by the
legal realists of the early twentieth century. See generally John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From
Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy
Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84, 86-98 (1995) (delineating the history of the indeterminacy argument
from the legal realists through the process theorists towards the critical legal theorists).
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) is a far-reaching and non-homogenous body of thought. Critical
Legal Scholars differ across the spectrum in their approach to and degree of extremity in the appli-
cation of indeterminacy doctrine. For a better understanding of this universe of opinion and a thor-
ough listing of works on the foundations of CLS, see Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, A Bibliog-
raphy of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984).
160. See Richard Michael Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. MIAMi L.
REV. 505, 513-16 (1987) (describing the nuances of a sample indeterminacy of law and doctrine
argument).
161. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 593-97 (1986) (giving an in-depth formulation of all
aspects of the critique of rights).
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the indigent individual ("private" liberty rights) or for the State ("public"
court efficiency rights). This indeterminacy allows for many different
lines of justification to evolve, often contradicting each other though they
are rooted in the same doctrinal tree.
The following exercise in mathematical metaphor demonstrates this
Comment's understanding and approach to the indeterminacy critique.'62
Many proponents of the more extreme vision of doctrine and indetermi-
nacy believe that the problem lies within the existence of doctrine it-
self.'" For these advocates, any doctrine, no matter what its original in-
tention or prudent and descriptive wording, will be used by judges to
conform to any particular decision.' " Any doctrine in this extreme vision
can be symbolized by - (infinity), meaning that the doctrine has an infi-
nite realm of possible results. Infinity, simply put, encompasses every-
thing." This wholly "infinite" indeterminate aspect of doctrine thus be-
comes the inherent problem of doctrine."
The radical vision of doctrine and indeterminacy becomes quite
cumbersome when it comes time to construct a solution that results in a
more consistent application.'67 A slight variation of the metaphor presents
162. In a broader sense, the implications of mathematics on the indeterminacy argument have
been previously discussed within the scope of legal scholarship. The context of such discussion
focuses on the applicability of particular mathematical theories and proofs to potential indeterminacy
of language. Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1439, 1441
(1992). Brown and Greenberg ponder the avenues for obtaining a viable legal formalism through
mathematical inference. See generally id. (comparing formalism in both the legal and mathematical
communities and their corresponding indeterminacy).
163. See infra notes 166-67.
164. Id.
165. "The symbol '-,' represents a limitless quantity." BARRON'S DICIONARY OF
MATHEMATICS TERMS 167 (Douglas Downing ed., 2d ed. 1995).
166. The radical indeterminacy argument can be drawn out to absurd lengths. Taken to ex-
tremes, everything, anywhere in the universe, is entirely indeterminate because it can only be de-
fined relative to something else. That "something else" itself must be defined before it can be used in
relation to the original object, color, shape, etc., for definitional purposes. In torn, the "something
else" is defined in relation to another "something else," and so on, and so on ad nauseum. So every
term a judge uses in analysis is in the purest sense indeterminate. However, this Comment, as dis-
cussed in the proceeding text and footnotes, works from an understanding that some terms can be
defined with sufficient determinacy if placed in a quantifiable matrix. There is precedent for such
thinking. See Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82
CAL. L. REv. 509, 522-27. "One should not exaggerate the problem. If vagueness is generally in-
eliminable, it does not follow that it is irreducible in a given area, or with respect to a given speech
community. The most successful endeavors in this regard have involved the comparativization and
the quantification of descriptions." Id. at 525.
167. Guyora Binder articulates this position, noting that
If critical legal studies is to have a meaningful effect on an oppressive cultural system, it
must move beyond criticism. It must begin to imagine and build social situations that of-
fer people empowered identities. And if critical legal scholars hope to influence their stu-
dents, they must start thinking about how these situations ... can be fostered by lawyers.
Guyora Binder, Beyond Criticism, 55 U. C. L. REV. 888, 889-90 (1988). Binder sternly criticizes
the futility of radical critical legal studies and poses a practical solution of political action. Id. at 905-
14. Binder's solution is a direct response to the frustrating and unending circularity of the radical
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a more optimistic approach and, in the end, a more practical solution.
One must first admit that at its heart, doctrine is indeterminate. No matter
how much one fine-tunes a doctrine there still will be some potential for
subjective analysis by any particular judge. Yet, at the same time, if a
doctrine can be constructed in a well-defined manner, objective and
quantifiable in material terms, it minimizes the impact of indeterminacy.
In the mathematical metaphor, as per this adjustment in theory and
understanding, substitute n (pi) for - for a particular doctrine. T, the ex-
act ratio of the circumference to the diameter of any circle, is very well
defined.'" This ratio is the same for any circle in the universe. 9 Despite
the precise, well-defined, and consistent nature of t, the ratio itself is
indeterminate. ic is an irrational number, a number which has no last
digit; the decimal places carry out forever.'70 Despite this indeterminacy,
the ratio remains quite clear and definable, as the indeterminacy becomes
less drastic with the calculation of more decimal places. In very much the
same way, a highly defined doctrine, based on easily quantifiable objec-
tive criteria that are exact (not abstract ideas such as fundamental rights,
class status, etc.), can minimize the impact of subjective judicial inter-
pretation. Under this approach indeterminacy becomes manageable.'7'
critical legal studies conundrum. Hasnas presents the problem succinctly: "If by showing the law to
be indeterminate ... [Critical Legal Studies has] ... shown it to be an inherently political mecha-
nism by which dominant social groups illegitimately impose their ideological preferences upon
society, how can [Critical Legal Studies] advocate its use to produce the egalitarian society [CLS
theorists] favor?" Hasnas, supra note 159, at 101.
168. DAVID WELLS, THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF CURIOUS AND INTERESTING NUMBERS 48
(1987). Selecting n as a metaphor is not an arbitrary decision. it permeates the world that we live in
and holds a special place in mathematics. As Wells notes and demonstrates, the value of t crops up
in numerous mathematical solutions and the sums of numerous infinite series. Id. at 53. Simply put,
think of the beauty in a naturally occurring ratio, a ratio in an object that is real, observable, and
tangible, that is the same everywhere, that recurs throughout mathematics, that yet at the same time
has no exact value.
169. Id. at48.
170. An irrational number is "any real number that is not rational, and therefore any number
that cannot be written as a decimal that either terminates or repeats." Id. at 12.
171. Using a highly precise metaphor such as it might imply, on the surface at least, that law is
a science. The use of this analogy is not meant to imply that law is scientific and ultimately defin-
able. Obviously there are no absolute truths that can be distilled from the vast laboratory of judicial
opinions. It is precisely the critique of Critical Legal Studies (and legal realism before it) that such
truths do not exist. See supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text. The n metaphor implies a solu-
tion that works within the Critical Legal Studies matrix (the less radical version of the theory, more
along the lines of pragmatic Critical Race Theory or Feminist Legal Theory). The iT metaphor ac-
cepts the basic Critical Legal Studies critique of doctrinal indeterminacy. Yet, within that indetermi-
nacy the metaphor explores the possibilities for consistency of analysis. The metaphor thus becomes
a tool to show that law, while indeterminate and not necessarily scientific per se, can be consistent
and not arbitrary.
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D. Material Equal Protection
In forma pauperis analysis inevitably deals with concerns that im-
plicate equal protection. At the heart of all in forma pauperis situations is
an individual who is denied access to the courts when others are able to
gain such access. The law treats at least one person differently from the
larger societal group. As previously noted, the current equal protection
matrix poses a problem in that indigent individuals fighting for free ac-
cess to the courts do not comprise a suspect or semi-suspect class."
Without such status they must argue some fundamental rights violation
and face the indeterminate doctrine of that arena.
Any new structure of analysis must recognize and address the equal
protection nature of an in forma pauperis analysis and its overlap with
substantive due process at the fundamental rights level. A new test for in
forma pauperis analysis must incorporate equal protection and funda-
mental rights analysis in a single, separate, determinative test. The new
test must clarify and define rights through objective manifestations, not
through indeterminate terminology.
While it is true that "the Constitution does not provide judicial
remedies for every social and economic ill,' 7 the language of the Equal
Protection Clause itself provides judicial remedy for in forma pauperis
situations. The Equal Protection Clause reads, "[n]o state shall ... deny
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.""'
These words themselves are ample building material for a new constitu-
tional test that avoids the pitfalls that plague current in forma pauperis
analysis. The best way to gain an understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause for the purposes of in forma pauperis is to look at what charac-
terizes the Court's results in such cases.
In characterizing the results of in forma pauperis cases, a scholar
noted that
the conventional wisdom is that these cases can be reduced to two
propositions: first, waiver of access fees is required only if the right
sought to be enforced through the courts is fundamental, and second,
that waiver is required only when the courts provide the sole means
of vindicating that right.'76
172. See Austin, supra note 25, at 773-74. In reality the true root of the in forma pauperis
problem is the fact that the Court does not see classification based upon wealth as suspect. If the
Court did recognize such classification as suspect, an indigent seeking in forma pauperis status
would have no need to demonstrate a fundamental rights violation. With the absence of a funda-
mental rights discussion, the overlap between due process and equal protection would be moot.
Regardless, this Comment does not take issue with the Court's current construction of suspect class
status. Such discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment.
173. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
174. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32 (1973).
175. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
176. Austin, supra note 25, at 770.
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The Court, discussing its previous protection of individuals from
wealth-based discrimination, noted that "[t]he individuals... who con-
stituted the class discriminated against in our prior cases shared two dis-
tinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were com-
pletely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence,
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to
enjoy that benefit.""
In moving towards determinacy, the key to utilizing these charac-
terizations is removing the rights-based analysis (the root of the current
problems of indeterminacy) from consideration while still retaining the
Court's intention. Keeping this goal in mind, we turn to an interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause, informed at the most fundamental level
by the desired results of the Court.
The first key phrase in the Equal Protection Clause is "any person."
This phrase does not imply any need to prove suspect classification to
invoke such protection. Under these words the state need only deny one
specific individual the protections of the law. The other key phrase is
"equal protection of the laws." Simply interpreted, this means that all
individuals should be treated equally under the law. While at certain
times some legal avenues may be open to some and not others, a viola-
tion of "equal protection of the laws" encompasses a situation where a
law actually takes away all protection. Additionally, nowhere does the
Amendment provision discuss state interests. In light of these considera-
tions, this Comment creates a solution to the informa pauperis dilemma:
material equal protection. '
In its construction, material equal protection analysis takes direct
guidance from the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment, yet at the
same time eradicates the problems currently present in the muddled doc-
trine of in forma pauperis.9 Material equal protection focuses on the
material effect of a statute on the individual seeking relief. In this con-
text, a material effect could also be described as a substantive or objec-
tive effect. The material effect is the taking away of the only recourse
available to the individual to get out of the differential treatment situa-
tion. In this situation of differential treatment, the only remedy available
is one which only the court can grant.
177. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1,20(1973).
178. The solution and test presented in this article are designed only for use in in forma pau-
peris situations. However, there may very well be applications of such a solution outside the area of
informa pauperis in other equal protection cases.
179. Material equal protection was inspired by proposals for reforming equal protection analy-
sis in the area of maternity leave. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARAsSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN (1979); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986). Both Finley and MacKinnon
discuss methods of transcending the inherent male standards that women must compare themselves
to in order to gain either equal or special protection for maternity leave.
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Under material equal protection, a petitioning party will receive
protection by the court if she was denied the material legal protection
afforded to others. Class status and indeterminate fundamental rights
would never be discussed as they are incorporated into the material as-
pect of the analysis.'" In essence, this method focuses on any material
differences that the law creates. In the final calculation, the material
equal protection assessment of materiality is accomplished through two
yes/no questions: (1) Is the court access that the individual seeks access
that any other in society can gain under the statute?; (2) Does that indi-
vidual have any other recourse whatsoever to resolve his or her situation
other than the remedy that the court can grant?"' Under this test a yes
answer to the first question and a no answer in the second invoke equal
protection.
This two-pronged test effectively blocks the openings for indeter-
minate judicial decision-making. Both questions require a judge to make
an objective determination.'" The first question fixes its operation around
the words "any others." For example, if a statute states that an individual
must pay $2000 to gain an appeal it is obvious that some individuals will
be able to pay such fees. The answer to the first question is yes, others
can gain court access under the statute. Most of the time this answer will
be yes. In the interests of docket efficiency, these statutes are written
with the expectation that some people can pay, while others cannot. As
court access is commonly understood as bringing a grievance before the
court, the first question effectively limits the subjective determination
that a judge can make. The second question then becomes the key aspect
of the material equal protection test.
With respect to both questions in the material equal protection test,
the words themselves highly define and guide the decision-making proc-
ess. These words have common understandings and are placed into a
controlled environment: the construction of the test itself. The precise
and objective nature of the language makes a Justice look quite unrea-
sonable when she says something does not exist when it really does. In
other words, when a test forces a Justice to look for court access that
"any others" have and "any other recourse whatsoever," the analysis is
reduced to looking for factors that are objectively quantifiable.
The concern might be raised that material equal protection is too
narrowly constructed to adapt to changes over time. It is true that the
180. See infra Part III.E.
181. Of course, for any such recourse to be valid it must also be lawful.
182. It may be argued that despite its attempts at objectivity, material equal protection fails at
the gate in its use of terms. It is true, as the author has recognized, that all words are indeterminate in
exact meaning. This allegation could be made at the words "access" and "recourse," words that are
fundamental in the implementation of material equal protection. Yet, as already discussed, there are
some terms that do have some common understanding attached to them, some aspect of determinacy
that guides their usage. "Access" and "recourse" are two such words. See supra note 166.
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method of material equal protection analysis is constructed narrowly.
This construction creates consistency in analysis and results. The scope
of the analysis and the results, however, are quite broad. The material
equal protection test allows for adaptation as it has no prescription on
particular quantities, class status, levels of scrutiny, or protected rights.
The material effects of different laws may vary over time, yet the ramifi-
cations of that differential treatment remains a constant. The methods of
assessment are the same yes/no questions and the results are the same
type of results; the only difference being different situations, rights, and
issues.
An intriguing aspect of material equal protection is how the test
protects individual fundamental rights without mentioning them. As pre-
viously presented in this Comment, a practical critique of rights analysis
draws out the fundamental indeterminacy problem with current informa
pauperis doctrine.' 3 With the many avenues of resolution available to a
Justice, all dealing in some manner with a rights-based inquiry, a Justice
can validly justify a decision for the individual or the state. While the
Equal Protection Clause is often seen as protecting individual rights, by
actually bringing rights into the debate the door opens for the denial of
such rights. The best way to protect individual rights is to take the rights-
based decision away from the judge.
While never dealing with individual rights in a judicially determi-
native sense, material equal protection is inherently informed by the fact
circumstances attendant to such rights. Racial, ethnic, sexual orientation,
religious, and gender discrimination are often the bases for differential
treatment by laws. As these discriminatory implications inform the par-
ticular differential treatment under a law, a Justice answering yes to the
first question and no to the second implicitly upholds the rights that were
violated in the statute's operation, thus validating those individual rights.
Under this approach, a Justice who would rather not uphold certain indi-
vidual rights has no choice but to do so in the appropriate circumstances,
based upon the material and objective nature of the two yes/no material
equal protection questions.
Material equal protection, in sum, fits the model of the mathemati-
cal ratio of n. Material equal protection analysis is well-defined and
based on easily quantifiable, objective determinations, in the same man-
ner as the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter. Indeterminacy
still exists in the sense that the judge will make the ultimate decision, as
the n ratio is also indeterminate. The quantitative observations the judge
must make, however, minimize that indeterminacy.
It is important to note how material equal protection parallels the
Court's previous results, yet implements those results in a more determi-
183. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
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nate and objective manner. At a deeper level the emphasis on funda-
mental rights translates such that the more severe the threat to a funda-
mental right (such as in criminal convictions, parental terminations, etc.),
the less the possibility that there will exist some other recourse for the
individual to resolve the situation. As detailed previously, fundamental
rights are incorporated into material equal protection but in a more de-
terminate manner. A demonstration of this parallel relationship is pre-
sented in the next section: an application of material equal protection to
the Griffin line of informa pauperis cases.
E. Applying Material Equal Protection to In Forma Pauperis
This Comment does not disagree with the Court's holdings in the
Griffin line. It should be clear, however, that future decisions may retract
this line of protections. In response, material equal protection promises
consistent results in which judges cannot decide cases based upon politi-
cal leanings. The following section demonstrates the consistent applica-
bility of material equal protection to the Griffin line, including M.L.B.
The application of material equal protection to Ms. Brooks's situa-
tion results in the same outcome reached by the Court. The first question
in the analysis, whether the court access sought is available to at least
one individual in society is answered with a resounding yes. Quite obvi-
ously, at least one individual could pay the transcript costs. The second
inquiry, whether the individual has any other recourse whatsoever to
resolve her situation other than the remedy that the court can grant, is
answered with a definitive no. Ms. Brooks's attempt to re-obtain her
parental rights absolutely requires an appeal. The material result of the
Mississippi law is that Ms. Brooks has no method of appealing the pa-
rental rights termination while others faced with the same legal situation
could afford the court costs. No method other than a court determination
can alleviate the differential treatment. She will thus be able to proceed
informa pauperis. In material equal protection terminology, the law sub-
stantively treats her differently and materially affects her differently than
other citizens.
Under material equal protection the civil court limitations on the
Griffin line stand. In Kras,'" while others could gain the desired court
access under the statute (by paying the filing fee), other recourses to dis-
solve debt are available. This denial of bankruptcy proceedings does not
violate material equal protection because there is no material effect cre-
ated by such a law. As the Kras Court noted, many methods exist for a
debtor to resolve his debts, only one of which is filing for bankruptcy.'"
184. For a description of the case, see supra notes 58-67.
185. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973). There is evidence in the Kras decision
itself for the compatibility of material equality with the Equal Protection Clause. The Court stated
that, "[Kras's] position [would] not be materially altered in any constitutional sense." hL (emphasis
added).
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The law itself does not deny an individual the ability to resolve debt,
which is the material aspect of bankruptcy. In contrast, Ms. Brooks is
differentially affected in a material manner because she has no method
whatsoever to appeal the termination of her parental rights when others
can utilize that method as they can afford the costs.
Additionally, in Ortwein," material equal protection upholds the
law mandating filing fees for welfare appeals. Some individuals on wel-
fare will probably be able to pay for a welfare appeal filing fee, so the
answer to the first inquiry is yes. However, with respect to "any. other
recourse whatsoever," arguably other recourses do exist for these indi-
viduals to alleviate their impoverished situation, such as receiving private
charity or obtaining employment.' Thus the situation is similar to Kras,
in that other recourses exist for the individuals seeking relief. The answer
to the second question in turn is yes. Invocation of equal protection does
not occur. This result may seem anti-intuitive at first glance. The poor in
this situation however are not differentially treated in any material matter
as per material equal protection analysis. Simply put, this law does not
discriminate on the basis of wealth. While informa pauperis is designed
to protect the poor from having poverty itself be used as an obstacle to
the ultimate fair distribution of justice and treatment of rights, such pro-
tection is not invoked by the Ortwein fact pattern. In Ortwein, the law in
question deals obstensively with poverty itself. Such a law does not vio-
late equal protection. In contrast, a law violative of material equal pro-
tection discriminates on the basis of poverty.
Under material equal protection the holdings of the other major
cases in the Griffin line are also consistent. The Griffin and Mayer cases
both elicit the same results. Again, in response to the first question under
material equal protection, other people could pay the required court tran-
script fees and gain court access in a situation where the appellants could
not. No other recourse whatsoever exists for the Griffin and Mayer appli-
cants as their criminal convictions can only be overturned through an
appeal granted by the court." Both -cases, therefore, invoke equal protec-
tion. The Boddie case follows in kind."9 As the appellants have no other
way to legally end their marriage and others in society could afford to
legally end their own marriages, equal protection is invoked under the
two-question material equal protection test.
186. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
187. While this stance may be controversial, welfare is no longer an entitlement, nor an abso-
lute right. In essence, welfare is a safety net that is not the only method of fiscal recovery for the
individual. Compare welfare to the parental rights scenario in which no individual or body can grant
or terminate parental rights other than the court. See Personal Responsiblity and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 103, 401, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
188. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
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Material equal protection circumvents the discussion of suspect or
semi-suspect classifications, which represents a large stumbling block for
indigents in equal protection analysis. Rational or compelling state inter-
ests are never at issue. Additionally, and most importantly in cases such
as Ms. Brooks's, fundamental rights are involved only indirectly and in a
much more objective and determinate analysis structure." While mate-
rial equal protection disregards these considerations, its results are ex-
actly the same as the Griffin line decisions. Material equal protection
thus avoids the indeterminate pitfalls of current in forma pauperis analy-
sis while retaining the desired results embodied in the Griffin line. This
replacement analysis effectively reduces the indeterminacy in the doc-
trine to a controllable, manageable level. Without any meaningful level
of indeterminacy, Justices will not be able to abuse the doctrine set up to
protect indigents to the point to actually revoke such protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
M.L.B. undoubtedly was a victory for parental and individual fun-
damental rights. This victory must not, however, obscure the problems
that the M.L.B. decision portends for the future. The confused and inde-
terminate doctrine upon which the decision rests will eventually turn on
itself, each resulting strand of doctrine ending up on different sides of
future opinions. There is too much room at present for a Justice to ma-
190. Interestingly enough, as a sidelight, material equal protection brings the debate back to the
side argument of whether or not the court should follow an originalist interpretive pattern in assess-
ing the Constitution and its amendments. In fact, material equal protection poses a possibility for
harmonization of the originalist and non-originalist positions.
As is clear from the background of this Comment, a primarily fundamental rights non-
originalist approach has brought the doctrine this far to its climax in confusion. See supra notes 15-
16 and accompanying text. For some time, originalists, among them Justice Scalia, have been argu-
ing that such focus is incoherent, deviates from original constitutional intentions, and places too
much judge subjectivity in place of the constitution itself. Anders, supra note 16, at 904-05. Yet, at
present there exists no real originalist solution except to exercise judicial restraint, invalidate current
unenumerated fundamental rights, and frame constitutional interpretation in an original inteItion
framework. See id. at 903-12 (detailing Justice Scalia's originalist approach to constitutional analy-
sis).
Critical Legal Studies, the basic radical legal theory that is the impetus for much of the
author's vision, is looked upon by the mainstream legal community as something of a fringe rebel
group, described as "dangerous, potentially violent, and on at least one occasion as a form of 'guer-
rilla warfare."' Guyora Binder, On Critical Legal Studies as Guerrilla Warfare, 76 GEo. L.J. 1, 1
(1987) (quoting Critical Legal Times at Harvard, TIME, Nov. 18, 1985, at 87). Material equal pro-
tection creates no unenumerated rights, no suspect classes, and in the end works rather closely with
only the words given in the Fourteenth Amendment. The goals and roots of material equal protection
are rather progressive, yet the means by which these goals are achieved end up in a much more
conservative looking package. By no means is this idea alone in its basic approach. In a rather par-
allel way Professor Nancy Ehrenreich proposes embracing privatization as a means of implementing
progressive forms as privatization is a means "to use the master's tools to dismantle the master's
house." Nancy Ehrenreich, The Progressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 1235,
1238 (1996). Ehrenreich turns the logic of Audre Lorde's famous quote, "[t]he master's tools will
never dismantle the master's house" upon itself. See Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never
Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER OUrSIDER 112 (1984).
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nipulate a particular strand of doctrine to further a political agenda. The
very doctrine protecting the indigent inevitably will deny the indigent
protection from the oppressive monetary constraints of court access.
Recognizing such problems, yet realizing the possibility for a more
determinate solution, the Court must clarify in forma pauperis analysis.
Doctrinal application can be consistent, yet manageably indeterminate at
the same time. The common understanding of the determi-
nacy/indeterminacy quandary must move away from a futile critique and,
instead, reflect reality. The time has come, therefore, to envision doctrine
in the mathematical model of ir, not oo. Material equal protection, a clear
and objective means of analysis, achieves this goal. It also retains the
Court's important limitations on informa pauperis. While the indetermi-
nacy inherent in doctrine can never be fully eradicated, a solution based
upon easily quantifiable and objective factors minimizes the effects of
indeterminacy. Material equal protection enables the Court to limit sub-
jective judicial bias and move toward an objective standard of in forma
pauperis.
M.L.B. announces a glaring weakness in informa pauperis analysis.
The doctrinal sea of which M.L.B. is a part, while well intentioned, is
unpredictable under the surface. This undertow threatens the stability and
reliability of in forma pauperis doctrine. It is time to establish a determi-
nate flow of constitutional analysis protecting court access. Material
equal protection offers a stabilizing solution.
Eric K. Weingarten*
* Many individuals generously assisted and challenged the author. Notes and Comments
Editor Todd Ingram, University of Denver College of Law Professors Nancy Ehrenreich, Alan Chen,
and Julie Nice, Law Review editors Kent Kostka and Karla Robertson, and finally, the author's
father, Norman Weingarten.
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LAW REvIEwS AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP:
SOME COMMENTS
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN"
Law reviews are the primary outlet for legal scholars, and the law
review system is unique to legal education. People in other fields are
astonished when they learn about it; they can hardly believe their ears.
What, students decide which articles are worthy to be published? No peer
review? And the students chop the work of their professors to bits?
Amazing. And then they check every single footnote against the original
source? Completely loco. Can this really be the way it is?
Secretly, I share their astonishment; and I think the system is every
bit as crazy, in some ways, as they think it is. There is, in fact, quite a
literature of invective-professors and others railing against the law re-
views.' But it would be rude to make much of a point of all this. After
all, the reason I am writing these lines is because the University of Den-
ver asked me to contribute a few pages in honor of their law review and
its anniversary. A guest is not supposed to question the very existence of
his host. Besides, Denver is one of the few-the very few-schools that
takes law-and-society seriously, and its ethos and point of view no doubt
have an impact on its law review as well.
So, instead of carping and whining, I want to explore a few features
of the law review system, and speculate about their consequences. After
all, an institution so entrenched is bound to affect the very nature of legal
scholarship-both in formal senses (for example, the length of articles);
and in the substantive sense (what people write about). The medium may
* Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor, Stanford Law School. J.D., 1951; M.LL., 1953,
University of Chicago.
1. See, e.g., Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and
Tenure, 103 HARv. L. REv. 926 (1990); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
527 (1994); James Lindgren, Reforming the American Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1123 (1995);
Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Stident-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1131 (1995).
The literature goes back quite far--at least as far as the well-known article by Fred Rodell, Goodbye
to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REv. 38 (1937).
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not be the message, but it bends and refracts the kind of messages that
people are likely to send.
If you wanted to defend the system, you might begin by pointing out
that law reviews were not designed, originally, to serve as the primary
vehicle for legal scholarship. They were supposed to be training for stu-
dents. Students learn how to be careful and precise, how to edit, how to
handle (legal) language, and how to construct and critique (legal) argu-
ments. At the same time, the law review students form a kind of elite. In
the old days, their elite status was even more pronounced than it is now.
The best employers, hoping to skim off the cream, would hire only law
review editors. Law review was therefore an adjunct to the grading sys-
tem. For students, it could be an important rung on the ladder of success.
The students, of course, were producing work that was (or was supposed
to be) scholarly. Nonetheless, the prime goal of the review, originally,
was not scholarship as such, but getting training and practice for stu-
dents.
The law review, however, also became a prestige item for the
school, and in the course of time every school decided they had to have
one. The Harvard Law Review dates from the late 19th century. In 1900
only a handful of law schools had law reviews. Now they all do-well,
almost all. Many schools have two. A few have as many as five or six.
Harvard apparently has nine (or is it ten?). Berkeley has given birth to
eight; Tulane has six reviews, Notre Dame five, Temple four.' In almost
all schools, though, there is the law review; and the second or third jour-
nals are, well, second- or third-class citizens.
The net result, of course, is that there is a staggering number of law
reviews and subsidiary law reviews. According to one study, there were
326 of them in 1985.' There are now apparently over 400. This is another
unique aspect of the system: no other field has so many journals. There
are a lot more academic psychologists and economists than there are law
professors; but many fewer journals. Economists talk about the "big
five;" there are of course many journals for economists, not just five; but
most of the others fall far short by way of prestige. In law, there are doz-
ens and dozens of respectable, even prestigious law reviews. Not only
are there many, but the law reviews are getting fatter and fatter all the
time. Some of them publish eight issues or more a year. The Denver
University Law Review runs over 1,000 pages a year. That is nothing
special. Some journals, to be sure, publish fewer pages, but lots of them
publish more. The Harvard Law Review (Vol. 1 had a mere 408 pages)
2. Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace,
71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 615,638-39.
3. Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal
Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK
U. L. REv. 353, 363 (1996).
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runs to more than 2,000 pages. It is not alone. Vol. 95 of the Michigan
Law Review, for 1997, ran to 2,658 pages; and Vol. 70 of the Tulane Law
Review attained 2,749 pages. Can anybody read that much?
With all those pages at their disposal--one estimate is that there are
over 150,000 printed pages available annually, 150,000 hungry mouths
to feed 4 -the reviews can afford to print really long articles. No econo-
mist or psychologist could hope to place an article of 100 pages, or even
70 pages, in any leading journal. But very long articles are common in
law reviews--they are even completely normal. In 1985, the mean length
of law review articles, in a sample of reviews, was 41.83 pages.5 Fifty
pages is therefore nothing special. Seventy makes hardly a ripple. Ninety
and 100 page articles are easy to find. In Vol. 82 of the Virginia Law
Review, I came across an article that was 229 pages long, with 769 foot-
notes. Is this some sort of record? Not at all. One notable article, pub-
lished in 1987, was 491 pages long, swallowed up two whole issues of a
review, and contained 4,824 footnotes.
Law review editors are supposed to enforce tight, concise writing.
But in fact, legal scholarship suffers enormously from bloat. Very few
articles are tightly written. They might have tight sentences, but the piece
itself goes on and on. And on. Many articles have a kind of hopeless obe-
sity. They display absolutely everything the author has read on the sub-
ject, or related subjects, or subjects related to related subjects. The foot-
notes often almost crowd out the text. If there were only a handful of
journals, the typical article would have to be lean and spare. The authors
would be forced to get to the point immediately. As it is, if somebody
writes (say) an article on some small point of divorce or tax law or the
constitution, the author is likely to begin with 30 pages or more of intro-
ductory material. She will put the subject in context, discuss it histoii-
cally, mention (and perhaps critique) everything else written about it;
most of this stuff is wholly unnecessary to the modest point that comes
up after the reader (if there is one) wades through oceans of print. I say
30 pages; but I have seen articles with way, way more-huge, inflated
articles whose "introductions" were as long as the rest of the article; and
completely unnecessary.7
The law reviews have such a voracious appetite for material, that
anything can get published; and by that I mean anything. Published, that
is, somewhere. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, the competition to get into
the "better" law reviews is fierce and unremitting. A high-prestige law
4. Michael L. Closen & Robert J. Dzielak, The History and Influence of the Law Review
Institution, 30 AKRON L. REV. 15, 38 (1996).
5. Saks et al., supra note 3, at 366.
6. The article, mentioned in Lasson, supra note 1, at 937, is Arnold S. Jacobs, An Analysis of
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 207 (1987).
7. For a defense of this practice, see Wendy J. Gordon, Counter-Manifesto: Student-Edited
Reviews and the Intellectual Properties of Scholarship, 61 U. CI. L. REv. 541, 547-48 (1994).
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review will receive hundreds of manuscripts a year; and accept maybe
1% of these. According to one estimate, the top journals get as many as
1,200 annual submissions. This tremendous load is exaggerated by the
custom of multiple submissions. Our author will print out fifty copies of
her masterpiece, and send it off to fifty law reviews. If they all reject (or,
more likely, ignore) her, she will crank up the Xerox machine and send it
out to fifty more. You can't do that in journals that operate on the peer
review system. But on law reviews, manuscripts are read not by faculty
but by students, and nobody cares about wasting their time.
Thus the system of law reviews affects what appears in them in
some important structural ways. It encourages long, wordy articles
crammed with footnotes. (This custom is reinforced by, or reinforces, the
notion that young professors must write at least one long, complex,
densely annotated "tenure piece," and place it in a leading review.) The
footnotes, of course, get meticulously checked by the student editors and
editors-to-be. This relieves the author of some of the responsibility for
accuracy. Why bother, when the law review is going to check the foot-
notes, anyway? The law reviews also enforced a certain style of writing;
and they forced footnotes and sources into a rigid "blue book" strait-
jacket. The official law review style was dull and flat. All the blood was
drained out of it. Law review editors hated short, simple sentences. They
loved to string clauses together with words like "whereas" or "albeit."
They loved to say things like "assuming, arguendo, that . . ." They
committed many crimes against our mother tongue. To be fair, the
straitjacket has gotten a shade looser lately; first of all, the law reviews
have opened their doors to "narrative," and, whatever the failings of this
style, it is not usually boring. I also have the impression that at least some
authors of standard articles have learned to write decent English. But on
the whole, law review style-blight is still definitely there.
What about content? The influence of the law review system on the
nature of legal scholarship is much harder to show than the influence on
matters of structure, style, and form. But so pervasive a system is bound
to have some sort of impact, if we could only figure out what it is. One
thing is clear- the law reviews definitely have power-at least within the
academy. 9 If the editors of the Harvard Law Review accept an article by
young Smithers, a brand-new assistant professor at the University of
North Dakota Law School, they have definitely given his career a jump-
start. Poor Smithers-if he only knew what sorts of thing those editors
really dug!
8. Hibbitts, supra note 2, at 643. -
9. Do they influence the law itself? The work of judges? What legislators think? This is a
different and very difficult question. There may be some slight impact, but it is certainly hard to
show.
[Vol. 75:2
LAW REVIEWS AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
The editors would no doubt say, if asked, that what they like is
quality; but that is only partly true. They like quality, but they also like
articles that are relevant, trendy, with-it (whether they realize this fact or
not). Who sets the trends? It is, probably, a kind of reciprocal affair: the
law reviews print what appeals to the student editors, but what appeals to
the student editors is, in part at least, the result of what their professors
tell them is "in," or what excites the professors and gets radiated through
the classroom experience.
In any event, no matter how much some professors carp at them, the
reviews are here to stay. They cannot be replaced by peer-review jour-
nals: out of the question. Where would we find so many peers? There
are, in fact, a fair number of law-related journals that are peer-review
journals-the Law & Society Review, for example, or the Journal of Law
& Economics. There are likely to be more in the future. But I do not ex-
pect these journals to drive the law reviews out of business. Peer review,
anyway, is far from perfect. Professors are not angels, and they are not
unbiased. Most of them are former law review editors, after all. They can
be just as trendy as their students.' °
Ultimately, then, the problem is not really the law reviews: the
problem is legal scholarship itself-the subject matter that fills the law
reviews." I now turn briefly to this subject.
At the beginning of the century, legal scholarship fell for the most
part into three categories. There was doctrinal analysis-attempts to line
up cases, to put them into some kind of order, to explain how they related
to each other. There were critiques: the raw material was the same sort of
doctrinal analysis, but the writer criticized some cases, and praised cer-
tain other cases. On what basis did he do this? Legal logic, of the Lang-
dell sort; or some sort of vague appeal to social norms-statements that
such and such was the "better" rule, or the "more just" rule. The third
category consisted of casebooks and other teaching materials. These. do
not particularly relate to the law review, so I will pass this category by.
The aims of legal scholarship have changed over the years. Langdell
thought law was a "science." The job of the law teacher was to teach
students the principles of that science. Langdell himself put together a
casebook, but wrote almost nothing else. His followers were also case-
book editors; and they critiqued cases from the standpoint of what they
considered logic and legal principle. There was also a generation of great
treatise-writers-men like Williston, Corbin, and Wigmore. They
10. Hibbitts, supra note 2, at 653.
11. Much of the following is impressionistic. I am not aware of any actual study of the content
of law reviews in the 1990s. For an earlier study, see Lowell J. Noteboom & Timothy B. Walker,
Survey, The Law Review-Is It Meeting the Needs of the Legal Community?, 44 DENV. U. 426
(1967).
12. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1983).
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amassed enormous textbooks-works in many volumes, which were
supposed to be definitive and exhaustive statements of the law on some
subject. There were great differences between, say, Williston (very
Langdellian), and Corbin (more of a realist); but they were writing in the
same genre nonetheless. These men became leading "authorities" in their
fields, and were at the pinnacle of the teaching profession. They were
concerned exclusively with appellate case law, with putting it into some
kind of order, and separating wheat from chaff.
Legal scholarship today is different, much more complex, and in
many ways totally anarchic. The older forms of scholarship no longer
command the same respect (the casebook might be a partial exception).
Doctrinal analysis is still "the staple commodity, even in the reviews
edited at fancy schools,"'3 but it definitely has rivals which vie for atten-
tion at these "fancy schools" and at others as well. Faculty members have
gone off in a dozen directions at once-law and economics, law and so-
ciety, critical approaches, feminist approaches, approaches out of history,
philosophy, psychology, even literary studies. It would be rash to say that
there is no hierarchy any longer. Constitutional theory still seems to be
king of the jungle. But the lines are most definitely blurred.
Much legal writing, however, is still quite normative. 14 It still asks
the question, what is the right rule, the good rule, or the right or good
institution? And the most popular currents in legal scholarship all try to
answer this question, in one way or another. The different strands of
scholarship simply use different techniques and criteria. Many legal
economists, for example, have done nothing more than to take the old
questions, only giving them new answers. What is the more efficient rule
or institution? They apply their techniques to doctrine in torts, property
law, contracts, bankruptcy, and so on. That the critical literature is, well,
critical, goes without saying. It too is concerned with what is right and
what is wrong. The critical writers do not always know what the right
arrangement is, but they are certainly keen on spotting and unmasking
the wrong ones. The leading specialists in constitutional law-the theo-
rists--also write in a heavily normative way. They try to construct a
13. Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the 'Middle Ground,' 91 MIcH. L. REv. 2075,
2100 (1993). Gordon's article is part of a symposium of comments on Harry T. Edward, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34
(1992), an article which, among other things, attacked the law schools (and law reviews) for turning
away from scholarship that was useful to the profession. Among the many interesting comments, see
Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1921 (1993).
14. Edward L. Rubin, indeed, claims that the
entire point of standard legal scholarship is to explore and contrast the pragmatic
implications of conflicting normative positions . .. . The most promising discourse for
standard legal scholarship... is not the vaguely articulated neo-formalism of the courts,
but prescriptive arguments based on consciously acknowledged normative positions.
Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1835, 1893
(1988).
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system of postulates or guidelines which would let us know which cases
the Supreme Court decided correctly; and which it did not.
I do not want to exaggerate. Nor do I want to say that these currents
of scholarship have no value. They most certainly do-some more than
others, of course. And the recent "schools" of thought cannot and should
not be treated as if they were monoliths. Terms like "feminist jurispru-
dence" are pretty big tents; they cover a wide area, and all sorts of differ-
ent tendencies and points of view huddle under them.
Still, those of us (like myself) who consider ourselves members of
the law and society movement are apt to deplore the strong and almost
exclusively normative flavor of legal scholarship. Perhaps it would be
better to say we are disappointed with how little influence we have in the
legal academy; how sad we are that the parade seems to be passing us
by.15
Normativity in legal scholarship means that most of the social sci-
ences get short-changed. The exception is economics; but even here, the
"economics" of law and economics tends not to be, with honorable ex-
ceptions, data-driven, empirical economics; it is pretty theoretical, and
pretty normative, as I have already mentioned. Legal history is in some-
what better shape. It has a growing literature; and it is genuinely popular
with students, at many law schools. And many, many of these schools in
fact offer course-work in legal history. Very few schools, on the other
hand, offer courses in law and society.
My impression is that, nonetheless, far too many law professors
really have no idea what legal history is all about; and the same goes for
work in the law and society tradition. This kind of scholarship is quite
foreign to them. My evidence is mostly anecdotal, I have to admit. But it
is based on my own experience; and the experience of colleagues. I hear,
over and over again, colleagues dismissing work in history and empirical
social science as "merely descriptive." They say that the work lacks
"theory." I have heard this, for example, in conversations with professors
who ask me my opinion of some young law teacher, struggling to get
tenure. Yes, they say, this is an extensive piece of work; but isn't it
"merely descriptive?" I never hear "descriptive" without the word
"merely" attached. And "descriptive" is obviously something bad in it-
self. Other young scholars have told me that they are expected to forget
the "law and" stuff; if they want tenure, they have to write a major "le-
gal" piece, and get placed in one of the better law reviews. I know of one
case where a promising junior scholar put aside his massive, significant
historical study for years, while he ground out "law review articles" to
qualify for tenure. Maybe he was overreacting to a chance comment here
and there. Maybe he misread the situation. But even this is significant. I
15. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REv. 763 (1986).
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am sure these young scholars cannot be totally wrong, and totally para-
noid.
In legal scholarship, "theory" is king. But people who talk about le-
gal "theory" have a strange idea of what "theory" means. In most fields,
a theory has to be testable; it is a hypothesis, a prediction, and therefore
subject to proof. When legal scholars use the word "theory," they seem
to mean (most of the time) something they consider deep, original, and
completely untestable. History almost by definition lacks theory. Empiri-
cal studies, too, are not theoretical-they are, of course, "merely de-
scriptive."
So the caravan moves on without us. I don't want to be too pessi-
mistic, however. Somehow, and in the face of obstacles, the law and so-
ciety movement does lurch forward. It does better outside the law
schools than inside. Legal history has done well inside law schools. Both
of these fields do not have to rely on law reviews; they have their own
journals-peer review journals at that. The law reviews, however, are
dominated by the powerful, normative schools of thought that struggle
with each other, debate each other, and fill up thousands of pages every
year. For most legal scholars, the law reviews are legal scholarship; and
nothing else (except case-books) is worth considering as such.16
Will the situation change? The law review system is here to stay, as
far as I can tell. What the reviews print is another story. They will con-
tinue to mirror what happens in the law schools. It is very unlikely that
the law school world will kick its habit of normativity; almost impossible
for what I consider real scholarship to become the dominant form in law
schools. Perhaps there is no real alternative. Still, a few more recruits
would be welcome in the club.
In general, law schools all sing the same song, and pursue the same
goals. There are some honorable exceptions. Wisconsin, Denver, and
Berkeley are schools that take seriously the job of relating law to the
society in which it is imbedded. Scholarship that looks with a keen, rig-
orous eye at legal process; scholarship that is not afraid of exploring re-
ality; scholarship that straddles disciplines, and draws inspiration from
the social sciences--this kind of scholarship is nurtured at these few
schools, and sporadically at others. The work that scholars do at these
schools spills over into the law reviews, of course. This work is like rain
in the desert. Like rain in the desert, however, it is all too rare.
16. Hence when the Chicago-Kent Law Review did a survey of "faculty scholarship," they
limited the survey to articles published in the top twenty journals. They did not count the peer review
journals; and they did not count books, book chapters, and so on. Janet M. Gumn, Chicago-Kent
Law Review Faculty Scholarship Survey, 66 Cn.-KENT L. REv. 509 (1990). The survey covered the
period 1983-1988. Almost everything I wrote in that period (for example), would not have been
counted.
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ODYSSEY: FROM ABORTION TO SUSTAINABILITY
RICHARD D. LAMM*
I came back from a trip to India in the mid-1960s believing passion-
ately that the world was at war with its own fertility. There is something
compelling about spending time in a country like India, which is geo-
graphically smaller than the United States, but has four times as many
people. It made me question for the first time what America's demo-
graphic future was going to be, and whether it was amenable to public
policy. Was demography destiny or a public policy choice? America was
then, and still is, the fastest growing developed country in the world, and
I started to ask whether this was an asset or a liability.
Public policy can be thought of as the constant redefinition of the
unacceptable. Public policy is often born when what has been accepted
(as status quo or misfortune) is seen as an amenable injustice. Much
public policy is finally deciding that a factor previously "given" is unac-
ceptable and can, after all, be changed through human action. Yester-
day's inevitabilities become today's public policy choices.
At one time, people thought whether they lived or died was "God's
will." My grandmother was old at fifty and said God "blessed" her with
nine children. Slowly, humankind learned that to a great extent health
can be improved by public policy. Similarly, the number of children a
woman had was thought to be beyond human control, but an impressive
number of women (and men) pioneers showed the world that women can
have control over their fertility. Must not the countries of the world soon
decide that public policy can, through laws on women's rights, birth
control, abortion, and immigration have a large impact of their demo-
graphic future? Has the future demography of a country become a new
issue to be discussed and subject to public policy influence?
It seemed to me at the time, and more strongly now, that the world
needs a whole new concept of thinking about population growth,
* Professor, Center for Public Policy & Contemporary Issues, University of Denver, Denver,
Colorado. Governor of Colorado, 1975-1987; Professor of Law, University of Denver College of
Law, 1969-1973. B.S., Colorado State University, 1950; LL.B., University of Colorado, 1952;
LL.M., Yale, 1954.
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sustainability, and fertility. This, of course, goes against some of our
most atavistic human feelings. But that notwithstanding, humankind has
to recognize that the pro-natalistic policies are obsolete. The "multiply
and replenish the earth" culture needed for a harsh world where human
survival was in doubt has become obsolete.
I began to ask: Why would a nation in the late 20th Century want to
double its size? Are additional people really a national asset? How could
the world sustain a doubling in size and then another doubling? Believ-
ing, ultimately, that the world must stabilize its population and that
sooner was better than later, I embarked on a whole new odyssey that
would deeply impact my life and career.'
In 1966, I was elected to the Colorado State Legislature. Public
policy is a front row seat on how new pressures change old laws and
mores, and how the "felt necessities" of a given time grow, develop and
cause change. The public changes its mind slowly, one step at a time. I
have been lucky enough to have a front row seat on this process for the
last 35 years, and the University of Denver College of Law has played an
important role in my odyssey.
When I was in college, there were parts of the United States where
married couples' use of birth control was illegal; i.e., Griswold vs. Con-
necticut.2 There was a feeling of revulsion in Connecticut, Massachusetts,
and other states that law would intrude into the private lives of people,
especially married people. Clearly, here was a law that was a hangover
from our pro-natalistic and puritan past, and one which attempted to im-
pose a particular religious view on the general public. In the first case to
find privacy rights, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Connecticut's
anti-birth control law as unconstitutional
When I took office in the Colorado Legislature in 1967, I was ap-
proached by a group of women who principally represented the nascent
and emerging women's rights movement. There were others in the group
who did not know what the "women's rights" movement was, but saw
abortion as a public health problem which was not being handled cor-
rectly. Most sought more control over their lives, particularly their bod-
ies. I was reluctant to get involved in a subject so controversial, feeling it
was a fool's errand for a freshman legislator; but, as I listened, I became
increasingly intrigued. Perhaps the public had moved on this subject
much more than was generally recognized. Was this an issue whose time
had come?
1. See Richard D. Lammn, The Reproductive Revolution, 56 A.B.A. J. 41 (1970) (arguing that
the threat of overpopulation and unrestricted growth mandates legislative and legal steps to restrict
human fertility).
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. Id.
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At that time abortion was not only illegal, it was a taboo and a word
not said in polite company. While most religions accepted abortion in
some circumstances, principally to save the life of the mother or to save
her from great bodily harm, few people discussed the issue publicly and
very few legal abortions were done in the United States prior to 1967. On
the other hand, some estimates put the number of illegal abortions at one
million.'
I cautiously started sounding out to other legislators, and kept get-
ting encouragement. At this point, I needed a sample bill to show my
colleagues. Shortly before that time, I was the President of the Denver
Young Democrats. Susan Barnes had been a officer in the organization
and was now enrolled in University of Denver's College of Law. I called
her, and serendipitously she enrolled in a legislation class where she
agreed to do a draft of a liberalized abortion bill as her class project. The
planets were starting to align.
Public opinion on abortion had changed-changed dramatically in
the 1960s. There seemed to be a number of reasons for this. One was the
increasing publicity given to illegal abortion and the toll it took on the
health of American women. Additionally, people were starting to argue
that women from the beginning of time sought abortions no matter what
the law said or what the general public thought of the practice. Many
people had come to the understanding that for all practical purposes the
law could not say "if"--only "where" abortions were performed. A pre-
scient few were comparing abortion to the language in Griswold v. Con-
necticut. They asked if there were not "penumbras" of privacy where the
law could not and should not intrude. A fissure was opening up between
the law's demand and the public's attitude toward those demands.
However, the main underlying policy reason deep in the back of my
mind was: Is there any justification to force unwilling women to have
unwanted babies? Attitudes had changed, partly in response to a new
awareness of women's rights and partly because a new birth was no
longer seen as an automatic asset that helped to keep the community go-
ing. What public policy purpose was served in a crowded world to de-
mand a woman carry every pregnancy to term?
I started to carefully talk to other legislators and was surprised at
how receptive they were. Soon, I had an active Republican in the House,
Carl Gustafson, and in the Senate, John Bermingham, who had already
done so much good work carrying family planning bills. We put on a full
court press quietly contacting the legislators one at a time. By the time
we introduced the bill, we had a majority in both houses in favor of a bill
which would have made abortion legal if the physical or mental health of
4. See CYNTHIA GORNEY, ARTICLES OF FAITH: A FRONTLINE HISTORY OF THE ABORTION
WARS 23-25 (1998); Mark A. Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past: Pre-Roe Abortion Law in Action,
I VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 309, 315 (1994).
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the mother was at risk, if there was a substantial chance of fetal deform-
ity, or if the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest. The bill engen-
dered massive debate but passed both houses, and was signed into law by
a courageous Governor, John Love (himself a University of Denver
College of Law graduate). We were shell-shocked. A University of Den-
ver College of Law project in this, the most controversial of areas, had
become law!
I spent considerable time over the next few years helping other
states shepherd change to their abortion laws. I testified in a large num-
ber of states about the "Colorado Experience," but was there as a witness
mainly because I was a living example of someone who had touched
political fire and survived.
Then, in 1969, I was elected to the leadership of the legislature and
accepted an invitation from Dean Bob Yegge to join the faculty with a
special emphasis on the student practice program. Bob Yegge's role in
brilliantly responding to the student activism of the time with intelligence
and understanding has not been adequately told. It was a study in how
you maintain institutions in times of turmoil by strong leadership, flexi-
bility, and by leaking off some of the pressure. Dean Yegge had (and
has) that wonderful combination of vision, toughness, honesty, and flexi-
bility so important in a law school dean.
As Director of the Student Practice program, I sued-challenging
the constitutionality of the law that I myself was the chief sponsor. Many
University of Denver law students volunteered to work on the brief. We
argued a wide variety of constitutional objections, but our suit was made
moot a year later by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade!
A revolution was in progress. The political landscape was com-
pletely altered. During the late 1960s, change could not come fast
enough. The women's movement, the civil rights movement, the war-
we were in a period of galloping change.
In the areas of family planning and abortion, it was almost like some
cosmic burden of proof had been shifted from "Why?" to "Why not?"
The previously unthinkable had become the widely accepted. In a
crowded world filled with poverty and disease, one which was rapidly
changing the roles of women, was there any valid reason to force un-
willing women to have unwanted children? Most Americans do not be-
lieve, and most religions do not teach, that a fetus is the moral equivalent
to a child. The issue is still unresolved in many minds, but Colorado's
experience has essentially been duplicated by countries all over the
world.
5. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
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PLANNING AND POPULATION
In 1970, I was on the faculty of the University of Denver College of
Law and a state legislator when I became interested in land use planning
and the growth issue. With the help of some wonderful students and my
very able assistant, Howard Gelt, we drafted laws which I would intro-
duce in the legislature and wrote articles stating the case for state and
local control over land use planning and legal justifications for zoning.
Again, the law students played a great role, and some of them would
come with me to the legislative hearings. I had begun to think not only of
sprawl and poor planning, but of the whole question of state growth and
development. What policies would preserve the assets of Colorado that
had attracted me so powerfully when I first moved here?
I became increasingly convinced that new residents to a state or
community caused an increase in state and local taxes largely because
the cost of the new roads, schools, water, sewers was greater than the
new taxes paid by the new residents. We were on a treadmill that would
increase our taxes and decrease our quality of life.
Proving this was difficult. One of the biggest, but most satisfying,
projects of my University of Denver years was our attempt to quantify
the total costs of growth. We collected statistics on schools, highways,
hospitals, water and storm sewer systems, recreation facilities, etc., and
did one of the first studies on the costs of growth. While this will always
remain an inexact science, we clearly showed that a few people profited
from growth (builders, landowners, etc.), but the rest of the citizenry
subsidized that profit. Growth clearly generates more demand for taxes
than it creates in new taxes as subsequent studies confirm.'
OLYMPICS
As the only certified public accountant (CPA) in the Colorado leg-
islature in the early 1970s, I was chair of the Legislative Audit Commit-
tee when Denver won the bid to host the 1976 Winter Olympics and
turned to the state for financial assistance. Denver's bid for the 1976
Winter Olympics had the almost unanimous backing of the state's politi-
cal and economic elite, and broad support from the Colorado public. As
chairman of the Legislative Audit Committee, I started looking at the
Denver organizers' estimates of revenue and expenses. It was less than
confidence inspiring.
The Olympic Organizing Committee, under a short time line to get
the bid ready for the International Olympic Committee (IOC) had, of
necessity, to prepare rough estimates of the costs and benefits of the
Olympics for the United States Olympic Committee and IOC. More
6. See Joe Mount, Reprieving the Debt, 27 URB. LAW. 605, 611 (1995) (noting that economic
growth creates additional demand for tax-dependent services, and arguing that growth without re-
sponsible fiscal management can result in budget deficits).
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telling, the history of previous Winter Olympics was written in red ink,
with host cities like Shappiro, Japan or Montreal, Canada suffering what
appeared to be billion dollar deficits. Many host cities and countries
found the deficit figure so large that the country hid the exact total from
the public.
It soon became apparent that Denver's plan for Olympic funding
made the State of Colorado the default funder for the 1976 Winter
Olympics. Whatever the Denver Organizing Committee could not raise,
or the Federal Government would not contribute, the State of Colorado
had a moral, if not legal, obligation to fund. Where the national govern-
ments funded most previous Winter Olympics, here in Colorado we had
only a population of 2.5 million to spread the cost. This small population
tax base would be left responsible for any deficits, and a large deficit
seemed not only possible, but probable.
In law, it is always important to understand the context of events
and decisions. Today's population watches the Olympics on television
and they are impressed. The Olympics are a magnificent event and, fi-
nancially, the Olympic deficits have moderated due in part by the in-
creased television Olympic revenues and the fact that the IOC has be-
come more flexible with their demands on the facilities. But, in the
1970s, we were facing a sea of red ink.
At first, our efforts were ignored. My deputy, Howard Gelt, who
was the heart and soul of the University of Denver Student Practice Pro-
gram, started to get involved in my lonely battle. A young University of
Denver law student, John Parr, volunteered to go with Howard Gelt to
the IOC meeting in Japan to present our case against Denver's bid for the
1976 Winter Olympics. We audaciously asked the IOC to cancel Den-
ver's award of the 1976 Winter Olympics. We raised some money from a
growing concerned crowd of Coloradans who were starting to have sec-
ond thoughts about this event. Howard Gelt and John Parr traveled to
Japan where they did a terrific job in making the case to withdraw Den-
ver's Olympic designation. At one point in Tokyo, the Executive Com-
mittee of the IOC made a decision to withdraw the Olympic award, but a
few emergency meetings reinstated Denver's bid. Tempers were rising,
the sides were hardening, and the stakes were rising. Out of this obscure
office at the University of Denver College of Law, a revolution was
forming.
I was visited, often in my University of Denver office, by delega-
tions of Olympic supporters to try to persuade me to withdraw my objec-
tions and, additionally, was told that this issue would end my political
career. We continued forward. More and more University of Denver stu-
dents joined our efforts.
A courageous and honest newspaper editor, Michael Howard, of the
Rocky Mountain News, though an Olympic supporter himself, had the
[Vol. 75:2
ODYSSEY: FROM ABORTION TO SUSTAINABILITY
integrity to take an objective look at the Denver Olympics issue. He
asked the type of hard questions that our small group of opponents was
asking. The result was a series of articles in the Rocky Mountain News
setting forth the organizers' mistakes and looking at the real costs of the
Winter Olympics. While the Denver Post did puff pieces about the
Olympics, Mike Howard and his reporters followed high journalistic
standards and even got the Olympic organizers to admit that they "lied a
bit" in getting the Olympic bid. The spotlight of publicity was starting to
outline and shine on both the good and the bad.
We soon started a petition drive to amend the Colorado Constitution
to prohibit any additional state funding for the Winter Olympics. Riding
both the fear of cost overruns, and the new concern about growth along
with the fine articles by the Rocky Mountain News, we fielded an army of
volunteers. Soon, the proposed constitutional amendment to deny state
funding was on to the ballot.
The rest is history. Buie Seawell, now a professor at University of
Denver's Business School, hosted a widely watched debate on Channel 6
where I debated some of the supporters amidst a rash of continuing bad
stories on the proposed sites, planning, and costs. At the same time, we
argued. Why spend millions of dollars to "promote Colorado" (the main
justification for our bid) when we were already among the fastest grow-
ing states in the Union? Why did we want to attract more people? To the
Chamber of Commerce this was heresy, but the people of Colorado
overwhelmingly voted to stop any state funding of the Olympics in No-
vember 1972. Time Magazine ran a picture of our victory party where
our volunteers were lifting me to the ceiling of our headquarters and
yelling "the next Governor of Colorado." I had never really considered it
because I was so controversial-but it sounded pleasing to the ear-and I
get ahead of my story.
IMMIGRATION
Ever since my visit to India, I was intrigued with the relationship
between population and the law. When I was appointed to the faculty at
the University of Denver College of Law in 1969, I developed and taught
a course on "Population and the Law" with the great help of a brilliant
law student (and now a brilliant lawyer), Howard Holme. While devel-
oping this course at University of Denver, I started to become interested
in the antagonizing question of immigration. It was, after all, an inescap-
able part of the growth issue.
As we were developing the course, the Commission on Population
Growth and the American Future (the Rockefeller Commission) reported
to President Nixon:
We have looked for, and have not found, any continuing economic
argument for continued population growth. The health of our country
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does not depend on it, nor does the vitality of business, nor the wel-
fare of the average person.
These words made immense sense to me. To borrow the words of Pro-
fessor Al Bartlett at the University of Colorado, "What U.S. problem is
made better by more people?"
It soon became clear to me that immigration patterns would largely
dictate the kind of America in which our children and grandchildren will
inherit. It continues to be an issue with me today as I try to articulate the
non-xenophobic reasons to limit immigration. I co-authored a book in
1984, The Immigration Time Bomb,' which started to make the case
against continuing high levels of immigration-but the seeds were
planted in planning that course.
We are presently headed, but for immigration, for a stable U.S.
population. The average American woman has 2.1 children in her life-
time-a number which would stabilize the U.S. population by the year
2040 at approximately 305 million Americans. Whether we grow to 400
million or 500 million Americans, or even a billion Americans, depends
almost entirely on immigration. Today, 24.5 million people (approxi-
mately one out of every eleven people living in the United States) were
born in another country. We have doubled the foreign-born population in
the U.S. since 1970.'
What are the public policy reasons for immigration? The United
States was a large and mostly empty continent for hundreds of years, but
suddenly people were recognizing that we are no longer an empty conti-
nent. The days when an immigrant could take a plow to empty land and
create wealth were over. We now live in a cash/wage society, where it
takes massive amounts of capital to make a worker productive; and per-
haps more importantly, we now had a welfare state where the govern-
ment provided a safety net. Times had changed; policy and thinking
about immigration had not.
I soon came to believe that mass immigration is a policy which has
outlived its usefulness. Yet, past successes of various immigrant groups
prevents us from fully considering whether it continues to make demo-
graphic sense. Our society must look at the long-term domestic impacts
7. See COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE, RESEARCH
REPORTS 1, DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF POPULATION GROWTH (C. Westoff & R.
Parke, Jr. eds., 1972).
8. RICHARD D. LAMM & GARY IMMOFF, THE IMMIGRATION TIME BOMB: THE FRAGMENTING
OF AMERICA (1985); see also LEON F. BOUvIER & LINDSEY GRANT, How MANY AMERICANS?
POPULATION, IMMIGRATION AND THE ENvIRoNmENT (1994). For additional work by the author on
population growth and sustainability, see Richard D. Lamm & Steven A.G. Davison, The Legal
Control of Population Growth and Distribution in a Quality Environment: The Land Use Alterna-
tives, 49 DENY. L.J. 1 (1972).
9. THE 1998 WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 382 (1997).
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of immigration and answer some hard questions. It is not enough to
quote some words written on the Statute of Liberty by a New York
schoolgirl. We must ask: What benefits to the U.S. would be gained by
additional large scale immigration?
Do we really want America to grow from our present 260 million to
400 or 500 million? Who will benefit and who will pay? Will it make
America a better place to live?
In 1957, I was stationed by the U.S. Army in Colorado. The state
was a paradise. Denver's air was so clean that it seemed like small dia-
mond shavings glittered in suspension. There were approximately 1.5
million people living in Colorado. It was while developing my course on
"Population and the Law" that I started to ask: What is Colorado's
demographic future? What was America's demographic future?
In 1790, the first U.S. Census found 4 million Europeans living in
America. The U.S. has since had six doublings of our population in our
very short 200-year history (to 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 million).' It
dawned on me that just two more doublings would give us more people
in the United States then they currently have in India. Why would a na-
tion want such a scenario? To whose benefit?
The United States is no longer an empty continent that can absorb
endless pools of labor. We are a society that requires tens of thousands of
dollars in capital to create a job. We have large numbers of unemployed
and underemployed. It is time to close down the age of immigration. It
has served us well in the past. It does not make public policy sense for
the future.
Today, nations and regions are increasingly looking at other aspects
of growth. For the first time, they are asking questions about their demo-
graphic destiny. As an example, fear of excessive growth, crime, gangs,
congestion, pollution, foreign immigrants, earthquakes, fires, and a re-
duced quality of life are the most frequently cited reasons for leaving
California. Likewise, excessive growth is a major issue in most parts of
the U.S. The Clinton Administration's muddled immigration policy is
contributing to the uneasiness and changing attitudes. On his recent trip
to Mexico and Central America, the President decried illegal immigra-
tion, but seemed to shrink from any major steps to deport illegal aliens or
refugees overstaying their welcome.
Perhaps the most common reason given for additional population
growth is the claim that it is good for the economy. At the risk of treating
lightly what is a complex subject, it is important to point out the fastest
growing per capita incomes are in countries with the lowest rates of
population growth. Conversely, the lowest (or negative) rates of per cap-
10. Id. at 376-81.
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ita income growth are in countries with the highest population growth."
Clearly, there is a significant difference between population growth and
economic growth.
Not all members of a region (or country) experience the same eco-
nomic impact from a growing population. Large landowners and those
involved in real estate benefit disproportionately. The benefit to the aver-
age person is more problematic. Japan, for instance, has set a policy of
increasing the per capita wealth of its existing citizens. Its public policy
since World War II has been to slow population growth dramatically.
The Japanese go to great lengths to eliminate low-skilled jobs by auto-
mation, and try to move the workforce into higher value-added jobs.'2
With 120 million people on an island the size of Montana, they want a
high quality workforce-not an endlessly growing population. They
want to train their own people. The wealth of a country has much more
to do with the education level and skills of its population than the size of
its population.
It has been said the hardest challenge to public policy is to change a
policy that has been successful. Immigration has, in the past, been good
for America. A world that has always promoted population growth is
now moving to stabilize the same growth. Both, at a world and a regional
level, people are thinking the unthinkable, questioning the unquestion-
able, and reforming the previously unalterable.
THE LOST NOTEBOOK
During my second term as Governor of Colorado (1978-1982), at
my urging, the Department of Local Affairs looked at how state policy
could better balance population growth in Colorado. Of Colorado's sixty-
three counties, over twenty of them had a larger population in 1900 than
they had in 1970. Colorado and the nation were suffering twin-related
problems: urban sprawl and rural decline. Why not work on both prob-
lems at once, and try to find state policies that could revitalize rural
Colorado and, at the same time, take at least some pressure off the urban
areas. Setting forth policies thought to accomplish these twin goals, we
issued what we unwisely called the "Human Settlement Policy."'" The
legislature exploded in furry of protest. My administration was called on
to defend its actions.
While at the University of Denver College of Law, I kept a number
of notebooks on a number of different subjects, including one on this
vexing question of public policy initiatives that could influence where
11. Id. at 737-76, 785-837.
12. See Steven C. Earl, The Need for an American Industrial Policy, 1993 B.Y.U. L.'REv.
765,788 (1993).
13. Neil Westergaard, Lamm Faces Challenge of Obscurity, DENVER POST, Jan. 12, 1987, at
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and how people settled. It had extensive notes justifying and supporting
what we were trying to accomplish. Smugly, I went home to the Gover-
nor's Mansion to defend my administration. No notebook. None of my
good quotes, none of my research showing that this was a subject a num-
ber of nations and leaders were addressing.
Being Governor is like drinking out of a fire hydrant. It can, as they
say, be a twenty-four hour a day job, and it comes at you from early
morning to evening. The phone is always ringing; there are always peo-
ple to see. You divide the day into hundreds of small parts. No more time
for quiet contemplation; it is constantly in your face-and the gover-
nor/professor was without his research. No one in my Department of
Local Affairs could duplicate the work I had done on such short notice,
and I did not have a minute to reconstruct the research. My "Human Set-
tlement Policy" not only went down in flames, but it went down without
an adequate defense in its behalf.
Fast forward to a week in 1986. We were preparing to move out of
the Governor's Mansion after twelve years. There is a Parkinson's Law
to living in a twenty-seven room mansion where "stuff accumulates to fit
into the space available." There were endless hours of packing, sorting,
deciding what to give to the Colorado State Historical Society when,
behind a row of books, was my notebook! Oh, how useful it would have
been. Belatedly, let me justify my misnamed "Human Settlement Pol-
icy."
It was all there. All the material I could have used. President Nixon
in his 1970 State of the Union message supported this concept strongly.
He spoke of the emptying out of rural America on the one hand, and on
the other the problem of violent cities. He also thought we could alleviate
both problems by trying to use government to develop rural America.
Just pouring more and more people into already overcrowded cities is
not the way to build a better country...so our goal is for balanced
growth in America, and a key is the program to revitalize the Ameri-
can countryside.'
He continued:
Where are those 100 million going? You cannot pour them into New
York, into Los Angeles, into Chicago, and the rest, and choke those
cities to death with smog and crimes and all the rest of what comes
with overpopulation. This is one nation. and for the good of all
Americans, we need one national policy of balanced growth.'5
14. PRESIDENT RIcHARD M. NIXON, STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS (Jan. 22, 1970), reprinted
in relevant part in COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrr', ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrry: FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1970).
15. Id.
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The notebook had the citation to the 1968 Republican Party Platform
language stating: "Success with urban problems in fact requires accel-
eration of rural development in order to stem the flow of people from the
countryside to the city.' 6 This would have been incredibly useful.
Similarly, the 1968 Democratic Party Platform promised: "Balanced
growth is essential for America...to achieve the balanced growth, we
must greatly increase the growth of the rural non-farm economy."'" More
grist for the mill.
The National Governor's Conference of 1968 passed a bipartisan
resolution stating that "population imbalance is the core of nearly every
major social problem facing the nation today," and urged policies to
bring out a "more even distribution of population among states."'8
Additionally, I had page after page of language which could have
helped justify our efforts. Example:
Cities have been building and rural communities emptying for a long
time in the United States and every other advanced country. Mecha-
nization of agriculture released manpower from the land. Most rural
countries had reached their population peaks decades before, as early
as 1850 in some cases. Commonly, by the end of the century, nearly
half the counties in the nation, while most all of them rural, lost
population in the 1940s, and about the same number in the 1950s.' 9
It was all there. It was all too late. Would it have made a difference?
Probably not. My generation has become much more skeptical about the
ability of government policy to counter market forces, and I now know
of the numerous failures in other parts of the country and world to ac-
complish the goal of balancing population growth. However, the differ-
ence between a spirited defense, and total defeat can be as simple as a
lost notebook. The moral of this story is that you have some gold in your
notebooks and on your computer. Keep it handy.
SUSTAINABILTY
No trees grow to the sky, and geometry tells us that no growth rate
is ultimately sustainable. Sustainability is an idea whose time has come,
but it will be a difficult birth. As Bronowski says in The Ascent of Man:
"In every age, there is a new way of looking at and asserting the coher-
16. REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITrEE, THE REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 1968 16 (1968).
17. See DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM OF 1968, in 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1972,
(Donald B. Johnson & Kirk H. Porter eds., 5th ed. 1975).
18. 1968 NATIONAL GoVERNOR'S CONFERENCE, RESOLUTION 2(1968).
19. Id. at 17; see also 116 CONG. REc. 31,607 (1970) (stating congressional findings in the
proposed Agricultural Act of 1970 regarding population migration from rural to urban areas).
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ence of the world."2 I am now trying to think of the public policy impli-
cations of such a sustainable world.
We need a whole new paradigm around which to organize our civi-
lization. Our economic and demographic thinking is unsustainable. This
renders obsolete many of our political and social institutions and much of
our ethical tradition. We must ask what is the cumulative impact of how
we live and what we consume. The next age of humanity will be the age
of sustainability where we recognize we cannot have infinite growth in a
finite world. There is an old Aztec saying: "The frog does not drink up
the pond in which he lives."
Sustainability is a new way of looking at the world. It tries to see
our place in the ecological whole. It tries to recognize the cumulative
impact of 6 billion people (or 3.5 million Coloradans), and the economy
they produce on the natural world. I believe our current trends to be un-
sustainable. You cannot have an economic system that does not sustain
the biosystem. You cannot have religious or ethical principles that con-
flict with the natural world. All human systems inevitably exist subject to
the biosystem, and we need to increasingly give thought to a sustainable
world economy, a sustainable population, and a sustainable Colorado.
It has been said by others that "nature bats last" and, ultimately,
ecology trumps economics and the environment trumps the economy. I
increasingly believe neither population growth nor economic growth is
sustainable and that sustainability will eventually replace growth as an
organizing paradigm. We cannot have a religious tradition, or an econ-
omy or even an ethical code that is inconsistent with the biosphere.
It is not only our ecosystem warning us that it is under stress. Our
biodiversity is shrinking, our fisheries are in decline, our biotic world is
in decline, our oceans are warming, our topsoil erodes, and our water
tables fall. Mammals, birds, reptiles, and even our nearest relatives, the
primates, are declining in numbers. These, to my mind, are not unrelated
events. They go the heart of a new view of the world.
CONCLUSION
In a document entitled, "Warning to Humanity," over half of the
living Nobel laureates in the sciences added their names to a list of over
1,600 senior scientists, which stated:
We, the undersigned senior members of the world's scientific com-
munity, hereby warn all humanity of what lies ahead. A great change
in our stewardship of the earth and the life on it is required if vast
20. 1. BRONOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 20(1973).
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human misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is
not to be irretrievably mutilated.'
They went on to state: "Human beings and the natural world are on a
collision course... that may so alter the living world that it will be un-
able to sustain life in the manner that we know it.
2 2
I reached a painful conclusion during my years at the University of
Denver College of Law that our human-centered use of the earth, even
our human-centered ethics, was not sustainable. I'am willing to admit
that I may be wrong, but at least I am in good company.
ADDENDUM: RICHARD LAMM'S NEW RULES OF PUBLIC POLICY
As a final thought to reflect upon where my personal odyssey has
led, I share twelve rules of public policy. They reflect my years of legis-
lative, executive, and academic experience.
(1) The New Deal's social insurance was wise public policy, but it
is unsustainable. It has become demographically obsolete. We
must get America prepared to run a nation of 50 Floridas, with
twice the percentage of elderly as in the recent past. Defending
the status quo in Medicare, Social Security and Medicaid is like
defending your snowman in the spring. It is just a matter of
time.
(2) The dreams of the 1960s cannot be funded with the economy of
the 1990s. Being in government and having to balance a budget
is like sleeping with a blanket that is too short. Needs exceed
resources; projected costs exceed projected revenues.
(3) Everything we do in public policy prevents us from doing
something else. You cannot say "yes" without also saying "no"
somewhere else.
(4) Public policy is, thus, faced with a series of choices to which
there is not an answer without some political sacrifice and pain.
Yet, America has no tradition of making hard choices. In the
future on many issues, we must choose between the unaccept-
able and the unpalatable. Politics faces what unions call "give-
backs." It will be a time of testing for democracy.
(5) Yesterday's solutions are often today's problems. Deficit
spending, for example, has turned from an asset to a liability.
My generation has accumulated more "future taxation without
representation" than King George III.
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(6) We cannot buy justice for today by encumbering tomorrow.
Both political parties are guilty of "credit card" compassion. To
be compassionate, you must pay for it yourself-not put it on
your children's credit card. We have to be concerned about be-
ing both good neighbors and good ancestors.
(7) There are no public policy reasons for blindly transferring re-
sources from the young to the old.
(8) The price of compassion is restriction. If we are to provide
health care to all Americans, we cannot afford to pay for every
available procedure for every person, and we will be forced to
set priorities. The sooner we admit that all societies ration
medicine, the better will be our national health.
(9) Immigration clearly has been shown to negatively affect our
own poor. A nation has its first duty to its own poor.
(10) U.S. public policy cannot solve its pressing problems within the
existing political dialogue. America is not only not solving
many important problems, but we are not even debating them.
(11) The best short-term politics is often the worst long-term public
policy. We face a time of testing-whether a democracy can
downsize expectations.
(12) The above rules cannot be accomplished within the existing
political system. The Republicans do not see the value in gov-
ernment and the Democrats do not see the limitations. Neither
can act responsibly without massive self-inflicted pain. We
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Not too long ago a lawyer was called to testify in my court as an
expert on attorney fees. As he was reciting the litany of his qualifica-
tions, he said, "I completed my legal education at the (XYZ) law school
in 1985." As I listened to the rudderless rhetoric of his testimony, I con-
cluded that his was indeed a correct assessment of his intellectual prog-
ress. Unlike the young writer in Thomas Wolfe's Look Homeward,
Angel' who said that following his college days he was commencing to
begin to start to write, the hapless pettifogger in my courtroom had added
a whole new dimension to the concept of hubris. I had the impression
that he would expect even the gods on Olympus to listen to him with rapt
awe.
I should probably add that it is very tempting to sit on the federal
bench and identify oneself with divinity. It is an occupational hazard that
is not always corrected even by reversals from a court of second conjec-
ture.
A major event, such as this graduation, is similar in at least one way
to the prospect of being hanged; it works wonderfully to concentrate the
mind.2 It suggests to me some points and observations I want to share
with you as you commence to begin to start your life in the law.
First, as my friend Peter Baird wrote to his son, who was about to be
sworn in to the State Bar of Arizona, "Do no harm!"3 I pass Peter's wise
* Senior Judge, United States District Court, District of Colorado; Adjunct Professor of
Law, University of Denver College of Law; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Colorado
School of Law. B.A., University of Colorado, 1958; J.D., University of Denver College of Law,
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University Law Review), 1959-1960.
1. THOMAS WOLFE, LOOK HOMEWARD, ANGEL (1957).
2. JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON L.L.D. (1952).
3. Peter D. Baird, A Lawyer's Letter to His Son, LMG., Summer 1997, at 59,59.
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words on to you: Bear in mind that you have considerable power and that
it should only be used with wisdom and compassion. Among others, you
wield the power to destroy with a complaint or a motion what it took a
lifetime or even generations to build. You will obtain information in
transactions that if divulged improperly could result in disaster-not only
for your client, but for you, your associates, and the public as well.
Very soon, after attending to that pesky little instrument of torture
called a bar exam, you will take an oath that will bind you for life. In-
cluded in that oath is the provision that you will abstain from all offen-
sive personality, and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputa-
tion of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which you are charged.
It is a curious irony that the three years of intensive training you
have just completed have had little to do with the awesome responsibility
of determining what, if anything, is required by justice. You have been
taught to know or learn what is required by law and your professors have
poignantly insisted during your studies that resort to a bleating cry for
justice is not an acceptable excuse for sloppy analysis. But what is the
justice of the cause with which you will be charged?
Whether consciously or unconsciously, our jurisprudence has been
carried for the last hundred and fifty years or so on the assumption that
law consists of an autonomous body of legal rules. By identifying the
source, in terms of precedent, it is supposed that most, if not all, legal
disputes can be resolved by testing the facts presented against that
source. It follows from an acceptance of this process that the function of
law is essentially not one of doing justice, but of determining, without
reference to political or general morality, what result the rule revealed by
the test yields in a particular dispute.
Sophisticated positivists acknowledge that there are areas of law in
which this test does not yield a conclusive answer and that in these inter-
stitial areas of uncertainty disputes may be resolved according to moral
or other extralegal precepts. Lawyers, however, are trained to maintain a
sharp line between law and morals and, by relegating the disputed areas
of law to the outer periphery, to reduce to the vanishing point the areas of
law in which good and bad can be considered relevant. Unfortunately,
lawyers and judges become habituated by this process to present what
are essentially morally based decisions as the products of a mechanical,
value neutral process.
One result we bring upon ourselves by couching our thoughts in this
mechanistic garb is the proliferation of lawyer jokes. These jokes dem-
onstrate that people believe in justice and use a sort of "gallows humor"
to point out how often the law and lawyers miss the mark in achieving it.
[Vol. 75:2
UNLESS REQUIRED BY JUSTICE
Another result is that what happens to people caught up in legal
disputes seems neither good nor bad; it's just what happens. This is such
a stunning concept that in recent years some vulgarians have felt it nec-
essary to display their understanding of it with automobile bumper stick-
ers attesting to the belief that this or that happens.
The illusion is that lawyers and judges have no justice function.
Indeed, almost the only group of people who are suspicious about the
concept of justice, who get very skittish even using the term, are those
trained in the law to be advocates, teachers and judges.
This view that we have no justice function is clearly wrong. To say
that we have an obligation to be amoral, to say that we should blindly
apply legal rules, without determining whether a pragmatic application
accomplishes justice, is to view law as a series of valueless computa-
tions.
The positivist notion that law is some sort of science is a canard
which has already received more than its fair share of attention. Many
years ago, Karl Llewellyn, a great legal educator and something of a
positivist himself, said with a choice phrase well worth remembering,
that in any case "doubtful enough to make litigation respectable," there
are at least two authoritative premises between which the court must
choose. I suggest to you that the only basis on which such choices can be
made is to decide what is just. Given the positivist training implicit in
your law school experience, you must now embark on a lifetime journey
to discovery just that: What is just?
In 1954, Professor Lon L. Fuller described the challenge in these
words:
The prevention of indecencies in the use of ... power must depend
ultimately on the pressures of public opinion, particularly the opinion
of the legal profession. This opinion can be effective only if it is in-
formed by a sound philosophy. It cannot be so informed when it ac-
cepts a view that treats ... power as a brute datum and refuses to ex-
amine the rational and moral grounds of its justification and accep-
tance.4
To that I wish to add that there is nothing sacred about earlier decisions
and there is no need to treat them as holy writ.
More to the point, the human condition is demonstrated in the lives
of the people you will represent, those you will oppose, and those with
whom you will work. The enduring conditions of those caught in the
extremities of experience will compel your attention for the rest of your
lives. That is precisely what you are trained to do: To guide people away
from or through, if necessary, the exceptional circumstances of life.
4. Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 465
(1954).
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You will live with injustice all of your life. It is an ineluctable ele-
ment of the human condition. The problem, of course, is how to live with
it and the greatest sin for you, once you take that oath, is indifference to
it.
You must recognize the suffering of those who are subjected to in-
justice. To understand this, put yourself in their position. You will sense
that whatever you undertake and do well-even excellently---the sense
of admiration and envy derived from success will be to no avail. Behind
every triumph or feeling of joy lurks the gnawing belief that it can be
taken away, that it will be taken away and that you will be left in a vortex
of emptiness and self-alienation.
To suffer from injustice is to live with the unspeakable horror that
no matter what you do or try to do, there are those to whom your life has
no importance or value. More to the point, there will be those who will
insist that you recognize that your life has no importance. Injustice will
come to the fore whenever the illusion of equality is shattered, whenever
rules are applied differently for one than for another, whenever false
statements are made with utter disregard for the truth, and whenever in-
tent is bereft of compassion.
Justice, insofar as I understand it, is a safe harbor, a place of respite
where the lingering sense of injustice, of deprivation, in the fullest sense
of the word, is not tolerated, where the unsuspected and unchartered
value of every human being is recognized. All else is vanity.
The legal profession exists, not to perform valueless computations,
but to provide order in a living society where otherwise there is madness,
to afford dignity where otherwise there is degradation, and to express our
highest aspirations where otherwise there would be despair.
As Primo Levi, the Italian writer and eventual victim of the Holo-
caust once charged, it is the duty of righteous people to make war on all
undeserved privilege, but one must not forget that this is a war without
end.' If for no other reason, this war without end means that as alumni
you have a continuing obligation to support this institution so that it can
prepare others to follow in your footsteps just as others have supported it
to prepare you.
We lawyers are not the only people responsible for maintaining a
free and just society, but certainly it will never exist without our constant
commitment to do justice in every circumstance. That is the cause with
which we are charged. In its pursuit I wish all of us well-and be careful
out there.
5. PRiMo LEvI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED (1988).
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Denver University Law Review's 75th Anniversary
ARE LAW SCHOOLS SHORT-CHANGING THEIR STUDENTS?
RICHARD M. KOON*
When I was asked to write an article in connection with the Denver
University Law Review's 75th anniversary, I was both honored and hum-
bled ("humbled" sounds better than "surprised"). When I found out for-
mer Governor John Love, former Governor Dick Lamm, and former and
present Dean Bob Yegge had been accorded a similar honor, I immedi-
ately had a vision of one of those entrance exam questions where you are
given four geometric shapes or four words and asked to identify the one
that does not fit with the other three. I felt like the answer to just such a
question! Nonetheless, this seemed to be the perfect forum to air some
questions that had been floating around in my mind about law schools
and legal education. Why now, and what is the connection with the Uni-
versity of Denver College of Law?
Just what should law schools be doing, and are they doing it?
Should they be the keepers of professorial legal intellects who chum out
reams of articles on esoteric legal issues (the "Publishing Professors'
Mission")? Should they provide some legal background to students who
will have a good chance to pass the bar exam and, sometime after
graduation, be turned into practicing lawyers through the efforts of
"teachers" outside the law school (the "Middle Ground Mission")? Or
should they be preparing their tuition-paying constituencies to, upon
graduation, hit the ground running as at least semi-functional lawyers
(the "Ready-to-Work Mission")?
Three possible law school "mission statements," and no one in their
right mind would suggest we could get a consensus opinion on what is
the correct mission. However, if we asked the students, clearly the
oddsmakers would install the Ready-to-Work Mission as the prohibitive
favorite. There are all of those student loans to repay, not to mention
mouths to feed. Law students want to be as marketable as possible upon
graduation. The fact that they studied under professors who are prolific
publishers is not going to help. The fact that they learned to "think like a
* Partner, Holland & Hart, LLC, Denver, Colorado. B.S., Colorado State University, 1963;
J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1966; Editor-in-Chief, Denver Law Journal, 1965-1966.
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lawyer," passed the bar, and are ready to be trained, is not enough. Their
prospective employers want to hire someone who is as ready as possible
to step up to the plate. Granted, we all continue to learn and get better at
what we do with each experience, but employers want to polish or ele-
vate skills, not teach them in the first instance.
Are law schools paying attention to their students? Recent statistics
would suggest not. According to a recent study of approximately 900 law
firms, the ratio of lateral hires to entry level hires has increased by
slightly more than 50% between 1994 and 1996.' While that may be
good news to practicing attorneys, it is anything but good news to law
school graduates. Since a lateral will command a higher salary than a
new graduate, there must be some reason other than economics for this.
But, wait a minute, it is economics. Law firms and other employers want,
to the largest extent possible, immediate help with their work loads. They
want to hire someone who can fill a role on the "team" formed to meet
the needs of a particular client or particular matter. Those teams do not
have a position designated for "the clueless beginner." Clearly, a first or
second year lawyer is not expected to be able to make the contribution of
a partner level lawyer, but they are expected to be able to contribute. If
they have never drafted an agreement, never participated in a closing,
never prepared an opinion letter, then they are a "drain," not a contribu-
tor. The job market for "drains" is going down the you-know-what.
Every business must listen to its "customers" if it is to succeed. And just
who are the law schools' customers? Once again, a consensus answer is
unlikely, but I submit that the largest customer block of every law school
is made up of its students and their potential employers (this is where the
alumni come in). This is also where the University of Denver College of
Law comes in. Through the years, one attribute that has set the College
of Law apart from its brethren, and particularly from that "other" Colo-
rado law school, has been its leadership in developing programs to pro-
vide practical experience for its students. Sounds good, but the fact is,
the College of Law has earned its reputation largely on its litigation
practice programs. It is time for the College of Law to fly its leadership
colors and show the way by developing quality transactional practice
programs.
Enough negativism. What should law schools do if they decide to
listen to their customers and adopt the Ready to Work Mission? They
need to establish practice courses where students learn, and get to experi-
ence (that is, after all, the best way to "learn") practical skills. Just as
1. For 1996 figures see the publication entitled "Employing Associates in 1997: Patterns and
.'actices" published by the National Association of Law Placement and based upon responses from
arproximately 900 law firms, and for 1994 figures see the publication entitled "Employing Associ-
ates: Patterns and Practices at Mid-Decade" published by the National Association for Law Place-
ment based upon responses from a slightly smaller sampling than for 1996. Statistics from these
publications were provided by Judy Collins of NALP.
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with other curriculum, there should be courses with various points of
emphasis among which students can choose. Some examples of practical
course subject matter' are Loan Transactions (Lender and Borrower Rep-
resentation), Mergers and Dissolutions, Business Entity Selection and
Formation (Partnerships, Corporations, LLC's, LLP's), Business Sales
and Acquisitions (Asset Transactions and Stock Transactions), Legal
Opinion Drafting, Software Licensing Agreements, Intellectual Property
Transactions, Employment Agreements, Non-Compete Agreements, and
Banking Institutions (Chartering, Selling, and Purchasing). I am sure you
could think of others.
Law school administrators much more experienced in such things
than I could structure the courses, but I offer one example. The Loan
Transactions course could involve a factual statement about a lender, the
borrower, and the basic terms of the loan. Students could first draft, ne-
gotiate, and finalize a comprehensive commitment letter. The next step
would be to draft, negotiate, and finalize the appropriate loan documents
which would include, at a minimum, a loan agreement, promissory note,
security agreement, financing statements (and where to file), deed of
trust or mortgage, and a guarantee. The borrower's opinion letter could
be the subject (using the same facts and the documents prepared in the
Loan Transactions course) of the Opinion Drafting course. If a security
interest in trademarks, patents, or copyrights, or other intellectual prop-
erty is involved, it could be a part of the Intellectual Property course. If
the loan is to fund the purchase of a business (assets or stock), then that
underlying transaction could be the subject of the Business Sales and
Acquisitions course. It could all become incestuous in a positive and
educational way. In all likelihood, students would not operate on an indi-
vidual basis in these courses, but would be set up as "mini law fins" to
represent their "client." Ideally, as an example, a student with an interest
(and background course curriculum) in taxation would be included in
each "firm" in the Business Sales and Acquisitions course. Want to make
these classes even more practical? We could add clients. One essential
practice skill is learning how to deal with clients, how to decipher what
they say in order to learn the essentials of the transaction, and how to
explain the legalese and/or their options to them. If we want to get crea-
tive, we could find these clients in the university's MBA program. Law-
yers will tell you that many of their clients could use a course in "How to
Best Utilize Your Lawyer for Fun and Profit." The MBA program could
establish just such a course and it could dove-tail into the new practice-
oriented law school curriculum. Will this new curriculum require the
hiring of additional law professors? Not necessarily. I suggest law
schools make it clear to their professors that developing and leading
these classes is valued just as highly as (might I suggest more highly
2. I am concentrating in this article on the transactional field, leaving to others the decision
whether there are sufficient litigation practice programs, and what their effectiveness is or should be.
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than) writing an article on some esoteric point of law for possible publi-
cation. Do that, and I believe course development and staffing will take
care of itself.
Am I suggesting law schools abandon the teaching of real property,
corporations, wills and estates, taxation, torts, evidence, and the other
basics? Of course not, and those classes should be taught in the earlier
years and the practice courses in the senior year. I am only suggesting
that before law schools smile proudly and turn their graduating students
out into the real world, they provide those students with some real world
experiences in which they are forced to think about a factual setting,
draft and negotiate the necessary documents, and close the deal. Then
they can make the team, not go down the drain.
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IN CELEBRATION OF SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
JUSTICE PATRICIO M. SERNA*
I consider it an honor to be asked to contribute a short essay in
honor of the 75th anniversary of the Denver University Law Review. An-
niversary issues permit, if not demand, personal reflections, or at least
reflection in a different and more personal voice from the usual law re-
view article that is more rigid and formalistic in both content and format.
I therefore feel unburdened by the constraints of traditional law review
formats, and free to venture where I wish to go and to share insights into
law school, the law, and legal culture that might not otherwise be suitable
for a conventional law review article.
The Denver University Law Review is not only an institution with a
time honored past-in this instance 75 years-but also one with a living
presence and an evolving future. I am pleased to say that the Law Review
has made a valuable contribution to students of the law, makers of the
law, and consumers of the law throughout its 75 year history, and this
contribution represents an important achievement for the University of
Denver College of Law. I am also proud to say that I was a member of
the Law Review-a staff member for Volume 46, 1969, and a Note Edi-
tor for Volume 47, 1970. Professor Ved P. Nanda, a most gracious per-
sonality and prolific writer, was our faculty advisor. Serving on the Law
Review was quite memorable and one of my most rewarding experiences
in law school. Particularly, I enjoyed the camaraderie that grew from
working closely with talented editors and staff toward our common goal
of publishing an excellent Law Review. The experience engrained in me
many valuable lessons in analytical thinking, problem solving, and legal
research and writing, which I have been able to put to good use in my
subsequent government service, legal practice, trial bench, and, cur-
rently, appellate bench.
To the current board of editors and staff, I offer my congratulations
on this 75th anniversary special issue. You are following a fine tradition
of excellence, and I know you will continue this tradition for others to
follow. Faculty advisors past, present and future, deserve special com-
mendation for the unwavering support and counsel you have provided
these seventy-five years and will provide in the years ahead.
* Justice, New Mexico Supreme Court. B.S., University of Albuquerque, 1962; J.D.,
University of Denver College of Law, 1970; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1971. Note Editor,
Denver University Law Review, 1970.
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During my campaign for New Mexico Supreme Court Justice last
year, I often said, "For someone like me, with no heritage of wealth or
social position, to be a law school graduate, to become a District Judge,
and to now be a candidate for Supreme Court Justice, demonstrates so
well that the American Dream is still available to us and our children."
I'm happy to report that my lifelong dream did become reality when I
was elected as a Justice of the New Mexico Supreme Court in November
of 1996. Dean Yegge was one of the speakers at my swearing-in cere-
mony on December 6, 1996. It was only fitting and proper that the per-
son primarily responsible for my attending law school be present and
share in this personally momentous occasion.
The Honorable Robert B. Yegge became the University of Denver
College of Law's ninth dean in 1965 and remained in that position until
1977. Ironically, in 1997, he again assumed the helm as dean, pending a
nationwide deanship search. In the spring of 1967, Dean Yegge obtained
a grant from the Ford Foundation to implement an innovative and inten-
sive two-month summer program to help address the serious need for
Hispanic attorneys. Professor William S. Huff, a person who personifies
quality, directed this first program. I was one of the eleven students who
successfully completed the first program, which opened the door to my
ensuing legal career. Following the success of this summer preparatory
program, the ABA and AALS established a National Counsel on Legal
Education Opportunity (CLEO), in 1968. Through the auspices of
CLEO, several other law schools throughout the nation established simi-
lar summer preparatory programs for minority students. All eleven of
us-and of course others who followed us-have done well and are
leaders in government service, business, private practice, the judiciary,
and other areas of public interest. Unfortunately, one of our original
eleven, Arthur Lucero, passed away due to cancer in October of 1997. I
gave the eulogy at Art's funeral service in Santa Fe. As a tribute to my
good friend, Art Lucero, I shall recite a few portions of that eulogy:
Santa Fe and the community of Denver have been blessed and en-
riched by the life, the mission, and the presence of Arthur Lucero. Art
had an inner-calmness about him that provided a sense of security and
stability to all those who were in his presence. He was a gentle war-
rior who devoted his life to helping our poor, our disenfranchised, our
youth and our elderly. He had an illustrious and distinguished legal
career, and was one of the founders of Legal Services for poor people
in Northern New Mexico and Southern Colorado. For the past ten
years, he worked for the City and County of Denver as Attorney Ad-
ministrator in charge of the Child Welfare Legal Unit, where he su-
pervised eleven attorneys and a support staff of seventeen employees.
Art confronted his illness and his own death with the same courage,
dignity, integrity, and inner-calmness that characterized his own life.
His sister, Connie, told me that he had died peacefully. He lived
peacefully and he died peacefully.
19981
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Thank you, Dean Yegge, for giving us the opportunity to be major
contributors to society and to pursue our dreams. Thank you also for
being a visionary that brought the law school to national prominence by
recognizing the importance of educating lawyers in disciplines other than
law in order to enhance their ability to analyze fully both legal doctrine
and issues of public policy. Under your leadership, the law school be-
came not only a teaching institution, but also a research organization and
a center of community action and service programs. You pioneered the
multi-faceted approach to legal education that today is prevalent in our
nation's law schools.
There are a few law school experiences I wish to share, and I am
confident they will bring back fond memories to other law school gradu-
ates. First, I want to say something about Professor Thompson Marsh,
who, with his technicolor system of briefing cases, made a tremendous
impression on me and taught me how to properly analyze a case. He had
a set of index cards with all the students' names on them. He would shuf-
fle the cards, pull off the top card, and call on that student. If you were
not prepared or did not give the correct answer, you would get a black
mark. After three black marks Professor Marsh would throw your card
away and you would never have to recite again. If you went through his
class without getting a single black mark you would get six bonus points
on your final exam. Each black mark counted a two-point reduction. One
day, I missed property class because the day before I had an impacted
wisdom tooth removed and I did not feel very well. I told my roommate,
Ralph Torres (today, a very prominent attorney in Denver who special-
izes in employment and labor law in the federal court system), to explain
my absence in the event my card came to the top of the list that day.
Well, lo and behold, Professor Marsh called on me that day and still gave
me a black mark, even though Ralph explained my absence. The next
day, I went to see Professor Marsh to attempt to persuade him to take
back the black mark. He refused. I could have attended class that day
despite my discomfort. I never missed another property class and ended
up with four bonus points rather than six. That experience taught me to
go the extra mile. I would not be on the New Mexico Supreme Court
today had I not gone the extra mile in my campaign. Thank you, Profes-
sor Marsh.
Secondly, let me relate an experience with Professor Lawrence Tif-
fany. In those days, students took three quarters of Criminal Procedure
(as in Property, etc.) and took one final exam for nine credit hours at the
end of the third quarter. Professor Tiffany gave us just one test question
which consisted of a very comprehensive fact pattern that contained nu-
merous issues. I read the fact pattern very carefully and outlined the is-
sues on the inside cover of the blue book used for exams. It just hap-
pened that Professor Tiffany had written on "stop and frisk," and his
work was cited by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case
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of Terry v. Ohio.' I noticed a Terry stop and frisk issue in the fact pattern
and noted it on my exam outline. However, in my written answer I inad-
vertently neglected to mention the Terry issue. I somehow managed to
still get a very good grade on my test, but to this day, I just know that it
would have been a monumental grade if only I had mentioned Terry.
This experience taught me to be thorough in what I write, and to very
carefully check my outline to assure that every point is adequately cov-
ered. Thank you, Professor Tiffany.
My final anecdotal experience concerns Professor Frank Jamison.
Almost thirty years ago, as a participant in the law school's County
Court Practice Program, Ralph Torres and I were handling a traffic case
in Jefferson County Court. The County Court judge presiding over the
case was none other than Judge Frank Jamison, who later became a pro-
fessor at the law school. The case involved an accident on private prop-
erty, and our client was cited for a traffic violation. We won in County
Court on the basis of lack of jurisdiction by the police to issue a traffic
citation involving accidents on private property. The case went all the
way to the Colorado Supreme Court, and we were affirmed. Ralph and I
were elated that we were instrumental in establishing a Supreme Court
decision that became the law of the land in all of Colorado. It was then
that I truly recognized and appreciated the importance of a State Su-
preme Court ruling and how it affected common people. Now that I serve
on the New Mexico Supreme Court, I appreciate the impact our decisions
have throughout the state. Thank you, Professor Jamison.
Preparing this essay has been enjoyable and nostalgic. I know the
law school will continue to prepare graduates with the knowledge, skills,
ethical standards, and fundamental values demanded of the legal profes-
sion in order to meet the challenges lawyers will face in the twenty-first
century. It seems to me that law is increasingly an interdisciplinary field
and thus, the growth of interdisciplinary legal analysis has been a signifi-
cant advancement which will continue to give students a well-rounded
legal education. With a heritage of dedicated people in the past, with a
current staff of persons sensitive to its history, and with a commitment to
law as a tool for improving society, the Law Review is no doubt assured
of a rich and productive future for many years to come.
To paraphrase Justice Holmes, the life of the law must not be mere
logic, it must also include moral and human values. At this 75th anniver-
sary celebration, it is especially appropriate for lawyers to evaluate how
1. 392 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1968) (citing and quoting from LAWRENCE TIFFANY ET AL.,
DETECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND
ENTRAPMENr (1967)).
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successful we have been as a profession in moving toward the goal of
social and legal justice for all. Lawyers dominate many powerful politi-
cal bodies in the United States and have a major impact on the govern-
mental destiny of America. Thus, lawyers must be visionaries in our so-
ciety and work to promote a responsible and responsive political process
so that the American dream is available to all.
REFLECTIONS ON 75 YEARS
REFLECTIONS ON A UNIVERSITY OF DENVER LAW EXPERIENCE
JUDGE JOHN C. PORFILIO*
Forty-two years. It is incredible to me, but that is the time which has
passed since I first entered the front door of the University of Denver
College of Law. Looking back over those years, I see mostly dim, fog-
enshrouded recollections, some of which must be factual, and surely
some are fanciful; yet, all are warm and treasured. Indeed, the years from
1956 to 1959 I spent trying to learn to be a lawyer in that old storefront
on Court Place are some of the best I have had up to this point in my life.
For those who have had the advantages that flow from a building
designed as an educational institution with a real library and classrooms
in which even the students in the back of the room can see the professor,
the understated "elegance" of the old College of Law facilities has no
meaning. Yet, that storefront with its noisy plumbing and dimly lit li-
brary plays a big part in the fondness of my recollections.
Somehow, Professor Works's demonstrations on the proper execu-
tion of a will would not have had the same impact as they did when he
could pop in and out of a nearby door. Were he confined to the stricture
of the present day classroom, his teaching methods would undoubtedly
be hampered. Law students would be denied the drama of Professor
Works's voice echoing from some dim recess, "Am I in your presence
now?" Moreover, his chant of "fire, theft, shipwreck, or storm" punctu-
ated by the sound of the flushing of the faculty toilet in the floor above
would ring hollow in an income tax course taught in today's edifice.
Most important, however, present-day students have been denied the
intimacy of those drafty little classrooms of yesteryear that seemed to
foster, rather than hinder, the learning process.
Offsetting the idiosyncrasy of the building on Court Place, however,
were the people who occupied it. From faculty to students, character and
characters were bountiful. At the top of anyone's list must be Professor
Thompson Marsh, whose colorful method of parsing a case caused him
to be dubbed the "Walt Disney of the Legal World."
Dr. Marsh was the quintessential teacher of the law. Quietly de-
manding excellence from his students, but self-deprecating (he used to
say he never changed exam questions, only the answers), he challenged
us to make lawyers out of ourselves. Although I looked forward to it with
dread for three years, the best course I took in my entire three years was
Future Interests taught by Dr. Marsh. That one class gave me an appre-
ciation for the law and its majesty that I gained from no other.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. B.A., University of Denver,
1956; LL.B., University of Denver College of Law, 1959.
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By singling out Thompson Marsh, I do not deprecate any of the
others who labored to make a lawyer out of me. Quite to the contrary, for
I would not have attained that goal without them. Yet, there was, and
there will ever be, only one Thompson Marsh.
This idyll would not be complete without mention of that one place
where law students went for solace, sustenance, and even higher learn-
ing: Sullivan's Bar and Grill. Sullivan's was the place to go when a sack
lunch was no longer palatable. It was not that the food there was better. It
was just hotter than what you could bring in a bag. Moreover, hanging
out with students and those who were then referred to as "derelicts" was
part of the process of honing one's mind to the sharpness required to pass
the bar. In the halcyon days of baseball when the World Series was
played in daylight, Sullivan's provided a television set so a student had a
place to go to sip ten-cent beers and watch real life unfold.
I am proud to say I am a product of a University of Denver legal
education. It was a schooling that took place in an atmosphere less than
ideal when measured by today's standards, but an education neverthe-
less. I am also proud of the accomplishments of my classmates who have
gone on to distinguished careers on the bench, at the bar, or in other pro-
fessions.
On the occasion of this anniversary, I raise my fanciful ten-cent beer
in a ringing toast to those classmates and the institution that nurtured us.
Here's to the Denver University Law Review! May it have another 75
years as successful as those just passed.
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REFLECTIONS ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE ROLES OF TECHNOLOGY,
PROBLEM SOLVING, AND CREATIVITY
KENNETH R. KAY*
Eli Jarmel
Eli Jarmel, my constitutional law professor at the University of
Denver College of Law, died while I was in law school. I'll never forget
the main lesson he taught me. One afternoon he asked the following
question: "How many of you think the Christmas tree at Denver City
Hall is unconstitutional?" Seven of us (out of fifty-five) raised our hands.
He responded by saying, "Class dismissed."
As the others filed out, I went up to him and asked why he had
asked that question. He responded: "I wanted to see who in the class was
Jewish." "You got it right on the head," I said. "All seven of us who
raised our hands are Jewish and I do not think there are any other Jews in
the class."
The next day he opened class with the following statement, "Your
view of the Constitution will be mostly impacted by your social and cul-
tural background-more than anything we will ever teach you about con-
stitutional law." My legal career has not followed a straight course, and
of all the lessons I learned in law school, this is one that I will never for-
get.
Jimmy Winokur
Energy and enthusiasm are rarer commodities than one would sus-
pect. Jimmy had such exuberance for a subject matter about which I had
no interest (property law). He taught me that one's energy (and particu-
larly his energy) is contagious. To this day, it still amazes me that he was
able to make property law seem real and relevant to me. Today, I fully
believe my energy and enthusiasm are one of the most critical elements
that I can bring to my clients. I thank Jimmy for his example and inspi-
ration for this.
Murray Blumenthal
I believe Murray was the first non-lawyer on the faculty at the Uni-
versity of Denver College of Law. At that time, having a sociologist on a
law school faculty was fairly unconventional. He taught the "negotia-
tions" course. In retrospect, it may have been the most important course I
took in law school. Instead of modeling "confrontation" as the best
model for dispute resolution, over twenty-five years ago, Murray was
* Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Infotech Strategies, Washington, D.C. B.A., Oberlin
College, 1973; J.D., University of Denver, 1976.
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talking about understanding what was a "win" from the client's perspec-
tive. He talked about trying to fashion "wins" for the clients rather than
for the dueling attorneys. This made sense to me because I was more
interested in problem solving and dispute resolution than I was in the
gamesmanship of litigation. I wish I had seen this perspective acknowl-
edged in my other courses, but I really appreciated the model Murray
advanced.
John Reese & Steve Browning
The internships I undertook while I was in college and law school
left a significant legacy for my future professional development. In law
school, John Reese sponsored me on three occasions. First, I went to
Washington, D.C. in 1975, and spent three months as a legal intern for
the newly created Senate Budget Committee. That internship ultimately
led to me being hired as legal counsel to Senator Max Baucus. (My in-
ternship supervisor at the committee, and one of my most important
mentors, Steve Browning, ultimately became Senator Baucus's adminis-
trative assistant; so goes the ways of Washington, D.C.)
Second, John Reese sponsored an internship in the Colorado legis-
lature for Polly Baca Barragan. That internship led to a third project John
sponsored, which was a study by John Parr and myself of the Colorado
regulatory boards. Finally, John Reese, Cooley Howarth and I spent a lot
of time launching a major anniversary edition of the ABA Administrative
Law Review. Cooley and John sent me to Washington, D.C., where I
convinced a dozen "D.C. types" to write for the issue, which helped
launch the University of Denver's publication. I mention all of this be-
cause, as I look back, this cluster of activity seems as important as most
of my course work at the University of Denver.
Jim Ellis & Bill Gates, Sr.
After years of working on Capitol Hill, I ended up at the Washing-
ton, D.C., office of a Seattle law firm doing primarily legislative work.
The two attorneys that most impressed me during my decade at that firm
were our Seattle senior partners Jim Ellis and Bill Gates. They impacted
me profoundly, not because of their first-rate lawyering, but because they
modeled a commitment to civic duty. I will never forget a luncheon ad-
dress Jim Ellis gave (he has been one of the city fathers of modern Seat-
tle), when he observed that perhaps a legal education did not prepare us
for solving the problems of real people. He talked about law school edu-
cation preparing us to break things down. He said, "One had to learn on
one's own the skills to build things," to be constructive. I wonder how a
legal education can model the "building up" skills?
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Creativity and Technology
I often counsel young people on whether to pursue a legal educa-
tion. I have not been very encouraging. I am now working at the inter-
section of information technology and the delivery of services. How do
we harness information technology to improve healthcare, education and
government? Those who will impact that field will have vision and un-
derstand technology and will harness those two to effectively interact
with one another.
Will there be legal jobs in that new world? Absolutely! The "value"
of the legal work will be important, but of a second order. Young law-
yers who want to go that route should take intellectual property courses
and about the role of law in this new world. The law schools should talk
to visionaries and technologists about the following questions:
How can a legal education be more relevant in this new digital world?
How can legal educators help their students find vision?
How can legal educators help their students embrace the new tech-
nology?
How can legal educators help design a legal education and legal sys-
tem that "build up" (not tear down) the critical elements of the forth-
coming digital world?
Karen Christensen
The best thing that happened to me in law school was that I met
Karen (Karen Christensen, J.D., University of Denver College of Law,
1975). She was Jimmy Winokur's teaching assistant in Problems in Le-
gal Practice in the fall of 1973 and spring of 1974. She moved to Wash-
ington, D.C., in 1975 to work at the Department of Justice, and I fol-
lowed in 1976 and took my first job with former Congressman Ed Koch.
Karen is now General Counsel and Acting Deputy Director for Grants
and Programs at the National Endowment for the Arts. Both of us have
had fabulous twenty-year professional experiences in Washington, D.C.,
and our children are now 26, 15 and 12. We just celebrated our 20th an-
niversary.
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEGAL EDUCATION
JOHN A. LOVE*
In order to give an account of the contribution my legal education
has made to my life and career, I think it necessary to set the stage by
remembering the University of Denver College of Law as it was when I
attended from 1938 to 1941.
Those years were still very much a part of the great depression.
Lack of money affected all the students and the resources that the school
could provide. Tuition was all of $75 a quarter.
Denver was then a city of maybe 300,000 or 350,000. The Law
School was housed on the second floor of a commercial building at 14th
and Court. One of the tenants on the ground floor was Mapelli's Meat
Market. It reminded us of its presence periodically by wafting up the
smell of rendered fat.
The Law School quarters consisted of some three small classrooms,
offices for the faculty, and a library. By today's standards, the library
must have been minimal, but to me at that time, it was enormous.
The school was staffed by three full-time professors, the dean and a
combination secretary-librarian.
Dean Wolcott taught constitutional law. Al Zarlengo taught con-
tracts, and Gordon Johnson taught Torts. (I still remember two or three
weeks considering Ms. Palsgraff's troubles with the Long Island Railway
Co.) Tom Marsh led ongoing discussions on Real Property and Future
Interests. He earnestly and at length explained the Rule in Shelley's case
with no discernible success that I could determine.
Our class consisted of some fourteen struggling students. Many of
us found it necessary to hold down jobs to support our efforts-I, for
example, spent some two years tending bar at the Nob Hill on East Col-
fax from 6:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. This schedule made it difficult some-
times to complete the briefing of cases I had been assigned. It also in-
volved Leonard Sutton and me in an early scrape with the law. A regular
customer of the Nob Hill approached me one time with an offer to buy a
full set of Colorado annotated statutes for the bargain price of $75. Not
having that large a sum, I joint ventured with Leonard, bought them and
promptly resold them for the huge sum of $150. After our resale, the
Rocky Mountain News appeared with a story that made it clear that the
Statutes had been stolen by a custodian at the Capitol. Our legal back-
ground immediately alerted us to our potential liability, and we hotfooted
* Governor of Colorado, 1963-1973. A.B., University of Denver, 1939; J.D., University of
Denver College of Law, 1941; Hon. Ph.D., University of Denver, 1962.
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down to see John Carrol, the then district attorney. Fortunately, he only
smiled, told us to return the money, and dismissed us.
Admitting the possibility of bias, I believe that the class of 1941 was
outstanding, if not unique.
Among its members was Bob McWilliams, later Chief Justice of the
Colorado Supreme Court, then and now a member of the U.S. Court of
Appeals, Tenth Circuit. He swore me in as Governor of Colorado three
times and administered the oath to my daughter when she became a
member of Colorado's Supreme Court.
Leonard Sutton, recovering nicely from our brush with the law,
went on to a successful practice and served as Chief Justice of the Colo-
rado Supreme Court.
Howard Jenkins, who I believe was one of the earliest, if not the
first black to graduate from University of Denver College of Law, went
on to serve with distinction for many years on the National Labor Rela-
tions Board.
Elizabeth Koefed, our only female entrant, was a smart, tough,
sometimes profane lady who made a name for herself with a truly com-
munity practice in one of the towns down the Arkansas Valley.
A measure of the quality of the legal education provided to us is the
fact that all of our class passed the bar on the first try, and we monopo-
lized the top spots, placing first and second. The notification of our ad-
mission to the bar came just in time to free us to go forth and win World
War II.
In looking back, I marvel at the drive and dedication that the ad-
ministration and the faculty of the school brought to the task with the
minimal resources at their command. I believe in addition to teaching the
law, they taught us how to think. I know that the law school experience
was, by all odds, the high point in my education. I am grateful that in the
depth of the depression, there were dedicated people who made it possi-
ble for me to try to reach my dreamed-of potential.
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The original name of the Denver University Law Review was first
the Denver Bar Association Record (1923) and then Dicta (1928). Dicta
was a joint publication of the College of Law and the Colorado and Den-
ver Bar Associations. In 1949, the University of Colorado Law School
was asked to join the joint effort but the offer was declined. The October,
1949 issue featured an article by University of Denver College of Law
Dean Gordon Johnson, itled "Notes on Legal Education and the Profes-
sion of Law," addressing the question, ironically, "Are There Too Many
Law Graduates?"
As a law student, I served on the editorial board of Dicta. Indeed, I
authored my first law review note for the pages of Dicta entitled "Dog's
Bill of Rights"' in 1957, which was reprinted in Law Review Digest.! As
a young practitioner, I contributed to the annual review of Torts (1962)
and Civil Procedure and Appeals (1963) for Dicta.
During my first term as dean, the bar associations and the college
amicably agreed to separate efforts. In 1966, the Denver Law Journal
emerged as the scholarly journal of the college under the editorial super-
vision of a student board of editors and the faculty supervision of Profes-
sor Ved P. Nanda. Eventually, the Colorado and Denver Bar Associa-
tions created a separate publication which is now known as the Colorado
Lawyer.
The first issue of Denver Law Journal was a symposium on oil
shale, a pioneer and premier effort on a then-pressing subject. One of my
first dean's reports appeared in the Denver Law Journal in the spring of
1967 under the title "Our Diamond in Rough"3 which, coincidentally,
was largely a reflection of the 75 years of existence of the College of
Law on the 75th anniversary of the founding of the College of Law. In
the fall of 1967, a special issue' of the Denver Law Journal contained the
papers presented at the meeting of the Curriculum Committee of the As-
sociation of American Law Schools, held at our College of Law, made
possible by a grant from the Danforth Foundation. I was the chair of the
committee at the time and contributed one of the papers entitled: "The
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. A.B., magna cum
laude, Princeton University, 1956; M.A., 1958, J.D., 1959, University of Denver.
1. Robert B. Yegge, Dog's Bill of Rights, 34 DICTA 178 (1957).
2. L. REv. DIG., Sept.-Oct. 1957.
3. Robert B. Yegge, Our Diamond in Rough: Report of the Dean, 44 DENV. L.J. 307 (1967).
4. Special Issue, 44 DENY. L.J. Fall 1967.
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Future Legal Practitioner in the United States: What Training He Must
Receive."5 The name of the journal changed once again to the Denver
University Law Review in 1985 at the recommendation of the student
board of editors.6
There have been numerous special issues of what is now known as
the Denver University Law Review which drew widespread national at-
tention. For example, with Otis A. Singletary, vice president of the
American Council on Education, I edited a special issue on "Legal As-
pects of Student-Institutional Relationships" in 1968.! It was the first
serious discussion in a law review of the then pressing issues of student-
institutional relationships, which were boiling over at that time, including
the famous Woodstock and Woodstock West student statements. Also, in
1968, there was an historic symposium on "International Business Trans-
actions: The Transfer of Technology in Transactional Business."8
The Law Review predecessor published a symposium issue in 1970
on "The Implications of Science and Technology for the Legal Process,"
becoming the first law review to address this subject in a sympos ium.
The final issue in 1974 contained a symposium on "New Directions in
Legal Education and Practice"'" with a preface by the president of the
American Association of American Law Schools acknowledging and
saluting the Denver Law Journal on its 50th anniversary. This sympo-
sium continued the tradition of the Law Review, and the College of Law,
of addressing cutting edge issues in legal education.
These special issues gained national and international attention.
Other significant contributions through individual articles, symposia, or
special issues have had wide ranging impact on the academy, the judici-
ary, and the profession.
In 1974, the Law Review began a significant service and contribu-
tion to the legal profession in creating the annual Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals Survey. It is a review of the decisions, and their impact on the
fabric of American law, delivered by the judges of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The twenty-three year history of
this annual service is an important contribution to legal literature and an
important tool for practitioners doing research on issues before the
United States Court of Appeals.
5. Id.
6. See generally Board of Editors, Preface, 62 DENY. U. L. REV. vi (1984) (discussing
history of the nomenclature of the Denver University Law Review, as well as stating reasons for the
changes).
7. Symposium, Legal Aspects of Student-Institutional Relationships, 45 DENY. L.J. 497
(1968).
8. Symposium, International Business Transactions: The Transfer of Technology in
Transactional Business, 45 DENY. L.J. 1 (1968).
9. Symposium, The Implications of Science and Technology for the Legal Process, 47 DENY.
U. 549 (1970).
10. Symposium, New Directions in Legal Education and Practice, 50 DENv. U. 389 (1974).
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When I was a member of the editorial board of Dicta, Professor Jim
R. Carrigan (later Colorado Supreme Court justice and currently United
States District Court judge) was the faculty advisor. Earlier faculty advi-
sors were Professor Allen Mitchem and Arnold M. Chutkow. Subsequent
faculty advisors have been Professors John Phillip Linn, Ved P. Nanda,
William Altonin, Edward P. Richards, m, Stephen L. Pepper, and J.
Robert Brown, Jr.
The Denver University Law Review and its predecessors in title
have had a distinguished 75-year history. As we approach the new mil-
lennium, I am confident that the same quality, creativity, and vigor will
remain, if not escalate.
